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Tom Ricks's Inbox at The Washington Post:
Marine Maj. Gen. Larry Taylor, now in Iraq, recently wrote to a young Marine to warn him against assuming that the country's next war will be like those in Iraq and Afghanistan/Pakistan. I was particularly struck by his last point -- that the danger of being wrong about a big war is far greater than the danger of being wrong about a small one...
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Counterinsurgency in Vietnam
Lessons Learned, Ignored, then Revived
by Rufus Phillips, Small Wars Journal
Counterinsurgency in Vietnam (Full PDF Article)
By the end of 1954, coup plotting was foiled so the army could begin seriously considering its pacification assignment. No one knew whether the Vietminh might reinitiate active resistance with stay-behind cadre in the zones they were evacuating so we had to help prepare the army for possible combat as well as for an active pacification campaign to win the support of the civilian population which had only known communist rule. During the first occupation operation we tried to improve troop behavior mainly through lectures. One such lecture was given to army truck drivers to stop them from running over people and their livestock when they passed through villages. After that lecture, I witnessed these same drivers getting back into their trucks only to go off barreling through villages scattering people and chickens right and left. Obviously a few lectures were not going to do the job. The first occupation was a learn-as-you-go affair. Communist resistance was passive not active and the operation went off without serious adverse consequences but without creating a strongly positive relationship between the army and the population.
Consequently, in preparing for the next occupation of a large zone in Central Vietnam containing about two million people, the army leadership with our help undertook much more intensive training in troop behavior and civic action all the way down to the platoon level with skits illustrating good and bad behavior as well repeated lectures. The army as servant of the people and civic action – actively helping the population – was instilled as every soldier’s duty down to the lowest private. As a consequence, the entire occupation came off without a single untoward incident between the troops and the population. Towards the end of the operation, people were actually coming out of their houses voluntarily offering drinking water to the soldiers. (It was the dry season when daily temperatures climbed over 100 degrees). The popular response in turn generated real pride down in the ranks. While there was no active combat, had it occurred I believe the positive attitude of the army towards civilians would have prevailed. The population’s initial fear and indifference turned into active support as the local people began identifying arms caches left behind by the Vietminh (the existence of these caches clearly indicated they intended to return), as well as fingering active Vietminh stay-behind cadre.
Erin Simpson, at Abu Muqawama, has more on Tom Ricks's WaPo piece.
... I think we've systematically underestimated the impact of our flat-footedness in confronting a variety of irregular threats. This goes back at least to the Marine barracks bombing in Beirut and runs through Mogadishu, Nairobi, the USS Cole, to the Trade Towers. MajGen Taylor is concerned that we might not be able to deter nations states in the future. I think we should be concerned that we have already demonstrated inability to deter non-state actors. In fact, we have provided the opposite: a clear and compelling invitation to attack us in an irregular manner. And perhaps when these efforts focused on mere embassies and barracks, you could say that these were tragic, but isolated attacks that could be dealt with locally or tactically (ie, force protection, local counter-terrorism, etc.).
But we now know that's utter folly. These aren't Lilliuputian pin-pricks. We now know that our stumbling in Lebanon and clumsiness in Somalia provided very clear lessons learned to al Qaeda and their fellow travelers... Our ham-fistedness not only failed to deter our enemies, but provided them with a clear strategy for confronting us. Today we are experiencing the long-term, strategic effects of our myopia.
Like the general, I am unsure of the nature of all our future threats. And like the general, I worry that focusing on COIN could leave us somewhat more vulnerable to conventional attack. I just wish the general would worry more about the impact of our already demonstrated vulnerability to irregular assaults.
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Reports: Christopher Hill to Be US Ambassador to Iraq - Voice of America
News outlets in the United States are reporting that Christopher Hill, the lead American negotiator on North Korea, is expected to be nominated as the next U.S. ambassador to Iraq.
There has been no official confirmation of the reports Monday on CBS, ABC, the Associated Press and Reuters, which quote unnamed officials who say Hill is expected to be the nominee.
Hill is currently the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.
Hill has previously served as ambassador to South Korea, Poland and Macedonia. He was also special envoy to Kosovo. Before he started his career in the foreign service, Hill served as a Peace Corps volunteer in Cameroon.
