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May 2009 Archives

May 1, 2009

A Young Marine’s Dream Job

Training Afghans as Bullets Fly: A Young Marine’s Dream Job - C. J. Chivers, New York Times

Three stone houses and a cluster of sandbagged bunkers cling to a slope above the Korangal Valley, forming an oval perimeter roughly 75 yards long. The oval is reinforced with timber and ringed with concertina wire.
An Afghan flag flutters atop a tower where Afghan soldiers look out, ducking when rifle shots snap by.
This is Firebase Vimoto, named for Pfc. Timothy R. Vimoto, an American soldier killed in the valley two years ago. If all goes according to the Pentagon’s plan, this tiny perimeter - home to an Afghan platoon and two Marine Corps infantrymen - contains the future of Afghanistan. The Obama administration hopes that eventually the Afghan soldiers within will become self-sufficient, allowing the fight against the Taliban to be shifted to local hands...

More at The New York Times.

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1 May SWJ Roundup

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This Week at War

This week's SWJ contribution to Foreign Policy - This Week at War by Robert Haddick - is now posted. Topics include - Do Pakistan's leaders lack an instinct for survival? - Will the United States ever fix its combat advisor problems?

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May 2, 2009

Sit Down

Ex-Spy Sits Down With Islamists and the West - Robert F. Worth, New York Times.

Talking to Islamists is the new order of the day in Washington and London. The Obama administration wants a dialogue with Iran, and the British Foreign Office has decided to reopen diplomatic contacts with Hezbollah, the Shiite militant group based here.
But for several years, small groups of Western diplomats have made quiet trips to Beirut for confidential sessions with members of Hamas, Hezbollah and other Islamist groups they did not want to be seen talking to. In hotel conference rooms, they would warily shake hands, then spend hours listening and hashing out accusations of terrorism on one side and imperial arrogance on the other.
The organizer of these back-door encounters is Alastair Crooke, a quiet, sandy-haired man of 59 who spent three decades working for MI6, the British secret intelligence service. He now runs an organization here called Conflicts Forum, with an unusual board of advisers that includes former spies, diplomats and peace activists...

More at The New York Times.

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2 May SWJ Roundup

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Garbage, Lies, and Uncertainties

Garbage, Lies, and Uncertainties
Deception vs. Risk in War
by Bing West
Reprinted with Permission by Marine Corps Gazette

Garbage, Lies, and Uncertainties (Full PDF Article)

This article addresses why assessments were poor in Iraq and what can be done to improve risk assessment in Afghanistan. Seven months after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, retired Marine Gen Anthony C. “Tony” Zinni gave a blistering speech. “My contemporaries, our feelings and sensitivities were forged on the battlefields of Vietnam,” he said, “where we heard the garbage and lies, and we saw the sacrifice. I ask you, is it happening again?”1 The audience of Navy and Marine officers rose in applause, presumably cheering a criticism of civilian officials, and not of themselves.

That was a misleading illusion. In Vietnam, generals as well as policymakers and politicians contributed to failure. In 1966 President Lyndon B. Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara ordered GEN William C. Westmoreland, the commander in South Vietnam, to undertake a strategy to “attrit [sic]… [the Communist forces] at a rate as high as their capability to put men into the field.”2 Westmoreland enthusiastically championed the attrition strategy. Inside the military, only the Marines dissented. Overall, the U.S. military command agreed with a strategy that substituted physical for moral determination and led to body counts as the measure of progress. McNamara gradually came to disbelieve the military reports and quietly turned against the war.

Thus there was “garbage” in the form of body counts inflated by the military and “lies” (deception) by a Secretary of Defense who did not believe in his own strategy, plus a Joint Chiefs of Staff that did not demur in a flawed strategy. Generals and civilian officials alike shared responsibility for the conduct of the war.

Garbage, Lies, and Uncertainties (Full PDF Article)

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Two Weeks Left for Pakistan?

US General Says Pakistan Could be Just Two Weeks from Collapse - Isambard Wilkinson, Daily Telegraph.

There may be just two weeks left to prevent the Taliban from overthrowing Pakistan’s government, Gen David Petraeus, the commander of American forces in the region, has told officials.
American officials have watched with growing anxiety as Taliban fighters have strengthened their grip on north-western Pakistan.
Militants advanced to within 60 miles of Islamabad, the capital, last month and were pushed back only when the US put pressure on Pakistan to launch a counter-offensive.
Gen Petraeus, the head of Central Command, which covers all US forces in the Middle East and south Asia, is reported to have said that “the Pakistanis have run out of excuses” and now accept that tough action has to be taken to guarantee the government’s survival...

More at The Daily Telegraph.

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May 3, 2009

Moment of Truth in Pakistan

Moment of Truth in Pakistan - David Ignatius, Washington Post opinion.

President Obama convened a crisis meeting at the White House last Monday to hear a report from Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who had just returned from Pakistan. Mullen described the worrying situation there, with Taliban insurgents moving closer to the capital, Islamabad.
"It had gotten significantly worse than I expected as the Swat deal unraveled," Mullen explained in an interview. He was referring to a truce brokered in February in the Swat Valley, about 100 miles north of Islamabad. The Pakistani military had expected that the cease-fire would subdue Taliban fighters in Swat. Instead, the Muslim militants surged south into the district of Buner, on the doorstep of the capital.
Listening to Mullen's report at the White House were two senior officials - Defense Secretary Bob Gates and special envoy Richard Holbrooke - who were serving in government back in 1979, when a Muslim insurgency toppled the Iranian government, with harmful consequences that persist to this day. The two policy veterans "made the argument that it's worth studying the Iran model," recalls a senior official who took part in the White House meeting...

More at The Washington Post.

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3 May SWJ Roundup

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US Drone Attacks in Pakistan Backfiring?

US Drone Attacks in Pakistan 'Backfiring,' Congress Told - Doyle McManus, Los Angeles Times opinion.

David Kilcullen is no soft-headed peacenik.
He's a beefy, 41-year-old former Australian army officer who served in Iraq as a top advisor to US Army Gen. David H. Petraeus. He's one of the counter-insurgency warrior/theorists who designed Petraeus' successful "surge" of troops into the streets of Baghdad.
But a few days ago, when a congressman asked Kilcullen what the US government should do in Pakistan, the Australian guerrilla fighter sounded like an antiwar protester.
"We need to call off the drones," Kilcullen said.
In the arid valleys of western Pakistan, the United States is fighting a strange, long-distance war against Al Qaeda, the Taliban and their Pakistani allies. Unmanned "drone" airplanes take off from secret runways, seek out suspected terrorists and, with CIA employees at the remote controls, fire missiles to blow them up.
Officially, this is a covert program, and the CIA won't acknowledge that it's going on at all. Unofficially, intelligence officials say the Predator strikes are the most effective weapon they have against Al Qaeda...

More at The Los Angeles Times.

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Travels With Nick # 1

Nick Dowling is on his way to Eastern Afghanistan - SWJ asked him to share his observations as time and Internet access permits:

The Al Muntaha restaurant and bar sits majestically atop the legendary Burj Al Arab hotel in Dubai, mirroring the mast-top spars of the sailboat shape of the iconic hotel. Originally touted as the world’s only seven-star hotel (now since more realistically categorized by Jumeirah Group as five-star premier), and uber luxe hotel bar is an ironic place to contemplate my upcoming two-week expedition into the southern slopes of the Hindu Kush and to try to better understand Coalition efforts to stabilize Eastern Afghanistan.

What brings us to Afghanistan? My company trains and supports DoD and State in the non-lethal and interagency dimensions of war. In both training programs and our handbooks, we help military and civilian staffs to better understand the political, economic, and cultural dimensions of their mission and we teach them how to form an effective team with other parts of the interagency and NGO space. You will be relieved to know I don’t do this training. Rather we have a team of about sixty veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan PRTs and similar reconstruction or advisory roles in these wars. My role is to manage this extraordinary collection of interagency talent and lend my perspective of working stability operations at the policy level for more than 16 years. Quite simply, we are the experts in small war “soft power.”

As I sip my $32 blueberry martini (delicious but, crikey, not THAT delicious), I ponder several questions :

(1) What are the political, economic, and human dimensions of conflict and instability in Eastern Afghanistan (and Western Pakistan for that matter)? Do our military units, PRTs, and NGOS understand and agree on the local sources of conflict and is there an integrated strategy to promote stability at the provincial and local level?

(2) Is the capacity building mission of extending legitimate governance from Kabul still the right development strategy? Or should we put greater emphasis on addressing needs and capacity at the local and tribal level as a means to build political support among the people?

(3) Is the military-PRT structure in Afghanistan working effectively? How can we enable more effective civil-military teams focused and capable of provincial and local level engagement and assistance?

(4) Perhaps a shorter summary of these questions: what the hell is going on with governance, economics and reconstruction in Afghanistan and what needs to be fixed?

I hope to report back to SWJ on what we (myself and two of my Afghanistan trainers) find on our travels. We will be meeting and traveling with a wide range of folks at many levels, including the military, PRTs, journalists, and the Afghans themselves. But first, can someone wire me some cash to cover my Al Muntaha bar bill?

Nick Dowling is a small wars policy wonk with experience in OSD, the NSC Staff, NDU, and the contracting sector. He has worked on stability operations for 16 years, most prominently on Bosnia and Kosovo as a Clinton Administration appointee and Iraq and Afghanistan as a DoD contractor. He is currently President of IDS International, a leader in interagency and “soft power” types of support to the US military. He is a graduate of Harvard, got his masters at Georgetown, and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Although a veteran of print and television media interviews and publications, this is his first foray into SWJ.

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May 4, 2009

4 May SWJ Roundup

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Versatility as Institutional Imperative

Dissecting war and placing it into various “bins’ may seduce us into believing that we have somehow discovered a way to make it coherent. However, we’d be wrong. War is war. The threats we face are always hybrid threats. Military operations always require capabilities across the spectrum of conflict.

--SWJ comment posted 10 March 2009.

Future conflicts will introduce an array of threats that defy simple categorization. We have at times tried to categorize threats in discrete operational themes such as conventional or unconventional, regular or irregular, high intensity or low intensity, traditional, terrorist, or criminal. However, the world is just not that accommodating. The security challenges we face are complex, and we have every reason to believe—based on our own experiences and on other conflicts we have recently observed—that our enemies will seek to employ a variety of threats in confronting us. Our model of the spectrum of conflict in FM 3-0 can be somewhat misleading in that it implies gaps among the different operational themes. What our model does not portray is the affect that time has on conflict and the likelihood that our enemies will seek to migrate among these themes. We cannot expect that we will have the option of selecting a category of conflict and then implementing a strategy confined to that category—the enemy gets a “vote.”

Hybrid, networked threats further blur the space among operational themes adding even greater complexity to the current and future operating environment. In response, our units and leaders in theater adapt from one theme to another frequently, sometimes day by day, often mission by mission and location by location. This occurs at all levels from the tactical to the strategic.

The hybrid threats we face are also increasingly decentralized in execution. Their objective is to exploit us by decentralizing operations and employing information operations as a weapon. In the book The Starfish and the Spider by Rod Beckstrom and Ori Brafman, the authors examine business models that provide insights into how open and decentralized systems operate: “when attacked, a decentralized organization becomes even more open and decentralized….open systems can easily mutate.”

The point is that the threat doesn’t confine itself to a single operational theme. The enemy adapts to leverage their strengths and to exploit our vulnerabilities. I believe LTG Stan McChrystal—one of our truly innovative senior leaders—had it right when he said, “to defeat a network, you have to be a network.” So our challenge is to adapt our institutions and develop our leaders to confront the complexity and decentralization inherent in the future operational environment.

We must avoid either-or constructs about conflict and how we organize, train, and equip ourselves in anticipation of conflict. When we commit our “campaign-quality” Army to a sustained operation in the future operating environment, it will need to be versatile enough to respond to all forms of contact. Even more important, it will need to be led by leaders agile enough to deal with complexity and anticipate the changes inherent in an extended campaign.

General Martin E. Dempsey is Commanding General of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command.

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A Backyard Challenge

A Backyard Challenge
by Dr. Nadia Schadlow, Small Wars Journal

A Backyard Challenge (Full PDF Article)

While President Barak Obama’s meetings in Mexico in mid-April resulted in several promising agreements, the challenges presented by the increasing violence and instability in Mexico are serious and will take years to resolve. Despite the Administration’s recent efforts to backtrack from statements that Mexico is on the verge of a collapse, many experts believe that the country is, at the very least, in a serious struggle to preserve the rule of law. Addressing the ongoing problems in Mexico will be a critical test of the U.S. government’s ability to marshal all of its instruments of power to deal with a growing criminal insurgency on its border.

Over the past few years, criticisms about the militarization of American foreign policy have grown. In response, within the U.S. government a concerted effort has been made to develop new approaches that balance so-called “hard power” with “soft power” in order to maximize all of America’s capabilities to shape circumstances on the ground. Some important strides were made with the publication of two Army field manuals: one on counterinsurgency and the other on stability operations. These are not just military manuals. They are the best existing descriptions of how to balance the select use of military force with economic and political initiatives. The synergies developed should then shape positive developments and stem violence fueled by relatively small groups of criminals, insurgents and non-state actors.

A Backyard Challenge (Full PDF Article)

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The New Media Agora

Here's a link to a video recording of The New Media Agora Panel at the 2009 Milblog Conference. Left to Right on the video: Bill Roggio of The Long War Journal, Bill Nagle of Small Wars Journal and Andrew Exum of Abu Muqawama. The panel was moderated by Greyhawk of Mudville Gazette. Hat Tip to Nathan Long for the video.

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Travels With Nick # 2

Nick Dowling is on his way to Eastern Afghanistan - SWJ asked him to share his observations as time and Internet access permits:

Kabul is smaller than I thought it would be. It seems like more of a frontier town feel than a big crowded third world city. The streets reminded me initially of the National Urban Warfare Training Center out at Ft. Irwin... the dusty brown mud buildings... the crooked little shops with old men dressed in the classic Pashtun clothing.. goods piled in windows and on tables....... the hanging meats. That Kabul reminds me of NTC is a credit to former NTC CGs Dana Pittard and Bob Cone and their restless dedication to the training mission. The only thing NTC needs to really capture Kabul is about 5,000 Toyota Corollas... seemingly the only vehicle on the road. Kabul's streets also illustrate that this is a town used to conquest and war. Every street is lined with walls topped with razor wire, every building a miniature fortress.

We had hoped to move straight to RC East on our first day but milair availability being somewhat sketchy and weather dependent, we were delayed and forced to overnight in Kabul. This was not a hardship. We stayed at the beautiful and luxurious Kabul Serena Hotel and dined with journalists and NGO workers at a classic Kabul hang out, the Gandamack Lodge. For the interagency crowd discussion starts at social hour, with civilians sharing perspectives and hassles over beers while the military remains tightly behind the wire. We need a whole-of-government drinking hole.

