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September 2009 Archives

September 1, 2009

Is the War in Afghanistan Worth Fighting?

Time to Get Out of Afghanistan - George Will, Washington Post opinion.

... US strategy - protecting the population - is increasingly troop-intensive while Americans are increasingly impatient about "deteriorating" (says Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) conditions. The war already is nearly 50 percent longer than the combined US involvements in two world wars, and NATO assistance is reluctant and often risible.
The US strategy is "clear, hold and build." Clear? Taliban forces can evaporate and then return, confident that US forces will forever be too few to hold gains. Hence nation-building would be impossible even if we knew how, and even if Afghanistan were not the second-worst place to try: The Brookings Institution ranks Somalia as the only nation with a weaker state.
Military historian Max Hastings says Kabul controls only about a third of the country - "control" is an elastic concept - and " 'our' Afghans may prove no more viable than were 'our' Vietnamese, the Saigon regime." ...

Is the War in Afghanistan Worth Fighting? - Washington Post opinions.

On Monday the commander of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan called for a new strategy to fight the Taliban. The Post asked experts whether the war in Afghanistan is worth fighting. Below are contributions from John Nagl, Andrew J. Bacevich, Erin M. Simpson, Thomas H. Johnson and Danielle Pletka.

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David Cameron "Gets It" Right

A Catalogue of Errors that Shames the UK - David Cameron, The Times opinion.

Twelve days ago, Abdul Baset Ali al-Megrahi was released by the Scottish government. His freedom came two decades after a bomb, which was smuggled on to Pan Am Flight 103, exploded over Lockerbie, killing 11 people on the ground and 259 people on the plane. The only man convicted of the crime, al-Megrahi spent just eight years in prison - less than a fortnight for each victim - and was welcomed back to Tripoli as a returning hero.
Decisions concerning the fate of criminals, not least those responsible for mass murder, often provoke widespread public anger. But the outrage at this one has crossed continents and damaged our relationship with our closest ally, America. It has been a fiasco.
At its heart lies a series of failure of judgment. The first failure was the decision by Kenny MacAskill, the Scottish Justice Secretary, to release al-Megrahi on “compassionate grounds”. Due process found al-Megrahi guilty, a verdict upheld on appeal. The Libyan Government accepted responsibility for the bombing and paid compensation to the Lockerbie families. Any doubts about the safety of al-Megrahi’s conviction should have been tested by the second appeal, which he instead withdrew. That is why I said that compassionate release was completely inappropriate. We are dealing here with someone convicted of one of the biggest mass murders in British history. Al-Megrahi’s victims were not allowed the luxury of “dying at home”. What on earth was Mr MacAskill thinking of when he made this utterly bizarre decision?
The second misjudgment was Gordon Brown’s failure to speak up clearly and promptly. On a matter fraught with such emotion, and with the potential to damage Britain’s reputation abroad, a decisive lead from the Prime Minister was required. Mr Brown should have condemned the decision to release al-Megrahi. At the very least, he should have expressed an opinion. But all we got, day after day, was a wall of silence, finally broken after a long week when Mr Brown declared that he was “angry” and “repulsed” at scenes in Tripoli. We all were...

Much more at The Times. David Cameron is the leader of the Conservative Party and Leader of the Opposition in the United Kingdom. He has occupied both positions since December 2005.

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1 September SWJ Roundup

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The promise and perils of security force assistance

The Stimson Center has published an essay I wrote for it on the future of security force assistance.

Theme: In the wake of the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns, U.S. policymakers will look for new approaches to implement U.S. national security strategy. Security force assistance will attract a lot of attention and is likely to be a "growth business." But security force assistance is no panacea. Top U.S. policymakers will have to give their attention to some significant reforms if security forces assistance is to achieve its promise and avoid some of its perils.

Read the whole essay here.

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Detainee Operations in Counterinsurgency Operations

Detainee Operations in Counterinsurgency Operations
Lessons from Afghanistan 2005-2006
by Luke Coffey

Detainee Operations in Counterinsurgency Operations (Full PDF Article)

With the ongoing engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan much has been written recently concerning counterinsurgency operations and irregular warfare. Even though counterinsurgency operations do not stop at the gates of a detention center, adequate guidance on dealing with detainees is lacking in much of this literature.

In early 2005 Task Force Guardian, the Military Police brigade task force in Combined/Joint Task Force (CJTF)-76 in Afghanistan began a new approach to detainee operations. This was accomplished by building on the hard work of previous rotations and allowed leaders to simultaneously meet broader counterinsurgency objectives as set out by CJTF-76 while improving the welfare of the detainee population. Two things were done differently in 2005 than in previous years. First, there was a push to vastly improve the living conditions and welfare of the detainee population beyond those required by international and historical norms. Secondly, Task Force Guardian initiated a Psychological Operations (PSYOP) program in the detention facility in order to convey key messages to the detainee population. This combined effort placed the leaders of Task Force Guardian in a better position to meet desired CJTF-76 counterinsurgency objectives. This paper highlights some of the lessons learned and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) used by Task Force Guardian in 2005 to meet desired end-states in the area of good detainee operations in counterinsurgency operations.

Detainee Operations in Counterinsurgency Operations (Full PDF Article)

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U.S. Army War College Information as Power Blog

The U.S. Army War College just announced the launch of its Information as Power blog:

"Information is an element of national power along with diplomatic, military and economic power. The current information environment challenges the United States as never before. It has leveled the playing field for not only nation states, but non-state actors, multinational corporations and even individuals to affect strategic outcomes with minimal information infrastructure and little capital expenditure. The Information as Power web site is an online resource that provides an electronic library of current and historical articles and documents. Its purpose is to facilitate an understanding of the information element of power in this new and difficult environment in order to better address the national security issues we currently face. Unlike sites focused on one aspect of the information element this site attempts to broadly consider all the dimensions of the information environment: physical, informational and cognitive."

Visit Information as Power.

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September 2, 2009

Taliban Surprising US Forces With Improved Tactics

Taliban Surprising US Forces With Improved Tactics - Karen DeYoung, Washington Post.

The Taliban has become a much more potent adversary in Afghanistan by improving its own tactics and finding gaps in the US military playbook, according to senior American military officials who acknowledged that the enemy's resurgence this year has taken them by surprise.
US rules of engagement restricting the use of air power and aggressive action against civilians have also opened new space for the insurgents, officials said. Western development projects, such as new roads, schools and police stations, have provided fresh targets for Taliban roadside bombs and suicide attacks. The inability of rising numbers of American troops to protect Afghan citizens has increased resentment of the Western presence and the corrupt Afghan government that cooperates with it, the officials said.
As President Obama faces crucial decisions on his war strategy and declining public support at home, administration and defense officials are studying the reasons why the Taliban appears, for the moment at least, to be winning...

More at The Washington Post.

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A Middle Way On Afghanistan?

A Middle Way On Afghanistan? - David Ignatius, Washington Post opinion.

It's the nature of Afghanistan that nothing there ever works out quite the way outsiders expect, and that certainly was the case with last month's presidential election. Rather than producing a mandate for good governance, as US officials once hoped, the balloting has instead brought allegations of fraud, political squabbling and delay, and a new set of headaches in the war against the Taliban...
To get the flavor of McChrystal's strategy (the actual document remains classified), I reviewed the counterinsurgency guidance he has prepared for his troops. The headline reads: "Protecting the people is the mission. The conflict will be won by persuading the population, not by destroying the enemy." ...
The counterinsurgency doctrine McChrystal is advocating has excited a new generation of military officers. I've seen it applied in outposts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it's impossible not to be impressed by the dedication and even the idealism of its proponents. But there is little hard evidence that it will work in a country as large and impoverished as Afghanistan. Even in Iraq, the successes attributed to counterinsurgency came as much from bribing tribal leaders and assassinating insurgents as from fostering development projects and building trust...

More at The Washington Post.

What's Right With Afghanistan - Michael O'Hanlon and Bruce Riedel, Wall Street Journal opinion.

The national mood on the Afghanistan war has soured fast, and it's not hard to see why. American combat deaths have exceeded 100 for the summer, the recent Afghan election was tainted by accusations of intimidation and fraud, and Joint Chiefs Chairman Mike Mullen says the security environment there is "deteriorating." Meanwhile, congressional leaders worry about the war's impact on the health-care debate and the Obama presidency more generally. Antiwar groups are starting to talk about "another Vietnam." Opposition is mounting to the current policy - to say nothing of possible requests for additional troops from the US commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal.
The questions and concerns being raised are legitimate. Clearly, the mission has not been going well. Problems with our basic strategy, especially on the economic and development side, still need immediate attention. Moreover, our Afghan friends have a crucial role to play in both security and development, and if they fail to do so the overall warfighting and state-building effort will not succeed.
However, it is important to remember our assets, and not just our liabilities, in the coming debate over Afghanistan policy this fall. Democracies sometimes talk themselves out of keeping up the faith in tough situations, and we should avoid any such tendency towards defeatism, especially so early in the execution of the Obama administration's new military/civilian/economic strategy, which combines stronger and more widespread counterinsurgency measures with increased nation-building efforts. Indeed, the US, our NATO allies, and the future Afghan government - be it another Hamid Karzai presidency, or a new administration - have a number of major strengths in this mission...

More at The Wall Street Journal.

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US to Boost Combat Force in Afghanistan

US to Boost Combat Force in Afghanistan - Julian E. Barnes, Los Angeles Times.

US officials are planning to add as many as 14,000 combat troops to the American force in Afghanistan by sending home support units and replacing them with "trigger-pullers," Defense officials say. The move would beef up the combat force in the country without increasing the overall number of US troops, a contentious issue as public support for the war slips. But many of the noncombat jobs are likely be filled by private contractors, who have proved to be a source of controversy in Iraq and a growing issue in Afghanistan. The plan represents a key step in the Obama administration's drive to counter Taliban gains and demonstrate progress in the war nearly eight years after it began.
Forces that could be swapped out include units assigned to noncombat duty, such as guards or lookouts, or those on clerical and support squads. "It makes sense to get rid of the clerks and replace them with trigger-pullers," said one Pentagon official, speaking on condition of anonymity because the plans have not been announced. Officials have spoken in recent days about aspects of the plan...

More at The Los Angeles Times.

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2 September SWJ Roundup

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Gaining the Initiative in Afghanistan

Gaining the Initiative in Afghanistan
by Colonel Gian P. Gentile

Gaining the Initiative in Afghanistan (Full PDF Article)

A very recent article in the Washington Post says that the enemy in Afghanistan has improved its tactical fighting abilities when confronting American forces there. The article stated that the enemy has figured out “gaps” in the current American tactical and operational approach of population centric counterinsurgency. And the article added the tactical improvement on the part of the enemy in Afghanistan, according to “American military officials,” has taken us by “surprise.” This means in effect that the enemy has the initiative.

Afghanistan is war, right? In war there has to be fighting or the threat of fighting for it to be war, right? If there is no fighting or threat of fighting then it cannot be war, right?

The answer to this tactical problem in Afghanistan provided by the Counterinsurgency Experts is better population centric Coin tactics and operations; just try harder at building schools, roads, local security forces, establishing government legitimacy, and population security through dispersion of forces to protect them. Once we get better at these processes and try just a bit harder, with a just a few more troops, then voila (just like we think happened in Iraq) victory is achieved, triumph is at hand. But where in this formulation of scientific processes are the enemy and the killing of them?

Gaining the Initiative in Afghanistan (Full PDF Article)

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COIN Center Calls on Kiwi Hard Yakka

The US Army / USMC Counterinsurgency Center is pleased to host Major Josh Wineera during a COIN Center Webcast Wednesday, 23 SEP 09 from 1000 to 1100 CST (1100 - 1200 EST). Major Wineera will explore the difficulty in capturing a greater understanding of the complex contemporary operational environment. To explore that difficulty, Wineera examines the role of the Human Terrain System teams and a developing New Zealand Army model to control what David Kilcullen has labeled the conflict ecosystem. As a lead-in to this webcast please see Wineera’s The Colloquium article Inter-Bella: Understanding the Area of Operations Ecosystem.

Major Josh Wineera, New Zealand Army, has served in Iraq, East Timor, Bougainville, and Bosnia. He is a guest lecturer at the New Zealand Defence College and Massey University, and is a part-time Master’s student at the Centre for Defence Studies, Massey University.

Those interested in attending may view the meeting on-line at this link and participate via Adobe Connect as a guest. Remote attendees will be able to ask questions and view the slides through the software.

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Afghan Village Militia: A People-Centric Strategy to Win

Afghan Village Militia
A People-Centric Strategy to Win
by Dr. Ronald L. Holt

Afghan Village Militia: A People-Centric Strategy to Win (Full PDF Article)

The evidence is clear that what we are doing in Afghanistan is not working. Our credibility with the average Afghan is deteriorating along with popular confidence in the Karzai government (Ackeman, 2008). Counterinsurgency can only buy time and ultimately success depends on government reform and the effective delivery of services. There is little hope of this happening under a Karzai government.

Our methods are too clumsy, too alien, and we depend too much on airpower for the Afghan civilians to tolerate the current situation. We need to inculcate a new attitude of leveraging culture, as it is, not trying to change it into a centrally-organized nation mimicking US or NATO models. We are too focused on risk-aversion, careerism and force protection to make significant changes in the way we operate easily. If you keep doing the same thing the same way you generally get the same results.1 More troops will help, but will not be sufficient if they are used in the same way as the troop already in Afghanistan. In fact, more troops used the same way tactically, will leave a bigger Coalition Force (CF) footprint and, could potentially do more harm than good. Even with three new brigades we will still be running an economy of force operation and the force to space ratio is still going to be insufficient to provide the local population with security. This is particularly true if most of the increased troops spend most of their time on the FOBs and are road-bound targets of IEDs. We get a passing grade at “clear” but we are failing completely at “hold.”

Afghan Village Militia: A People-Centric Strategy to Win (Full PDF Article)

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September 3, 2009

Washington’s Afghan Brawl

Washington’s Afghan Brawl - Thomas Rid, Kings of War. (H/T Bernard Finel)

The debate on the pros and cons of Afghanistan is raging inside the Beltway. And it is a bit unsettling.
On the one side are those who say no, America has no national interests in Afghanistan — and yes, it’s a war of choice: let’s leave the hellhole and get out asap. On the other side are those who say yes, our security is on the line and al-Qaeda must be defeated in Afghanistan — and no, it’s a war of necessity: let’s do it seriously and pour in more troops and money. Until it’s fixed, like Iraq.
You’ve seen it. Shrill and loud, some of the contributions. The other side is brandished as “foolish” and “not serious.” Both sides make up straw-men and then mow them down. And don’t look at the reader comments. All that is even more disturbing if you consider that people are dying in this business.
So what should we make of it? As often in verbal fistfights, both sides have a couple of valid points. Let’s block out the shouting and try listening to some of the nuances. I would venture to say that most experts should be able to agree on ten assumptions — some of them are just statements of fact...