If nominated and confirmed by the US Senate, Hill would replace another career diplomat, Ryan Crocker, as Washington's top diplomat in Iraq.
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Irregular Warfare and the Vandalia Expedition in Fiji, 1859
by Dr. Timothy L. Francis, Small Wars Journal
Irregular Warfare and the Vandalia Expedition (Full PDF Article)
Irregular operations have a long history in the U.S. Navy. From cutting out expeditions against West Indian privateers in the 1790s, the sailing Navy’s version of visit-board-and-search operations off Tripoli in 1801 or skirmishes against rioters or Chinese troops during the Taiping rebellion in 1855, American Sailors were comfortable conducting irregular or ad hoc combat operations ashore. Under the command of skilled officers and experienced chief petty officers, veteran Sailors put the mission first, accomplishing remarkable feats at a then acceptable cost in lives. One of many examples took place in the South Pacific in the 1850s, an area of great interest to American merchants and traders.
It was cold and dark at 0300 on 9 October 1859 when the 40 Sailors and 10 Marines under Lt. Charles Caldwell prepared for battle, arming themselves with minié rifles, swords and a wheeled 12-pounder howitzer. Their ship, the chartered schooner Mechanic lay off Waya, a small, rugged island at the western edge of the Fiji archipelago. The expedition intended to climb the steep hills, pass into the interior and, as put by Lt. Caldwell in his diary, “destroy the town [of Somatti] and bring the natives to an engagement - It was a novel undertaking to assault and destroy a mountain tribe in their stronghold with a party of Seamen.”
Irregular Warfare and the Vandalia Expedition (Full PDF Article)
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Obama’s Vietnam - John Barry and Evan Thomas, Newsweek
About a year ago, Charlie Rose, the nighttime talk-show host, was interviewing Lt. Gen. Douglas Lute, the military adviser at the White House coordinating efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. "We have never been beaten tactically in a fire fight in Afghanistan," Lute said. To even casual students of the Vietnam War, his statement has an eerie echo. One of the iconic exchanges of Vietnam came, some years after the war, between Col. Harry Summers, a military historian, and a counterpart in the North Vietnamese Army. As Summers recalled it, he said, "You never defeated us in the field." To which the NVA officer replied: "That may be true. It is also irrelevant."
Vietnam analogies can be tiresome. To critics, especially those on the left, all American interventions after Vietnam have been potential "quagmires." But sometimes clichés come true, and, especially lately, it seems that the war in Afghanistan is shaping up in all-too-familiar ways. The parallels are disturbing: the president, eager to show his toughness, vows to do what it takes to "win." The nation that we are supposedly rescuing is no nation at all but rather a deeply divided, semi-failed state with an incompetent, corrupt government held to be illegitimate by a large portion of its population. The enemy is well accustomed to resisting foreign invaders and can escape into convenient refuges across the border. There are constraints on America striking those sanctuaries. Meanwhile, neighboring countries may see a chance to bog America down in a costly war. Last, there is no easy way out.
More at Newsweek.
Afghanistan Is Not Iraq, So US Best Not Surge Ahead Blindly - Christopher Brown, US News and World Report
Americans are often accused of fighting the last war. Unfortunately, this has a greater ring of truth to it than most would care to admit and normally ends up costing us far more in blood and treasure than if we just considered how new conflicts differ from previous efforts. This is the very danger facing America as it prepares to take the successful surge strategy from Iraq and transplant it to Afghanistan.
If America attempts a cookie-cutter approach in Afghanistan, is it likely to prove once again that "war is God's way of teaching Americans geography." That is because Afghanistan is nothing like Iraq. This is true in terms of both the physical and cultural socioeconomic geography that America is confronting.
More at US News and World Report.
Plans Emerge for New Troop Deployments to Afghanistan - Chip Cummins, Roshanak Taghavi and Jay Solomon, Wall Street Journal
Senior US commanders are finalizing plans to send tens of thousands of reinforcements to Afghanistan's main opium-producing region and its porous border with Pakistan, moves that will form the core of President Barack Obama's emerging Afghan war strategy.
Mr. Obama is likely to formally approve additional deployments this week, and Pentagon officials hope the full complement of 20,000 to 30,000 new troops will be on the ground by the end of the summer, pushing the U.S. military presence to its highest level since the start of the war in 2001.