The Serena also happened to be hosting a conference with twelve Provincial Governors. In our discussions with several of the Governors, two topics were on their mind:

1) giving the Provinces more governing authority by moving away from the Kabul-centric strategy adopted in 2002
2) the fall elections and, in particular, the implications should President Karzai lose

These two questions will drive many of our discussions over the next two weeks.

Nick Dowling is a small wars policy wonk with experience in OSD, the NSC Staff, NDU, and the contracting sector. He has worked on stability operations for 16 years, most prominently on Bosnia and Kosovo as a Clinton Administration appointee and Iraq and Afghanistan as a DoD contractor. He is currently President of IDS International, a leader in interagency and “soft power” types of support to the US military. He is a graduate of Harvard, got his masters at Georgetown, and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Although a veteran of print and television media interviews and publications, this is his first foray into SWJ.

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May 5, 2009

'Hybrid War' to Pull U.S. Military in Two Directions

'Hybrid War' to Pull U.S. Military in Two Directions, Flournoy Says
By John J. Kruzel
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, May 4, 2009 – The type of “hybrid warfare” that defense experts predict the United States is increasingly likely to face will pull the military in two directions, the Defense Department’s top policy official said today.

Michele Flournoy, undersecretary of defense for policy, said America's conventional dominance gives incentive to its enemies to use asymmetric means to undermine U.S. strengths and exploit its weaknesses.

“Preparing for this operating environment will pull the Army, and the military writ large, in two very different directions,” she told the roughly 200-person audience at the Army Leader Forum at the Pentagon.

On the one hand, the United States must be ready for irregular warfare, in which combatants blend in with civilian populations and conduct roadside-bomb attacks, suicide bombings and similar tactics, she said.

“Those of you who served in Iraq and Afghanistan know firsthand how challenging it is to operate effectively in such an environment,” she said.

Meanwhile, she said, the United States must remain prepared to deal with high-end threats, though these are much more likely to be asymmetric in character. Illustrating this concept, Flournoy described a scenario in which rising regional powers and rogue states use highly sophisticated technologies to deny U.S. access to critical regions and to thwart its operations.

These tactics range from anti-satellite capabilities, anti-air capabilities and anti-ship weapons to weapons of mass destruction and cyber attacks.

Further complicating the battle landscape is the prospect of sophisticated nonstate actors using high-end capabilities such as weapons of mass destruction or guided rockets or munitions, as in the case of Hezbollah in Lebanon during its 2006 war with Israel.

“We can expect to see more hybrid conflicts in which the enemy combines regular warfare tactics with irregular and asymmetric forms of warfare,” she said.

The concept of hybrid warfare garnered attention last month when Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates announced his budget recommendations at a Pentagon news conference.

Gates proposed distributing allocated funds in accordance with what he characterized as the type of “complex hybrid” warfare he expects will be increasingly common. He placed roughly half of his proposed budget for traditional, strategic and conventional conflict, about 40 percent in dual-purpose capabilities and the remaining 10 percent in irregular warfare.

Gates also said recently that the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review – a congressionally mandated Defense Department strategy review completed every four years – would be unique in its consideration of this blended type of warfare.

“This will be the first QDR able to fully incorporate the numerous lessons learned on the battlefield these last few years; lessons about what mix of hybrid tactics future adversaries, both state and nonstate actors, are likely to pursue,” he said at the Army War College in Carlisle, Pa.

Flournoy provided a glimpse of the 2010 QDR, which the department will submit to Congress early next year.

In addition to the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, key security challenges include violent extremist movements, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, rising powers with sophisticated weapons and increasing encroachment across the so-called global commons, which include air, sea, space and cyberspace, she said.

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5 May SWJ Roundup

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Security Force Assistance

This week we published Army Field Manual 3-07.1: Security Force Assistance. In it, we seek to capture in doctrine our many years of experience in building partner security forces. Security Force Assistance is derivative of the broader mission of Stability Operations which we have documented in doctrine in FM 3-07.

It’s important to note that Security Force Assistance occurs under a variety of conditions, and it is the conditions that will determine how and with what organizations we use to accomplish the mission.

We have military cooperation agreements with more than 125 nations around the world and often provide security force assistance in response to host nation requests. This assistance is generally delivered by Offices of Security Cooperation, always under the control of the US Embassy Country Team, and is accomplished by a mixture of assigned military and civilian personnel, contractors, and mobile training teams. These mobile training teams come from either the General Purpose Forces -– perhaps more appropriately described as Multi-Purpose Forces -– or from the Special Forces depending on the type of training requested.

Under conditions of active conflict where we have direct responsibility for security -- as in Iraq and Afghanistan -- tactical commanders will have a security force assistance mission to train, advise, and assist tactical host nation forces. This mission is accomplished using the resources of the modular brigade augmented as necessary based, again, on conditions. The conditions include the “state” of security -- described in doctrine as Initial Stage, Transforming Stage, and Sustaining Phase -- as well as the capacity and capability of the host nation security forces. Security Force Assistance at the Institutional Level will be accomplished by a Security Transition Headquarters organized under the Joint Task Force. This Security Transition Headquarters partners with the US Embassy Country Team and evolves over time into an Office of Security Cooperation as described above.

Finally, we have security relationships with some nations facing significant internal security challenges but which, for many reasons, may not accept a large, visible US military presence within their borders. If they request Security Force Assistance under these conditions, the mission is generally assigned to US Special Operations Forces, potentially augmented by regionally-oriented General-Purpose Forces.

Clearly, the future operational environment will require us to demonstrate as much versatility in Stability Operations as we have in Offense and Defense Operations. Understanding the variety of conditions under which Security Force Assistance occurs is an important first step.

General Martin E. Dempsey is Commanding General of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command.

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Tactics in Counterinsurgency

FM 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency was released on 21 April and is available here at Small Wars Journal.

This field manual establishes doctrine (fundamental principles) for tactical counterinsurgency (COIN) operations at the company, battalion, and brigade level. It is based on lessons learned from historic counterinsurgencies and current operations. This manual continues the efforts of FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, in combining the historic approaches to COIN with the realities of today’s operational environment (OE)—an environment modified by a population explosion, urbanization, globalization, technology, the spread of religious fundamentalism, resource demand, climate change and natural disasters, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This manual is generic in its geographic focus and should be used with other doctrinal sources.

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May 6, 2009

6 May SWJ Roundup

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Travels With Nick # 3

The road from Kabul to Jalalabad is as spectacular a drive as you can find. Toyota Corollas and jingle trucks snake along a river that cuts through dramatic mountains, along the edge of spectacular gorges, and across lush river valleys. As we made the trip, scores of Kuchi nomads walked the road, shooing their livestock off the road as we pass. The drive also gave me reason to ponder the example of Nangarhar province, often cited as the success story of the East. The drive is relatively safe because Nangarhar is relatively safe -- and increasingly prosperous thanks to its fertile land and its trade route to Pakistan.

Many attribute Nang's success to its legendary and controversial warlord governor, Gul Agha Sherzai. Sherzai is practically a caricature of the Afghan warlord: a former Muj against the Russians, he combines ruthlessness with Machiavellian political skills and a convenient comfort with corruption or worse. He would be easy to dislike if not for the fact that he keeps Nangarhar safe and increasingly prosperous while staunchly pro-American. The visible focused police presence I saw in downtown Jalalabad is indicative of how Sherzai has tamed the province and increased capacity along many dimensions. Fertile lands and an increasing role as a regional economic hub have spurred ideas of what reliable power, further irrigation, and an airport could yield in turning Jalalabad's agricultural wealth into a valuable export.

My hosts in Jalabad were the fine soldiers of the 3rd Brigade, 1st Infantry division at FOB Fenty. I am indebted to these guys for their invitation and taking the time to talk with me about our handbooks and training projects. Long gone, however, is the cushy life of the Burz Al Arab or Kabul Serena. My Fenty quarters were a plywood prison cell right next to a busy helo pad. The 3-1 has really faced some extraordinary challenges -- reforming as an entirely new unit only months before deployment to RC East -- a treacherous and challenging counterinsurgency mission. It is a great credit to COL John Spiszer and his team that they have sustained modest progress in the Northeast even as the situation in the South has deteriorated. The 3-1 has an extraordinary, if perhaps overly stovepiped, group of support units for the engagement and reconstruction of Nangarhar. You have a PRT, HTT, ADT, MTT, not to mention vairous partners in a collection of NGOs and IOs. WTF! Leaving aside (for now) the organizational wisdom of this alphabet soup, Nangarhar is potentially a worthy example of success in the East. Or is it?

Is Sherzai's strongman approach one we would want to duplicate elsewhere? Does the Provincial government have a self-sustaining income stream to function? There is little taxation collected in the province except for the tariff at Torkham Gate -- the primary trade route with Pakistan. The Afghan Torkham profits go directly to a fund controlled by Sherzai, allegedly used for "reconstruction" in an account he controls. Real development is almost entirely funded by outsiders such as the US PRT and various USAID programs. A small budgetary allotment from Kabul just about pays for existing salaries, with none for development, construction, or even much maintenance. Thus, much of the governance and economic growth may be unsustainable servicing of the US grant-making and logistics appetite.

One can think of stabilization as a sequence from engagement to ceasefire to managed peace to self-sustaining peace to long term development and (perhaps) democratization. Nangarhar is ready for a stronger emphasis on sustainable development and governance capacity building that can withstand the inevitable departures of Sherzai and most US assistance. This is not to dismiss the contribution made by Sherzai. He is a good example that working with nasty characters can be a necessary and effective part of small wars.

Nick Dowling is a small wars policy wonk with experience in OSD, the NSC Staff, NDU, and the contracting sector. He has worked on stability operations for 16 years, most prominently on Bosnia and Kosovo as a Clinton Administration appointee and Iraq and Afghanistan as a DoD contractor. He is currently President of IDS International, a leader in interagency and “soft power” types of support to the US military. He is a graduate of Harvard, got his masters at Georgetown, and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Although a veteran of print and television media interviews and publications, this is his first foray into SWJ.

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Why Civilian Integration is Essential in Post-Stability Operations

Why Civilian Integration is Essential in Post-Stability Operations
by Master Gunnery Sergeant John Ubaldi
Small Wars Journal

Why Civilian Integration is Essential in Post-Stability Operations (Full PDF Article)

After the euphoria of the removal of Saddam Hussein from power had abated in April of 2003, disorder and chaos became the order of the day. It became apparent that the United States had failed to plan for the restoration of the political and economic order after major combat operations had ended. U.S. experience in Iraq and Afghanistan have amply shown that America’s national security structure is still engrained in the Cold War mind set and not adequately prepared to meet the challenges of a post Cold War environment. Civilian and defense leaders failed to understand that combat operations and governance are integral parts of warfare and do not end on a set timetable. The result was a strategic failure on their part to effectively plan for the reconstitution of the Iraqi governmental structure. The current national security strategy is badly flawed and a total reorganization of how the U.S uses its immense power is long overdue. The U.S. will face many types of contingencies in the future, and how we respond will have repercussions beyond the region that the U.S is engaged. For the U.S. to avoid a repeat of Iraqi Freedom it must reform its national security structure, have a designated unity of command in the initial post stability operations, and finally integration of civilian agencies into the military command structure.

Since the end of the Second World War, the nature of warfare has evolved to 4th generation warfare or irregular operations. Unfortunately the U.S. national security apparatus is deeply embedded in the bygone era of the Cold War and not suited for the challenges that confront the U.S. in the 21st century. The root of Washington’s failure to anticipate the political disorder in Iraq rests precisely in the characterization of these challenges as “postwar “ problems, a characterization used by virtually all analysts inside and outside of government. The Iraq situation is only the most recent example of the reluctance of civilian and military leaders, as well as most outside experts, to consider the establishment of political and economic order as part of war itself.

Why Civilian Integration is Essential in Post-Stability Operations (Full PDF Article)

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May 7, 2009

A Balanced Approach to Irregular Warfare

A Balanced Approach to Irregular Warfare - Admiral Eric T. Olson, The Journal of International Security Affairs.

To successfully deter and confront the global insurgency threatening the world and our nation today, the U.S. military must be able to employ a balanced approach to warfare, carefully blending the full spectrum of military, para-military and civil action to achieve success. It is an approach I refer to as “balanced warfare.” It is the manner in which our nation’s Special Operations Forces are combating terrorism today, and it is the guiding principle behind the Department of Defense’s campaign plan to combat global terrorism.
Today, we find ourselves living in a “new normal.” The world is not going to go back to the way it was before 9/11. Our national security is threatened not only by terrorists and terrorist organizations, but also by fragile states either unwilling or unable to provide for the most basic needs of their people. Further, sovereignty is not what it used to be; advances in communications, transportation and global networking continue to make borders more transparent, economies more interconnected, and information available on an unprecedented scale. The effects of this globalization create stresses on underdeveloped and developing nations and societies, which in turn create regional instability and unrest...

More at The Journal of International Security Affairs.

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7 May SWJ Roundup

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Exposing Counterfeit COIN

Gian Gentile: Exposing Counterfeit COIN - Kelley B. Vlahos, Antiwar.com.

... Hadn’t you heard of Gian Gentile?
He shook his head.
He’s active duty. He’s West Point, I pressed on. He’s at the forefront of this pushback against COIN.
The journalist shook his head. He let me write down Gentile’s name. Looking skeptical, he moved on.
It really shouldn’t be a surprise, that members of the elite news media — particularly the ones who don’t necessarily focus on a national security beat — fasten easily onto the conventional narrative and "move on" condescendingly, satisfied their knowledge is au courant and complete.
Army Colonel Gian Gentile just doesn’t fit into their equation, though his name is known well enough, if only at the U.S Military Academy, military journals, critical foreign policy webzines like Antiwar.com, and as a foil and vexation for the COIN-centric blogs, the doctrine’s biggest promoters, like Small Wars Journal and Abu Muqawama (a moniker for Andrew Exum, Iraq war veteran and senior fellow at Flournoy’s CNAS).
To the rest of the world, the mainstream media included, Col. Gentile is kind of a ghost. Persistent and clever, sometimes noisome and everywhere. That he might remain invisible to people inside-the-beltway is only a problem in that information gatekeepers like the aforementioned journo, craft narratives about the war — about future wars — without the consistent insight of the contrary view. As consumers of the news — as Americans — we should demand the whole scoop...

More at Antiwar.com.

Continue reading "Exposing Counterfeit COIN" »

Travels With Nick # 4

The helo flight to Camp Wright in Asadabad took us to the central front of the counterinsurgency battle for RC East. Kunar is the most dangerous province in the East, yet also features some vibrant development efforts and an energetic moderate reformist governor. Along Kunar's river valley, development, governance and security follow the growth of bridges and roads. In the northern valleys, a mix of tribal and Taliban insurgents challenge US extension of the security bubble at every ridge.

There is no denying the opportunity in Kunar. Along the Kunar river valley and where there are roads, the 3-1 is effectively applying security operations capacity building, and reconstruction projects with strong results. This is indicative of the 3-1 leadership's strong emphasis on non-lethal operations and effects. One example is the Kunar construction corps, a program which offers young military age men throughout the East a small stipend and the opportunity to learn a range of construction skills. Every graduate is immediately hired by one of the plentiful construction companies building infrastructure in Kunar.

