Small Wars Journal

A Deadline We Can Believe In?

Fri, 12/11/2009 - 3:24am
A Deadline We Can Believe In? - New York Times.

President Obama said that troop withdrawals from Afghanistan will begin in 18 months. Some of his advisers have hinted that the deadline is flexible. So, should we stick to the timeline or not? Here are three opinions from experts on the subject.

Advantage: Taliban - Ahmed Rashid

President Obama's decision muddied the waters as far as American credibility in Afghanistan and Pakistan is concerned, and created misapprehensions in Europe.

Just Stick to It - Marc Lynch

There are many reasons to be skeptical of the plan's prospects, from the corruption in Kabul to the difficulties of state-building. But a clearly communicated timeline increases the odds of success.

Military Time, Civilian Time by Nathaniel Fick

The strategic benefits of setting a timeline may outweigh its tactical costs, if it persuades President Hamid Karzai and Pakistan to make progress stabilizing Afghanistan.

A Deadline We Can Believe In? - New York Times.

Comments

Scott Corey (not verified)

Fri, 12/11/2009 - 9:53am

I have argued elsewhere for a self-determined limit on US combat activity in Afghanistan (guest essay Informed Comment 10/29/09), and remain willing to defend it. The primary goal of Islamic radicals is to control Islam. Attacking non-Muslims is, above all, a means to that end, and our response must bear that in mind. That means that we must take a clear posture that our use of combat forces is expeditionary, not imperial.
This posture does several things: 1) It admits the legitimate use of force by the US, but explicitly avoids the imperial role cast for us by the radicals; 2) It helps staunch the flow of legitimate Afghan resistance fighters into organizations that are controlled by more hardcore radical leadership; 3) It challenges the Afghan government to urgently rebuild its power on its own people, not on a "wag the dog" relationship with us.
I would add that it presses Pakistan to take the opportunity it has now to employ its forces on one side of the border while there are still substantial forces on the Afghan side of the line to block retreat.
Our departure from Afghanistan after the Soviet occupation and our current drawdown from Iraq make the threat to leave credible.
Finally, making the commitment keeps our decisions in our hands. Note how quickly the analogies to Johnsons decision on Vietnam in 1965 have faded. That is because this moment in Afghanistan is more important than the decision to escalate troop levels. The more important parallel, if one is needed, is the comparable moment when Diem and Nhu used US trained forces to attack Buddhist monasteries. Similarly, Karzais corrupt election practices presented us with an ally that takes our support so for granted that it can afford to undermine its own legitimacy within the country. Refusing to let our political and strategic position be dictated by others and retaining our discretion over when and where we fight is crucial. On this fundamental decision Obama has done better today than Kennedy did in 1962.