US commanders said the moves are part of a push to beat back the resurgent Taliban and secure regions of Afghanistan that are beyond the reach of the weak central government in Kabul. Unlike Iraq, where violence has typically been concentrated in cities, the war in Afghanistan is being increasingly waged in isolated villages and towns.
More at The Wall Street Journal.
Obama Seeks Narrower Focus in Afghan War - Karen DeYoung, Washington Post
As President Obama prepares to formally authorize the April deployment of two additional combat brigades to Afghanistan, perhaps as early as this week, no issue other than the US economy appears as bleak to his administration as the seven-year Afghan war and the regional challenges that surround it.
A flurry of post-inauguration activity -- presidential meetings with top diplomatic and military officials, the appointment of a high-level Afghanistan-Pakistan envoy and the start of a White House-led strategic review -- was designed to show forward motion and resolve, senior administration officials said.
But newly installed officials describe a situation on the ground that is far more precarious than they had anticipated.
More at The Washington Post.
Ten Questions with Thomas P.M. Barnett
by Mark Safranski
Ten Questions with Thomas P.M. Barnett (Full PDF Article)
Small Wars Journal interview with Dr. Thomas P.M. Barnett on a wide range of issues – our lack of a grand strategy and need for self-awareness, advice for President Obama, globalization and frontier integration, the counterinsurgency debate, foreign policy priorities and much more.
Dr. Barnett is Senior Managing Director at Enterra Solutions and a contributing Editor for Esquire magazine. A former Assistant for Strategic Futures in the OSD Office of Force Transformation and a professor at the Naval War College, Barnett was the author of The Pentagon’s New Map and Blueprint for Action, he regularly advises the OSD, State Department, PACOM, CENTCOM and briefs senior members of the armed forces and the intelligence community as well as members of Congress.
Dr. Barnett is the author of the newly released Great Powers: America and the World after Bush.
An Obama A-Team for Iran - David Ignatius, Washington Post opinion
Whom should President Obama appoint as his emissary to Iran, to take on what may be the most important diplomatic mission in decades? The right person (or persons) would have the stature and experience to engage Iran at the highest level -- and to explore what Obama in his inaugural address called "a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect."
My nominees are Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft, former national security advisers for Presidents Jimmy Carter and George H.W. Bush, respectively. They would elevate the Iran mission, connecting it to the tradition of bipartisan strategic thinking that shaped America's role in the modern world. And, like our youthful new president, these two octogenarians understand the need for America to "turn a page" in its foreign policy and to connect with what Brzezinski has called a "global political awakening."
More at The Washington Post.
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Iraq Announces Preliminary Results of Provincial Elections - Edward Yeranian, Voice of America
Iraq's electoral commission has announced the preliminary results of last weekend's provincial elections, amid some accusations of irregularities and voting fraud. The Iraqi army and security forces, however, say that they will maintain order despite any challenges.
The head of Iraq's High Electoral Commission Faraj al-Haidari announced the preliminary results of Saturday's provincial election, indicating that 90 percent of the vote had been counted and that international observers were pleased with the electoral process.
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's bloc won 38 percent of the vote in Baghdad, 37 percent in Basrah, and large margins in other provinces.
This is the country's first election since 2005, with fourteen of Iraq's 18 provinces having voted.
More at Voice of America.
A Volatile Brew
by Colonel Robert Killebrew, Small Wars Journal Op-Ed
A Volatile Brew (Full PDF Article)
Last June a group of men in police SWAT team uniforms stormed a building in Phoenix, Arizona, and killed a suspected drug dealer. But the gunmen wearing police uniforms and firing police weapons weren't cops -- they were members of a Mexican drug gang evening scores with a troublesome dealer in the United States. When the real police arrived, the gang dug in for a shootout. That's increasingly common south of the border, but fortunately it didn't end well for the criminals this time.
The Phoenix incident is just one symptom of the growing unrest across the United States' southern border, where the Mexican government is waging a deadly war against murderous drug cartels. Even further south, a volatile brew consisting of thousands of demobilized former soldiers and guerrillas, state-sponsored terrorists and criminal-terrorist hybrids such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) and the Salvadoran MS-13 gang is threatening the rule of law in Latin America. More ominously, it's moving north. In fact, some of these thugs are already here.