The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) works well with moderate and reform minded Governor Wahidi and various district governors and ministry officials. Wahidi is slowly building legitimacy by delivering (thanks to the PRT) strong flows of projects to the province while also carrying a strong anti-corruption banner.

But central Kunar's development is untenable if the northern valleys can continue to harbor a strong Taliban sanctuary.

In small wars, we talk of human terrain as well as geographical terrain. In both senses, Kunar has some of the roughest, most inaccessible terrain in the world. Deeply isolated, xenophobic, independent tribes occupy steep northern valleys of Gaziabad, Pech, and Korengal with no roads in or out. Tribal conflict and smuggling interests incite violence and well-established collaboration with the Taliban. Attacks on ISAF forces are a daily threat, including major coordinated operations.

Sometimes in COIN, circumstances favor a paradoxical approach. Such may be the case in Korengal, where the short, tough, bearded Korengalis on these steep ridges conjure up the image of Pashtun Gimlis defending Helms Deep. By all accounts, the Korengalis hold no ambitions for global terrorism or an Islamic caliphate. They largely seek to be left alone, sell their timber, and resist control by any foreigner -- foreigner meaning someone from outside their Valley. The Korengal provide Taliban limited sanctuary and transit of their territory as a matter of practical resistance and collaboration against Afghan and ISAF forces attempts to extend control into the Korengal and enforce anti-logging laws. The Korengalis offer fierce resistance and are difficult to engage on projects. One wonders if a better approach would be to look the other way -- in several respects. Pull back US and Afghan forces and seek to de-emphasize ANP and ANBP timber smuggling enforcement in the area. Heck, the US could even offer to buy the timber at a good price if the Korengalis promise to keep the Taliban out of their valley and/or agree to a dialog with the Afghan government on key issues (e.g. when will the trees run out, balancing autonomy with government services, etc). At a minimum, shifting emphasis from the Korengal would enable the Army to apply more resources in Gaziabad and Pech, areas where population security and clear-hold-build strategies may have a better chance. As always, this issue is more complicated than I present so I don't know what is the best strategy -- only US and ANA forces on the ground are in a position to make that determination. But we do know that adaptive, non-linear strategy tied to conflict assessment is essential to COIN and, likely, to success in Afghanistan's East.

Nick Dowling is a small wars policy wonk with experience in OSD, the NSC Staff, NDU, and the contracting sector. He has worked on stability operations for 16 years, most prominently on Bosnia and Kosovo as a Clinton Administration appointee and Iraq and Afghanistan as a DoD contractor. He is currently President of IDS International, a leader in interagency and “soft power” types of support to the US military. He is a graduate of Harvard, got his masters at Georgetown, and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Although a veteran of print and television media interviews and publications, this is his first foray into SWJ.

Continue reading "Travels With Nick # 4" »

Mexico's Narco-Insurgency and U.S. Counterdrug Policy

Mexico's Narco-Insurgency and U.S. Counterdrug Policy - Hal Brands, US Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute.

In late 2007, the U.S. and Mexican governments unveiled the Merida Initiative. A 3-year, $1.4 billion counternarcotics assistance program, the Merida Initiative is designed to combat the drug-fueled violence that has ravaged Mexico of late. The initiative aims to strengthen the Mexican police and military, permitting them to take the offensive in the fight against Mexico’s powerful cartels. As currently designed, however, the Merida Initiative is unlikely to have a meaningful, long-term impact in restraining the drug trade and drug-related violence. Focussing largely on security, enforcement, and interdiction issues, it pays comparatively little attention to the deeper structural problems that fuel these destructive phenomena. These problems, ranging from official corruption to U.S. domestic drug consumption, have so far frustrated Mexican attempts to rein in the cartels, and will likely hinder the effectiveness of the Merida Initiative as well. To make U.S. counternarcotics policy fully effective, it will be imperative to forge a more holistic, better-integrated approach to the “war on drugs.”

More at the Strategic Studies Institute.

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Understanding the Long War

Understanding the Long War - Tom Hayden, The Nation.

The concept of the "Long War" is attributed to former CENTCOM Commander Gen. John Abizaid, speaking in 2004. Leading counterinsurgency theorist John Nagl, an Iraq combat veteran and now the head of the Center for a New American Security, writes that "there is a growing realization that the most likely conflicts of the next fifty years will be irregular warfare in an 'Arc of Instability' that encompasses much of the greater Middle East and parts of Africa and Central and South Asia." The Pentagon's official Quadrennial Defense Review (2005) commits the United States to a greater emphasis on fighting terrorism and insurgencies in this "arc of instability." The Center for American Progress repeats the formulation in arguing for a troop escalation and ten-year commitment in Afghanistan, saying that the "infrastructure of jihad" must be destroyed in "the center of an 'arc of instability' through South and Central Asia and the greater Middle East."

The implications of this doctrine are staggering. The very notion of a fifty-year war assumes the consent of the American people, who have yet to hear of the plan, for the next six national elections. The weight of a fifty-year burden will surprise and dismay many in the antiwar movement. Most Americans living today will die before the fifty-year war ends, if it does. Youngsters born and raised today will reach middle age. Unborn generations will bear the tax burden or fight and die in this "irregular warfare."

There is a chance, of course, that the Long War can be prevented. It may be unsustainable, a product of imperial hubris. Public opinion may tire of the quagmires and costs--but only if there is a commitment to a fifty-year peace movement...

More at The Nation.

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Give the Afghan Army a Governance Role

Give the Afghan Army a Governance Role - Bing West, Wall Street Journal opinon.

The only way to reach Viper Company of the 26th Regiment, First Infantry Division, is by helicopter. When I fly in, Capt. Jimmy Howell greets me. "I'm holding a shura [meeting of village elders]," he says. "We won't be shot at until they leave." The steep-sided Korengal Valley, 70 miles northeast of Kabul, is the scene of the war's fiercest fighting, claiming 57 American lives over the past three years.
Sure enough, an hour after the elders leave the shura, 30-millimeter shells strike the outpost. Cpl. Marc Madding, an Afghan army adviser, begins firing .50 caliber rounds at the enemy position, laughing as an Afghan soldier scurries from the latrine with shells bursting behind him. Capt. Howell adjusts mortar and artillery shells on the hillside, followed by an A-10 aircraft dropping 250-pound bombs. It's another afternoon in the Korengal, the hot spot in a district that's recorded some 1,990 similar engagements since mid-2005.
Overwhelming American firepower forced the wily fundamentalist insurgents to maintain a respectful distance. A few days earlier, an enemy unit had let down its guard and lost 15 combatants to a well-staged American ambush. Most of the fundamentalists killed were from villages that frequently receive food and medical aid from the U.S. Army outpost. The following day, an American soldier was killed outside a nearby village...

More at The Wall Street Journal.

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May 8, 2009

8 May SWJ Roundup

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Call for Paper and Panel Proposals

The Committee for the Analysis of Military Operations and Strategy (CAMOS), a cooperating organization of the International Studies Association (ISA) has been allocated two panels at the 2010 ISA Convention in New Orleans, LA (Feb. 17-20 2010).

This year’s convention theme, “Theory vs. Policy? Connecting Scholars and Practitioners”, addresses the issue of trying to bridge the gap between theory and practice and between academics and practitioners. This has always been the core mission of CAMOS in relation to the broad field of strategic and security studies. Thus, CAMOS seeks paper proposals that address the following topics:

• the sources of military effectiveness and force employment in war; • the causes and effectiveness of intervention policy;
• the origins and effectiveness of terrorism, as well as the sources of terrorist recruitment;
• non-traditional conflict triggers, including refugee flows, environmental scarcity, and NGO involvement in conflict settings; and
• the relationship between coercive and non-coercive strategies in a counterinsurgency or reconstruction environment.

We especially welcome panel or paper proposals that draw on both scholars and practitioners and that have clear policy relevance.

Paper proposals should include the paper titles, a short abstract (500 words max), and contact information for the author(s). Panel proposals should include the same for each paper, along with a title and abstract for the panel as a whole, and contact information for panel chair and discussant, if included.

Please submit proposals by Friday 29 May 2009 to:
Dr. Sergio Catignani
Assistant Professor in International Security
University of Leiden
Phone: +31615166911
Email: sergiocatignani @ gmail.com (If you send your proposal as an attached document, please include your surname and paper title as the document title.)

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Don Ayala: Probation in Slaying of Paula Loyd's Murderer

Ex-contractor Given Probation in Slaying of Afghan - Associated Press. A former military contractor has been sentenced to probation for shooting and killing a handcuffed prisoner in Afghanistan. Don Ayala of New Orleans pleaded guilty to manslaughter charges that normally would carry up to eight years in prison. But U.S. District Senior Judge Claude Hilton decided probation was warranted under the circumstances. The man whom Ayala shot had set fire to 1 of Ayala's colleagues (Paula Loyd) minutes before the shooting...

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Pakistan Again Squares Off Against Taliban in Swat

Pakistan Again Squares Off Against Taliban in Swat - Matthew Rosenberg, Rehmat Mehsud and Zahid Hussain, Wall Street Journal.

With soldiers again squaring off against Taliban militants in the Swat Valley, Pakistan faces a dual test it has often failed before: fighting a counter-insurgency campaign while caring for those displaced by the conflict.
For the past several days, Pakistan's army and the Taliban have been fighting sporadically along the mountain ridges of Swat after a peace deal collapsed. Pakistani officials say they are determined that the offensive will continue until the military asserts control over the 400-square-mile area.
But even with a fresh infusion of U.S. military technology and training, it is far from clear that the army will do any better this time than last, when it was ground to a halt by the militants and entered a peace that gave control of the valley to the Taliban...

More at The Wall Street Journal.

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This Week at War # 15

This week's SWJ contribution to Foreign Policy - This Week at War by Robert Haddick - is now posted. Topics include - Military advisors for Pakistan: too little, too late? - How to speak truth to power about Afghanistan.

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May 9, 2009

End of Story

The Photo from the "Photo-Op"

The Story Comes to an End - Louis Caldera Resigns

The White House Report - Internal Review

Video of the Flyover Photo-Op

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May 10, 2009

10 May SWJ Roundup

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A Model for Population-Centered Warfare

A Model for Population-Centered Warfare
A Conceptual Framework for Analyzing and Understanding the Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency
by James A. Gavrilis, Small Wars Journal

A Model for Population-Centered Warfare (Full PDF Article)

One of the most profound changes the U.S. military must make to be effective at countering insurgency is to shift strategic centers of gravity from the physical to the human aspects of warfare.

The nature of counterinsurgency, or unconventional warfare, differs from conventional warfare in a very important way: the population is the center of gravity. We say this, but what does it mean? How does it change operations? How do we implement this idea? Many of our military leaders are still trying to answer these questions. Our military has a predisposition to focus on enemy forces and capabilities and the confrontation between friendly and enemy forces, with little emphasis on the social or political context within which the confrontation takes place.

The change to seeing the population as the center of gravity is a major shift for conventional forces. It is a serious adjustment from our current and predominantly conventional military thinking about warfare. Although this idea has been discussed and debated in military and academic circles for at least a decade, the shift has not been made by all. However, this critical re-focusing is required for successful counterinsurgency campaigns, for countering terrorism in the long term, and for successful conduct of stability operations, or any form of irregular, hybrid, or population-centered warfare.

This focus on human factors in warfare has major implications for how the U.S. trains, organizes, and equips its forces, as well as where resources are allocated in order to better prepare for and conduct counterinsurgency. And this shift runs counter to the thinking that military hardware and high technology can solve military problems, which may be true if the military problems are kinetic. But technological and physically-defined solutions can be void of human factors, factors which underpin successful counterinsurgency. I have found that technology can enable counterinsurgency operations, but population-centered operations are not dependent on technology. The recent demands for increasing the number of U.S. Civil Affairs units are an indicator that some operational leaders recognize that a population-centered approach has merit.

A Model for Population-Centered Warfare (Full PDF Article)

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Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan

Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan - Trudy Rubin, Philadelphia Inquirer opinion.

It is cold and wet on the vast and desolate grounds of the Kabul Military Training Center, ringed by mountains on the outskirts of the city. Here, Afghan officers backed by NATO mentors are training new recruits to shoot and care for their AK-47s.
Seventy percent of the new grunts are illiterate, although officer cadets have a high school education. But the motivation of these youths seems high, in a country where the Afghan National Army is a respected institution.
On the shooting range, trainee Mohammed Arif from Kandahar has no qualms about the possibility of fighting a fellow Pashtun who is a Taliban. "If he comes to destroy my country, then I will kill him because he is the enemy," he says...

More at The Philadelphia Inquirer.

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May 11, 2009

11 May SWJ Roundup

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On Pirates and Strategies

On Pirates and Strategies
by Lieutenant Colonel Robert Bateman, Small Wars Journal

On Pirates and Strategies (Full PDF Article)

Let us talk about pirates, and piracy and viable options. But first, and most importantly, let us consider the ways to think about the problem. At least, from a military perspective. What follows is a brief primer that may help each of you form your own opinions about the various options offered by pundits left, right, center, military, political and everything in between.

For starters, lets get really basic. There are a lot of people now who read Small Wars Journal, and not all of them are professional military. Moreover, despite the existence of some damned fine doctrinal definitions, we have all seen examples where the same word means different things to different people. So to remove that area of potential error let me start by pointing out that no matter what Joint Publication 1-02 says, there are not just three levels of war, there are four levels of war. These levels are: Tactical, Operational, Strategic, (the only three the military acknowledges) and the highest, the Political level of war. That's easy, right? So that we all understand each other, let’s do a quick hash of what these levels mean.

On Pirates and Strategies (Full PDF Article)

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Gen. McKiernan Replaced in Afghanistan

U.S. Replaces Commander in Afghanistan - Peter Spiegel and Yochi Dreazen, Wall Street Journal.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced Monday that he had asked for the resignation of the U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. David McKiernan, saying he believed new leadership was needed to implement the Obama administration's war strategy.
Speaking at a Pentagon news conference, Mr. Gates said he had recommended the appointment of Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal to replace Gen. McKiernan. Gen. McChrystal is a Green Beret who ran special operations forces in Iraq until moving to a top Pentagon job last year.
"We have a new strategy, a new mission and a new ambassador," Mr. Gates said. "I believe that new military leadership also is needed"....

More at The Wall Street Journal.

Gates Recommends Replacement for Top Command in Afghanistan - Ann Scott Tyson, Washington Post.

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates today asked for the resignation of the top American commander in Afghanistan, Gen. David McKiernan, saying the U.S. military "must do better" in executing the administration's new strategy there.
Gates recommended that President Obama nominate veteran Special Operations commander Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal to replace McKiernan, who would depart as soon as a successor is confirmed. Gates also recommended that Lt. Gen. David Rodriguez, the former head of U.S. forces in eastern Afghanistan who is currently serving as Gates's military assistant, be nominated to serve in a new position as McChrystal's deputy...

More at The Washington Post.

