The prospect of a robust military push in Kandahar Province, which had been widely expected to begin this month, has evolved into a strategy that puts civilian reconstruction efforts first and relegates military action to a supportive role. The strategy, Afghan, American and NATO civilian and military officials said in interviews, was adopted because of opposition to military action from an unsympathetic local population and Afghan officials here and in Kabul.
There are also concerns that a frontal military approach has not worked as well as hoped in a much smaller area in Marja, in neighboring Helmand Province. The goal that American planners originally outlined - often in briefings in which reporters agreed not to quote officials by name - emphasized the importance of a military offensive devised to bring all of the populous and Taliban-dominated south under effective control by the end of this summer. That would leave another year to consolidate gains before President Obama's July 2011 deadline to begin withdrawing combat troops...
More at The New York Times.
Comments
The challenge of the civilian "surge" remains basically the same from my time in Paktia/Khost 2003. Freedom of movement for non-government organization (NGO's) and international organization (IO's)personnel was very restrictive.
For example: USAID at that time used implementing partners for infrastructure development (schools, clinics, etc)- at that time, International Organization of Migration (IOM) had most of the field projects USAID funded and supported. IOM subscribed to the daily report from the UN on travel restrictions..at that time..almost all of SE Afghanistan. NGO's and IO's would not interface with US mil folks on the assumption that doing so would impair their relationships with the locals. That said, not one time did any of the few organizations representatives work with the PRT on collateral projects ( For example: a water well was planned at site "x"; the natural assumption that the clinic funded by USAID and implemented by IOM should be located near or adjacent to the water well).
These very small examples of coordination were painfully bypassed because of issues within the NGO community, the military and the folks operating inside the walls at the Embassy in Kabul.
The Point:
(a) Any infrastructure development programs must be based on the initiative of the local people.
(b) Security in and around the project should be the responsibility of the locals...the project itself should be the catalyst to make the project function. If it fails, it is the local shura members that the locals should hold responsible...not the military nor western civilians who dare go outside the wire to see what's going on.
(c) We in the west..feel that "we can always to it better.." Bringing in all the experts and applying western technology to a culture not much changed in 1000 years just impedes any progress.
(d) At last read, the total amount of civilian from the US to support the surge initiative was in the area of 1000 personnel. As I understand it from those in-country, only about 350 are actually in place...and most of those are only on 6 months contracts...by the time the full compliment is in place...a larger number will be planning their exist strategy back to the States.
I never felt during the many hours with sweet green tea that "buying the hearts and minds" of the Afghan people would be productive in the long term..nor successful.
How many times did I hear well intended persons attempt to "make friends" with the locals to enhance their ability to positively impact relationship confidence. But, after multiple rotations..it was easy to see the faces of those introduced to "new people"..that their expressions said.."OK, another guy coming and going in 6 months or less..let's just let him talk..take what we can take...and do what we do regardless.."
After almost 9 years in Afghanistan, the west has lost or is in the process of loosing support support for operations in Afghanistan..can you just imagine how the locals feel.
Like one Afghan Army officer told me..."you guys can go home just about anytime..but we are here forever..think what we have to endure after you guys leave.." So true..
He is correct...I rotated out in late September of 2003.
"Minister of Defense Abdul Rahim Wardak said the new approach was adopted after officials considered the mistakes made in Marja and the much larger scale of Kandahar."
What mistakes is he talking about?
With Taliban activity increasing it sounds like we are going to lose a lot of "civilian surge" equipment and a lot of folks and still not dig out the Taliban operatives.