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National Defense University's Center for Technology and National Security Policy has just released an online report - Civilian Surge: Key to Complex Operations - by Hans Binnendijk and Patrick M. Cronin.
The United States needs to develop the capacity to conduct complex operations that require close civil-military planning and cooperation in the field. This study is comprehensive review of this national need and examines how the need can best be met.
Its main conclusion is that current efforts to build a civilian response capacity for complex operations are unfinished and that the Obama administration needs to dedicate additional attention, including new legislation and resources, to complete the task. It recommends what civilian capacity to build, how much of it is needed, and how to manage and organize it.
Read the full 223 page report or continue on for the major findings by chapter...
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Mullen Addresses Need for ‘Whole Government’ Approach
By Jim Garamone
American Forces Press Service
All portions of the U.S. government have a role in dealing with any instability that results from the world’s financial crisis, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said here yesterday
Navy Adm. Mike Mullen gave a public talk sponsored by Princeton University and its Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, visited with the college’s ROTC detachment and participated in a roundtable discussion with the faculty.
In his remarks, the chairman expressed concern about the militarization of U.S. foreign policy.
“What is overarching is the global financial crisis,” Mullen said. “I worry a great deal as we work our way through this – and I think it’s going to take longer rather than shorter to do that. I worry about the effect that will have on instability throughout the world.”
The chairman noted that throughout history, the United States hasn’t been good about predicting where instability will occur. “As this crisis really takes hold, there will be places that become unstable that we haven’t anticipated,” he said. “We need a whole-of-government approach.”
The United States military is a force for freedom and good in the world, Mullen said, but it’s not the solution to every problem. “The United States military is necessary, but it is not sufficient alone,” Mullen said. He pointed out that the American military is stretched and is doing missions that servicemembers have not been trained to do.
“They are an incredible group of young people who are incredibly adaptive and creative and innovative, and they do this unbelievably well,” he said. “But we need to back off of that over time.”
Other Cabinet-level departments – State, Treasury, Commerce, Justice – have the proper expertise for “soft-power” missions and need to have personnel able to deploy to address these problems, Mullen said. “But in my opinion,” he added, “we are a good decade away from creating a capability in our other departments.”...
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SWJ's 5th weekly contribution to Foreign Policy - This Week at War by Robert Haddick - is now posted. Topics include - Will civilians take back America's foreign policy? - The military and the media - two scorpions in a bottle? - New books:
David Kilcullen is the author of The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. In his new book, Kilcullen attempts to disentangle the global "war on terror" from the array of small wars that originate from unique local circumstances. Kilcullen is a retired Australian army officer, holds a Ph.D., and was a top adviser to Gen. David Petraeus in Baghdad and to the U.S. State Department. He is also one of the most popular contributors to Small Wars Journal, which collected his writings here.
Thomas P.M. Barnett, a professor at the U.S. Naval War College and an advisor to the U.S. government, has authored Great Powers: America and the World After Bush. In this book, Barnett attempts to get his audience to consider what America's grand strategy should be, taking into account not only U.S. military and economic power, but also America's cultural reach and the influence it has had over the past century. Barnett discussed his new book in this Small Wars Journal interview.
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Iraqi Intelligence at the Brigade/Division Level
Systemic Deficiencies and Training Solutions
by Nick Padlo, Small Wars Journal
Iraqi Intelligence at the Brigade/Division Level (Full PDF Article)
During 15 months in Iraq, I worked with nearly 100 Iraqi intelligence professionals. Throughout the deployment, I noticed systemic intelligence shortcomings existing consistently at all tactical and operational levels. While some of the shortcomings were due to cultural barriers, others were primarily due to previously embedded misconceptions and a lack of formalized training. In either case, the solutions to the problems are attainable through U.S. training and sustainable after an eventual scale down in U.S. operations.
In order to modernize the role of Iraqi intelligence officers, the Iraqi Army must minimize the intelligence officer’s (S2s) role in direct source operations, integrate the intelligence officer with the rest of the battalion/brigade/division staff, understand and employ digital systems to consolidate and organize intelligence, and reinforce the link between the Iraqi Army and the legal system. The intelligence component of U.S. Military Training Teams (MiTT) should focus on these specific shortcomings in order to better equip Iraqi intelligence professionals to fight a modern counterinsurgency.