U.S. Replaces Commander in Afghanistan in War Overhaul - Elisabeth Bumiller, New York Times.

The Pentagon is replacing the top American commander in Afghanistan, Gen. David McKiernan, less than a year after he took over, marking a major overhaul in military leadership of a war that has presented President Obama with a worsening national security challenge.
Defense officials said that General McKiernan was removed because of what they described as a conventional approach to what has become one of the most complicated military challenges in American history. He is to be replaced by Lt. Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, a former commander of the Joint Special Operations Command who recently ran all special operations in Iraq.
The decision reflects a belief that the war in Afghanistan has grown so complex that it needs a commander drawn from the military’s unconventional warfare branch...

More at The New York Times.

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May 12, 2009

Travels With Nick # 5

PRT Nuristan is just barely in the untamed frontier of Nuristan. Tucked in the southwest corner of the province, the PRT is located at FOB Kala Gush -- at the end of the road from Mehterlam. Beyond Kala Gush, western Nuristan is accessible only by dirt tracks largely unfit for vehicles and trafficked on foot by Nuristanis and their animals -- and the occasional Taliban smuggler and insurgent. Parun, the provincial capital, is in the center of Nuristan and not accessible to Kala Gush except by a four day hike over 18,000 foot mountains. Provincial officials make the hike to visit the PRT or to catch a ride to Kabul. US officials only find their way to Parun by helicopter. Eastern Nuristan is similarly partially accessible by road before mountains and dirt paths present the only way forward to the north or west. Three valleys, all mostly inaccessible.

How does one execute a population-centric approach to COIN in an area where you cannot go except by a three day hike? About six weeks ago, the PRT and both US and Afghan supporting forces pushed north along a mountainous dirt track in order to reach Doab, one of the bigger villages about 30km north of FOB Kala Gush. The idea was to conduct an extended engagement with village leaders to discuss reconstruction projects, establish some rapport, and to contest any anti-Afghan forces in the area. There was dispute among US officers about whether MRAPs or Humvees could navigate these rough mountain tracks. The drive was slow and precarious, the US vehicles clinging to the edge of dirt mountain but they did reach Doab and engage the elders. So far so good. Not long after they began the drive home, an estimated 100-150 insurgents attacked the US convoy, engaging in an extended 8 hour firefight along the entire route back to FOB Kala Gush. If one can imagine walking a balance beam while getting shot at for 8 hours, one can get a feel for the engagement. To the credit of US forces, they returned to base largely intact, have suffered two non-critical wounds and losing one HUMVEE. However, one wonders the secondary effects of pushing into the Doab valley and the ensuing violence.

In the words of Paul Newman's harried and hunted Butch Cassidy, "who are those guys?" Is the Taliban and al Queda actually using the dirt tracks of Nuristan as meaningful transit routes? Or are these tribal warriors defending their valley from foreigners as they have any other force that ventured into their mountains? The answer to that question informs how important Nuristan is to the COIN fight in northeast Afghanistan. Mountains with xenophobic locals should be left alone. Significant Taliban transit routes may need interdiction. It is hard for to believe that the Taliban can move significant men and supplies across the mountains of Nuristan -- or why the independent minded Nuristanis would help them. But mountain men of Afghanistan can hike for days and days and perhaps the Taliban have found some acceptance among the Nuristans.

Meanwhile the PRT and maneuver forces at FOB Kala Gush will try to remain positively engaged with the locals at Doab and others in the Afghan frontier -- with aid if not military force. Yet this quandary underscores one of the weaknesses of the current US reconstruction approach -- the very military nature of PRTs. When military presence is in itself an incitement to resistance and anti-US/anti-government sentiment, would a more traditional civilian/NGO assistance approach make more sense in many areas? A team of Afghan locals working on behalf of a USAID-funded NGO could likely have gotten in and out of Doab without violence and more positive effect.

Nick Dowling is a small wars policy wonk with experience in OSD, the NSC Staff, NDU, and the contracting sector. He has worked on stability operations for 16 years, most prominently on Bosnia and Kosovo as a Clinton Administration appointee and Iraq and Afghanistan as a DoD contractor. He is currently President of IDS International, a leader in interagency and “soft power” types of support to the US military. He is a graduate of Harvard, got his masters at Georgetown, and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Although a veteran of print and television media interviews and publications, this is his first foray into SWJ.

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12 May SWJ Roundup

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McKiernan, McChrystal, SOF & SF vs. GPF, SOF vs. SF, AF, IW, COIN...

McKiernan, McChrystal, SOF & SF vs. GPF, SOF vs. SF, AF, IW, COIN... - Join the discussion on the Small Wars Council.

If the SF are the solution, why is it that one of primary LOO - develop indigenous capacity, has, for the most part been filled by a 'heinz variety' of elements from across the US services, rather than SF? (For god's sake, in Basra during Charge of the Knights I met a Navy O6 nuclear dude on a MiTT task ...). Why is the JCISFA at Leavenworth largely a big army org?

Discuss at the Council.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ADM Michael Mullen speak to reporters at the Pentagon.

Also see the transcript of the press conference with Secretary Gates and Adm. Mullen on leadership changes in Afghanistan.

Also, more by:

Ex at Abu Muqawama

Ex (again) at The Argument

Fred at Slate

Tom at The Weekly Standard Blog

Richard at Belmont Club

James at Outside the Beltway

Jules at Forward Movment

Herschel at The Captian's Journal

Noah at Danger Room

Robert at Westhawk

Judah at World Politics Review

Joshua at Registan

Laura at The Cable

Tom R. at Best Defense

Tom B. at Thomas P.M. Barnett

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Riskless War

Riskless War
Technology, Coercive Diplomacy, and the Lure of Limited War
by Dr. Douglas Peifer, Small Wars Journal

Riskless War (Full PDF Article)

Just when critics have consigned the Revolution in Military Affairs and Transformation to the dustbin of clichéd phrases, a fresh buzz of excitement is stirring among technophiles. Admiral Arthur Cebrowski and his evangelists of network-centric warfare failed to come to grips with the realities of small wars, counterinsurgency, and urban warfare, but a younger cadre of writers, operators, and analysts is emerging who insist that we are indeed in the midst of a Revolution in Military Affairs, only one that centers on robots, unmanned vehicles, and artificial intelligence. They claim that unmanned systems and robots are changing the calculus of war, and will allow the United States to threaten military intervention and the use of force without substantial risk to ourselves.

Will robots, UAVs and precision-guided munitions be as strategically effective as their advocates proclaim? Do they provide a future, high tech solution to the challenges of small wars? More specifically, will technological dominance enable the United States to threaten and wage limited wars that compel the enemy to do our will, as the more exuberant unmanned and robotic system advocates assert? The historic record indicates that even in times of technological disparity, the promise of waging war from afar was elusive and uncertain.

Riskless War (Full PDF Article)

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May 13, 2009

Petraeus's Tougher Fight

Petraeus's Tougher Fight - David Ignatius, Washington Post opinion.

It's a small irony of history that Gen. David Petraeus, attacked by the left for his role in revitalizing the Bush administration's effort in Iraq, is now being asked by a Democratic president to do much the same thing in Afghanistan. The Centcom commander intends to apply the same counterinsurgency tactics he developed in Iraq, but Afghanistan will be in many ways a tougher fight.
Petraeus isn't a man who likes to lose, and he's assembling an all-star team. Gone is Gen. David McKiernan, a solid but uninspired commander; he will be replaced by Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, a rising superstar who, like Petraeus, has helped reinvent the US Army.
Petraeus has an asset in this new campaign that was sorely lacking in Iraq, which is strong diplomatic support, and this enables a regional approach to the war. Special envoy Richard Holbrooke and Petraeus are two headstrong bulls in a small paddock, but so far they are making this crucial partnership work...

More at The Washington Post.

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Obama's Right on Target in Afghanistan

Obama's Right on Target in Afghanistan - Max Boot, Los Angeles Times opinion.

President Obama and his aides continue to impress with their handling of Afghanistan. Not only have they approved a major troop increase and a de facto commitment to nation-building, but now they have shifted personnel to make the most effective use of the added resources and turn around a failing war effort.
The big news is that Army Gen. David D. McKiernan is out after just 11 months as the top commander. He will be replaced by Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal. Just as important, if less heralded, is the decision to appoint Lt. Gen. David Rodriguez, who had previously served in Afghanistan as commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, as the second-ranking commander. His role will be vital: to help the overstretched NATO staff pull together its disjointed war effort.
When I visited Afghanistan recently, I spent a couple of hours with McKiernan. He struck me as competent but too conventional and too colorless, not the rare kind of dynamic leader who could turn around a campaign in trouble. He was no George Patton, Matthew Ridgway, Creighton Abrams - or David Petraeus...

More at The Los Angeles Times.

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13 May SWJ Roundup

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A Slow Road to Self-reliance

A Slow Road to Self-reliance - Trudy Rubin, Philadelphia Inquirer opinion.

The six young men looked too scrawny to fulfill the high hopes placed on their shoulders.
They were members of the Afghan Public Protection Program, an auxiliary police force recruited from local villages in strategically important Wardak province. The force has been compared (mistakenly) to the Sunni militias that helped U.S. troops stem al-Qaeda violence in Iraq.
The Wardak program is a pilot project designed to provide local volunteers to help hold areas that have been cleared of Taliban by US and Afghan troops. They are trained by the Afghan national police, who in turn are trained by a team of US Special Forces. The special-ops guys call the volunteers "the AP3" or "the Guardians."
"We want to do this all over the country," said Maj. Gen. Michael Tucker, deputy commander of US forces in Afghanistan, referring to the project. Yet some news reports cite the slow progress of this experiment as one reason his boss, Gen. David McKiernan, was suddenly fired on Monday.
So what are we to make of the Guardians of Wardak? If they're so important, why is the project advancing at such a measured pace?

More at The Philadelphia Inquirer.

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Occupying Iraq

Occupying Iraq
A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority
by James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Benjamin Runkle and Siddharth Mohandas, Rand

The American engagement in Iraq has been looked at from many perspectives — the flawed intelligence that provided the war's rationale, the failed effort to secure an international mandate, the rapid success of the invasion, and the long ensuing counterinsurgency campaign. This book focuses on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority and its administrator, L. Paul Bremer, who governed Iraq from May 2003 to June of the following year. It is based on interviews with many of those responsible for setting and implementing occupation policy, on the memoirs of American and Iraqi officials who have since left office, on journalists' accounts of the period, and on nearly 100,000 never-before-released CPA documents. The book recounts and evaluates the efforts of the United States and its coalition partners to restore public services, reform the judicial and penal systems, fight corruption, revitalize the economy, and create the basis for representative government. It also addresses the occupation's most striking failure: the inability of the United States and its coalition partners to protect the Iraqi people from the criminals and extremists in their midst.

Full monograph at Rand.

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May 14, 2009

14 May SWJ Roundup

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This Isn’t About You

The Unforgiving Minute: A Soldier's Education
By Craig M. Mullaney

If you can fill the unforgiving minute
With sixty Seconds' worth of distance, run,
Yours is the Earth and everything in it,
And--which is more--you'll be a Man, my son!

--Rudyard Kipling, "If"

This Isn’t About You - Craig M. Mullaney, Vanity Fair.

"Having served as a platoon leader in the Afghanistan war, Craig M. Mullaney—an Obama-administration adviser and author of the new best-seller The Unforgiving Minute: A Soldier’s Education—understood full well the dangers that his younger brother, Gary, would face when he deployed to Baghdad. Watching from the audience at Gary’s Ranger School graduation, Mullaney reflected on his own experiences, and lessons learned, during three rigorous months of training."

Much more at Vanity Fair.

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This Way Out?

Rachel Maddow Show (MSNBC) - good summary of recent Af-Pk events and issues and nice interview with rogue cousin Andrew Exum.

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The Taliban Can Be Stopped

The Taliban Can Be Stopped
by Colonel Gary Anderson, Small Wars Journal

The Taliban Can Be Stopped (Full PDF Article)

The Taliban are not ten feet tall, and there is no horde of Taliban supermen overrunning either Afghanistan or Pakistan. That is not how they operate. We and the Pakistanis tend to try to put their “offensives” in our frame of reference, and then are continually surprised when massive applications of force fail to stop them, and only result in increased negative publicity and civilian casualties.

The reality of Taliban offensives is that they largely consist of their fighters walking into an undefended village, and announcing to the population that, “there is going to be a war here, if you don’t want to be part of it, leave.” Those who don’t want to be part of the war do depart and become internally displaced persons or refugees (in the case of those who flee across borders). Those who stay can either assist the Taliban or dig in and hope that they do not get caught in the crossfire.

The Taliban do bring a rough sense of law and order and swift justice that contrasts with the cumbersome and corrupt governance that all too often characterizes governance in the hinterlands of both Pakistan and Afghanistan. Lack of security and poor governance, not the Taliban are the real enemies in both nations.

The Taliban Can Be Stopped (Full PDF Article)

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Reversal in Iraq

Reversal in Iraq - Stephen Biddle, Council on Foreign Relations.

Iraq is currently in the early stages of a negotiated end to an intense ethnosectarian war. As such, there are several contingencies in which recent, mostly positive trends in Iraq could be reversed, threatening U.S. national interests. This Center for Preventive Action Contingency Planning Memorandum by Stephen Biddle assesses four interrelated scenarios in Iraq that could derail the prospects for peace and stability in the short to medium term and posits concrete policy options to limit U.S. vulnerability to the possibility of such reversals. It argues that the effectiveness of mitigating the consequences of a reversal is uncertain and that, therefore, a vigorous preventive strategy in the form of slowing the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq is less costly both politically and militarily in the long run.

More at the Council on Foreign Relations.

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The Pope

The Pope
by Dalton Fury, Small Wars Journal

The Pope (Full PDF Article)

Behind his back we referred to him simply as SAM or Stan the Man. Always with reverence and respect of course. Later on, about the time he started to wear shiny silver stars, we started to refer to him as The Pope.

LTG Stanley McChrystal’s meteoric rise through the ranks is no surprise to anyone that has ever had the opportunity to work for or with him. I was fortunate, from a subordinate officer perspective, on numerous occasions.

Few know the facts just yet as to why GEN McKeirnan was moved out of command in Afghanistan. Regardless of the reasons, and I’m certainly not read on to the scuttlebutt, I do know that America’s interests, America’s warriors, and America’s mission in Afghanistan couldn’t be in better hands under LTG McChrystal. My biggest concern is that I hope the senior officers in Afghanistan soon to be under LTG McChrystal’s command are well rested.

The Pope (Full PDF Article)

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May 15, 2009

The Way Ahead

A Single-Minded Focus on Dual Wars - Greg Jaffe, Washington Post.