Much more at Kings of War.

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3 September SWJ Roundup

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The Same Old Mistake

The Same Old Mistake - Kimberly Marten, New York Times opinion.

The US and Afghan governments have announced a new policy to pay tribal militias to provide security in Afghanistan. This began as a measure to deter Taliban attacks during recent elections but is set to become permanent.
Almost point for point, this plan repeats the terrible mistake that the British colonial army made in the Pashtun tribal areas in what would become Pakistan, in the late 19th century.
The British disrupted local Pashtun power balances by injecting outside money into tribal politics. British intelligence officers created charts of which sub-tribes and leaders (or maliks) had the most influence, and paid them extra money. The favored maliks in turn used these funds for patronage, paying off their supporters. Canny Pashtun factions second-guessed the British, creating security problems that they then “solved” to look more powerful. British payments to the new “official maliks” became hereditary. This system violated the tribal code of equality among all Pashtun men, but the official maliks accepted it with enthusiasm...

More at The New York Times.

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September 4, 2009

Can the US Lead Afghans

Can the US Lead Afghans? - Mark Moyar, New York Times opinion.

The Afghanistan debate is increasingly focused on two words: troop numbers. Those numbers certainly deserve serious attention as President Obama decides whether to raise them even further this year. But in Afghanistan, as in past counterinsurgencies, it is important to remember that all troop numbers are not created equal. When it comes to indigenous forces, quality often matters more than quantity, and quality often declines when quantity increases.
Current recommendations of American and Afghan troop strengths are, for the most part, based on the size of the Afghan population. Dennis Blair, the director of national intelligence, has produced figures using a ratio of 25 troops for every 1,000 Afghans. His methodology assumes that increasing American troop strength by, say, 20 percent will increase counterinsurgency capacity by roughly the same amount. That assumption is correct, because the quality of the additional American units will be broadly similar to that of the others. Where the methodology fails is in its assumption that doubling Afghan troop strength, as many now advocate, will double counterinsurgency capacity by roughly the same amount.
Where the methodology fails is in its assumption that doubling Afghan troop strength, as many now advocate, will double counterinsurgency capacity. In reality, such an increase is likely to cause quality to fall. With Afghan security forces already two-and-a-half times as large as the American forces, and America lacking the political will to reduce that ratio, the counterinsurgency cannot afford such a drop...

More at The New York Times.

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4 September SWJ Roundup

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About the Image We Use...

From time to time we get asked about the image SWJ and SWC uses in the upper left hand corner of all the main pages... The image is called Tracking Bin Laden and was painted by U.S. Army Center of Military History, Museum Division's staff artist Sergeant First Class Elzie Ray Golden, US Army.

SFC Golden produced fourteen works of art as a member of the Soldier-Artist Team 25 in 1990 that documented ROTC training at Fort Lewis, Washington. He designed the May 1992 cover of Soldiers magazine featuring women in the Army during World War II, the 1991-1994 Army Aviation Association Commander's Conference posters, and the Armed Forces Day posters for 2001 and 2002. His works of art are featured in the Center of Military History books, Portrait of an Army and Soldiers Serving the Nation. The Army Historical Foundation also featured his work in the book The Army, published in 2001. SFC Golden has been the subject of articles and interviews for ArtForum and Der Spiegel magazines, German public television and public radio, and the Hartford Courant newspaper.

He won first place in 2000 in the fine art category of the first Military Graphic Artist of the Year (MILGRAPH) competition, and again in 2002.

SFC. Golden studied fine art at the School of Visual Arts in New York and the University of Arizona. He entered active military duty in October 1984. His assignments include the 13th Support Command, Fort Hood Texas; 2d Infantry Division, Camp Casey, South Korea; Training Support Activity, Eighth Army, East Korea, Yongsan, South Korea; and the 10th Aviation Brigade, Fort Rucker, Alabama.

Tracking Bin Laden won First Place - DINFOS MILGRAPH 2002, Military Graphic Competition, Fine Art category.

Continue on for several examples of SFC Golden's work...

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This Week at War: McChrystal plays defense

Here is the latest edition of my column at Foreign Policy:

Topics include:

1. Afghanistan and civil-military relations,

2. Communication breakdown.

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September 5, 2009

5 September SWJ Roundup

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Why We’re Getting it Wrong in Afghanistan

Why We’re Getting it Wrong in Afghanistan - Anthony King, Prospect.

Writing in this month’s Prospect, Stephen Grey details the political and military mistakes that have been made in Helmand. Perhaps most importantly, he identifies the role of the institutional culture of Britain’s armed forces: “cracking on”—the unshakeable determination of Britain’s troops. Grey is right that the ethos of “cracking on” is the army’s greatest quality; effective armies require fortitude and morale in order to endure the losses that they will inevitably suffer. Yet, as he notes, it may be the army’s greatest weakness too...
A new Afghan strategy is essential—and the announcements from US General McChrystal and Gordon Brown at the end of August recognise this. However, their new strategy in Helmand also requires a reformation of Britain’s armed forces themselves. The success of General Petraeus in Iraq rested finally on a common recognition by the US Army and Marine Corps that the way in which they trained, planned and conducted military operations required profound revision. In short, operational success demands institutional reform at home. While valuable at the tactical level, the culture of “cracking on” needs to be expunged from operational command. The armed forces, the ministry of defence and government need to develop more mature criteria on which to assess the performance of commanders—judging them by their political contribution to the campaign, not by the number of air assault operations they have conducted....

More at Prospect.

Cracking on in Helmand - Stephen Grey, Prospect.

... Even in chaos and dysfunction, the British army is good at preserving a belief in order and purpose. And when men die their officers steel them and move onwards with poetic speeches, just as Lieutenant Colonel Robert Thomson did on 10th July 2009, after a dreadful day near the town of Sangin in Helmand in which five of his men were killed. In his eulogy Thomson wrote about men saluting the fallen, and returning to the ramparts. “I sensed each rifleman tragically killed in action today standing behind us as we returned to our posts, and we all knew that each one of those riflemen would have wanted us to ‘crack on’… And that is what we shall do.”
Crack on. From Basra to Sangin, I’ve heard that phrase as regularly as Amen in church. Cracking on: the army’s greatest quality, and perhaps its greatest weakness. I remember standing vigil on Sergeant Johnson’s body at dusk on a hilltop, after he had died in the battle for the town of Musa Qala in December 2007. His fellow soldiers were silhouettes, drawn close to their commander. On the horizon muffled bombs flashed through the drizzle. Major Jake Little told his men to put their grief to one side, to deal with it later. After the battle.
Cracking on could also mean failing to challenge impossible orders, or unwillingness to expose a flawed strategy...

More at Prospect.

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September 6, 2009

In Afghanistan, Let's Keep It Simple

In Afghanistan, Let's Keep It Simple - Ahmed Rashid, Washington Post opinion.

For much of the 20th century before the Soviet invasion in 1979, Afghanistan was a peaceful country living in harmony with its neighbors. There was a king and a real government, which I witnessed in the 1970s when I frequently traveled there. Afghanistan had what I'll call a minimalist state, compared with the vast governmental apparatuses that colonialists left behind in British India and Soviet Central Asia.
This bare-bones structure worked well for a poor country with a small population, few natural resources and a mix of ethnic groups and tribes that were poorly connected with one another because of the rugged terrain. The center was strong enough to maintain law and order, but it was never strong enough to undermine the autonomy of the tribes. Afghanistan was not aiming to be a modern country or a regional superpower. The economy was subsistence-level, but nobody starved. Everyone had a job, though farm labor was intermittent. There was a tiny urban middle class, but the gap between rich and poor was not that big. There was no such thing as Islamic extremism or a narco-state...

More at The Washington Post.

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A Stable Pakistan Needs a Stable Afghanistan

A Stable Pakistan Needs a Stable Afghanistan - Frederick W. Kagan, Wall Street Journal opinion.

Winning the war in Afghanistan - creating a stable and legitimate Afghan state that can control its territory - will be difficult. The insurgency has grown in the past few years while the government's legitimacy has declined. It remains unclear how the recent presidential elections will affect this situation.
Trying to win in Afghanistan is not a fool's errand, however. Where coalition forces have conducted properly resourced counterinsurgency operations in areas such as Khowst, Wardak, Lowgar, Konar and Nangarhar Provinces in the eastern part of the country, they have succeeded despite the legendary xenophobia of the Pashtuns.
Poorly designed operations in Helmand Province have not led to success. Badly under-resourced efforts in other southern and western provinces, most notably Kandahar, have also failed. Can well-designed and properly-resourced operations succeed? There are no guarantees in war, but there is good reason to think they can. Given the importance of this theater to the stability of a critical and restive region, that is reason enough to try...

More at The Wall Street Journal.

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The Afghanistan Abyss

The Afghanistan Abyss - Nicholas Kristof, New York Times opinion.

President Obama has already dispatched an additional 21,000 American troops to Afghanistan and soon will decide whether to send thousands more. That would be a fateful decision for his presidency, and a group of former intelligence officials and other experts is now reluctantly going public to warn that more troops would be a historic mistake.
The group’s concern - dead right, in my view - is that sending more American troops into ethnic Pashtun areas in the Afghan south may only galvanize local people to back the Taliban in repelling the infidels.
“Our policy makers do not understand that the very presence of our forces in the Pashtun areas is the problem,” the group said in a statement to me. “The more troops we put in, the greater the opposition. We do not mitigate the opposition by increasing troop levels, but rather we increase the opposition and prove to the Pashtuns that the Taliban are correct. “The basic ignorance by our leadership is going to cause the deaths of many fine American troops with no positive outcome,” the statement said...

More at The New York Times.

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Secretary Gates is Spot On

Last paragraph from Secretary of Defence Robert Gates’ letter to Thomas Curley, President and Chief Executive Offer of The Associated Press, concerning the publication of a photograph of Lance Corporal Joshua Bernard, United States Marine Corps, as he lay fatally wounded in Afghanistan.

I cannot imagine the pain and suffering Lance Corporal Bernard's death has caused his family. Why your organization would purposefully defy the family's wishes knowing full well that it will lead to yet more anguish is beyond me. Your lack of compassion and common sense in choosing to put this image of their maimed and stricken child on the front page of multiple American newspapers is appalling. The issue here is not law, policy or constitutional right - but judgment and common decency.

The Associated Press statement concerning this affair can be found here. A Small Wars Council discussion on this issue can be found here.

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6 September SWJ Roundup

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COIN Best Practices: Report 1

This just released by the Institute for the Study of War: Building Security Forces and Ministerial Capacity: Iraq as a Primer by LTG James M. Dubik (U.S. Army, Ret.). Full report here. Overview below:

This report discusses how U.S. commanders in Iraq vastly accelerated the growth of the Iraq Security Forces as part of a broader counterinsurgency strategy to supplement the Surge of U.S. forces into the region.
The author, Lieutenant General James Dubik (ret.), who served as the commander of Multi-National Security and Transition Command – Iraq (MNSTC-I) from mid-2007 to mid-2008, oversaw a rapid growth in the quantity of Iraqi Security Forces, an improvement of their operational capability due to the partnership and training with the U.S., and a reformation of the Iraqi Ministries of Interior and Defense to help institutionalize the growth of these indigenous security forces. Despite the success in developing security forces during the Iraqi Surge, our current military doctrine does not reflect the lessons learned or best practices used in 2007 – 2008.
Future conflicts will likely arise in failing states and will therefore involve the Army in counterinsurgency (COIN) or stability operations. The conventional forces of the United States Army will have an enduring requirement to build the security forces and security ministries of other countries. This requirement is consequently not an aberration, unique to Iraq and Afghanistan. Planning, training, doctrine, and acquisition must take account of this mission and support it.

And from the Conclusions:

In fragile, failing, or failed states, it may take a generation for an indigenous force to reach a level of self-sustainment, in which case the U.S. must prepare to engage in a long-term cooperative security arrangement with the host nation.
Nations that require security force assistance and security sector reform are likely also to require external funding for these tasks. Foreign contributions are necessary for success and can have a double benefit – by contributing to the growth of state finances as well as security forces.
Organizations with responsibilities like MNSTC-I have to be staffed with leaders experienced in operating large, institutional organizations and staffed with members able to link their tactical, day-to-day actions to strategic effects. The Army must train its officers and its general officers better to meet these management requirements.

Building Security Forces and Ministerial Capacity: Iraq as a Primer.

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Ryan Crocker's advice on Afghanistan

Who better to ask than Ryan Crocker for advice on what to do about Afghanistan?

Crocker is a 37-year veteran of the Foreign Service and spent virtually his whole career in the Middle East and South Asia. He was U.S. Chief of Mission to six countries: Lebanon, Kuwait, Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. He is a Career Ambassador and was awarded the Medal of Freedom.

Does Crocker have the answer to Afghanistan? Well, no easy answer. In this essay for Newsweek, in which he recaps his career, Crocker says:

1) Don't expect what worked in Iraq to work in Afghanistan,

2) The Taliban and al Qaeda have strategic patience; the U.S. better get some, too.

3) The world, and the bad guys, won't allow the U.S. to walk away.

So no simple answer, even from Ryan Crocker. But his Newsweek essay is still worth reading.

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September 7, 2009

Should Obama Go 'All In' On Afghanistan?

Should Obama Go 'All In' On Afghanistan? - Andrew J. Bacevich, Los Angeles Times opinion.

Back in January when he took office, Barack Obama had amassed a very considerable pile of chips. Events since then have appreciably reduced that stack. Should he wager what remains on Afghanistan? That's the issue the president now faces.
The first true foreign policy test of the Obama presidency has arrived, although not in the form of a crisis coming out of nowhere announced by a jangling telephone at 3 a.m. Instead, a steady drip-drip of accumulating evidence warns that Afghanistan is coming apart...
Obama's advisors - Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Michael Mullen and Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the commander on the ground in Afghanistan - have been quite candid in arguing that half-measures won't suffice. The war is going badly. The Taliban is gaining in strength. Seven-plus years of allied efforts in Afghanistan have accomplished very little.
Even if the military's recently rediscovered catechism of counterinsurgency provides the basis for a new strategy, turning things around will take a very long time - five to 10 years at least. Achieving success (however vaguely defined) will entail the expenditure of vast resources: treasure (no one will say how much) and, of course, blood (again, no one offers an estimate)...