Iraqi Intelligence at the Brigade/Division Level (Full PDF Article)
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The Insurgent Who Loved 'Titanic' - Thomas E. Ricks, Washington Post
This excerpt was taken from The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008.
Capt. Samuel Cook, who was commanding the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment's C troop in the northern Tigris Valley in Salahuddin Province had been pursuing the local leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, whom he considered a "very passionate, eloquent speaker, well educated." The terrorist leader offered to talk, and Cook took him up on it. "He was tired of being on the run, and he no longer believed in what he had once been preaching," Cook said. He provided information on the whereabouts of a higher al Qaeda leader for the province, who was killed in a firefight two weeks later. He also told them that al Qaeda in Iraq had three major sources of funding: crime, the Kurds, and the Iranians. Cook would use this information adroitly, asking local Sunni insurgents why they thought al Qaeda was their friend, if it was on the payroll of the dreaded Persian power. The insurgents, who had affiliated with al Qaeda as the surge began to hit them, also were growing tired, Cook recalled.
Cook had a light touch. In December 2007, he sent a letter to the community wishing them a happy Eid al- Fitr, a festival that marks the end of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, and one of the most significant Muslim holidays. At the beginning of the Eid feast, he met with the al Qaeda man, telling him that he had enough evidence to detain him. The man responded that Cook was wading into a fight between tribes, implying that he didn't understand the situation. Cook countered, "We have far too many reports from people in your own tribe to make this a tribal affair." Cook then told the man and some sheikhs who had waited outside that the reconciliation process is not easy and that the al Qaeda man and he disagreed on his guilt, but that out of respect for the Eid holiday, he wouldn't detain him at this time. As Cook hoped, those three actions - the letter, the meeting, and the show of respect - persuaded other insurgents to come see the thoughtful American...
More at The Washington Post.
Afghan Leader Finds Himself Hero No More - Dexter Filkens, New York Times
A foretaste of what would be in store for President Hamid Karzai after the election of a new American administration came last February, when Joseph R. Biden Jr., then a senator, sat down to a formal dinner at the palace during a visit here.
Between platters of lamb and rice, Mr. Biden and two other American senators questioned Mr. Karzai about corruption in his government, which, by many estimates, is among the worst in the world. Mr. Karzai assured Mr. Biden and the other senators that there was no corruption at all and that, in any case, it was not his fault.
The senators gaped in astonishment. After 45 minutes, Mr. Biden threw down his napkin and stood up.
“This dinner is over,” Mr. Biden announced, according to one of the people in the room at the time. And the three senators walked out, long before the appointed time.
Today, of course, Mr. Biden is the vice president.
More at The New York Times.
The Dissenter Who Changed the War - Thomas E. Ricks, Washington Post
Army Gen. Raymond T. Odierno was an unlikely dissident, with little in his past to suggest that he would buck his superiors and push the US military in radically new directions. A 1976 West Point graduate and veteran of the Persian Gulf War and the Kosovo campaign, Odierno had earned a reputation as the best of the Army's conventional thinkers -- intelligent and ambitious, but focused on using the tools in front of him rather than discovering new and unexpected ones. That image was only reinforced during his first tour in Iraq after the US invasion in 2003.
As commander of the 4th Infantry Division in the Sunni Triangle, Odierno led troops known for their sometimes heavy-handed tactics, kicking in doors and rounding up thousands of Iraqi "MAMs" (military-age males). He finished his tour believing the fight was going well. "I thought we had beaten this thing," he would later recall.
Sent back to Iraq in 2006 as second in command of US forces, under orders to begin the withdrawal of American troops and shift fighting responsibilities to the Iraqis, Odierno found a situation that he recalled as "fairly desperate, frankly."
So that fall, he became the lone senior officer in the active-duty military to advocate a buildup of American troops in Iraq, a strategy rejected by the full chain of command above him, including Gen. George W. Casey Jr., then the top commander in Iraq and Odierno's immediate superior.
Much more at The Washington Post.
The Generals' Insurgency: The Story Behind the U.S. Troop Surge in Iraq - Washington Post. Follow the link for the story behind the story on Tom Ricks' latest book - The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008. Includes key documents, key players, timeline, video, and related content.
The Gamble will be released on 10 February 2009.