... Gates's experience at Dover offers a window into what is driving him as he seeks to remake Washington's biggest and most ponderous bureaucracy. For decades, the Pentagon's focus has been on building expensive, high-tech weapons programs for conventional wars. Gates has embarked on an ambitious effort to force the department to focus more of its energy on developing arms and equipment that can help troops on the ground as they battle insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq.
His push to refocus the department comes as the war in Afghanistan appears in stalemate and violence against US troops and Afghan forces is on the rise. In neighboring Pakistan, where the Taliban and al-Qaeda have carved out a haven from which they can launch attacks on US troops, the government's hold on power throughout the country has grown shakier.
Last week, Gates fired the top US commander in Afghanistan. The new commanders will be responsible for fighting the war and implementing President Obama's new strategy. Gates sees his job as making sure they have the tools they need...

More at The Washington Post.

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15 May SWJ Roundup

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This Week at War # 16

This week's SWJ contribution to Foreign Policy - This Week at War by Robert Haddick is now posted. Topics include - Why McChrystal? - Can an antiwar movement stop the Long War?

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May 16, 2009

16 May SWJ Roundup

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Travels With Nick # 6

The next stop on our trip of the northeast was to the PRT at Mehterlam in Laghman province.

A Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan operates as a combined military-military-military-military-civilian unit. The idea is that counterinsurgency and stability operations required civilian agency capabilities. In reality, PRTs are almost entirely military, even though many of the officers are air force pilots and ship drivers with little or no experience in reconstruction operations. PRTs are supposed to have a State, USAID, and USDA representative in their command group but often these civilians have not shown up, are on TDY, go on leave or transfer every three months, or don’t work effectively on the PRT.

A strong exception to this stereotype of PRT dysfunction is the Laghman PRT. The PRT Commander, LTC Steve Erickson, USAF, really impressed us with his description of how he and his USAID rep talk through COIN and development principles in their operations. Laghmanis are known as particularly clever and well educated Afghans, particularly the Pashtuns along the southern branches of Alingar and Alishing rivers and the fertile plains around Mehterlam. The more remote parts of the province do offer some pockets of insurgency and Erickson and his team have responded with a popular COIN reconstruction strategy focused on roads. Roads are a popular project because they effectively address multiple issues and needs -- allowing security forces more rapid and secure transit throughout the province, enabling commerce through much faster delivery of goods or customers to market, building government capacity by extending reach of health clinics or schools, and by putting people to work. Although Erickson confessed that he and his USAID rep do not always agree, he described a healthy relationship of communication, dissent and debate, and decision-making that are the hallmarks of good teams.

Why would this military aviator and USAID development worker form such a strong working partnership? When I ask those in the field why a civ-mil partnership works (or doesn’t work), the answer is usually “personality.” While I think that is true, it also illuminates a bigger problem: organizations dependent on personality for effective team work are rolling the dice. Military officers, Foreign Service diplomats, and development professionals are three different tribes each with unique cultures, dialects, and belief systems and not an insubstantial amount of rivalry. We throw members of these tribes into a difficult, cramped, stressful environment and expect them to operate with unity of effort and minimal friction. And then we pin our hopes on personality?

It shouldn’t. Organizations that effectively and consistently address the challenges of teamwork and leadership do not depend on personality as much as they depend on clarity of responsibilities, clarity of process, and clarity of mindset. If all the players clearly understand who is supposed to do what, why each of their roles is critical to the whole, how to make decisions that properly weigh each perspective, and why they must bring a mindset of collaboration and cooperation, personality becomes much less of an issue (although never a non-issue). This type of organizational clarity and mindset requires clear communication and training/mentoring programs. As a trainer of military units and, just recently, PRTs heading to Afghanistan, we are working hard on the clarity of roles, staff processes, and a mindset of collaboration. Building effectively cooperation will be especially important as the civilian surge in Afghanistan increases the civilian presence in PRTs. Hopefully these efforts will improve the civil-military and PRT-maneuver unit cooperation in Afghanistan and make success less dependent on personality.

As for the impressive LTC Erickson, his situation underscores another weakness in our current system. In just a couple more months, he will leave Afghanistan and return to other USAF duties. Will DoD and the USG capture and leverage his knowledge of and relationships in Laghman province and his understanding of how to blend defense, diplomacy, and development in the Afghanistan COIN environment? Almost certainly not. Instead, LTC Erickson’s reward will be a return to his role as an Air Force pilot and have little further to do with the political and economic challenges in Afghanistan. Success in Afghanistan requires that we better leverage the knowledge and talent of human resources with this type of experience and understanding. We can do better.

Nick Dowling is a small wars policy wonk with experience in OSD, the NSC Staff, NDU, and the contracting sector. He has worked on stability operations for 16 years, most prominently on Bosnia and Kosovo as a Clinton Administration appointee and Iraq and Afghanistan as a DoD contractor. He is currently President of IDS International, a leader in interagency and “soft power” types of support to the US military. He is a graduate of Harvard, got his masters at Georgetown, and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Although a veteran of print and television media interviews and publications, this is his first foray into SWJ.

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Countering the Military's Latest Fad

Countering the Military's Latest Fad - Celeste Ward, Washington Post.

When Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates announced Monday that he was dismissing Gen. David McKiernan as the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan and replacing him with Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, he signaled his support for an intellectual movement that in a few short years has come to dominate military thinking in Washington. Both McChrystal and his new No. 2, Lt. Gen. David Rodriguez, Gates emphasized, have a "unique skill set in counterinsurgency."
Counterinsurgency is king. Once the province of graduate students and historians of the conflicts in Vietnam and Algeria, this resurgent doctrine of how to wage a type of unconventional war has become the lens through which the American defense establishment analyzes what happened in Iraq, what to do now in Afghanistan, and the very future of warfare.
Gen. David H. Petraeus, the head of U.S. Central Command and the former commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, is the inspiration and leading light of this movement. In 2006, he coauthored the Army field manual on how to conduct counterinsurgency operations, stressing the need to provide security for the local population and support the host government, among other imperatives. A vocal cohort of students and adherents of counterinsurgency -- now given the inevitable military acronym "COIN" -- has emerged to advance the cause. New think tanks and blogs propagate and debate counterinsurgency research, and tomes exploring insurgencies past, present and future are on every cognoscente's reading list. Even the State Department has embraced the concept, composing its own counterinsurgency manual for U.S. civilian agencies...

Much more at The Washington Post.

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Winning the Information War in Afghanistan and Pakistan

Winning the Information War in Afghanistan and Pakistan - Greg Bruno, Council on Foreign Relations.

With overwhelming firepower, Western armies rarely lose in combat to Taliban fighters in Afghanistan. But in the communications battle, the militants appear to hold the edge. The gap has grown especially wide in the Afghan war zone, analysts say. Using FM transmitters, the Internet, and threatening notes known as "night letters" (TIME), Taliban operating from the border region of Pakistan and Afghanistan have proven effective at either cowing citizens or winning them over to their message of jihad. U.S. special representative Richard Holbrooke told journalists in March 2009 that "the information issue--sometimes called psychological operations or strategic communication" has become a "major, major gap to be filled" before U.S.-led forces can regain the upper hand. As part of its new strategy for the Afghan war, the White House has called for an overhaul of "strategic communications" in Afghanistan "to improve the image of the United States and its allies" and "to counter the propaganda that is key to the enemy's terror campaign." But U.S. officials have acknowledged an institutional weakness in coordinating strategic communications across agencies, as well as broader disagreements on definitions and tactics. "A coordinated effort must be made to improve the joint planning and implementation of strategic communications," says the Pentagon's 2008 National Defense Strategy.

Much more at the Council on Foreign Relations.

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May 17, 2009

Death From Above, Outrage Down Below (Updated)

Death From Above, Outrage Down Below - David Kilcullen and Andrew Exum, New York Times opinion.

In recent days, the Pentagon has made two major changes in its strategy to defeat the Taliban, Al Qaeda and their affiliates in Afghanistan and Pakistan. First came the announcement that Lt. Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal would take over as the top United States commander in Afghanistan. Next, Pentagon officials said that the United States was giving Pakistan more information on its drone attacks on terrorist targets, while news reports indicated that Pakistani officers would have significant future control over drone routes, targets and decisions to fire weapons (though the military has denied that).
While we agree with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates that “fresh eyes were needed” to review our military strategy in the region, we feel that expanding or even just continuing the drone war is a mistake. In fact, it would be in our best interests, and those of the Pakistani people, to declare a moratorium on drone strikes into Pakistan...
The appeal of drone attacks for policy makers is clear. For one thing, their effects are measurable. Military commanders and intelligence officials point out that drone attacks have disrupted terrorist networks in Pakistan, killing key leaders and hampering operations. Drone attacks create a sense of insecurity among militants and constrain their interactions with suspected informers. And, because they kill remotely, drone strikes avoid American casualties.
But on balance, the costs outweigh these benefits for three reasons...

Much more at The New York Times.

Updates:

Jules Crittenden on Death From Above

Andrew Exum on Killing Civilians Remains Bad

Noah Shachtman on Calls for ‘Moratorium’ Hit New York Times

Spencer Ackerman on Stop The Drones

Andrew Sullivan on The Trouble With Predators

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17 May SWJ Roundup

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Curses, Foiled Again!

Starbuck at Wings Over Iraq says Curse You, Small Wars Journal! His ire is directed at Frank Hoffman, something to do about hybrid war...

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May 18, 2009

18 May SWJ Roundup

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Book Review: Embedded

Embedded
A Marine Corps Adviser Inside the Iraqi Army
reviewed by Major Niel Smith, Small Wars Journal

Embedded (Full PDF Article)

Embedded: A Marine Corps Adviser Inside the Iraqi Army by Wesley Gray, Naval Institute Press, 2009, 256 pages.

Embedded presents a tale not often told among the growing collection of memoirs by former company grade officers who served in Iraq and Afghanistan. Marine Capt. Wesley Gray served as an embedded combat adviser with an Iraqi battalion in Haditha, Iraq, during 2006. Gray deserves great credit for shining the spotlight the critical effort to develop competent Iraqi security forces. For those who have never had the pleasure of closely working as an embed, Gray’s narrative reveals the herculean challenges that most combat advisers face.

Although limited in scope to his location and time in Iraq, the situations he encounters are common to most advisers in Iraq. Gray’s account of his learning curve is the strongest aspect of the book.

Embedded (Full PDF Article)

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May 19, 2009

19 May SWJ Roundup

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Travels With Nick # 7

The drive up the Panjshir valley, north of Kabul, offers both spectacle and history. Ahmed Shah Massoud, the Lion of Panjshir, remains a legend in Afghanistan, particularly among Tajiks. The famed Muj and Northern Alliance leader was assassinated two days before 9/11, but his battle plan to defeat the Taliban was successful in the weeks that followed.

The PRT paved road through the Panjshir valley features gorgeous scenery contrasting with rusted hulks of Russian vehicles -- memorials to the Russian failure to control Massoud’s Panjshir valley. The Taliban learned this lesson and didn’t even challenge Massoud for control of Panjshir. Today, Panjshir is one of the most secure and peaceful provinces in Afghanistan. But the anger and impatience with Kabul is on the rise. Where is Massoud’s successor as the leader of Afghanistan? The joke in Panjshir today is that Massoud died as a warrior but all Massoud’s lieutenants became fat and rich.

Having met with many American officials in the early portion of my trip, the remaining days in Panjshir and Kabul focused on the perspectives of the Afghans themselves, from Governors to senior Karzai advisors to leading Kabul businessmen.

The lack of a political leadership or strategy in Afghanistan was obvious from both US and Afghan sources. The reconstruction effort has essentially created a corrupt welfare effort, with little political responsibility. The leadership on the Afghan side has been negligible. In my meetings, one Afghan governor went on for twenty minutes about how ineffective Karzai had been. Karzai’s doesn’t seem to take a strong position on anything. Meanwhile, US aid has been given out with no more strategy or conditionality than “more the merrier” creating essentially a welfare economy rife with corruption and with no Afghan having much incentive to take responsibility or initiative. One former government official and Kabul businessman told us “you have turned Afghanistan into a nation of conniving beggars.”

Ambassador Holbrooke, so effective in applying leverage to chart a political course in the Bosnia and Kosovo, must apply a similar approach in Afghanistan. This means applying US and international leverage to demand much more from the Karzai government and Afghan political officials in terms of taking responsibility, countering corruption, and countering Taliban influence in eastern tribal areas. We must single out or sideline those Afghans that are content to milk the reconstruction effort and not challenge militant influence in their areas. We must challenge substantive corruption that threatens key political objectives in reconstruction. And we must view the application of force primarily in political terms, not military terms.

None of this is to suggest that the US choose the next President of Afghanistan. When one Afghan politician advised me that the US choose more carefully than they did with Karzai, I firmly noted that it was the responsibility of the Afghans themselves to choose their leadership. No American anointed President can hold credibility or legitimacy in Afghanistan.

The blame for this political ineffectiveness in Afghanistan lays with both Karzai and the Bush team. Both have neglected their responsibilities in Afghanistan over the past six years. Obama’s enhanced focus on Afghanistan is apparent, but it is too early to see effects. State has outlined a broad enhancement to the civilian capacity both in Kabul and in the field. The elevation and/or reshuffling of political and now military US leadership in Afghanistan is the clearest indication of both higher priority and a new direction. A new strategy is in play in broad strokes but the application in the field is not underway substantially.

Others are also thinking strategically about Afghanistan. Perhaps the most stunning and visual construction effort in Panjshir is Massoud’s tomb - a massive undertaking impressively perched on a mid-valley promontory. This project, a worthy memorial for Afghanistan’s fallen hero, is funded by Tehran for pennies compared to the US reconstruction effort.

Nick Dowling is a small wars policy wonk with experience in OSD, the NSC Staff, NDU, and the contracting sector. He has worked on stability operations for 16 years, most prominently on Bosnia and Kosovo as a Clinton Administration appointee and Iraq and Afghanistan as a DoD contractor. He is currently President of IDS International, a leader in interagency and “soft power” types of support to the US military. He is a graduate of Harvard, got his masters at Georgetown, and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Although a veteran of print and television media interviews and publications, this is his first foray into SWJ.

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A Conversation About the Obama-Netanyahu Meeting

Charlie Rose Show: A conversation about the Obama-Netanyahu meeting with Jim Hoagland, Rashid Khalidi, Bret Stephens and Lally Weymouth.

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Perspective on the Systems Perspective

Perspective on the Systems Perspective
How Army Special Forces Can Use Existing Systems within the Operational Environment
by Major Michael Longacre, Small Wars Journal

Perspective on the Systems Perspective (Full PDF Article)

The purpose of this article is to articulate how Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) can use existing elements of the Operational Environment (OE) to accomplish desired military endstates. SOF assets gain marked advantages by indentifying and making use of pre-existing structures within the EO and ensuring the roles these systems play within the EO support our objectives. As a military, we would not ignore or destroy a country’s entire road systems and then create a new road network on which to operate our vehicles. Nor would we attempt to conduct a lodgment without using existing sea and air ports. However, as a nation we attempted to support a fledging state in Iraq by disbanding its existing security apparatus and the Ba’ath party that had previously ran the daily functioning of the government. In contrast, preserving, influencing, and strengthening the social, political, and economic infrastructure better allows us to achieve our aims and fully embraces the “by, with, and through” approach that has made ARSOF so successful.