More at The Los Angeles Times.

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7 September SWJ Roundup

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Ramping Up to Face the Challenge of Irregular Warfare

Ramping Up to Face the Challenge of Irregular Warfare - Lieutenant Colonel Mark Grdovic, Special Warfare.

In the 1960s and again in the 1980s, the U.S. military experienced a revival of interest in irregular warfare, or IW, similar to the one that is occurring today. In both of the previous periods, the topic enjoyed a celebrity-like popularity in professional military forums until such time that circumstances allowed it to be relegated back to the margins in favor of a return to “proper soldiering.”
Both previous revivals produced high-quality doctrine and curriculum in professional-education courses. So why, then, did IW fail to become ingrained as part of the military mainstream? The manner in which a topic is framed can significantly influence the opinion of the target audience. Suggesting that IW is the graduate level of warfare, while clearly expressing the topic’s difficulty, fails to recognize the considerable effort that the Army has invested in mastering major combat operations, or MCO. Given the imbalance between the Army’s investment in MCO and in IW, it’s not surprising that, by comparison, IW appears more difficult and complex. Over the last several decades, old IW concepts have often been reintroduced or reinvented under new names, such as “low-intensity conflict” and “military operations other than war.” While there is no question that those concepts are complex, presenting them as new byproducts of emerging and changing world conditions, such as globalization, urbanization and radicalization, brings into question not only the enduring nature of the IW requirement but also whether these conflicts are, in fact, merely anomalies to be weathered. While labels and marketing techniques may be helpful in reconciling our collective discomfort with the topic, they undermine the overall integration of the topic by further entrenching skeptics...

More at Special Warfare.

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Cracking the Code on Measures of Effectiveness

Colonel Dave Maxwell; who sent along an earlier recommendation, see Ramping Up to Face the Challenge of Irregular Warfare; also recommends Cracking the Code on Measures of Effectiveness by Sergeant Christopher E. Howard published in the September - October 2009 edition of Special Warfare. SGT Howard's article took 1st place in the Alfred H. Paddock Psychological Operations Essay Contest.

One of the most perplexing problems facing the PSYOP community is measuring the effectiveness of Psychological Operations. The larger the scale of the PSYOP effort, the more complex the problem grows, thus making operational PSYOP of a national or regional scope more difficult to measure than tactical efforts of limited scope.
Units often rely on measures of performance, or MOP, - showing what and how much they did - in lieu of measures of effectiveness, or MOE, because the former are comparatively easier to ascertain. But MOP alone do not answer the critical question, “Is the PSYOP effort working?” Although MOP serve a purpose, the greater emphasis should always be on obtaining valid, accurate MOE, since they provide decision-makers with the information necessary to determine which efforts deserve continued funding, which should be used as templates for future efforts and which should be adjusted or even abandoned.
Solving the MOE riddle requires that PSYOP planners and analysts do the “heavy lifting” before initiating PSYOP. Establishing the criteria for assessment requires solid planning and analysis. Unfortunately, those activities are often dispensed with in the name of expediency...

More at Special Warfare.

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Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North on Poppy

Lieutenant Colonel North on Poppy

By Allison Brown

Everyone has read by now that Afghanistan's poppy production is down for the second year running because the farmgate price is too low for farmers to bother planting. Production has become ever more concentrated in Helmand and other southern provinces where the national government has no hold. Oliver North (Blooming Financial Support at Fox News) does not address the dynamics of these changes, only a few current policing actions from a rather narrow, US- and militray-centric point of view.

Here are some shortcomings in North's presentation...

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Monday's Think Hard About It

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September 8, 2009

Crux of Afghan Debate: Will More Troops Curb Terror?

Crux of Afghan Debate: Will More Troops Curb Terror? - Eric Schmitt and Scott Shane, New York Times.

... most specialists on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, inside and outside the government, say terrorism cannot be confronted from a comfortable distance, such as by airstrikes or proxy forces alone. It may take years to turn Afghanistan into a place that is hostile to Al Qaeda, they say, but it may be the only way to keep the United States safe in the long term. Many agree with the classified strategy for a troop buildup that Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top commander in Afghanistan, has presented to Mr. Obama and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in recent days.
They say a large American-led NATO ground force is needed to clear Taliban-held territory and hold it while instructors train sufficient, competent Afghan soldiers and police officers to secure those areas. The allied force, the argument goes, will buy time and space to help the Afghans build more effective local, provincial and national governments, and create some semblance of an economy. Since many polls in Afghanistan show little support for the Taliban, a stable, peaceful country would not be likely to become a home for terrorists...

More at The New York Times.

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8 September SWJ Roundup

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The greatest threat

What is the greatest threat to U.S. security? The greatest threat to U.S. security is something that would upset the usefulness of the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE), the consolidated U.S. government database of terrorist suspects around the world. The government uses that database to establish watch lists, no-fly lists, screen visa applicants at U.S. consulates, conduct surveillance, coordinate investigations with foreign and local partners, etc. It was the lack of such a database and its applications that permitted 9/11 to happen. Today, the TIDE database and the activities it supports is the U.S. government’s most important counterterrorism tool.

According to a story in Sunday’s Washington Post, TIDE information, in theory at least, is currently available to the public through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. The intelligence community wants to end that possibility through legislation that will exempt TIDE information from FOIA disclosure. According to the story, several privacy interest groups are lobbying against passage of such an exemption.

What’s the problem? An excerpt from the article:

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Afghanistan and Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, More

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates' first interview with Al-Jazeera.

More on Secretary Gates 4 September interview with Al-Jazeera:

Secretary Gates Interview with Al Jazeera at the Pentagon - Transcript
Pakistan Tops List of Challenges, Gates Says - American Forces Press Service
Gates Praises Pakistan's Grip on Extremists - Agence France-Presse
Gates Reaffirms US Commitment to Afghanistan - Washington Post
US Cannot Think of Afghan Withdrawal - American Forces Press Service
Gates Corrects Holbrooke on Afghanistan Metrics - Washington Independent
Gates Speaks Frankly on Pakistan, Iraq - American Forces Press Service
US Enlists Arabs to Pressure Tehran - The Australian
Gates: Arab World Should Arm Against Iran - Jerusalem Post
Gates Labels Iran as Problem - American Forces Press Service
Gates: Arab World Should Unite to Counter Iran Threat - Voice of America
Gates Urges Arabs to Strengthen Military Ties - Agence France-Presse

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September 9, 2009

Pentagon Keeps Wary Watch as Troops Blog

Pentagon Keeps Wary Watch as Troops Blog - James Dao, New York Times.

... There are two sides to the military’s foray into the freewheeling world of the interactive Web. At the highest echelons of the Pentagon, civilian officials and four-star generals are newly hailing the power of social networking to make members of the American military more empathetic, entice recruits and shape public opinion on the war.
Gen. Ray Odierno, commander of American forces in Iraq, is on Facebook. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen, has a YouTube channel and posts Twitter updates almost daily.
The Army is encouraging personnel of all ranks to go online and collaboratively rewrite seven of its field manuals. And on Aug. 17, the Department of Defense unveiled a Web site promoting links to its blogs and its Flickr, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube sites.
The Web, however, is a big place. And the many thousands of troops who use blogs, Facebook, Twitter and other social media sites to communicate with the outside world are not always in tune with the Pentagon’s official voice. Policing their daily flood of posts, videos and photographs is virtually impossible - but that has not stopped some in the military from trying...

More at The New York Times.

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9 September SWJ Roundup

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September 10, 2009

Truth Time on Afghanistan

Obama's Afghan Hopes Meet Reality - Jim Hoagland, Washington Post opinion.

The aftermath of Afghanistan's elections has been uglier and more consequential than the campaign that preceded the voting. It has become clear that President Hamid Karzai's bid for reelection was tainted by widespread fraud, a development that represents the Obama administration's first significant failure in foreign affairs...
The disputed elections are not simply a political embarrassment. They pose significant questions about the new US counterinsurgency strategy of population protection, which was initially keyed to clearing areas contested by the Taliban - largely the Pashtun-inhabited southern region - to enable people there to vote freely.
But even in many of the "cleared" villages, Afghans refused to come out to vote, apparently fearing that in a matter of weeks or months the Taliban would seep back into their zones and seek vengeance on those who went to the polls...

More at The Washington Post.

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10 September SWJ Roundup

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Worst Case Unfolding in Afghanistan?

Worst Case Unfolding in Afghanistan? - Greg Grant, DoD Buzz.

What if the entire US strategy in Afghanistan is based on a flawed premise? A counterinsurgency campaign is waged to defeat insurgents who are trying to supplant a central government with some version of their own. In Afghanistan, the US military has been trying to defeat a largely Pashtun insurgency that doesn’t care much for our man in Kabul, President Hamid Karzai.
That goal never appeared easy; the Pashtun are an extremely war like bunch and they don’t like foreign armies on their soil either. Now things have gotten even worse as the insurgency has spread far beyond the Pashtun community, driven in large measure by the illegitimacy of the Karzai regime. It was hoped that national elections would serve to unify the country. Widespread accusations of voter fraud have dashed those hopes.
Last month, speaking at the US Institute of Peace, Tuft University’s Andrew Wilder, who has spent a great deal of time in Afghanistan, said the “fundamental flaw” in the US counterinsurgency strategy there was trying to extend the reach of the central government when the local people view the central government as the number one cause of insecurity...

More at DoD Buzz.

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Tactical Strategic Communication!

Tactical Strategic Communication!
Placing Informational Effect at the Centre of Command
by Commander Steve Tatham

Tactical Strategic Communication! (Full PDF Article)

In October 2006, Brigadier Andrew Mackay was appointed to lead 52 Brigade, British Army, to Helmand Province, Afghanistan. Mackay, with much stabilisation experience from previous conflicts had used his pre-deployment time to read and to research not just the country but also some of the many ideas of how counter-insurgency (COIN) operations may be conducted. At the forefront of his mind was the work of former French Army Officer, David Galula, who in his book ‘Counterinsurgency Warfare’ had looked at the need to build consent amongst organic populations to deny insurgencies support; his work was a direct result of his own military service in Algeria. For Galula, and for Mackay, ‘the population was the prize’ and in Afghanistan that prize might be for the taking, but in Mackay’s view only if influence was embedded at its core.

Tactical Strategic Communication! (Full PDF Article)

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China potpourri

Here is a collection of recent essays on China:

Evan Medeiros of RAND wrote a book-length report on China’s international behavior. Medeiros concludes that China is a status quo power. According to Medeiros, China’s leaders are focused on China’s internal problems and development and are using China’s increasing economic and diplomatic presence in the global community to improve China’s domestic situation. Medeiros asserts that China does not seek to push the U.S. out of east Asia and that China does not foresee a conflict with a major power within a 15-20 year planning horizon. However, he believes China will resist actions the U.S. might take which would constrain China’s options, especially in the Asian region.

Click through for more ...

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Krulak on Will

General Charles Krulak, 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps, responds to "Time to Get Out of Afghanistan" - a Washington Post op-ed by George Will in this e-mail.

Here's the intro paragraph:

I would imagine that your article "Time to Get Out of Afghanistan" will result in some "incoming" on your Command Post. First and Foremost, let me say that I am in total agreement with your assessment. Simply put, no desired end state has ever been clearly articulated and no strategy formulated that would lead us to achieve even an ill defined end state.

General Krulak goes on to articulate several points concerning our efforts in Afghanistan.

More at General Krulak's e-mail to George Will.

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Stronger

They tried to destroy us but they only made us stronger.

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September 11, 2009

On General Krulak's E-mail to George Will

Ten years ago, the ideas about warfare expressed in General Krulak's email to George Will would have been merely disappointing. However, after eight years of war have we have learned many hard lessons at a very high price, and the ideas attributed to General Krulak are now incomprehensible.

General Krulak appears unsure as to whether al-Qaeda and the Taliban are our enemies, and whether the United States has an interest in preventing Taliban control of Afghanistan. Exactly eight years ago today, al-Qaeda operatives supported by the Taliban-controlled government of Afghanistan murdered 3,000 Americans on American soil. The answer to the general's question is yes - al-Qaeda and the Taliban are America's enemies.

General Krulak advocates the use of 'hunter-killer teams' backed by airpower governed by minimal rules of engagement to 'take out the bad guys.' This light footprint tactic has failed for the last eight years. Aircraft operating with few or no ground forces cannot distinguish between insurgents and innocent civilians. Minimal rules of engagement result in maximum civilian casualties, tacitly assisting our enemies as they seek sanctuary and support from civilian populations.

General Krulak misrepresents the manpower requirements necessary for success in Afghanistan. Most of the troops required to provide security for the Afghan people can and will come from the Afghans themselves. Indeed, the most important task for American military forces is to strengthen the capabilities of Afghan security forces to accomplish this task.

General Krulak speculates that the American people would not provide the resources necessary to prevail in Afghanistan. While every citizen is entitled to his or her opinion, it's not clear that General Krulak has any particular expertise in the area of domestic American political opinion.

What's more certain is that the American people and their elected representatives have provided virtually everything asked of them by our military leaders. If there are insufficient resources to prevail in Afghanistan, it is the responsibility of senior military officers and other leaders within the executive branch to ask for more. It is dismaying that a retired general officer would advocate abandoning the war in Afghanistan out of concern for its impact on military personnel or equipment. We must tailor our forces to meet the demands of our wars, rather than vice versa.

After eight years of war, we have learned some hard lessons in Iraq and Afghanistan, including:

* Al-Qaeda and its terrorist affiliates pose a serious threat to the security of the United States, our people and our allies
* Airpower and special operations forces are a necessary part of any counter-terrorism operation, but in and of themselves are insufficient to deny sanctuary to terrorist organizations.
* Developing host-nation security forces is an essential component of counterinsurgency operations. These forces are more credible, more enduring and more cost-effective than relying exclusively or primarily on U.S. forces.
* It is the responsibility of general officers to ask for the resources necessary to win our wars.