Thomas E. Ricks uses hundreds of hours of exclusive interviews with top officers in Iraq and extraordinary on-the-ground reportage to document the inside story of the Iraq War since late 2005 as only he can, examining the events that took place as the military was forced to reckon with itself, the surge was launched, and a very different war began.
Since early 2007 a new military order has directed American strategy. Some top U.S. officials now in Iraq actually opposed the 2003 invasion, and almost all are severely critical of how the war was fought from then through 2006. At the core of the story is General David Petraeus, a military intellectual who has gathered around him an unprecedented number of officers with both combat experience and Ph.D.s. Underscoring his new and unorthodox approach, three of his key advisers are quirky foreigners—an Australian infantryman-turned- anthropologist, an antimilitary British woman who is an expert in the Middle East, and a Mennonite-educated Palestinian pacifist.
The Gamble offers new breaking information, revealing behind-the-scenes disagreements between top commanders. We learn that almost every single officer in the chain of command fought the surge. Many of Petraeus’s closest advisers went to Iraq extremely pessimistic, doubting that the surge would have any effect, and his own boss was so skeptical that he dispatched an admiral to Baghdad in the summer of 2007 to come up with a strategy to replace Petraeus’s. That same boss later flew to Iraq to try to talk Petraeus out of his planned congressional testimony. The Gamble examines the congressional hearings through the eyes of Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker, and their views of the questions posed by the 2008 presidential candidates.
For Petraeus, prevailing in Iraq means extending the war. Thomas E. Ricks concludes that the war is likely to last another five to ten years—and that that outcome is a best case scenario. His stunning conclusion, stated in the last line of the book, is that “the events for which the Iraq war will be remembered by us and by the world have not yet happened.”
Thomas E. Ricks is The Washington Post’s senior Pentagon correspondent, where he has covered the U.S. military since 2000. Until the end of 1999 he held the same beat at The Wall Street Journal, where he was a reporter for seventeen years. A member of two Pulitzer Prize- winning teams for national reporting, he has reported on U.S. military activities in Somalia, Haiti, Korea, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Kuwait, Turkey, Afghanistan, and Iraq. He is the author of Fiasco, Making the Corps, and A Soldier’s Duty.
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Command Sergeant Major Jeffrey J. Mellinger assumed the duties of the U.S. Army Materiel Command’s Command Sergeant Major on Nov. 2, 2007. CSM Mellinger was previously assigned to the U.S. Army Alaska and spent several months speaking to units and groups on his experiences.
CSM Mellinger was drafted on April 18, 1972, at Eugene, Oregon. Following basic and advanced training at Fort Ord, California, he completed airborne training at Fort Benning, Georgia. His first assignment was in the Federal Republic of Germany as a unit clerk. Upon his return from Germany, CSM Mellinger was assigned to the 2d Battalion (Ranger), 75th Infantry, Fort Lewis, Washington. For the next five years, CSM Mellinger served as unit clerk, battalion personnel staff NCO, machinegun squad leader, rifle squad leader, rifle platoon sergeant and weapons platoon leader. He then performed drill sergeant duty at Fort Gordon, Georgia, and returned to the 2nd Ranger Battalion, serving again as a platoon sergeant.
Additional assignments include: Special Forces Military Freefall Instructor, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; senior team leader, 75th Ranger Regimental Reconnaissance Detachment, Fort Benning, Georgia; assistant professor of Military Science, University of Alaska-Fairbanks; First Sergeant, Company C (Airborne), 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry (Manchu), Fort Wainwright, Alaska; Senior Enlisted Advisor, 41st Separate Infantry Brigade, Oregon Army National Guard; Command Sergeant Major, 3rd Battalion, 10th Infantry, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri; Command Sergeant Major, 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia; Commandant, U.S. Army Alaska Noncommissioned Officer’s Academy, Fort Richardson, Alaska; Command Sergeant Major of United States Army Japan and 9th Theater Support Command, Camp Zama, Japan; Command Sergeant Major, First U.S. Army, Fort Gillem, Georgia; and Command Sergeant Major, Multi-National Force–Iraq from August 2004-May 2007.