In order to discuss how ARSOF may use these pre-existing components of the OE, this article first discusses the nature of these components, then explores some specific ways in which ARSOF and existing elements of the OE may support each other.

Perspective on the Systems Perspective (Full PDF Article)

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May 20, 2009

20 May SWJ Roundup

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Baltimore Sun's Loss, Politics Daily's Gain

SWJ has been a long time fan of the reporting and analysis of David Wood, most recently of the Baltimore Sun. Via Politico:

Seasoned military writer David Wood, who left the Baltimore Sun during the paper's massive layoffs in April, has joined AOL's new site, Politics Daily...
Previous to working at the Sun, Wood has covered national security and reported extensively overseas for Time Magazine and the Los Angeles Times. A Pulitzer-finalist, Wood won the Headliner Award for his Iraq coverage last year...

Via The Baltimore Sun and The Morning Call:

Wood has accompanied US troops in the field many times, both on domestic and overseas training maneuvers and in Desert Storm, the Persian Gulf tanker war, the operations in Panama, Somalia and Haiti, peacekeeping missions in the Balkans and combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. He was embedded with the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit in Somalia and the 10th Mountain and 101st Airborne Division units for Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan. In four trips to Iraq he has embedded with numerous units including the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment's 2nd Squadron in East Baghdad, the 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines in al-Anbar and the 386th Air Expeditionary Wing.

With that - here's David's inaugural post at Politics Daily - Moving Target: The Pitfalls Facing US Air Power in Afghanistan.

... In Iraq, the war against insurgents was largely fought on city streets, by infantrymen, and the role of air power was limited. In Afghanistan, there are fewer US troops and a lot more territory to cover -- perfect conditions, it would seem, in which to use America's formidable power to strike from the air. But it is more difficult than it seems.
This is bad news for the US war effort in Afghanistan. It's not something easy to fix, like tweaking strategy, inventing a new target sensor, or selecting a 250-pound bomb instead of the 2,000-pounder. The problem is that the United States doesn't know who, exactly, it is fighting in Afghanistan, and it doesn't know where they are...

Much more at Politics Daily.

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COIN Food for Thought

Via CavGuy at the Council.

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Treading on Hallowed Ground

Treading on Hallowed Ground
Counterinsurgency in Sacred Places
reviewed by Colonel William T. Anderson, Small Wars Journal

Treading on Hallowed Ground (Full PDF Article)

C. Christine Fair and Sumit Ganguly, eds. Treading on Hallowed Ground: Counterinsurgency Operations in Sacred Spaces. Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York: 2008.

A common tactic used by Shi’ite militias and rogue elements during Operation Iraqi Freedom has been the use of holy shrines for sanctuary and logistics. In 2004, for example, the US military fought members of Moqtada al-Sadr’s militia in Najaf, one of Shi’ia Islam holiest cities. On two occasions that year, followers of al-Sadr used the grounds of the most sacred Iman Ali shrine to conduct military operations and terrorist attacks. These operations posed particularly thorny issues for responding forces who were very sensitive to possible repercussions resulting from any damage to the shrine.

Obviously, the use of force against holy sites can antagonize and deeply affect religious communities. Any desecration, whether perceived or real, can generate a back-lash of local sentiment against the counterinsurgency force. The potential for a positive outcome in the eyes of the insurgent forces means that we can expect them in future security environments to continue to use this tactic. Thanks to this book, however, we can now identify some valuable lessons learned that warrant our attention. When responding to insurgents using sacred sites, counterinsurgent forces often failed to achieve desired outcomes due to several critical shortcomings: poor or faulty intelligence, the absence of a “deft public relations strategy” and a lack of restraint on the use of force.

Treading on Hallowed Ground (Full PDF Article)

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May 21, 2009

21 May SWJ Roundup

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May 22, 2009

Secretary Eric Shinseki: Past and Future

Secretary Eric Shinseki: Past and Future

By Captain Timothy Hsia

"We are looking at the future of the force mix, examining what it is going to look like in the years ahead, and it’s possible at the end of this process the decision will be made that some of the heavy brigades will become Stryker brigades.” [Secretary of the Army Pete] Geren said, adding that the Stryker concept “has been an extraordinarily successful program."

Since 2003, the Army has fielded seven Stryker brigade combat teams, each equipped with about 300 Stryker wheeled vehicles built on common chassis. Stryker units have spent most of their time in Iraq, but the Pentagon announced in February that the 5th Stryker BCT would deploy to Afghanistan for the first time.

-- Army Brass Hint at More Stryker Brigades by Matthew Cox

Eric Shinseki, the Secretary of the Veteran Affairs, has his work cut out from him. For the next few years, the Veteran Affairs will be handling the cases of thousands of returning veterans from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq who return home with physical and psychic wounds as testament to their tours of duty downrange. If the past is any guide to Shinseki’s competence and character, then the future bodes well for the Veteran Affairs, as Shinseki’s reforms of the Army during his tenure as Chief of Staff were absolutely crucial to the Army’s ability to better wage a counterinsurgency campaign...

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What Does It All Mean?

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Transforming the National Security Culture

Transforming the National Security Culture
A Report of the Harvard Kennedy School’s Defense Leadership Project

Transforming the National Security Culture (Full PDF Report)

From the Preface

General Edward C. Meyer, former Army Chief of Staff, has compared our best leaders to diamonds. Just as the diamond requires three properties for its formation—carbon, heat, and pressure—successful leaders require the interaction of three properties—character, knowledge, and application. We at the Harvard Kennedy School seek to foster an environment in which our student leaders can develop their character, expand their knowledge, and launch into promising career trajectories through the application of newly polished skills for the benefit of our nation’s security. The Harvard Kennedy School Defense Leadership Project is a proud example of the work that can be produced in this environment.

As we seek to generate and promote more effective leadership in national security policy, we are deeply committed to bridging the gap between leadership theory and practice. Supporting collabora¬tive thinking among experts in the field is critical to this objective. The student-generated Defense Leadership Project aptly sought to address a critical shortfall in national security leadership through its collaborative endeavor. As this report attests, the Defense Leadership Project specifically created unprecedented opportunities for reflection and discovery for students and prominent practitioners from different disciplines, sectors, and cultures to elicit proactive solutions to tomorrow’s challenges.

Well-trained and equipped leaders sharing collaborative mentalities are paramount for successfully preserving our national security. The combined support of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, and the Center for Public Leadership speaks to the shared belief in the importance of this initiative, and the associated recommendations. We applaud the students involved in the Defense Leadership Project and the energy this team put into organizing guest speakers and writing this report. We hope our nation’s leaders might draw from their informed and insightful findings.

From the Introduction

In late winter 2007, a small group of veterans attending Harvard University decided to challenge the status quo. Frustrated by their experiences overseas and what they perceived as a lack of innovative leadership within their own organizations, they sought to develop new ideas. They wanted to create something the business world would call a skunk works, an autonomous group of creative thinkers, charged with working on advanced projects. Enlisting the help of three separate research centers at Harvard—the Center for Public Leadership, the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy (which also had played a role in the publication of the Army’s new counterinsurgency manual), and the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs—the students took their proposal to the larger student body.

At a special reception for all Harvard graduate students who had served (or were serving) within the national security community, the students announced open applications for an initiative they called the Defense Leadership Project sponsored by the Harvard Kennedy School’s Center for Public Leadership. The response from the crowd—which had been full of veterans returned from combat tours, homeland security officials, intelligence analysts, private security consultants, and others—was overwhelming. Applications poured in, and after selecting the most talented, experienced, and creative individuals, the panel set to work defining its mission.

The students almost immediately came to realize that most of their frustrations were rooted in leader¬ship and organizational culture. In their eyes, the national security establishment was facing a major crisis: leaders at all levels were routinely ill-equipped to understand, visualize, or respond effectively to the modern security environment. The problem was one of adaptation: decades of Cold War doctrine and thinking had left behind a sense of unassailable institutional inertia. Despite the undeniable rise of asymmetric threats such as insurgents, terrorists, militias, and other nonstate actors, the defense establishment had continued to invest overwhelmingly in preparations for traditional, conventional warfare.

While many blue ribbon panels and study groups have been convened since 9/11 to develop recommendations for the security establishment, few have focused on the role of the individual leader. New organizational models and next-generation technologies may improve our nation’s readiness, but—in the humble opinion of the students—success or failure would be defined by the ability of individual leaders to operate effectively with minimal guidance, adapt, and collaborate across traditional institutional stovepipes. In other words, victory will not be gained by overwhelming our enemies with brute force, but by empowering our leaders to innovate faster than the enemy can respond.

The panel’s methodology would be simple: Invite senior level defense leaders to Harvard for closed door, nonattribution, and brutally honest discussions. Combine the enthusiasm and “on the ground” perspective of the students with the strategic outlook of decision makers and experts. Develop bluesky solutions, record notes for every session, and eventually, write the proposals into a report intended for senior policy makers. This booklet is the end result of our efforts. We respectfully submit these recommendations for your consideration, in the hope that a few of the ideas might prove useful or inspire further inquiry.

From the Foreword

When the Center for Public Leadership at the Harvard Kennedy School brings together graduate students and national security students at Harvard—military veterans, homeland security officials, intelligence officers, private security contractors, and others—in a Defense Leadership Project, one expects powerful results as they work with distinguished guest panelists. After all, it’s Harvard, the Kennedy School, David Gergen’s Center for Public Leadership, and our own country’s security leaders. We have great expectations.

Rarely do results of such an intellectual engagement provide the call to action that this report delivers. Not an academic treatise, this is a tough report by people on the ground, across the sectors, examining every aspect of the defense community, and this is the powerful result. And it’s all about leadership, the leaders of the future required right across the national security community, to lead, respond, mobilize, inspire, build the alliances and partnerships an uncertain future demands in the emerging security environment.

The formal recommendations the panel makes in this report are sobering and illuminating and fall into four categories:

• Finding critical talent
• Transforming talent into institutional capability
• Reforming the existing organization to promote balance and interoperability
• Accelerating generational change.

Three powerful messages flow through the recommendations, the rationale, and the call to action in this report:

• A massive need for change in the national security organizations and community to prepare our leaders to meet future threats
• Emerging leaders, the new generation of national security professional workers, will generate the change essential to meet evolving challenges
• The inspiring ideas will come from bright young minds committed to our security establishment who know change is the leadership imperative of our time.

Transforming the National Security Culture (Full PDF Report)

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This Week at War # 17

This week's SWJ contribution to Foreign Policy - This Week at War by Robert Haddick is now posted. Topics include - Losing the media war to the Taliban and Pakistan's hedges are growing wild.

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May 23, 2009

Travels With Nick # 8: Escape From Kabul

My flight from Kabul to Delhi was at 9:40 am on Indian Airlines, the national carrier of India. I was flying through Delhi on my way to visit some friends in Kathmandu, Nepal. I figured I was in the neighborhood.

I left for the 20 minute drive to the airport early -- 6am -- insurance against unknown delays or issues. Good thing too. One would expect Kabul airport security to be tight. One would hope and expect Indian Airlines security to be extra tight considering the Indian Embassy in Kabul was bombed only two months prior. Correct on both counts. My car had barely reached the outskirts of the airport when we reached the backup for first security checkpoint. The Afghan National Police (ANP) were searching all cars, searching all bags, and doing pat downs on all passengers. After I piled back in the car, we crawled for another quarter mile before reaching the second checkpoint, manned by the Afghan National Border Police (ANBP). This time, passengers and their bags were forced to exit the car, go through a bag and personnel scan/search, and then rejoin their searched car for the final quarter mile drive to a chaotic parking lot where one could catch a bus to the terminal. After a ten minute wait, the bus made the two minute drive to the terminal where all passengers were dumped into an outdoor baggage and personal screening line for the third security check. Successfully passing this check entitled me to enter the airport terminal building and try to figure out how to turn my e-ticket into a boarding pass. Turns out, e-tickets are issued for flights from Kabul but not advised. I lucked out and the Indian airlines agent literally hand wrote my ticket out on a blank piece of white paper. Next came two more security check points inside the terminal (including one where they wrap your baggage in a strap) before finally getting to the gate at 8:55am, only 45 minutes before scheduled departure. The flight was delayed thirty minutes so we finally boarded at about 10am — but not before going through one last bag search and pat down literally right at the door of the plane.

All the waiting in traffic, security lines, and at the gate gave me plenty of time to reflect on the trip and core policy and operational questions about our mission in Afghanistan. At the start of the trip, I intended to learn more about the causes of conflict in Eastern Afghanistan and whether the US strategy and resources were matched and organized effectively to the problem. In particular, I wanted to look at the question of whether the US strategy of expanding governance from Kabul was still realistic or if a more local political engagement approach might make more sense.

I came away from the trip angry at the negligence of the Afghan politicians and the Bush Administration for squandering six years and countless billions of dollars on a politically soft and ineffective version of nation building. Spending money on infrastructure projects and coaching good governance is a grossly insufficient political strategy, particularly in the corrupt and inefficient atmosphere of Afghanistan today. I saw no evidence of a strategic approach to apply pressure and leverage on Afghan politicians, warlords, and tribes in order to build pragmatic support, stamp out corruption and isolate extremist influence. There apparently has been little effort to forge pragmatic political deals with the Pashtun tribes or to devise a more nuanced relationship between tribal authority and participation in the political process. Areas where security is good like Kabul or the West are not nearly the economic success stories one would expect from six years of security and economic development. Organizationally, the US military in has been asked to do the impossible in Afghanistan, burdened with too few troops and unsupported by a US civilian presence so minimal and irregular to render itself strategically meaningless. The net effect has been to falsely raise expectations, effectively lower responsibility and accountability, and turn the US military into an undermanned welfare program.

These critiques do not undercut in any way my admiration for the many tremendous individual leaders like John Spiszer or Steve Erickson who are making a difference despite organizational or resource shortcomings. In my view, Afghanistan’s backslide is the result of weak leadership at the national level, not failures at the operational level.

There are reasons for optimism. The Obama team is leaning hard into AfPak, as evidenced by injection of both new and additional senior leadership, both civilian and military, as well as the surge of military and civilian resources into Afghanistan and the new assistance programs for Pakistan. What is less clear at this point, is how the Holbrooke/Eikenberry/McCrystal team will reenergize the political process in Afghanistan to impose more accountability and pragmatic cooperation from key Afghan leaders in Kabul and across the East. Having been an inside observer of Mr. Holbrooke’s work in the 1990s, I’m confident we’ll see much more political leverage in play in the coming months, in Kabul, Islamabad and in the provinces. Regardless of who wins the fall presidential elections in Afghanistan, the new Afghan President must take a tougher political line with corrupt or tainted warlords and work relentlessly to forge political deals with the Pashtun east at the expense of extremism. He should tell Afghans stop expecting the West to lift them up and call upon them to rebuild the Afghanistan they dream of. Stronger leadership in Kabul and Washington can make secure areas like Kabul shining examples of progress and prosperity to remind people what is possible and offer Afghans a more tangible alternative to conflict or the Taliban.