I respect General Krulak for his decades of service to our country. However, I was dismayed that any officer, active or retired, could still hold the views attributed to him on September 11, 2009.

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The Military-Media Relationship: A Dysfunctional Marriage?

A Miltary Review twofer on the military-media relationship:

The Military-Media Relationship: A Dysfunctional Marriage? - Thom Shanker, New York Times, and Major General Mark Hertling, U.S. Army.

In the information age, the first casualty of war is often trust—between those who fight the wars and those who report them. A general and a journalist express their ideas about truth, trust, and getting the story straight.

Fostering a Culture of Engagement - Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell IV, U.S. Army, Lieutenant Colonel Shawn Stroud, U.S. Army, and Mr. Anton Menning.

In the contemporary media environment, the Army must move beyond “business as usual” to embrace a culture of engagement. This dynamic mediascape can be potentially chaotic, but it also offers opportunities.

Much more in the September - October 2009 edition of Military Review.

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Fulbright Scholars Want to Pave Way

Fulbright Scholars Want to Pave Way to Brighter Future for Iraq
by Hemin Sultan and Tenay Guvendiren

Fulbright Scholars Want to Pave Way (Full PDF Article)

The flagship international exchange program sponsored by the United States Government, the Fulbright Program, is designed to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries. It promotes leadership development through learning and international cooperation. The Fulbright Program operates in more than 155 countries and has provided over 285,000 participants - chosen for their academic merit and leadership potential - with the opportunity to study, teach and conduct research in each others' countries and exchange programs. Approximately 7,000 grants are awarded annually. Hundreds of Fulbright alumni worldwide currently hold top positions in government, higher education, journalism, law, and the private sector, but in Iraq, these organizations are barely functioning and the potential benefits of the Fulbright program to Iraq are not being maximized.

Fulbright Scholars Want to Pave Way (Full PDF Article)

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Eight Weeks of America’s War, Not Eight Years of “Obama’s War”

Many of those advocating drawing down from Afghanistan argue that we have been fighting in Afghanistan for eight years, and if we haven’t won the war by now, we never will. The reality is that the White House has only really dedicated the effort to win for just over eight weeks, not eight years. This a worthy cause. Only if we control the ground in Afghanistan can we hunt and kill Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The men and women who served on the ground in Afghanistan who have risked and often sacrificed their lives since the awful events of September 11th have been trying to win from the very beginning, but over time they were abandoned by a Bush administration more interested in taking the fight to Iraq. Now the Obama administration is trying to salvage America’s War in Afghanistan, which we’ve been truly fighting for only eight weeks, after the Bush Administration basically lost the war over eight years.

The Obama administration is about to announce a major increase in our troop levels to Afghanistan. Voices on both the left and the right are emerging in opposition to our efforts to control the ground in Afghanistan so we can hunt and defeat al Qaeda and their Taliban hosts. Many such opponents and supposedly impartial observers, from across the political spectrum (The Nation, George Will, and Time Magazine) have taken to calling the war in Afghanistan “Obama’s War.” They have laid the success or failure of the conflict at the feet of the eight-month-old Presidency of Barack Obama. This view misplaces the credit of how catastrophically the Bush administration failed in Afghanistan, and how much of a fully national effort will be required to turn this debacle around...

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This Week at War: Gates fishes for friends in the Persian Gulf

Here is the latest edition of my column at Foreign Policy:

Topics include:

1. A U.S.-Gulf alliance against Iran?

2. Karzai has some thinking to do.

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September 12, 2009

Hitting Bottom in Foggy Bottom and the Information War

Hitting Bottom in Foggy Bottom - Matt Armstrong, Foreign Policy.

The State Department suffers from low morale, bottlenecks, and bureaucratic inepititude. Do we need to kill it to save it?
Discussion over the fate of Foggy Bottom usually focuses on the tenure of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the troubles of public diplomacy, and the rise of special envoys on everything from European pipelines to Afghanistan and Pakistan. But Americans would benefit more from a reassessment of the core functionality of the US State Department.
Years of neglect and marginalization, as well as a dearth of long-term vision and strategic planning, have left the 19th-century institution hamstrung with fiefdoms and bureaucratic bottlenecks. The Pentagon now funds and controls a wide range of foreign-policy and diplomatic priorities - from development to public diplomacy and beyond. The world has changed, with everyone from politicians to talking heads to terrorists directly influencing global audiences. The most pressing issues are stateless: pandemics, recession, terrorism, poverty, proliferation, and conflict. But as report after report, investigation after investigation, has highlighted, the State Department is broken and paralyzed, unable to respond to the new 21st-century paradigm...

More at Foreign Policy.

Preparing to Lose the Information War? - Matt Armstrong, MountainRunner.

It has now been eight years since 9/11 and we finally seem to understand that in the modern struggles against terrorism, insurgency, and instability, the tools of public diplomacy are invaluable and essential. We live in a world where an individual with a camera phone can wield more influence than an F-22 stealth fighter jet. The capability of engaging public audiences has long been thought of as the domain of civilians. But for the past eight years, the functions, authorities, and funding for engaging global audiences, from anti-AIDS literature to soccer balls to development projects, has migrated from the State Department to the Defense Department. It seems whole forests have fallen over the same period on the need to enhance civilian agencies - be it the State Department or a new USIA-like entity - to provide a valid alternative to the Defense Department who most, even the detractors, agree was filling a void left by civilians who abrogated their responsibility for one reason or another.
This summer may be a turning point. Some in Congress have unilaterally decided that 2010 is the year America's public diplomacy will stop wearing combat boots. Sounds good, right? This is the future most, including analysts and the military, have wished for. The military has been the unwilling (if passionate once engaged) and often clumsy surrogate and partner for the State Department in representing the US and its interests in Africa, the Middle East, and elsewhere around the world through what the House Armed Services Committee now calls "military public diplomacy." In some regions, State is almost wholly dependent on Defense money and resources to accomplish its mandate...

More at MountainRunner.

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Why Afghanistan Matters

Why Afghanistan Matters - Clifford D. May, Washington Times opinion.

Eight years ago this week, Osama bin Laden watched and then celebrated as a terrorist attack he had authorized brought down the World Trade Center and part of the Pentagon, slaughtering thousands of innocent Americans.
Bin Laden was, at that time, in Afghanistan, which was, at that time, ruled by the Taliban. Soon, US forces and their anti-Taliban Afghan allies would chase bin Laden and Taliban leader Mullah Omar across the border into the wild tribal areas of northwest Pakistan. From that base, they would organize an insurgency against US and NATO forces and a new Afghan government.
Conservatives are now divided over this conflict. The debate on the right is interesting but academic. Barack Obama - no conservative - is president. During his campaign for the White House, he blasted President Bush for diverting to Iraq resources needed for Afghanistan, the "good war," the war that, he emphasized, must be fought and won.
If Mr. Obama intends for this mission to succeed, he will have to return to this theme. He will have to use his not-inconsiderable powers of persuasion to make the case that Afghanistan is both worth winning and winnable. If he cannot bring himself to do that - with at least as much passion as he has put into the debate on health care - support for Afghanistan will collapse, and nothing pro-mission conservatives say, write or do will prevent it. Does history offer any precedent of an ambivalent commander in chief leading a nation to victory in war? ...

More at The Washington Times.

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12 September SWJ Roundup

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Strategic Communication Primer

Commander Steve Tatham, Royal Navy, who recently authored Tactical Strategic Communication! - Placing Informational Effect at the Centre of Command for British Army Review and republished here at Small Wars Journal, also penned Strategic Communication: A Primer.

The concept of Strategic Communication had, until late 2008, received only scant attention in the UK. However the production of the UK's counterinsurgency doctrine (still to be definitively named but catalogued as Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40: Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution) presented an opportunity for this to be addressed in what was to be a chapter on military influence.

That the doctrine has still not been published, after nearly two years of development, is indicative of the difficulties the British Armed Forces are experienceing in articulating not just lessons learned from Iraq and on-going operations in Afghanistan - but also in applying the same to future scenarios. To assist the Defence Concepts and Doctrine Centre in its work the UK Defence Academy's Director of Communication Research; Commander Tatham, a media operations expert and author of the 2006 polemic study 'Losing Arab Hearts and Minds: The Coalition, Al-Jazeera & Muslim Public Opinion; produced and published the Strategic Communication Primer in late 2008. This document attempts the first definition of strategic communication by the UK and considers some of the problems of communication in 21st Century conflict, settling on the pragmatic complexity model presented by Arizona State's Consortium for Strategic Communication. Tatham's primer has been followed by the roll out of a Strategic Communication education program across all UK Staff Courses. Trialed initially on the UK's Tri-Service Warrant Officer's course - where the concept was warmly welcomed - it has subsequently been rolled out to the initial (8 week) staff courses (for Lieutenants and Captains), the Advanced (1 year) staff course (for Majors and Lieutenant Colonels) and the Higher Staff Course for very senior officers.

Key in Tatham's findings are the belief that Strategic Communication is not simply the tighter binding of Information Operations, Public Affairs, etal, but that Strategic Communication should be a core component of the Command function; that recognizing every action, however benign it may superficially appear, will generate an informational effect. That effect can alter perception and for many perception equals reality. Tatham advised Brigadier (now Major General) Andrew Mackay during his planning for 52 Brigade British Army deployment to Helmand. Mackay centralized the idea, from lowest private to the highest ranks, that popular consent was vital and the story of his preparation and deployment is told in the recent British Army Review article by Commander Tatham linked above.

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September 13, 2009

The Afghan Illusion

The Afghan Illusion - Frederick W. Kagan, Kimberly Kagan and James M. Dubik, Washington Post opinion.

While some are discussing whether the US presence in Afghanistan should be maintained, the Obama administration does not appear to be seriously considering withdrawal. Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.) and others have instead proposed expanding the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) first and raising US force levels only if that approach is unsuccessful. This option holds out hope of success without the need to send more US troops, but we believe it is illusory.
Withdrawal now would allow Afghanistan to again become a haven for terrorists. It would destabilize Pakistan by giving refuge to terrorist and insurgent groups attacking Islamabad and by strengthening the forces within the Pakistani government and security forces that continue to support the Taliban as a hedging strategy against precisely such an American retreat. Pursuing an offshore strategy of surgical strikes using aircraft and Special Forces units would destabilize Pakistan for the same reasons. Further, if such a strategy could work against al-Qaeda, the commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal - the most accomplished practitioner of Special Forces counterterrorism campaigns - would be advocating it. Instead, he is advocating counterinsurgency...

More at The Washington Post.

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13 September SWJ Roundup

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Nation Building at the Barrel of an American Gun?

Nation Building at the Barrel of an American Gun?
A Short Reply to the Dubik and Kagans’ Washington Post Oped

Lieutenant General James Dubik, Dr Kim Kagan, and Dr Fred Kagan, the three authors of a Sunday Washington Post oped titled The Afghan Illusion: Kabul’s Forces Aren’t Yet a Substitute for Our Own, conclude their Oped with this statement:

"Building Afghan forces dramatically is part of a strategy for succeeding in Afghanistan and permitting the reduction of foreign forces. It cannot, however, be the whole strategy."

And to ask this reoccurring question one more time, what is the "whole strategy"? Although the authors do not come out and say it, armed nation building is clearly the "whole" strategy.

Why do we think nation building at the barrel of an American gun can work in Afghanistan? The authors cleverly tell us at the end of the article that the building up of the Afghani National Forces will allow the Americans to "begin" to reduce their footprint in 2011. But then again, that statement is followed by the idea that building Afghani forces is part of a larger strategy of (implied) nation building which I infer from the piece actually requires a generational effort. Realistically and being blunt and honest how could building an Afghanistan Nation up from what it is now take anything less than a generation?

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An Afghan Headache

An Afghan Headache - The Australian editorial.

Washington wants closure, but election fallout continues. Realpolitik suggests that the sooner a functioning government can be established in Kabul the better. But after weeks of revelations about widespread fraud in the August 20 election, the prospect of moving on quickly in Afghanistan remains elusive. At the weekend, opposition leader Abdullah Abdullah urged supporters not to take to the streets in protest, but insisted he would not be part of a national unity government with President Hamid Karzai - the solution being pressed by the international community.
With about 90 per cent of the vote counted, Mr Karzai has more than 54per cent support but the stories of bribery and ballot-box interference have destroyed confidence in the outcome. Monitors suggest up to 23per cent of votes counted so far could be fraudulent, according to a report in The Sunday Times.
It's a mess, but the problem is what happens next as governments involved in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force face falling domestic support for involvement in Afghanistan. It is a particular headache for the US, which favoured Mr Karzai in the first presidential election in 2004. With Americans increasingly unhappy about their troops in Afghanistan, President Barack Obama needs the electoral debacle to go away before it undermines his military strategy...

More at The Australian.

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Operational Design in Afghanistan

In the past two days, the debate has heated up at Small Wars Journal between two exceptionally brilliant officers regarding the future of NATO and ISAF in Afghanistan. On one side of the debate is Lt. Col. Paul Yingling, author of a critique of military organizational culture entitled “A Failure in Generalship”. The other is noted “COINtra”, Col. Gian Gentile, a history professor at West Point.

Much of the debate centers over a series of articles and rebuttals which have occurred over the past six weeks, but intensifying with George Will’s exhortation to give up on nation-building in Afghanistan and pursue al Qaeda via “over-the-horizon” capabilities. Will was joined by General Charles Krulak, the former Commandant of the US Marine Corps, who also echoed many of Will’s arguments in an e-mail earlier this week. Both George Will and General Krulak--as well as many within the defense community, such as Col. Gian Gentile and Col. TX Hammes--feel that Afghanistan has outlived its strategic relevance due to al Qaeda’s relocation into Pakistan and the perceived futility of building a nation-state in Afghanistan. Lt. Col. Yingling, on the other hand, feels that population-centric counterinsurgency can work in Afghanistan, given the right amount of troops and time. To Yingling, building a stable nation-state in Afghanistan is a necessary step in countering al Qaeda. Other prominent military thinkers agree with Yingling, such as retired Lt. Col. John Nagl, president of the Washington-based think-tank, Center for a New American Security.

Our professional community thrives on respectful, professional debate, such as the debate that exists over the strategic and operational goals in Afghanistan. We owe it to the men and women of ISAF to decide whether or not Afghanistan warrants further involvement, and if the situation does warrant involvement, we must determine the best course towards achieving ISAF’s goals...

