How one brigade turned Ramadi, Iraq's most violent city, into a model of stability. The riveting book by USA TODAY's Jim Michaels is scheduled for release June 22, 2010. A Chance in Hell: The Men Who Triumphed Over Iraq's Deadliest City and Turned the Tide of War is available for pre-order on Amazon.com.
Colonel Sean MacFarland's brigade arrived in Iraq's deadliest city with simple instructions: pacify Ramadi without destroying it. The odds were against him from the start. In fact, few thought he would succeed.
Ramadi had been going steadily downhill. By 2006, insurgents roamed freely in many parts of the city in open defiance of Iraq's U.S.-backed government. Al-Qaeda had boldly declared Ramadi its capital. Even the U.S. military acknowledged the province would be the last to be pacified.
A lanky officer with a boyish face, MacFarland was no Patton. But his soft voice masked an iron will and a willingness to take risks. While most of the American military was focused on taming Baghdad, MacFarland laid out a bold plan for Ramadi. His soldiers would take on the insurgents in their own backyard. He set up combat outposts in the city's most dangerous neighborhoods. Snipers roamed the dark streets, killing al-Qaeda leaders and terrorist cells. U.S. tanks rumbled down the streets, firing point blank into buildings occupied by insurgents. MacFarland's brigade engaged in some of the bloodiest street fighting of the war. Casualties on both sides mounted. Al-Qaeda wasn't going to give up easily. Ramadi was too important. MacFarland wasn't going to back down either. The two sides had fought to a stalemate.
At least until Sheik Abdul Sattar Bezia al-Rishawi emerged. A minor tribal leader, Sheik Sattar had earned his reputation as a smuggler. He carried a large six-shooter on his hip and had a taste for whiskey. But he hated al-Qaeda and was watching MacFarland's brigade as they battled militants toe-to-toe. This was a different group of Americans, Sattar thought. Sattar approached MacFarland and said he was ready to join with the Americans and fight al-Qaeda. Other officers might have kept their distance. MacFarland didn't hesitate. He promised Sattar his support.
What followed was one of history's unlikeliest - and most successful - partnerships. Together, the Americans and Sattar's growing band of fighters drove al-Qaeda from Ramadi. A Chance in Hell is compelling tale of combat leadership and how a handful of men turned the tide of war at a time when it looked most hopeless.
Jim Michaels is a military writer for USA Today and an experienced war correspondent. He is also a former U.S. Marine infantry officer. Again, A Chance in Hell: The Men Who Triumphed Over Iraq's Deadliest City and Turned the Tide of War is available for pre-order on Amazon.com.
Comments
Niel is right, the PA Army Guard was in Ramadi before the 1st BCT of 1 AD was called forward. I know firsthand what Tony Deane went through because I ran into him on my way through Kuwait, while I was part of a Transition Team. Right after I spoke to Tony and we went to Taji and the Phoenix Academy, his unit was sent to Ramadi. We operated in Najar and Quadasiyah provinces and monitored what was happening in An Arbar. We got on the ground at the beginning of May, 2006 and it was a shooting gallery up there.
Jim catches the essence of the layers of command and control. GEN Casey had a campaign plan that was premised upon the Iraqi Security Forces taking the lead and our forces would be drawing down (hence Tony's Brigade was the call forward force). The situation on the ground, as aptly described in the book, didn't support this plan.
During our year there, An Arbar province became the model, while the model upon our arrival, south of us, under British control went totally out of control.
The important factor of who had Operational Control (OPCON), Tactical Control (TACON), and Administrative Control (ADCON) is well described by Jim Michaels - our Transition Team was OPCON to MNC-I, ADCON to MND-B, and ADCON (heavy - what the heck is that?) to Irag Assistance Group. Just as described in the book, each aspect exerted whatever influence they could, unfortunately not always using bottom-up feed on what was really happening on the ground.
This book should be mandatory reading at ILE, and probably at Captain Career Courses. You see how quickly and how much the respective one-star, two-star, three-star, and even four-star commanders interact - and not. Just as Tony Deane did, however, we ended up doing the right thing. Conqueror 6, this is Warlord 5, over.
Makatak,
You have a few facts/timelines wrong in your critique.
The "USAR BCT" you mention was 2/28 ID, PAARNG, not USAR. They were the previous rotation to 1/1 AD (the unit owning AO Topeka in the book) in 2005-2006, not 2004. 2/2 ID, an active BCT from Korea, owned Ramadi 2004-2005. They did have a rough rotation due to a number of factors.
The western fight was under LtCol Alford in Al Qaim, yes his superb efforts to enlist the tribes in that area preceded 1/1's efforts and achieved some great local results. However, his actions had little influence in what transpired Ramadi 2006.
Jim Michaels, the author, covers all this in his book. (I read an early draft) While not an exhaustive academic history, he reveals a lot of the debates and discussions between MNF/MNC-I, I and II MEF, and the various BCTs about how to best do what you describe. Jim describes the overall effort to win the tribes in the Ramadi AO and gain the alliance with Sheik Sittar, who became the most important figure in the Awakening movement until his assassination.
As far as causation, the US's role in it, and other factors, that ground has been covered and re-covered here on SWJ. Reasonable people may disagree on how much one factor weighed vs. others, and we need a lot more interviews with Iraqis and perspective from time to make an accurate judgment. Timing was certainly a factor, and the situation in early 2006 provided opportunities not available in 2004-2005. However, I am firm in my opinion that our change of tactics played a significant role in starting, facilitating, and accelerating the awakening.
Jim's book, told largely from the perspectives of the major players of the US side in Ramadi, details how that was done. Jim's book does a great job capturing that story, and the essence of what the Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, and Airmen of the Ready First Combat Team paid for in blood in 2006-2007.
You may also want to read and join the discussion here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=3864), which has a lot of debate along these lines.
This sounds a little bit overblown. The "Anbar Revolution" (where tribal leaders started moving to the coalition side) began in 2005 in the western part of the province and moved east towards Ramadi. The MEF strategy all along was to separate Al Qaeda from the tribal leaders. In that sense, the brigade was a beneficiary of fortunate timing. In addition, they were an active-duty brigade (two rotations earlier, in 2004, a USAR brigade had the fight in Ramadi). Of course, if the author tells a good story and sells lots of books, then good for him. I hope he captures the larger context of actions throughout Anbar province and how the Brigade's actions both fit into that larger context and were enabled by external factors (and actors).