Having left Kabul, I arrived safely in Nepal, where soaring mountains and ancient Buddhist and Hindu culture now host a fledgling democracy — and a reminder of what is possible. The long time insurgency in Nepal has ended because the Maoist rebels are now part of the political process. Political engagement, process and compromise are the critical ingredients of peace more so than road projects or laser guided bombs. Security and reconstruction operations cannot themselves create political stability, they are only essential tools in pursuit of the political process. In Afghanistan and Pakististan, there is much political work to do. But I am thankful to have seen the beauty and the opportunity of Afghanistan and to meet Afghans who so passionately want peace and prosperity. I look forward to a future visit to Afghanistan that is far closer to that goal.

Thank you to Small Wars Journal for allowing me to share my thoughts on my Afghanistan trip. Readers can contact me at ndowling@idsinternational.net

Continue reading "Travels With Nick # 8: Escape From Kabul" »

May 24, 2009

Ending the Neverending War

Ending the Neverending War - Reviewed by John Nagl, Azure

The Forever War: Dispatches from the War on Terror
by Dexter Filkins
Knopf, 2008, 368 pages

Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq
by Linda Robinson
Public Affairs, 2008, 416 pages

The War Within: A Secret White House History 2006-2008
by Bob Woodward
Simon & Schuster, 2008, 512 pages

When the insurgency began in Iraq in the late summer of 2003, the United States Army was caught unprepared. Until then, it had been designed, trained, and equipped to win conventional wars, and was without doubt peerless in that arena. But it was not ready for an enemy who understood that it had no hope of defeating the United States on a conventional battlefield, and therefore chose to wage war against it from the shadows.
Yet over the five years that followed, in one of history’s most remarkable examples of adaptation under fire, the United States Army learned to conduct a surprisingly successful counterinsurgency campaign. Three new books, each by a prominent journalist, tell the story of that dramatic change, two from on the ground in Iraq and one from the corridors of Washington. Viewing the conflict from their different perspectives provides important insights into a war that America was losing badly only two years ago, and now looks to have turned around. It also suggests something about how America is likely to fight the war in Afghanistan under President Obama, and offers broader lessons about the nature of warfare in the twenty-first century...

Read more of the reviews at Azure.

The War in Iraq - Peter Mansoor, Azure

I enjoyed reading John Nagl’s excellent review (“Ending the Neverending War,” AZURE 35, Winter 2009) of three books that tell the story of the debacle and re-birth of American strategy in the Iraq war. It is a cautionary tale for any number of nations in the twenty-first century, Israel included. Nagl mentions that the U.S. Army was thoroughly unprepared for counterinsurgency warfare in 2003, but since the reasons for that lapse fell outside the purview of the books he was reviewing, he doesn’t state why. Simply put, the United States military has a love affair with technology and, during the decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, developed concepts that substituted technological prowess for strategic relevance. The future American way of war, according to certain defense intellectuals, was summed up in the phrase “Rapid Decisive Operations,” otherwise known as “shock and awe.” Using sophisticated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms, American forces would be able to find and distinguish all relevant targets on the battlefield and then, using precision-guided munitions, destroy them. Wars would be quick and relatively bloodless.
What the proponents of this approach failed to realize is that military operations are neither rapid nor decisive unless they lead to a more enduring peace. In this regard, the United States was guilty of trying to replace strategy with tactical and operational concepts that had marginal relevance to the kinds of wars that the nation would face after 9/11. We were guilty of becoming the Germans of the twenty-first century—a nation that used brilliant tactical and operational concepts but lost two world wars on account of strategic incompetence...

More at Azure.

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What the Tigers Taught Al-Qaeda

What the Tigers Taught Al-Qaeda - Mia Bloom, Washington Post opinion.

It took a pitched two-hour gun battle with Sri Lankan special forces. Then a rocket launched into his armor-plated ambulance. But last Monday, death finally came to Velupillai Prabhakaran, leader of the Tamil Tigers separatist group.
Also gone are Prabhakaran's son and heir apparent, Charles Anthony, and as many as 300 cadres. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), one of the most dangerous terrorist organizations on the planet, has been essentially wiped out.
But the Tigers' legacy remains intact. Their perfection of suicide bombings, their recruitment of women and children, their innovation in IEDs, have been emulated by other terrorist groups worldwide, from al-Qaeda to Hezbollah. Though they considered themselves superior to jihadi terrorists -- who regularly target civilians -- the Tigers opened the door to terrorism as a strategy of liberation and resistance to an unwanted government or occupying force. And they reached a standard of deadly efficiency envied by U.S. enemies and terrorists around the globe...

More at The Washington Post.

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No Magic Bullet on Iran

No Magic Bullet on Iran - David Ignatius, Washington Post opinion.

When U.S. and Israeli officials say that "all options are on the table" for stopping Iran from gaining nuclear weapons, that's usually taken to mean aerial bombardment of Iranian nuclear sites at Natanz and other locations.
But there is another option for impeding the Iranian program -- a covert campaign to disrupt and deceive Iran's nuclear establishment. Despite the secrecy surrounding such efforts, reports about Israeli and U.S. sabotage efforts have surfaced recently in newspaper stories, which undoubtedly have been read with interest in Tehran.
These published reports raise an interesting question: Do secret sabotage programs offer a "magic bullet" for dealing with the Iranian nuclear threat -- raising the cost to Iran of pursuing its program, while avoiding the chaotic backlash that would follow a conventional military strike?

More at The Washington Post.

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Memorial Day 2009

HEADQUARTERS GRAND ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC

General Orders No.11, WASHINGTON, D.C., May 5, 1868

I. The 30th day of May, 1868, is designated for the purpose of strewing with flowers or otherwise decorating the graves of comrades who died in defense of their country during the late rebellion, and whose bodies now lie in almost every city, village, and hamlet church-yard in the land. In this observance no form of ceremony is prescribed, but posts and comrades will in their own way arrange such fitting services and testimonials of respect as circumstances may permit.

We are organized, comrades, as our regulations tell us, for the purpose among other things, "of preserving and strengthening those kind and fraternal feelings which have bound together the soldiers, sailors, and marines who united to suppress the late rebellion." What can aid more to assure this result than cherishing tenderly the memory of our heroic dead, who made their breasts a barricade between our country and its foes? Their soldier lives were the reveille of freedom to a race in chains, and their deaths the tattoo of rebellious tyranny in arms. We should guard their graves with sacred vigilance. All that the consecrated wealth and taste of the nation can add to their adornment and security is but a fitting tribute to the memory of her slain defenders. Let no wanton foot tread rudely on such hallowed grounds. Let pleasant paths invite the coming and going of reverent visitors and fond mourners. Let no vandalism of avarice or neglect, no ravages of time testify to the present or to the coming generations that we have forgotten as a people the cost of a free and undivided republic.

If our eyes grow dull, other hands slack, and other hearts cold in the solemn trust, ours shall keep it well as long as the light and warmth of life remain to us.

Let us, then, at the time appointed gather around their sacred remains and garland the passionless mounds above them with the choicest flowers of spring-time; let us raise above them the dear old flag they saved from dishonor; let us in this solemn presence renew our pledges to aid and assist those whom they have left among us a sacred charge upon a nation's gratitude, the soldier's and sailor's widow and orphan.

II. It is the purpose of the Commander-in-Chief to inaugurate this observance with the hope that it will be kept up from year to year, while a survivor of the war remains to honor the memory of his departed comrades. He earnestly desires the public press to lend its friendly aid in bringing to the notice of comrades in all parts of the country in time for simultaneous compliance therewith.

III. Department commanders will use efforts to make this order effective.

By order of

JOHN A. LOGAN,
Commander-in-Chief

N.P. CHIPMAN,
Adjutant General

Official:
WM. T. COLLINS, A.A.G.

Commander-in-Chief Pays Memorial Day Weekend Tribute to US Military

Old Army Buddies - Michael Auslin, Washington Post
Those Who Make Us Say 'Oh!' - Peggy Noonan, Wall Street Journal
They Died for You - Rick Atkinson, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
Remembering Bataan - Washington Times
Roots of Memorial Day - Hayley Peterson, Washington Examiner
What are the Origins of Memorial Day? - Seattle Post Intelligencer
Observing Memorial Day - Larry Abeldt, Abilene Recorder Chronicle
What Does Memorial Day Mean? - Tabatha Hunter, Benton County Daily Record
What Patriotism Means to an American Citizen - Johnnie Godwin, The Tennessean
Let Us Honor the Best and Noblest of Us All - Spartanburg Herald Journal
Honor Their Sacrifice - Doug Chapin, Washington Times
The Dead We Honor - New York Post
Legacies of War Dead Endure - Rick Hampson, USA Today
Memorial Day Roll Call Salutes 148,000 Veterans - Gillian Flaccus, Associated Press
Obama Pays Memorial Day Weekend Tribute - Kent Klein, Voice of America
Grief and Honor at Arlington Cemetery - James Key, USA Today
Rolling Thunder - Michael Ruane, Washington Post
Memorial Day 2009 - Washington Post
This Memorial Day - New York Times
Being True to Our Values - Philadelphia Inquirer
Sterling Memorial - Bob McManus, New York Post
Memorial Day 2009 - McQ, Blackfive
A Word of Caution - Greyhawk, Mudville Gazette
How Not to Celebrate Memorial Day - Uncle Jimbo, Blackfive
Tibor Rubin - Greyhawk, Mudville Gazette

Memorial Day 2009

Taps

Taps

Band of Brothers

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May 26, 2009

26 May SWJ Roundup

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May 27, 2009

27 May SWJ Roundup

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Social Science for Counterterrorism

Social Science for Counterterrorism
Putting the Pieces Together
Edited by Paul K. Davis, Kim Cragin.
Contributors: Darcy Noricks, Todd C. Helmus, Christopher Paul, Claude Berrebi, Brian A. Jackson, Gaga Gvineria, Michael Egner, and Benjamin Bahney - Rand.

Social Science for Counterterrorism (Full Monograph)

The authors report on an aggressively interdisciplinary project to survey and integrate the scholarly social-science literature relevant to counterterrorism. They draw on literature from numerous disciplines, both qualitative and quantitative, and then use high-level conceptual models to pull the pieces together. In their monograph, they identify points of agreement and disagreement and point out instances in which disagreements merely reflect difference of research context or perspective. Priorities for further research are suggested and improved ways to frame questions for research and analysis are identified. The questions addressed relate to how terrorism arises, why some individuals become terrorists, how terrorists generate public support, how terrorist organizations make decisions, how terrorism declines, why individuals disengage, and how strategic communications can be more or less effective.

Social Science for Counterterrorism (Full Monograph)

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May 28, 2009

Goodbye CompanyCommand.com?

Hopefully this won't happen but Starbuck at Wings Over Iraq reports on a recent e-mail he received:

I just received this e-mail from someone involved in an Army-based web forum called "CompanyCommand.com" (whose sister site is "PlatoonLeader.com"). Seems that, with projected budget "cuts", the first thing to go isn't bloated programs like the F-22 Raptor or the Army's Future Combat System, but rather, inexpensive projects which have actually yielded impressive results by spurring innovation from the field...
Again, I don't know how serious the recommendation was to shut down CompanyCommand.com, but should anyone question the power of "The New Media" on combat operations, I merely direct them to this article in Small Wars Journal. (Includes interviews from Zenpundit, David Kilcullen, Thomas Ricks, Abu Muqawama, and, of course, from me).

Starbuck goes on to recommend that if you have an account at CompanyCommand or PlatoonLeader, log in and tell the admins not to shut the site down.

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28 May SWJ Roundup

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Countering Terrorism from the Second Foreign Fighter Glut

Countering Terrorism from the Second Foreign Fighter Glut
by Clint Watts, Small Wars Journal

Countering Terrorism from the Second Foreign Fighter Glut (Full PDF Article)

Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, which ended in early 1989, created a glut of foreign fighters, who found themselves unwanted by their home/source countries and restless for another Jihadi campaign. This “First Foreign Fighter Glut” spawned al-Qa’ida (AQ) and a decade of increasingly lethal terrorist attacks leading up to September 11, 2001.

Today, Western nations face a smaller, more lethal threat resulting from the “Second Foreign Fighter Glut.” As major conflicts in Iraq and later Afghanistan diminish in scale, a new generation of former foreign fighters will sit idle in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The future success of AQ hinges on its recruitment process in which former foreign fighters from Iraq and Afghanistan guide the recruitment and production of future foreign fighters who will conduct regional and global terrorist attacks. Left unchecked, the Second Foreign Fighter Glut will produce the next generation of terrorist organizations and attacks much as the First Foreign Fighter Glut fueled AQ.

Current Western counterterrorism (CT) strategies, largely overshadowed by counterinsurgencies (COIN) in Iraq and Afghanistan, place great emphasis on eliminating the supply of foreign fighters at their intended targets. These strategies fail to adequately mitigate the demand for jihad by young recruits in foreign fighter source countries.

Countering Terrorism from the Second Foreign Fighter Glut (Full PDF Article)

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May 29, 2009

29 May SWJ Roundup

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SWJ is Hot? Yep. So Says Rolling Stone... (Updated)

What do Lady Gaga and Small Wars Journal have in common? One is on the cover of the Rolling Stone and one isn’t – but sure enough both made the Rolling Stone 2009 “Hot List” – go figure.

Stocks may tumble and fortunes may fall, but hotness, it seems, is eternal.
There was some concern about compiling our latest Rolling Stone Hot List during an ice-cold era. But it seems that in these uncertain, gray days, we need what our Managing Editor Will Dana called "the sparkly and the sexy, the perfectly shaped diversions America leads the world in creating."
... Since we launched the Hot List in 1986, we've had our share of hits and misses (check our cover gallery to revisit all out past Hot Issues, from Angelina to Giselle to Britney). In 1988, we profiled "Hot Character Actor" Kevin Spacey, and we're particularly proud that in 1990, we introduced readers to a 23-year-old screenwriter named Jeffrey Abrams (you might know him now as Lost and Star Trek visionary J.J. Abrams). Of course, we've also missed the mark — in 1990, we thought Renny Harlin's hot streak would last, and the same issue that featured Abrams also declared Tevin Campbell "Hot Prodigy."
This time, we're banking on an assortment of movers, shakers and muckrakers that runs the gamut from the warfare digest "Small Wars Journal" to Hot Issue cover girl Lady Gaga…

Rolling Stone’s 2009 Hot List - as soon as we grab a hard copy of RS we'll post the SWJ entry - anyone seen it yet and care to share in comments below? This issue has not hit the news stands as yet.

Update:

Jules Crittenden at Forward Movement:

Yeah, well, anyone with a Y chromosome can see the chick with the Phyllis Diller fright wig and the bubble bikini is hot. Glad to see RS is getting hip to how hot Small Wars can be. Now breathlessly awaiting the print version with the actual RS SWJ review. Hate to get political about it, but seeing as SWJ was the go-to place for understanding the Iraq surge and RS is only just catching up two years later, forgive me for suspecting that the Odoption of the Bush embrace of counterinsurgency tactics has something to do with the new Small Wars fashion craze.