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When a Cup of Coffee Becomes a Soy Decaf Mint Mocha Chip Frappuccino

When a Cup of Coffee Becomes a Soy Decaf Mint Mocha Chip Frappuccino
by Brigadier Justin Kelly and Ben Fitzgerald

When a Cup of Coffee Becomes a Soy Decaf Mint Mocha Chip Frappuccino (Full PDF Article)

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War marked a point of departure for military analysis. Until then, strategic problems, although complex and thorny, were necessarily dealt with in the context of the greater competition between the East and West. From then, each new strategic problem outwardly enjoyed a degree of singularity and, accordingly, required a greater amount of a priori examination. The profusion and novelty of these emerging strategic problems stimulated an equally profuse and disparate amount of analysis and prescription.

The new wave of military theory began a little earlier, in the late-1980s, when Soviet theorists began to discuss the implications of emerging weapons, and sensing and communications technologies – conventional means that replicated the power of, and provided a useable alternative to, tactical nuclear weapons. They anticipated that the impact of these weapons was a Revolution in Military Affairs that would require a fundamental re-ordering of the tactical battlespace in the same way that the introduction of smokeless powder in the 1890s and tactical nuclear weapons in the 1950s did. The 1991 Gulf War offered a practical demonstration that hinted at what might be achievable through the thoughtful combination of these technologies and triggered a flood of seemingly new ideas, including proselytizing the proposition that there was an RMA underway. The idea of an RMA triggered a veritable flood of books describing the long waves of military innovation and identifying earlier periods of discontinuous or extremely rapid change. Depending on semantic arguments about what constituted a revolution, and historical arguments around the causality of victory and defeat, this resulted in lists of from none to 10 historical RMAs.

Academics, enthusiasts, think-tanks and contractors piled on. In the revolutionary fervor of the time, everything that had existed before was a suspect legacy and being up-to-date required coining new terms that seemed to capture the most recent sensation. As a result the militaries of the world found themselves rushing from enthusiasm to enthusiasm like spoiled adolescents. The RMA morphed into Network Centric Warfare, Effects Based Operations and a general desire for ‘transformation’.

At the peak of this triumphant cascade of gleaming new concepts and technology came the strategic shock of 9/11 followed by Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. As has been variously documented elsewhere, the early stages of these operations provided validation for the supporters of transformation but were followed quickly by costly insurgencies for which the military was unprepared. This in turn has seen a proliferation of new theories for counterinsurgency, population-centric operations and so called ‘irregular’ warfare. The net effect of these events is an increasingly diffuse array of ideas about the nature of current and future war, often described in dichotomies or mutually exclusive terms. While it is important to debate these issues, at present we are inadvertently adding to, rather than reducing, our strategic uncertainty.

When a Cup of Coffee Becomes a Soy Decaf Mint Mocha Chip Frappuccino (Full PDF Article)

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Only Decisive Force Can Prevail in Afghanistan

Only Decisive Force Can Prevail in Afghanistan - Lindsey Graham, Joseph I. Lieberman and John McCain, Wall Street Journal opinion.

Growing numbers of Americans are starting to doubt whether we should have troops in Afghanistan and whether the war there is even winnable. We are confident that not only is it winnable, but that we have no choice. We must prevail in Afghanistan. We went to war there because the 9/11 attacks were a direct consequence of the safe haven given to al Qaeda in that country under the Taliban. We remain at war because a resurgent Taliban, still allied with al Qaeda, is trying to restore its brutal regime and re-establish that country as a terrorist safe haven.
It remains a clear, vital national interest of the United States to prevent this from happening. Yet an increasing number of commentators, including some of the very same individuals who opposed the surge in Iraq and called for withdrawal there, now declare Afghanistan essentially unwinnable. Had their view prevailed with respect to Iraq in 2006 and 2007, the consequences of our failure there would have been catastrophic.
Similarly, the ramifications of an American defeat in Afghanistan would not only be a devastating setback for our nation in what is now the central front in the global war on terror, but would inevitably further destabilize neighboring, nuclear Pakistan. Those who advocate such a course were wrong about Iraq, and they are wrong about Afghanistan...

More at The Wall Street Journal.

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September 14, 2009

Time to Deal in Afghanistan

Time to Deal in Afghanistan - Fareed Zakaria, Washington Post opinion.

It is time to get real about Afghanistan. Withdrawal is not a serious option. The United States, NATO, the European Union and others have invested massively in stabilizing that country over the past eight years, and they should not abandon it because the Taliban is proving a tougher foe than anticipated. But there is still a large gap between the goals the Obama administration is outlining and the means available to achieve them. This gap is best closed not by sending in tens of thousands of more troops but, rather, by understanding the limits of what we can reasonably achieve in Afghanistan.
The most important reality of the post-Sept. 11 world has been the lack of any major follow-up attack. That's largely because al-Qaeda has been on the run in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The campaign against terrorist groups in both countries rests on ground forces and intelligence. A senior US military official involved in planning these campaigns told me that America's presence in Afghanistan has been the critical element in the successful strikes against al-Qaeda leaders and camps. Were America to leave the scene, all the region's players would start jockeying for influence over Afghanistan. That would almost certainly mean the revival of the poisonous alliance between the Pakistani military and the hardest-line elements of the Taliban...

More at The Washington Post.

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14 September SWJ Roundup

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September 15, 2009

US Kills Top Qaeda Leader in Southern Somalia

US Kills Top Qaeda Leader in Southern Somalia - Jeffrey Gettleman and Eric Schmitt, New York Times.

American commandos killed one of the most wanted Islamic militants in Africa in a daylight raid in southern Somalia on Monday, according to American and Somali officials, an indication of the Obama administration’s willingness to use combat troops strategically against Al Qaeda’s growing influence in the region.
Western intelligence agents have described the militant, Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, as the ringleader of a Qaeda cell in Kenya responsible for the bombing of an Israeli hotel on the Kenyan coast in 2002. Mr. Nabhan may have also played a role in the attacks on two American embassies in East Africa in 1998...

More at The New York Times.

US Says Raid in Somalia Killed Terrorist With Links to Al-Qaeda - Karen DeYoung, Washington Post.

Helicopter-borne Special Forces troops attacked and killed a top al-Qaeda-linked suspect in a raid in southern Somalia early Monday, US officials said. Officials said Saleh Ali Nabhan, 30, a Kenyan sought in the 2002 bombing of an Israeli-owned resort in Kenya and an unsuccessful attempt that year to shoot down an Israeli airliner, was among four men killed in the attack. US troops fired from the air at a vehicle in which the men were traveling.
At least four helicopters participated in the raid, launched from a nearby US naval vessel, a senior military official said. At least one of them landed, and troops retrieved the bodies. "You want to go in there, do this fast, and get out before you're detected," the official said...

More at The Washington Post.

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Obama Rejects Afghanistan-Vietnam Comparison

Obama Rejects Afghanistan-Vietnam Comparison - John Harwood, New York Times.

President Obama rejected comparisons on Monday between the war in Afghanistan and the conflict in Vietnam a generation ago, but he expressed concern about “the dangers of overreach” and pledged a full debate before making further decisions on strategy. The president’s comments, in an interview at the White House with The New York Times and CNBC, appeared to be a response to rising unease within his own party in Congress about the possibility of the United States becoming bogged down in Afghanistan.
Asked whether he worried about repeating the fate of President Lyndon B. Johnson, who declined to seek re-election in 1968 as a result of the turmoil over Vietnam, Mr. Obama replied: “You have to learn lessons from history. On the other hand, each historical moment is different. You never step into the same river twice. And so Afghanistan is not Vietnam.” But, he added, “The dangers of overreach and not having clear goals and not having strong support from the American people, those are all issues that I think about all the time.”
The president promised to weigh the recommendation of the top commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, on whether the United States should commit more troops. But he took issue with assertions that the job of dismantling terrorism networks can be handled by drones and other alternatives to soldiers on the ground...

More at The New York Times.

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15 September SWJ Roundup

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America's New Frontline

Rageh Omaar, Al-Jazeera International, investigates the US' military and political strategy for Africa and how its relationship with the continent may change under US president Obama. The first part of the documentary (Witness - America's New Frontline) can be seen from Sunday, September 20; and the second part airs from Sunday, September 27. US Africa Command (USAFRICOM) cooperated with Al-Jazeera, in the filming of this documentary.

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Afghanistan Troop Request May Contain Political Fail-Safe

Afghanistan Troop Request May Contain Political Fail-Safe - Spencer Ackerman, Washington Independent.

A forthcoming request from the commander of US troops in Afghanistan for additional resources for the war is likely to take the form of a palette of options, not simply an appeal for more troops, according to Obama administration officials. Combined with a recent congressional proposal to delay a troop request, the options request might allow President Obama to avoid the politically thorny question of ordering a second escalation of US forces in Afghanistan this year.
Administration officials said that the widespread expectation within the administration was that Gen. Stanley McChrystal would present Obama with a series of options for how to resource the US effort to combat the deterioration of security in Afghanistan, along with a discussion of the merits and drawbacks of each. Among the options anticipated by the officials: an accelerated increase in Afghan security forces; the transference of US or Afghan troops to relatively volatile parts of the country; substituting US support troops for US combat troops while holding overall troop levels static; or increasing US troops in total. The officials would not speak for attribution, citing the sensitivity of the internal Afghanistan debate...

More at The Washington Independent.

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Recent Small Wars Journal themes are in today's news

Three stories in today’s news connect directly to themes discussed here at the Small Wars Journal blog. These three themes are central and unresolved questions about how the U.S. and the West should protect themselves from global terror threats.

Somalia strike and offshore balancing

A helicopter-borne U.S. special operations group, apparently operating from a U.S. warship in the Indian Ocean, attacked and killed Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan along with several of his associates along a road in southern Somalia. According to the cited New York Times article, the U.S. special operations soldiers recovered the bodies and presumably other interesting intelligence products from the site.

This strike will boost the argument for “offshore balancing,” a subject of intense discussion after an email by General Charles Krulak, USMC (ret) in support of offshore balancing for Afghanistan found its way to Small Wars Journal blog.

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Alternate View: Somalia Strike and Offshore Balancing

Alternate Viewpoint on the Somalia Strike and Offshore Balancing
By Tom Donnelly

OK, I’ll take the bait.

To offer the killing of Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan as evidence of the success of a strategy of “offshore balancing” would be myopic in the extreme. By press accounts, it was a very well conducted SEAL raid, but let’s not confuse good tactics with good strategy.

Let’s begin with U.S. strategy toward Somalia. Since the withdrawal from Mogadishu in the wake of the “Black Hawk Down” incident – and let’s remember why this was Osama bin Laden’s favorite movie, an exemplar of America the “weak horse,” unable to run the course – keeping that failed state from becoming an al Qaeda haven has been a very narrowly run thing, at best. Arguably, the single most effective step in accomplishing that goal was the Ethiopian invasion that removed the Islamic Courts Union. Certainly, our support to the various UN-approved governments there hasn’t made a lasting impact – local “proxies” or “indigenous forces” have failed to establish anything remotely resembling stability. We’ve been safely offshore, but haven’t achieved much balance.

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Information Overload: Too Much Good Stuff to Digest

Between the day job requirements and scouring the ‘Net to bring you the most relevant Small Wars related news and commentary there are points in time where I just want to say – too much – make it stop! That said, here are several items I really would like to comment on or excerpt more completely but just do not have the time. I offer them up in digest form for your consideration.

Tara McKelvey at Columbia Journalism Review takes a cheap and shallow shot at Tom Ricks in Too Close for Comfort? - as do several in the comments section. I’d respond, but why bother when someone much more informed about such matters can do it much more eloquently? See Jamie McIntyre’s CFR’s Errant Dart at Line of Departure. Money quote: And the primary charge against Tom Ricks seems to be that he’s done too much research, talked to too many people, knows too much history, and is unafraid to say what he really thinks.

Speaking of Tom Ricks - he has several interesting posts up at Best Defense - Marine generals to Cheney: Knock it off, mac. Money quote: ... we never imagined that we would feel duty-bound to publicly denounce a vice president of the United States, a man who has served our country for many years. In light of the irresponsible statements recently made by former Vice President Dick Cheney, however, we feel we must repudiate his dangerous ideas -- and his scare tactics. Also see Tom's Rory Stewart on being a government consultant. Money quote: It's like they're coming in and saying to you, 'I'm going to drive my car off a cliff. Should I or should I not wear a seatbelt?' And you say, 'I don't think you should drive your car off the cliff.' And they say, No, no, that bit's already been decided -- the question is whether to wear a seatbelt.' And you say, 'Well, you might as well wear a seatbelt.' And then they say, 'We've consulted with policy expert Rory Stewart and he says ... And speaking of Rory Stewart, Emily Stokes over at The Financial Times as a great synopsis of her interview with Rory - Lunch with the FT. Certainly an interesting man living in interesting times.

At The National - Foreign Correspondent Gretchen Peters reports on an expert panel that says NATO has lost trust of Afghans - serious stuff if true and something that cannot be taken lightly.

Moving on, The Associated Press' John Milburn has penned a decent overview of the U.S. Army's advisor training program at The Columbus Ledger-Enquirer. Bottom-line: the mission is moving from Fort Riley to Fort Polk, and significantly expanding. Good news.

Joshua Foust at Registan, not one of our fans but that is most certainly okay with us, offers up the case for Afghanistan in regards to recent historical considerations. This is part 3 of a ? part series...

The GAO offers up a US NORTHCOM "report card" in a very recent Homeland Defense report to Congress titled U.S. Northern Command Has a Strong Exercise Program, but Involvement of Interagency Partners and States Can Be Improved.

Chris Schnaubelt has a very nice research piece at the NATO Defence College's web page - NATO and the New U.S. "Afpak" Policy - bottom line is we can do better. Dr. Schnaubelt holds the Transformation Chair at the College.

There's more but out of time - I'll leave you with sites (not all inclusive mind you) I should be reading more - given eight days a week - Ex's Abu Muqawama, Best Defense - Tom Ricks again, AFPAK Channel at Foreign Policy, Marc Lynch also at FP, Thomas P.M. Barnett, Max Boot at Contentions, Herschel Smith at The Captain's Journal, Steve Coll at The Think Tank, Danger Room - especially Noah, Jules Crittenden at Forward Movement, GrEaT sAtAn'S gIrLfRiEnD - still figuring that one out - but I like it, In Harmonium, Information Dissemination, Kings of War, The Lede at the NYT and thanks for the link guys, SWJ great friend Matt Armstrong's MountainRunner, Outside the Beltway, Schmedlap, Shadow Government at FP, The Long War Journal's The Threat Matrix, Joshua Foust's Registan, the whole crew at Threats Watch, uber-embed and boots on the ground reporter David Wood, Spencer Ackerman at The Washington Independent, Wings Over Iraq, Michael Yon - another boots on the ground - never comes home kinda guy, and of course Zenpundit aka Mark Safranski - always last but not least.

