Applying Iraq to Afghanistan

by Bradford M. Burris, Major, Psychological Operations, United States Army

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Editor's Note:  this article was submitted to us in early May, so the recent change in leadership at ISAF were not known to the author at the time.  We feel the analysis remains relevant so we are publishing as is, and a re-write/ update  is not what MAJ Burris needs to be doing in his last days before he's off to Afghanistan to do that "applying."

Now that the new US strategy for prosecuting the war in Afghanistan has been determined, military leaders and media pundits are turning their attention to discussions of the best manner in which to implement and execute the strategy.  As the military develops plans supporting the strategy and journalists search for stories about the plans, both will ask three questions:  first, what made US forces successful during the Iraq war; second, do those successes provide lessons learned for Afghanistan; and finally, how could US personnel translate those lessons to future military operations regardless of the culture and geography?  This essay is certainly not the first to investigate these three questions; however, it is unique because it supports no political or military agenda regarding the war in Afghanistan.

Although this essay will not provide an analysis of strategic motives, take a position on operational decision-making, nor make political comparisons between Iraq and Afghanistan; it will explore the American policies that fomented transition of the Al Anbar province from what was once referred to as the “wild west” to what experts now call a model for stability operations.  I will use process-tracing to identify relationships between US military activity and sustainable security in Anbar, present a theory explaining the correlation between US policy and provincial stability, present the general similarities at the provincial level between the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, and extrapolate the positive lessons learned from the Anbar experience to the current US involvement in Afghanistan. 

To frame the discussion of current situation in Afghanistan, I will draw heavily from General Stanley McChrystal’s initial situational assessment provided to the US political leadership in August 2009.  The result of my analytical research will be to provide US policy recommendations that are both specific enough to be effective at the provincial level in Afghanistan, as well as broad enough to be effective in U.S. military operations regardless of geographical location.  In order to maintain academic rigor and to encourage professional military discourse, I will also address the counterarguments to the assertions laid out in this essay. 

Download the full article: Applying Iraq to Afghanistan

Major Bradford M. Burris entered the United States Army in 1996 and has since commanded three times.  He commanded a Field Artillery training battery from March 2001 until June 2002.  He commanded Headquarters Battery, 2nd Battalion, 5th Field Artillery Regiment from November 2002 until March 2004 during which time he deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.  He commanded Alpha Company, 8th PSYOP BN (Airborne) from July 2007 until November 2008 during which time he deployed to numerous U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility locations.  He is currently earning a Master of Science Degree in Defense Analysis at the United States Naval Post Graduate School.