Greyhawk at Mudville Gazette:

Dave Dilegge asks "What do Lady Gaga and Small Wars Journal have in common? One is on the cover of the Rolling Stone and one isn't - but sure enough both made the Rolling Stone 2009 "Hot List" - go figure."
"This time," an anonymous Rolling Stone editor says of the list, "we're banking on an assortment of movers, shakers and muckrakers that runs the gamut from the warfare digest "Small Wars Journal" to Hot Issue cover girl Lady Gaga."
The kewl kidz know where to go for the show.

Andrew Exum at Abu Muqawama:

So are we bitter that our boss John Nagl nominated Small Wars Journal to Rolling Stone's "Hot List" instead of us? Naw. I'm pretty sure no one under 40 years of age reads Rolling Stone anymore, so it makes sense that my pleated pants-wearing boss would turn down Frampton Comes Alive! long enough to speak to some geriatric Rolling Stone journalist about the latest "hot" thing.
No, no, in all seriousness, congrats to Dave and the gang at SWJ. We'll be out behind the cafeteria dumpster smoking with the cool kids if anyone needs us.

Starbuck at Wings Over Iraq:

Small Wars Journal is a great site. But you normally wouldn't associate it with Rolling Stone Magazine's "Hot List". Until now.
It looks as if I'm going to have to acquire a copy of Rolling Stone when it gets shipped over here.

Joshua Keating at FP Passport:

Congratulations to everyone at SWJ! The recognition is well deserved. Since FP has teamed up with them to publish Robert Haddick's excellent weekly column "This Week at War," we can't help but feel a little hotter ourselves today.
Rumors that Ricks and Rothkopf are appearing together on the next Tiger Beat cover have yet to be confirmed.

Okay here's the scoop (RS page 85):

Hot Intelligence: 'Small Wars Journal'
The Military's New Must Read
Want to know how Obama is going to fight the war in Afghanistan? Then check out Small Wars Journal, an online magazine that provides a crash course on asymmetric warfare. Get schooled in fighting Somali pirates. Find out what Malcolm Nance, a former Navy interrogation instructor, thinks about waterboarding ("a torture technique, Period"). When David Kilcullen, special adviser to Gen. Petraeus, live-blogged the Iraq surge, he did it for SWJ.
Contributions include who's who of the sharpest minds in uniform, regardless of rank. "You're judged purely on the strength of your intellectual argument," says John Nagl, a retired lieutenant colonel who helped write the Army's Counterinsurgency Field Manual. Run by two former Marines, the site is a must-read for military insiders. "We must be doing something right," says co-founder Dave Dilegge, "because we get people calling us Attila the Hun warmongers one day and counterinsurgency-loving tree-huggers the next."

Hat tip to JMG1093 at the Council.

Continue reading "SWJ is Hot? Yep. So Says Rolling Stone... (Updated)" »

Creating a Supercharged Battalion

Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Coglianese believes this article still has some utility for SWJ readership. We agree and appreciate him sending it along.

Creating a Supercharged Battalion
By Lieutenant Colonel William David

Creating a Supercharged Battalion (Full PDF Article)

From the Preface:

In late July 1993, the 2nd Battalion 14th Infantry Task Force, 10th Mountain Division, departed Fort Drum for Mogadishu. They were to become the ground element of the 10th Mountain Division Brigade serving as the Quick Reaction Force for the United Nations command in Somalia.
They were the only U.S. maneuver element in country. Over a seventeen hour period on 3 and 4 October, TF 2-14 Infantry--fighting its way from the Mogadishu airfield to downtown--extracted ground elements of Task Force Ranger following the downing of two Task Force Ranger helicopters during an operation that had begun midday on Sunday the 3rd. This battle was marked by fierce fighting.
The 2-14 Infantry accomplished their challenging and dangerous mission. I am one of those who believe that only a really extraordinary infantry battalion could have gotten the Rangers out that night. TF 2-14 Infantry was clearly outstanding. Several of us, therefore, encouraged LTC Bill David to write this story.
Bill's story is simple and complex at the same time. The insights and lessons are, for the most part, timeless and broadly applicable. Bill presents a clear picture of what is required to make an outfit truly first rate.
This is the story of a battalion commander leading his soldiers in combat. LTC David describes how he built on the basic Army training and doctrine formula and added particular emphasis in core areas to develop a winning team.
This is a personal account. It is not history.
Luck was not a factor in 2-14's success. As will become apparent, 2-14's performance was the result of mission/combat-focused training, careful planning, aggressive execution, and an unwavering commitment to the welfare of soldiers….

Creating a Supercharged Battalion (Full PDF Article)

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This Week at War # 18

This week's SWJ contribution to Foreign Policy - This Week at War by Robert Haddick is now posted. Topics include - Can Counterinsurgency Ever be Used Again? - Social Scientists in the Trenches.

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May 30, 2009

30 May SWJ Roundup

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Weekend Reading and Listening Assignment

The Kilcullen Doctrine - Mark Safranski, ZenPundit.

While relatively short and designed, naturally, to help promote a book by a friend and CNAS colleague, Dr. Nagl has also taken a significant step toward influencing policy by distilling and reframing Dr. Klicullen’s lengthy and detailed observations into a reified and crystallized COIN “doctrine”. A digestible set of memes sized exactly right for the journalistic and governmental elite whose eyes glaze over at the mention of military jargon and who approach national security from a distinctly civilian and political perspective.

New Doctrines Without Strategic Foundations - Raymond Pritchett, Information Dissemination.

I am not an expert on counterinsurgency, but ever since the surge and getting turned onto the topic by reading the Small Wars Journal, I have studied it enough to understand when COIN is and is not effective. I don't believe that COIN is a subject anyone will truly master without a great deal of regional centric training, education, and experience, although I really appreciate how many concepts of COIN scale in warfare, in particular the complicated discussions of how to operate military forces in populated environments (like the littoral).

Legal Advice From the Taliban - Patrick Devenny, FP's The Argument.

So far, NATO has responded to Taliban expansion by reinforcing its units in the area, boosting its firepower, and combating the poppy economy through interdiction and crop substitution. That's the easy part. The real challenge will come after territory is regained and NATO begins its fight for the population -- not just the land. To get this next phase right, NATO and its Afghan allies would do well to take a lesson from the force that has been managing much of the south for the last two years: the Taliban. Yes, time to take advice from the enemy. What methods of "guerrilla governance" are attracting the support of local populations? And how could NATO and Afghan forces use them to "clear, hold, and build?"

Pakistan on the Brink - Ahmed Rashid, The New York Review of Books (Hat tip to Tom Ricks).

Pakistan is close to the brink, perhaps not to a meltdown of the government, but to a permanent state of anarchy, as the Islamist revolutionaries led by the Taliban and their many allies take more territory, and state power shrinks. There will be no mass revolutionary uprising like in Iran in 1979 or storming of the citadels of power as in Vietnam and Cambodia; rather we can expect a slow, insidious, long-burning fuse of fear, terror, and paralysis that the Taliban have lit and that the state is unable, and partly unwilling, to douse.

Petraeus: Video Shows Strike Aimed At Taliban - Steve Inskeep, NPR interview.

Gen. David Petraeus: I have. In fact, I was in Kabul the other night briefed by the brigadier general who I appointed to carry out an investigation of this particular incident, and there is indeed video from a B-1 Bomber that very clearly shows bombs hitting individuals who are the Taliban who are reacting to the movements of the Afghan and coalition forces on the ground.

What's Up With that "Global Engagement Directive"? - Marc Lynch, FP's Abu Aardvark.

The White House announced the other day that there would be a new desk at the National Security Council called the "Global Engagement Directive" which would take the lead in public diplomacy, international communications, foreign aid and other areas of engagement. This is a good move, which could potentially overcome a number of persistent problems in American public diplomacy and strategic communications.

5 Reasons Why this North Korean Crisis is No Groundhog's Day - Dan Twining, FP's Shadow Government.

North Korea’s missile and nuclear tests, new threats of war against its declared enemies, and the predictable results of these developments -- expressions of concern at the UN Security Council, U.S. offers of more unconditional talks, China’s ambivalent response - suggest that we remain in the “Groundhog Day” cycle of crisis and response that has characterized U.S. policy towards Pyongyang since 1994. In fact, new dynamics on the peninsula and in the region, and the fresh opportunity provided by what can now clearly be judged to be years of failed policy on denuclearization and disarmament, present an opportunity for a creative rethink about U.S. policy options. To clarify a way forward, it’s worth considering how the playing field has shifted (I see five ways that it has), and how this may create a different set of possibilities for the United States and our allies vis-à-vis the North Korean regime -- one that breaks decisively from the past and offers real hope for change.

Anything at Abu Muqawama.

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May 31, 2009

EX on GQ

Greyhawk over at Mudville Gazette asks: Now that Rolling Stone has included Small Wars Journal on the 2009 Hot List, how long until we see these at the local PX (or grocery store): Link to mag covers;-)

Starbuck at Wings Over Iraq comments: It's better than the initial joke that I had, where the cover of Rolling Stone Magazine would be a boy band consisting of Nagl, Exum, Dave Dilegge, Zenpundit and David Kilcullen called the "Small Wars Boys".

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31 May SWJ Roundup

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Future Conflict: Criminal Insurgencies, Gangs and Intelligence

Future Conflict
Criminal Insurgencies, Gangs and Intelligence
by John P. Sullivan, Small Wars Journal

Future Conflict: Criminal Insurgencies, Gangs and Intelligence (Full PDF Article)

Gangs dominate the intersection between crime and war. Traditionally viewed as criminal enterprises of varying degrees of sophistication and reach, some gangs have evolved into potentially more dangerous and destabilizing actors. In many areas across the world—especially in ‘criminal enclaves’ or ’lawless zones’ where civil governance, traditional security structures, and community or social bonds have eroded—gangs thrive. This essay briefly examines the dynamics of crime and war in these contested regions. Specifically, it provides a framework for understanding ‘criminal insurgencies’ where acute and endemic crime and gang violence challenge the solvency of state political control.

Criminal gangs come in many forms. They challenge the rule of law and employ violence to dominate local communities. In some cases they are expanding their reach and morphing into a new warmaking entities capable of challenging the legitimacy and even the solvency of nation-states. This potential brings life to the prediction made by Martin van Creveld who noted, "In the future, war will not be waged by armies but by groups whom today we call terrorists, guerrillas, bandits and robbers, but who will undoubtedly hit upon more formal titles to describe themselves."

Some advanced gangs—known as ‘third generation gangs’ and/or maras—are waging ‘wars” and changing the dynamics of crime. In some extreme cases they are waging a de facto criminal insurgency. As Adam Elkus and I recently noted: “Criminal insurgency is haunting the police stations and barracks of North America. Powerful criminal networks increasingly challenge the state’s monopoly on force, creating new threats to national security.” Mexico is currently challenged by extreme criminal violence, but it is by no means the only state in the Americas suffering from criminal insurgency. Transnational criminal organizations ranging from the transnational street collective Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) to the powerful Mexican drug cartels are steadily increasing in both power and reach. Even some American street gangs are evolving into ‘third generation’ gangs: large, networked, transnational bodies that may yet develop true political consciousness.

Criminal insurgency presents a challenge to national security analysts used to creating simulations and analytical models for terrorism and conventional military operations. Criminal insurgency is different from “regular” terrorism and insurgency because the criminal insurgents’ sole political motive is to gain autonomy economic control over territory. They do so by hollowing out the state and creating criminal enclaves to maneuver.

Future Conflict: Criminal Insurgencies, Gangs and Intelligence (Full PDF Article)

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SAS Secret War

SAS Secret War
Operation Storm in the Middle East
reviewed by Travis Weinger, Small Wars Journal

SAS Secret War (Full PDF Article)

SAS Secret War: Operation Storm in the Middle East. By Major General Tony Jeapes. London: Greenhill Books, first published 1980, this edition published 2005. 253 pages. $22.95. Reviewed by Travis Weinger.

A fanatical group, playing upon political and economic grievances in an isolated province, develops a base of support among the local tribes and launches a full-blown insurgency against the government and foreign power supporting it. The group violently attempts to break the traditional power structures and elites of the tribes and imposes a brutal and foreign ideology in their place. Realizing their mistake, the tribes begin, fitfully, to fight back against the outsiders, slowly reconciling with the counterinsurgents. The counterinsurgents partner with these tribal fighters to great effect, and the back of the insurgency is largely broken.

This could be a description of the course of the modern insurgency in Anbar province. Instead, it is the picture we get of the Dhofar insurgency in Oman in SAS Secret War, written by Major General Tony Jeapes, commander of the first full Special Air Service (SAS) squadron in Oman and SAS Commanding Officer from 1974 until the end of the war in 1975. Republished in 2005 (originally written in 1977), doubtless to cash in on the interest in counterinsurgency generated by the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, General Jeapes’ first-hand account of the successful British campaign in Oman during the 1970s is a fascinating read, both on its own merits as a story of war and in light of present-day discussions and debates about the nature and best practices of COIN.

SAS Secret War (Full PDF Article)

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Human Terrain: A Strategic Imperative

Human Terrain
A Strategic Imperative on the 21st Century Battlefield
by Nick Masellis, Small Wars Journal

Human Terrain A Strategic Imperative (Full PDF Article)

Six months into a one-year deployment, my unit was shifting its area of operation from the southeastern Tigris River city of Al-Kut, to one of the main centers of adherents to the Shia sect of Islam – Karbala. The city of Karbala, and particularly the twin mosques that tower over it, is central to the Shia Islamic faith. The significance of these structures is embedded in the culture, economy and faith of the over half a million residents, as well as of the millions of people who pilgrimage every year to visit the sacred, ancient metropolis.

However when I first arrived to the city and noticed the massive golden domes, I knew nothing of their significance; I knew nothing of the story behind the shrines and the history behind them; and I was still ignorant of the general cultural milieu. I was not at all unique – we all were mesmerized by the mosques and the culture around us, but had no clue where to begin in order to understand what they meant in the context of our presence among the people apart from: 1. do not get near the mosques; and 2. do not fire on them if fired upon from its vicinity. But more importantly, the prevailing attitude at the time seemed to be that we didn’t really have to understand anything beyond the latter. That seemed to be a reasonable tenant; after all, why would it be necessary to know such things about any given area, people or buildings? How, if at all, is it pertinent to the mission?

Well, one of the gravest shortfalls in the early years of Iraq “stabilization” was the lack of such understanding. That the tribes and religious sheiks had, in the midst of the political vacuum that developed after the fall of Saddam’s regime, assumed control and influence. The majority of military and civilian leadership in Iraq did not understand these religious and ethnic nuances, which heavily contributed to the sectarian violence and militias that developed in areas like Najaf and Karbala. Moreover, corruption in the country ran rampant, especially through the local police, who had a long history as a force of subversion and brutality. Even the interpreters were at times influenced by their own biases; to include the fear for their own lives and those of their families. As a result, this depreciated the value of effective translation, actionable intelligence and serious engagement with the population – essential components in counterinsurgency operations.

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