I've missed a few I like a lot, I'm sure...

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September 16, 2009

Mullen: More Troops 'Probably' Needed in Afghanistan

Military Chief Suggests Need to Enlarge US Afghan Force - Thom Shanker, New York Times.

The nation’s top military officer pushed back Tuesday against Democrats who oppose sending additional combat troops to Afghanistan, telling Congress that success would probably require more fighting forces, and certainly much more time.
That assessment by the officer, Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stopped short of an explicit request for more troops. But it signals that the military intends to have a public voice in the evolving debate as many Democrats express reluctance to expand the war and President Obama weighs options...

Moer at The New York Times.

Call for an Afghan Surge - Yochi J. Dreazen, Wall Street Journal.

America's top military officer endorsed sending more US troops to Afghanistan, a shift in Pentagon rhetoric that heralds a potential deepening of involvement in the Afghan war despite flagging support from the public and top Democrats in Congress. Addressing a Senate panel, Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, offered no new details about how many American reinforcements will be needed in Afghanistan. But his comments mean that both Adm. Mullen and Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who spoke on the subject last week, now appear willing to order more forces to Afghanistan despite their earlier skepticism about expanding the American military presence there.
Their support makes it easier for President Barack Obama to approve the plans of Gen. Stanley McChrystal - whom the Obama administration installed as the top American commander in Kabul - when he submits a formal request later this month for as many as 40,000 new troops, in addition to 62,000 now there...

More at The Wall Street Journal.

Mullen: More Troops 'Probably' Needed - Ann Scott Tyson, Washington Post.

The nation's top military officer told Congress on Tuesday that the US war in Afghanistan "probably needs more forces" and sought to reassure lawmakers skeptical of sending additional troops that commanders were devising new tactics that would lead to victory over a resurgent Taliban.
Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that 2,000 to 4,000 additional military trainers from the United States and its NATO partners will be needed to "jump-start" the expansion of Afghan security forces and strongly suggested that more US combat troops will be required to provide security in the short term. "A properly resourced counterinsurgency probably needs more forces," Mullen said in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Mullen spoke amid a growing political debate over Afghanistan as President Obama weighs a recently completed assessment of the war by Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top US and NATO commander there...

More at The Washington Post.

Joint Chiefs Chairman Mullen Says More Troops Probably Needed in Afghanistan - Julian E. Barnes, Los Angeles Times.

Facing increasingly skeptical congressional Democrats, the nation's top uniformed officer said Tuesday that the Obama administration's strategy to counter Afghanistan militants probably means that more troops will be needed there. The comments are likely to sharpen an intensifying national debate over the future of the mission in Afghanistan that could force President Obama to decide between military leaders pushing for more firepower and his political base wary of a quagmire. Growing numbers of Democrats, including top congressional leaders, have expressed doubts about increasing the number of combat troops.
Navy Adm. Michael G. Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said Tuesday that he had not received a formal request for additional trainers and combat troops. But Mullen said that, based on the strategy outlined by Army Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top allied commander in Afghanistan, a larger force is likely to be needed. "He is alarmed by the insurgency, and he is in a position where he needs to retake the initiative from the insurgents, who have grabbed it over the last three years," Mullen said in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee...

More at The Los Angeles Times.

President Obama's Top Military Adviser Exposes Afghanistan Rifts - Giles Whittell, Michael Evans and Catherine Philp, The Times.

Deep rifts at the heart of Western policy on Afghanistan were laid bare yesterday when President Obama’s top military adviser challenged him to authorise a troop surge that his most senior congressional allies have said they will oppose. Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that more US troops as well as a rapid increase in the size and capability of the Afghan army were needed to carry out the President’s own strategy for prevailing in Afghanistan as the eighth anniversary of a debilitating war approaches.
His remarks to a Senate hearing came as Bob Ainsworth, the British Defence Secretary, said that the Taleban had proven a resilient enemy. “We’re far from succeeding against them yet but I reject that we’re not making progress,” he said at King’s College London. Mr Obama also rejected claims that Afghanistan was turning into a quagmire akin to Vietnam, but his immediate dilemma is political: approving a surge could trigger a high-level mutiny within his own party. Making matters worse, a new poll showed that public support for the war has slumped since April...

More at The Times.

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Afghanistan’s Other Front

Afghanistan’s Other Front - Joseph Kearns Goodwin, New York Times opinion.

Allegations of ballot-stuffing in the presidential election in Afghanistan last month are now so widespread that a recount is necessary, and perhaps even a runoff. Yet this electoral chicanery pales in comparison to the systemic, day-to-day corruption within the administration of President Hamid Karzai, who has claimed victory in the election. Without a concerted campaign to fight this pervasive venality, all our efforts there, including the sending of additional troops, will be in vain.
I have just returned from Afghanistan, where I spent seven months as a special adviser to NATO’s director of communications. On listening tours across the country, we left behind the official procession of armored SUV’s, bristling guns and imposing flak jackets that too often encumber coalition forces when they arrive in local villages. Dressed in civilian clothes and driven in ordinary cars, we were able to move around in a manner less likely to intimidate and more likely to elicit candor.
The recurring complaint I heard from Afghans centered on the untenable encroachment of government corruption into their daily lives - the homeowner who has to pay a bribe to get connected to the sewage system, the defendant who tenders payment to a judge for a favorable verdict. People were so incensed with the current government’s misdeeds that I often heard the disturbing refrain: “If Karzai is re-elected, then I am going to join the Taliban.” ...

More at The New York Times.

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16 September SWJ Roundup

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The Army after This

The Army after This
by Vegetius

The Army after This (Full PDF Article)

The American defense establishment today is torn in two directions. It is agonizing between becoming a high tech, cutting edge 21st century fighting force poised for the uncertainties of tomorrow’s challenges, or spending more money on preparing for the wars we currently have and are likely to fight in the next five years. The irony is that there does not need to be a choice. The United States has to be able to confront hostile high tech state actors as well as to handle the messy problems spawned by radical Islamic movements and the associated chaos caused by a breakdown in governance in many parts of the third world.

The Army after This (Full PDF Article)

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September 17, 2009

Center for Defense Studies

I headed downtown last night to attend a reception for the kick-off of American Enterprise Institute's Center for Defense Studies. AEI was a first-class host (h/t to Tom Donnelly and crew) making for a very enjoyable evening. CJCS Admiral Michael Mullen was the guest of honor and he delivered an insightful overview address concerning national security issues in general and of course Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq in particular.

The Center for Defense Studies can be found here. From the "About" page:

The American Enterprise Institute is pleased to announce the creation of its Center for Defense Studies (CDS). The primary purpose of the center is to impart a distinct identity to the scholarship on defense issues and military affairs currently produced at AEI, while signaling a new, focused intent to pursue rigorous studies and analysis on a range of strategic, programmatic, and budgetary issues.

The center will be anchored by a series of targeted studies and reports. The American military establishment is an enormous and complex institution, only occasionally (and usually in moments of crisis) amenable to decisive direction, but also requiring constant smaller course corrections. For every major strategic point of deflection in American defense policy, there are dozens of programmatic, budgetary, and force posture decisions and assessments to be made. One purpose of CDS will be to better shape and influence these decisions, to the extent that they both determine larger strategic choices and are the systemic expressions of American strategic purposes. To that end, CDS has undertaken the following projects:

- a study, cosponsored by the Brookings Institution, on the emerging requirements for U.S. nuclear forces which will re-examine the purpose and posture of America’s strategic systems and capabilities;
- a comprehensive assessment of American security commitments and defense requirements modeled on the Defense Department’s Quadrennial Defense Review;
- an ongoing study on the performance of the first Stryker brigade deployed to Afghanistan, undertaken in an effort to better understand and communicate to policymakers the technological requirements for conducting mounted operations in the theater;
- an evaluation of the “hard power” capabilities of America’s allies and security partners—and how they impact U.S. defense spending and alliance culture.

To complement these scholarly efforts, CDS will also host a blog, FYSA “For Your Situational Awareness” where AEI scholars and others will regularly post commentary and analysis. The CDS website also features a frequently updated column titled “Must Reads,” designed to highlight a selection of noteworthy books, reports, and articles which are (or should be) informing and driving the day’s defense policy debates.

We hope that the website serves as a useful resource, and we welcome your comments.

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17 September SWJ Roundup

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Sometimes, on the Afpak debate, this is how I feel...

The beat goes on, the beat goes on
Drums keep pounding a rhythm to the brain
La de da de de, la de da de da...

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Obama’s Europe missile defense plan – the good and the bad

Today President Obama scrapped the Bush administration’s plan to install 10 ground-based interceptor (GBI) missiles and a high-powered radar in Poland and the Czech Republic. Instead, Obama proposed a distributed four-phase build-up of missile defense capability in Europe, focusing at first on the shorter range missile threats from Iran and later on potential intermediate (IRBM) and intercontinental (ICBM) range threats. Progressively improved versions of the U.S. Navy’s Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) will be the centerpiece of the new architecture.

The Obama announcement (followed up by a press conference with Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General James Cartwright, USMC) is essentially a redefinition of the U.S. response to the broad Iranian ballistic missile threat. The Bush plan was focused on hedging against an Iranian IRBM/ICBM threat, thought to be possible around 2015. The Iranian short and medium range missile threat was always a known problem but in the Bush era was managed separately. The Obama team has redefined the “Europe missile defense” issue by encompassing the entire Iranian ballistic missile threat, which in the short run won’t involve Europe at all (unless you count Turkey in Europe).

In any case, here, lifted from the White House website, is the four-phase plan:

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Afghanistan is Hard All the Time, but It’s Doable

Afghanistan is Hard All the Time, but It’s Doable - David Petraeus, The Times opinion (General David Petraeus is Commander, United States Central Command. This is an edited and abridged version of a speech that he gave last night at a Policy Exchange event in London).

... Countering terrorists and extremism requires more than a conventional military approach. Military operations enable you to clear areas of extremist and insurgent elements, and to stop them from putting themselves back together. But the core of any counterinsurgency strategy must focus on the fact that the decisive terrain is the human terrain, not the high ground or river crossing.
Focusing on the population can, if done properly, improve security for local people and help to extend basic services. It can help to delegitimise the methods of the extremists - especially if you can contrast your ability and willingness to support and protect the population with the often horrific actions of extremist groups. Indeed, exposing their extremist ideologies, indiscriminate violence and oppressive practices can help people to realise that their lives are unlikely to be improved if under the control of such movements.
For the strategy to work, it is also necessary to find ways to identify reconcilable members of insurgent elements and to transform them into part of the solution...

More at The Times.

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Exploring Three Strategies for Afghanistan

Exploring Three Strategies for Afghanistan - Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. Witnesses were Dr. John Nagl, President, Center for a New American Security (prepared statement); Dr. Stephen Biddle, Senior Fellow for Defense Policy, Council on Foreign Relations (prepared statement); and Rory Stewart, Director, Carr Center on Human Rights Policy (prepared statement). A video recording of the hearing can be found here (click on the title).

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Stability Operations: DoD Instruction 3000.05

Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05 - Stability Operations, released on 16 September 2009, was signed by Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michèle A. Flournoy.

Stability Operations Definition: For the purposes of this Instruction, stability operations is defined as an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.

Continue on for key excerpts...

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September 18, 2009

The Art of Declaring Victory and Going Home

The Art of Declaring Victory and Going Home
Strategic Communication and the Management of Expectations
by Dr. Tony Corn

The Art of Declaring Victory and Going Home (Full PDF Article)

Whether in three months, three years, or three decades, the U.S. will have to withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan some day. At this particular juncture, the Washington commentariat should be less concerned with the precise timing of any withdrawal than with the exact manner in which – when the time comes - the U.S. can convincingly “declare victory and go home.”

Contrary to a naïve belief, actions rarely speak for themselves. The choice of a communication strategy determines whether a military build-up is perceived as a temporary “surge,” or an open-ended “escalation,” and this initial perception, in turn, determines whether a future withdrawal will be perceived as “mission accomplished,” or “lack of resolve.”

At its most sophisticated, strategic communication is the art of managing expectations of friends and foes alike in a timely fashion. If there is only one lesson of Vietnam that the Obama Administration should meditate at this point, it is that unexpected cascading effects can make the most seemingly-cautious incremental strategy unravel in no time. In 1968, it took only two months from the beginning of the Tet offensive (January 31) for a President Johnson, overtaken by events, to announce that he would not seek re-election (March 31).

While it is hard to quarrel with those who argue today that America’s initial goals in Afghanistan have been met, it is still too early to heed calls to “declare victory and go home.” If nothing else, the continued presence of U.S. troops on Iran’s Western and Eastern borders has a nice way of “concentrating the mind” of the ayatollahs.

But it is not too early to realize that managing expectations over Afghanistan today is the most effective way of salvaging America’s reputation (not to mention the President’s own re-election) tomorrow. Irrespective of the future course of action in Afghanistan, the White House should not wait much longer before coming up with an “inoculation strategy” (as they say in comspeak) that will pre-empt future foreign attempts to equate an American withdrawal with a U.S. retreat or a U.S. defeat.

The Art of Declaring Victory and Going Home (Full PDF Article)

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18 September SWJ Roundup

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Theory, Policy, and Strategy: A Conceptual Muddle

Theory, Policy, and Strategy
A Conceptual Muddle
by Adam Elkus and Mark Safranski

Theory, Policy, and Strategy: A Conceptual Muddle (Full PDF Article)

It is impossible not to notice that elements of the current acrimonious debates over theory, operations, and practice are proxies for larger political differences over the use of force and its relationship to American national interests. So why are these fundamental policy disagreements being expressed through debate over technical points of military doctrine?

The answer lies in the uncertain, even negligent, muddle that has substituted for a clear paradigm to guide US grand strategy. Because policymakers have failed to define clear US interests, goals, and objectives, attempts have been made to derive grand strategic principles from theoretical debates or operational concerns. While these debates have been intellectually stimulating and often very useful to developing US national security and military doctrine, they cannot sustain US grand strategy. While strategic drift might be inevitable in country where much of strategy is determined by the cleavages of domestic politics, the cost of meandering can be measured in lost opportunities, treasure squandered, and lives lost. Policymakers must make a stand for a strong strategic paradigm to guide US operational methodologies.

Theory, Policy, and Strategy: A Conceptual Muddle (Full PDF Article)

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This Week at War: A work in progress

Here is the latest edition of my column at Foreign Policy:

Topics include:

1) Obama’s Afghan strategy - a blank page,

2) America’s spies adjust to the post-al Qaeda era.

Obama’s Afghan strategy - a blank page

According to a Sept. 17 Washington Post article, President Barack Obama stated he is waiting on making a decision about sending more soldiers to Afghanistan until he has “absolute clarity about what the strategy is going to be."

This declaration will come as a surprise to those who thought he had decided on his strategy for Afghanistan on March 27th. Are Obama and his advisers preparing to rip up the March strategy and delete this link from the White House Website?

The answer is yes. In his remarks on Sept. 16 to the American Enterprise Institute, Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm. Michael Mullen said that the administration was reviewing its strategy for Afghanistan, starting from “first principles.” Why would the Obama team feel the need to do that? Mullen had an answer for that – if Hamid Karzai’s reelection to the Afghan presidency is not accepted as legitimate, “hard questions” about the viability of the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan would follow.

Obama has undoubtedly concluded that he has little chance of sustaining political support in the United States for the Afghan effort if there is little acceptance of Karzai as the legitimate winner of the election. The best case scenario is a second-round runoff, which would at least give the Afghan election process a chance to redeem its legitimacy. But a final, well-scrubbed result to the first round may be a month away; a hypothetical second could stretch into 2010. Obama will see no point in making a decision on a new strategy, and the resources such a strategy will require, until a basic premise -- the legitimacy of the Afghan government -- is established.

Click through to read more ...

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September 19, 2009

19 September SWJ Roundup

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Saturday Morning Links

COIN Center SITREP - Latest monthly SITREP from the US Army / US Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center. Includes Security Force Assistance.

SSI September 2009 Newsletter - Strategic Studies Institute's monthly newsletter. Includes new publications, events and an op-ed on national security strategy reform.

Winning In Afghanistan - Anthony Cordesman, Center for Strategic and International Studies. The US will fail ... if the Administration and the Congress temporize and delay.

Iraqi Insurgents Take the Offensive as Parliamentary Elections Approach - Ramzy Mardini, Jamestown Foundation. Regardless of the security gains made in Iraq, the country is still riddled with poor institutions, ethnic and tribal rivalries and an absence of genuine reconciliation efforts.

GAO Report on Homeland Defense - September 2009 report to Congress on US Northern Command efforts.

CJCS Speech - Full transcript of Admiral Michael Mullin's remarks Wednesday at the American Enterprise Institute.

Arrr! - Today be the day me hearties!

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September 20, 2009

Bosnia's Lesson

Bosnia's Lesson - George Will, Washington Post opinion.

For 11 days in late August and early September in 1995, US and NATO air power defended Bosnian Muslims, who were being attacked by Bosnian Serbs, who were supported by Serbian Serbs. This was merely the overture to something much more ambitious - a grand concert of nation-building that began when the Dayton agreement reached in December of that year calmed the Balkan furies of revanchism and revenge, for a while.
But agreements, like flowers, last while they last, and today's fraying of Bosnia is not the fault of Richard Holbrooke, whose skill and tenacity produced the Dayton peace. Or perhaps the Dayton pause. Holbrooke, whose diplomatic career began in Vietnam, continues in the Obama administration, where his portfolio is Afghanistan and Pakistan. As the president contemplates an ambitious mission in the former, as a prophylactic measure to stabilize the latter, he should read "The Death of Dayton: How to Stop Bosnia From Falling Apart," in Foreign Affairs.
Political scientists Patrice C. McMahon and Jon Western note that Bosnia was "once the poster child for international reconstruction efforts" and was considered "proof that under the right conditions the international community could successfully rebuild conflict-ridden countries." Now, however, Bosnia "stands on the brink of collapse." ...

More at The Washington Post.

How to Stop Bosnia From Falling Apart - Patrice C. McMahon and Jon Western, Foreign Affairs.

After 14 years of intense international efforts to stabilize and rebuild Bosnia, the country now stands on the brink of collapse. For the first time since November 1995 - when the Dayton accord ended three and a half years of bloody ethnic strife - Bosnians are once again talking about the potential for war.
Bosnia was once the poster child for international reconstruction efforts. It was routinely touted by US and European leaders as proof that under the right conditions the international community could successfully rebuild conflict-ridden countries. The 1995 Dayton peace agreement divided Bosnia into two semi-independent entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, inhabited mainly by Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, and the Serb-dominated Republika Srpska (Serb Republic, or RS), each with its own government, controlling taxation, educational policy, and even foreign policy. Soon after the war's end, the country was flooded with attention and over $14 billion in international aid, making it a laboratory for what was arguably the most extensive and innovative democratization experiment in history. By the end of 1996, 17 different foreign governments, 18 UN agencies, 27 intergovernmental organizations, and about 200 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) - not to mention tens of thousands of troops from across the globe - were involved in reconstruction efforts. On a per capita basis, the reconstruction of Bosnia - with less than four million citizens -- made the post-World War II rebuilding of Germany and Japan look modest...

More at Foreign Affairs.

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A Better Missile Defense for a Safer Europe

A Better Missile Defense for a Safer Europe - Robert M. Gates, New York Times opinion.

The future of missile defense in Europe is secure. This reality is contrary to what some critics have alleged about President Obama’s proposed shift in America’s missile-defense plans on the continent - and it is important to understand how and why.
First, to be clear, there is now no strategic missile defense in Europe. In December 2006, just days after becoming secretary of defense, I recommended to President George W. Bush that the United States place 10 ground-based interceptors in Poland and an advanced radar in the Czech Republic. This system was designed to identify and destroy up to about five long-range missiles potentially armed with nuclear warheads fired from the Middle East - the greatest and most likely danger being from Iran. At the time, it was the best plan based on the technology and threat assessment available.
That plan would have put the radar and interceptors in Central Europe by 2015 at the earliest. Delays in the Polish and Czech ratification process extended that schedule by at least two years. Which is to say, under the previous program, there would have been no missile-defense system able to protect against Iranian missiles until at least 2017 - and likely much later...

More at The New York Times.

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CIA Afghanistan "Surge"

CIA Expanding Presence in Afghanistan - Greg Miller, Los Angeles Times.

The CIA is deploying teams of spies, analysts and paramilitary operatives to Afghanistan, part of a broad intelligence "surge" that will make its station there among the largest in the agency's history, US officials say. When complete, the CIA's presence in the country is expected to rival the size of its massive stations in Iraq and Vietnam at the height of those wars. Precise numbers are classified, but one US official said the agency already has nearly 700 employees in Afghanistan.
The influx parallels the US military expansion and comes as the nation's spy services are under pressure from Army Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal to improve intelligence on the Taliban and find ways to reverse a series of unsettling trends. Among them are a twofold increase in the number of roadside bombs, a growing sophistication in the kinds of assaults aimed at coalition troops and evidence that a Taliban group has developed an assembly-line approach to grooming suicide bombers and supplying them to other insurgent organizations...

More at The Los Angeles Times.

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20 September SWJ Roundup

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'Civilian Surge' Plan For Afghanistan Hits A Snag

'Civilian Surge' Plan For Afghanistan Hits A Snag - Jackie Northam, National Public Radio.

Speculation abounds over whether President Obama will authorize a troop increase in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the administration is expected to increase the deployment of American government civilian workers - experts who can help rebuild the country. But there are problems persuading civilians with the requisite skills to go to Afghanistan. When Obama unveiled his administration's strategy for Afghanistan in March, he emphasized that civilian experts were just as critical as the tens of thousands of additional US military personnel he was sending at that time.
"We need agricultural specialists and educators, engineers and lawyers," he said. "That's how we can help the Afghan government serve its people, and develop an economy that isn't dominated by illicit drugs. That's why I'm ordering a substantial increase in our civilians on the ground." To that end, the administration announced it would send about 450 civilians from several branches of the government by March 2010. The timetable was then accelerated to December of this year. But so far, only about a quarter of that number have been deployed to Afghanistan...

More at NPR.

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The Birth of Modern Counterinsurgency

The Picture Awaits: The Birth of Modern Counterinsurgency - Anne Marlowe, World Affairs.

At the time of the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003, counterinsurgency theory was about as popular in American military circles as tank warfare is today. An early study by the chief war planner for the 101st Airborne Division during its first deployment to Iraq reported “a collective cognitive dissonance on the part of the US Army to recognize a war of rebellion, a people’s war, even when they were fighting it.” There was a reason for this. Eager to forget the most painful experience in its history, the army had all but banished counterinsurgency from the lexicon of American military affairs after Vietnam. As a result, the army relied on a flawed strategy in Iraq for a period that lasted, according to author Thomas Ricks, at least “twenty months or more.
As US Army Colonel Gian Gentile has summarized this line of argument, there was a “bad war” in Iraq fought by officers who ignored the theory and practice of counterinsurgency, followed by a “good war” fought by its champions. In Vietnam, however, even the “bad” war was fought by commanders deeply versed in the tactics, techniques, and procedures of counterinsurgency (COIN)—much more, in any case, than their counterparts were on September 11, 2001. The United States may have gone, in James Fallows’s memorable phrase, “Blind into Baghdad.” It did not march blindly into Vietnam. On the contrary, counterinsurgency theory enjoyed a special vogue in the 1960s: it was certainly more fashionable and better understood by an educated public than it is today. Especially among military officers, COIN was more roundly known during this era than at any time up until the release of Field Manual 3-24 in December 2006...

More at World Affairs. SWJ hat tip to Victor Lamparski, Editor, War News Updates.

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Obama's Sunday TV Blitz

Obama's Sunday TV Blitz - Washington Post 44 Blog.

President Obama said Sunday he will remain skeptical about the need for more US troops in Afghanistan until he is satisfied that the military has the right strategy for winning the war there. In taped interviews on five Sunday morning news programs, Obama said his top generals have completed another review of that strategy, and that he will not act on a further troop increase until he is satisfied that the review has produced a winnable approach.
"What I'm not also gonna do, though, is put the resource question before the strategy question," Obama told NBC's David Gregory on "Meet the Press." "Until I'm satisfied that we've got the right strategy I'm not gonna be sending some young man or woman over there- beyond what we already have." ...

More at The Washington Post.

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September 21, 2009

McChrystal: More Forces or 'Mission Failure'

Via The Washington Post:

The top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan warns in an urgent, confidential assessment of the war that he needs more forces within the next year and bluntly states that without them, the eight-year conflict “will likely result in failure,” according to a copy of the 66-page document obtained by The Washington Post. Bob Woodward reports; Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Karen DeYoung provide analysis; and a declassified version of document is available on washingtonpost.com.

The Report: Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal says emphatically: “Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term (next 12 months) — while Afghan security capacity matures — risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible.” … McChrystal describes an Afghan government riddled with corruption and an international force undermined by tactics that alienate civilians. He provides extensive new details about the Taliban insurgency, which he calls a muscular and sophisticated enemy that uses modern propaganda and systematically reaches into Afghanistan’s prisons to recruit members and even plan operations.

Bob Woodward’s full story can be found here.

Analysis: McChrystal’s assessment, in the view of two senior administration officials, is just “one input” in the White House’s decision-making process. … When Obama announced his strategy in March, there were few specifics fleshing out his broad goals, and the military was left to interpret how to implement them. As they struggle over how to adjust to changing reality on the ground, some in the administration have begun to fault McChrystal for taking the policy beyond where Obama intended, with no easy exit. But Obama’s deliberative pace — he has held only one meeting of his top national security advisers to discuss McChrystal’s report so far — is a source of growing consternation within the military. “Either accept the assessment or correct it, or let’s have a discussion,” one Pentagon official said. “Will you read it and tell us what you think?” Within the military, this official said, “there is a frustration. A significant frustration. A serious frustration.”

The full piece by Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Karen DeYoung can be found here.

The Department of Defense on Sunday evening released a declassified version of Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal's assessment of the war in Afghanistan. The Post agreed to publish this version, which includes minor deletions of material that officials said could compromise future operations, rather than a copy of the document marked "confidential." The document can be viewed here.

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21 September SWJ Roundup

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More Forces or 'Mission Failure': Initial Thoughts

Here's a sampling of some early reaction - and in no particular order - to General Stanley A. McChrystal's COMISAF's Initial Assessment - released last night and posted by The Washington Post.

The Clock is Ticking - Tom Donnelly, AEI / CDS: Bob Woodward’s story in today’s Washington Post summarizes the Afghanistan “assessment” of Gen. Stanely McChrystal. It’s a good get by the dean of Washington insiders, but the report has been ripening in the Indian summer sun since August 30 and its main points–including the need for more troops - are hardly news. What is remarkable is how long it’s taking for the president to make up his mind.

The Case for More Boots on the Ground - David Wood, Politics Daily: In the sputtering debate about Afghanistan and what to do about the war, I haven't heard anyone advocate surrendering to the Taliban. What I have heard are lots of thoughts about how to make the war less painful, at least for us. Force the allies to do more. Train the Afghans to fight in our place. Cut back our own forces, just a bit. Find a cheaper way to fight, one that doesn't involve so darned many American troops. I particularly like this last one, because it feeds into the fantasy that superior American technology can overcome any adversary almost bloodlessly, especially the bearded primitives of Afghanistan.

Gulliver In Afghanistan - Andrew Sullivan, The Daily Dish: General McChrystal is to be congratulated, it seems to me, for the candor and seriousness of his report to the president on what has gone so wrong in Afghanistan and what can be done to set it right. McChrystal's role is to find a way to win: he's a soldier fighting a war. And yet this hardest of hard-nosed military men essentially concedes that this is a political problem at its heart. You cannot fight a counter-insurgency on behalf of a government that is as corrupt as Karzai's.

The Odd Optics of the 'Strategic Review' - Marc Lynch, Abu Aardvark: I must confess to finding the entire exercise baffling. The "strategic review" brought together a dozen smart (mostly) think-tankers with little expertise in Afghanistan but a general track record of supporting calls for more troops and a new counter-insurgency strategy. They set up shop in Afghanistan for a month working in close coordination with Gen. McChrystal, and emerged with a well-written, closely argued warning that the situation is dire and a call for more troops and a new counter-insurgency strategy. Shocking. Were it not for the optics of a leaked "strategic review" amidst an intensifying public debate, I doubt this would dominate the front pages.

The Afghanistan Strategic Review - Judah Grunstein, World Politics Review: Most of its principle elements have already emerged since July, but to see them finally gathered and presented in a coherent draft helps clarify the assessment of where things stand. Curiously, I was most impressed and encouraged by the discussion of the Afghan insurgency's strengths (pp. 2-5/2-8). I found myself thinking that, despite all of the insurgency's recent advances, our understanding of its various strands, how they overlap, and their lines of operation seems sophisticated enough to render aggressive kinetic operations effective.

What Strategy? This Strategy - Max Boot, Contentions: Keep in mind that this is the assessment of the administration’s handpicked general, who was brought in to replace a competent but uninspiring incumbent; he was judged the best man for the job. General McChrystal has done what was expected of him. He has delivered a cogent and impressive review of the situation, one that lays out his new strategy. Now he is simply waiting for the resources needed to execute that strategy. Without those resources, the “likely result,” he warns, is “failure.” Yes, one might prefer that debate take place according to a set of rules from a fabled age of civility, where politics stopped at the water's edge, generals were unfailingly deferential to civilian political leadership, and nothing was ever leaked to the press.

Debating Afghanistan: Beyond the McChrystal Leak - James Joyner, The New Atlanticist: Still, the tide has certainly shifted, with the Washington consensus that "winning" in Afghanistan is necessary having given way to serious doubts about whether "winning" is even possible - or even if we know what it means. Inertia and calls from respected generals for more troops to "finish what we've started" will likely prevail in the short run but, absent a rapid change in perception, it will be incumbent on the pro war side to make the case for staying the course.

And by “Strategy,” We Meant… - Tim Sullivan, AEI / CDS: So what gives? It can only be assumed that the president’s strategic objectives have shifted, or that the administration is somehow dissatisfied with elements of the military plan conceived by Gen. McChrystal. As Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Karen DeYoung suggest in today’s Post, it’s likely some combination of the two.

To Look Good Or To Feel Good? - Jules Crittenden, Forward Movement: Don’t forget the rest of the world and all of our allies and enemies out there, also paying attention. Our last big fashion faux pas, Vietnam, was all over us like a cheap suit for decades. Right up to Sept. 11, 2001. The problem is, the decision is still in the hands of people who have signalled that they can’t tell the different between looking good and feeling good.

Bob Woodward Strikes Again! - Peter Feaver, Shadow Government: It is not good to have a document like this leaked into the public debate before the President has made his decision. Whether you favor ramping up or ramping down or ramping laterally, as a process matter, the Commander-in-Chief ought to be able to conduct internal deliberations on sensitive matters without it appearing concurrently on the front pages of the Post. I assume the Obama team is very angry about this, and I think they have every right to be.

General McChrystal's Report on Afghanistan and External Influences - Bill Roggio, Threat Matrix: There are a couple of redacted sections of the report that would have made interesting reading, such as information on Taliban operations and the groups' command and control, and Taliban control throughout the country. One part of the report that will get lost in the inevitable political debate on the Afghan surge will be McChrystal's assessment of "External Influences" on Afghanistan. The assessments are brief but reinforce the available information on the safe havens in Pakistan and the ISI's role in aiding the Taliban, as well as the role of Iran's Qods Force in training and arming elements of the Taliban.

Why Does McChrystal Need More Troops for Afghanistan? - Gordon Lubold, Christian Science Monitor: McChrystal's apparent answer is that the US must mount a proper counterinsurgency effort. In the bumper-sticker parlance of counterinsurgency, coalition forces must clear, hold, and build. To do that, the US and its allies must protect the population, weed out the insurgency that attempts to grow among it, and train an indigenous security force to ultimately take over the mission. Afghanistan has long been an "under-resourced" mission, McChrystal says. This prevents coalition forces from being able to "hold" an area after clearing it. That creates a vacuum the insurgency can once again fill.

Winning Afghan Hearts and Minds - Patrick Walters, The Australian: Primarily, the war requires more coalition troops, and soon, if the military initiative is to be regained and the Taliban insurgency thwarted. McChrystal's conclusion is that the overall situation in Afghanistan is deteriorating and that without a clear step-up and an overhaul of strategy and tactics, the US-led coalition cannot succeed. McChrystal's 66-page study was completed late last month and leaked to The Washington Post yesterday. At the core of McChrystal's bleak assessment is the view that US strategy in Afghanistan cannot only be focused on seizing terrain or destroying Taliban insurgents.

The McChrystal Report: A Make or Break Moment for Obama - Michael Goldfarb, Weekly Standard: It's probably not a coincidence that the McChrystal report leaked just as Obama looked like he was going wobbly on his commitment to the war effort. Democrats on the Hill are already threatening to obstruct funding for additional US forces - Pelosi, Levin, and Murtha among them - and Obama was skeptical of the need for more US forces on the Sunday shows yesterday. "I don't want to put the resource question before the strategy question," Obama told CNN's John King. "Because there is a natural inclination to say, if I get more, then I can do more. But right now, the question is, the first question is, are we doing the right thing? Are we pursuing the right strategy?"

Now That the McChrystal Strategy Review Has Leaked … - Spencer Ackerman, Washington Indpendent: McChrystal can’t be faulted for presuming that Obama’s commitment in March to a counterinsurgency campaign for a counterterrorism goal meant he should interpret counterinsurgency as broadly as he could or pursue it as aggressively as he could. Nor can the administration be faulted for worrying that such commitments push the means into overtaking the ends they’re supposed to yield. And the public can’t be faulted for turning away from a war that exhibits such strategic drift. But the leak of the strategy review means it’s now harder for everyone to make rational decisions without worrying whether their bureaucratic adversaries are going to undermine them in the media.

It is 'Fish or Cut Bait" Time - McQ, Blackfive: Note that the word used is "success", not "victory". I'm not one to quibble about those words. Victory is used in a military sense. Victory is success. But we all know that while the military is an integral part of any success we might have there, ultimately it can't "win" the day by itself. Success will be defined as leaving a sovereign nation capable of governing and defending itself when we eventually leave. We may not like that definition, we may not like the fact that we're again engaged in nation building and we may not like the fact that such an endeavor is going to take years, possibly decades to achieve - but that is the situation we now find ourselves in. If we were to abandon Afghanistan now, we'd see it quickly revert to the state it was in 2001 - ruled by Islamic fundamentalists and a safe-haven for our most avowed enemies.

McChrystal to Resign if Not Given Resources for Afghanistan - Bill Roggio, Threat Matrix: Within 24 hours of the leak of the Afghanistan assessment to The Washington Post, General Stanley McChrystal's team fired its second shot across the bow of the Obama administration. According to McClatchy, military officers close to General McChrystal said he is prepared to resign if he isn't given sufficient resources (read troops) to implement a change in direction in Afghanistan.

Continue reading "More Forces or 'Mission Failure': Initial Thoughts" »

September 22, 2009

A Pragmatist, Gates Reshapes Policy He Backed

A Pragmatist, Gates Reshapes Policy He Backed - Peter Baker and Thom Shanker, New York Times.

On his tenth day on the job, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates signed off on an ambitious if politically charged plan to build a new missile shield in Europe. Just two weeks later, he supported an even more wrenching decision to send additional American troops to Iraq, into a war that was not going well.
That was nearly three years, one president and a political lifetime ago. Now serving Barack Obama instead of George W. Bush, Mr. Gates just recommended jettisoning his own missile defense program in favor of a reformulated version and once again is wrestling with whether to send more troops abroad, in this case to Afghanistan.
Quiet and unassuming, Mr. Gates has emerged as the man in the middle between policies of the past he once championed and the revisions and reversals he is now carrying out. His stature and credibility have allowed him to extract concessions on the inside, including on missile defense, according to senior officials, while serving as a formidable shield against Republican spears on the outside...

More at The New York Times.

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Maladies of Interpreters

Maladies of Interpreters - Joshua Foust, New York Times opinion.

In counterinsurgency, the most important thing is winning over the local population. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the commander in charge of all NATO forces in Afghanistan, was right to warn that a “crisis of confidence among Afghans” imperils the effort to rebuild the country. For most American troops, however, the only connection they have to the locals - whether soldiers in the Afghan army or villagers they’re trying to secure - is through their interpreters.
United States Army doctrine describes interpreters as “vital,” which is fairly obvious given the bevy of languages spoken in Afghanistan: Dari, Pashto, Tajik, Uzbek and others. Yet the way the military uses translators is too often haphazard and sometimes dangerously negligent. Many units consider interpreters to be necessary evils, and even those who are Americans of Afghan descent are often scorned or mistreated for being too obviously “different.”
Mission Essential Personnel, the primary contractor providing interpreters in Afghanistan, has basic guidelines: interpreters need to be given a place to sleep, for example, and fed. But beyond that, how they are treated is often left up to the individual unit. Many times, they are treated the way they should be: as vital members of a team. Sometimes, however, they are shockingly disrespected...

More at The New York Times.

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Obama's Befuddling Afghan Policy

Obama's Befuddling Afghan Policy - Leslie H. Gelb, Wall Street Journal opinion.

I'm lost on President Barack Obama's Afghanistan policy - along with most of Congress and the US military. Not quite eight months ago, Mr. Obama pledged to "defeat" al Qaeda in Afghanistan by transforming that country's political and economic infrastructure, training Afghan forces and adding 21,000 US forces for starters. He proclaimed Afghanistan's strategic centrality to prevent Muslim extremism from taking over Pakistan - an even more vital nation because of its nuclear weapons. And a mere three weeks ago, he punctuated his commitments by proclaiming that Afghanistan is a "war of necessity," not one of choice. White House spokesmen reinforced this by promising that the president would "fully resource" the war.
Yet less than one week ago, Mr. Obama said the following about troop increases: "I'm going to take a very deliberate process in making those decisions. There is no immediate decision pending on resources, because one of the things that I'm absolutely clear about is you have to get the strategy right and then make a determination about resources." He repeated that on Sunday's talk shows.
Are we now to understand that he made all those previous declarations and decisions without a strategy he was committed to? Prior to his recent statements, it seemed clear that the president and his advisers had adopted a strategy already - the counterinsurgency one - and that Gen. Stanley McChrystal was tapped precisely because he would implement that plan. The idea, to repeat, was to deploy forces sufficient to clear territory of Taliban threats, hold that territory, and build up the sinews of the country behind that...

More at The Wall Street Journal.

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22 September SWJ Roundup

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A Comprehensive Strategy for Afghanistan: Afghanistan Force Requirements

A Comprehensive Strategy for Afghanistan: Afghanistan Force Requirements - Frederick Kagan, American Enterprise Institute, and Kimberly Kagan, Institute for the Study of War.

President Obama identified a number of questions that must be answered before he can make a considered decision about whether or not to increase troop levels in Afghanistan. The assessment of General Stanley McChrystal, which appeared in the Washington Post on Monday, answers those questions. The assessment does not provide an estimate of the forces actually required, which were to be submitted in a later document.
The American people need to have a detailed explanation as soon as possible of what forces are needed, how they might be used, and why there is no alternative to pursuing the counter-insurgency strategy that General McChrystal proposes if we are to achieve the fundamental objectives President Obama announced in his March 27 speech, “…to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future."
To inform the national discussion, therefore, we have produced a report that argues for an addition of 40,000-45,000 US troops in 2010 to the 68,000 American forces that will be there by the end of this year. The report illustrates where US, NATO, and Afghan forces are now and where additional forces are needed to accomplish the mission. It links the US force requirements to the growth of the Afghan National Security Forces on an accelerated timeline. It explains the methodology for assessing the adequacy of a proposed force-level. This product, and our recommendations and assessments, are entirely our own - they do not necessarily reflect the views of General McChrystal or anyone else.

Afghanistan Force Requirements - Slide Presentation

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The Army wants your comments on its new Capstone Concept

Brigadier General H.R. McMaster has sent to Small Wars Journal the latest draft of Army Capstone Concept version 2.7. McMaster leads a team at TRADOC that is charged with revising the Capstone Concept, which provides fundamental guidance to the Army’s doctrine and training efforts.

By December, McMaster and his team will complete their work on the Capstone Concept. Between now and then, he wants to hear from you. So please open this file, read it, and provide your comments, either here or at the Capstone Concept comment thread at Small Wars Council. McMaster and his team will read these comments and use them to improve this important document.

(You will note that the Capstone Concept draft we received is marked “For Official Use Only.” I assure you that we received this document openly from the Army and for the purposes explained above. McMaster and his colleagues at TRADOC want Small Wars Journal’s readers to help them improve the Capstone Concept.)

UPDATE (1515 EST 24 Sept 09): TRADOC sent me a version of the file without the "For Official Use Only" notation, which I have inserted.

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Stirring Popular Resistance to Insurgency

Admin Note: This article has been removed - temporarily we hope - while it is reviewed by official authorities.

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September 23, 2009

23 September SWJ Roundup

Continue on for today's Small Wars Journal news and opinion roundup...

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September 24, 2009

Britain's Afghan Wisdom

Britain's Afghan Wisdom - David Ignatius, Washington Post opinion.

When it comes to Afghanistan, the British have a special perspective: Every mistake the United States has made recently, they made 150 years ago. So it's worth listening to British experts in the debate over Afghan strategy. Afghanistan drove the British bonkers for much of the 19th century. They couldn't control the place, but they couldn't walk away from it, either. They found that there wasn't a military solution, but there wasn't a non-military solution. It was a question of managing chaos. Sound familiar?
The best answer the British came up with was working with tribal leaders in the border regions - paying them subsidies, wooing them away from the baddies who genuinely threatened British interests, but otherwise letting them run their own affairs. That was a cynical approach and it left Afghanistan a poor, backward country. But it worked adequately, especially compared with the alternative, which was unending bloodshed in a faraway country that refused to be colonized. A modern version of this "work with the tribes" approach is still the best answer. And it seems to be an important part of Gen. Stanley McChrystal's strategy that was leaked this week. It's dressed up in the language of counterinsurgency - he speaks of "population-centric" operations, and he uses the word "community" 44 times, by my count. But his assessment is basically a discussion of how to stabilize the country without just shooting people...

More at The Washington Post.

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