Command Sergeant Major Jeffrey J. Mellinger - Official Biography
America's Last Draftee: "I'm a Relic" - Mark Thompson, Time
America's generals love to brag about their all-volunteer Army. That's because they tend to overlook Jeffrey Mellinger. He donned his Army uniform for the first time on April 18, 1972, about the time the Nixon Administration was seeking "peace with honor" in Vietnam and The Godfather was opening on the silver screen. Nearly 37 years later, he's still wearing Army green. Mellinger is, by all accounts, the last active-duty draftee serving in the U.S. Army...
The Army sent him all over the world, including tours in Japan and Iraq. General David Petraeus, who served as Mellinger's boss during the draftee's final three months in Iraq in 2007, calls him "a national asset" who kept the top generals' aware of the peaks and valleys in battlefield morale. "We lost count of how many times his personal convoy was hit," Petraeus says. "Yet he never stopped driving the roads, walking patrols, and going on missions with our troopers." (Mellinger's 33-month Iraq tour was punctuated by 27 roadside bombings, including two that destroyed his vehicle, although he managed to escape injury.) Mellinger now serves as the Command Sergeant Major, the senior enlisted man in the Virginia headquarters of the Army Materiel Command, trying to shrink what he calls the "flash-to-bang time" between recognizing what soldiers need and getting it to them...
He doesn't have much patience for those, like Rep. Charles Rangel, D-N.Y., who want to bring back the draft to ensure that war's burdens are equally shared. "We're doing just fine, thank you, with the all-volunteer force," Mellinger says. "Until the time comes that we're in danger of losing our capabilities to do our missions, then we ought to stick with what we have — there is no need for the draft." ...
Much more at Time.
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A Military Tactician's Political Strategy - Thomas E. Ricks, Washington Post
As Gen. David H. Petraeus flew into Baghdad in February 2007, preparing to take command of U.S. forces in Iraq, Col. Peter R. Mansoor, his executive officer, knelt alongside his seat. "You know, sir," he said, "the hardest thing for you, if it comes to it, will be to tell the American people and the president that this isn't working."
The general said nothing in response. "But he heard it," Mansoor remembers. And he nodded.
Petraeus arrived for his third tour in Iraq to execute the "surge" strategy developed by Lt. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno and outlined by President George W. Bush a few weeks earlier: 30,000 additional troops, new counterinsurgency tactics, and a mission to protect the population and bring security to a country verging on civil war, with the hope that political reconciliation would follow...
More at The Washington Post.
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(This is an edited version of my statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Afghanistan, chaired by Senator John F. Kerry, on 5th February 2009).
Senator Joseph Lieberman made a timely and well-argued call, during his recent speech at the Brookings Institution, for a comprehensive political-military campaign in the Afghanistan-Pakistan (AFPAK) region. Seven years into a long war, we need to be honest with ourselves about the harsh strategic choices we face. And we need to recognize that before we can expect long-term strategic progress, we first have to deal with an immediate, acute crisis that could derail the entire effort this year. Let me first discuss long-term strategic choices, then turn to the immediate crisis, and conclude with some remarks on Pakistan...
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Love and Hate
by Captain Michael Few, Small Wars Journal
Love and Hate (Full PDF Article)
One of my best commanders preached a very simple command philosophy. “Mike,” he would proclaim, “sometimes you got to give the love, and sometimes you got to give them the hate.”
To emphasize his point, he would clench both fists and extend mock punches: one representing the love and one representing the hate. This philosophy served our squadron well both in leading his airborne reconnaissance squadron and clearing Al Qaeda held safe-havens in Northern Iraq.
The premise behind this philosophy reflected many years studying the art of leadership and his straightforward assessment coupled a deep understanding in discretion and discernment tempered in the pragmatism of the complicated realities of real life mutually exclusive to the black and white moral world view preached at the academy.
In 1879, MG John Schofield declared that “the discipline which makes the soldier of a free country reliable in battle is not to be gained by harsh nor tyrannical treatment. On the contrary, such treatment is far more likely to destroy than to make an army.” Conversely, the leadership of coddling and friendship is marked with disrespect and irreverence from one’s subordinates.
Simply put, soldiers desire neither a dictator nor buddy in a commander. They demand leadership.
No End In Sight To The Iraq 'Gamble' - (Audio) Fresh Air from WHYY, February 10, 2009 · Washington Post special military correspondent Thomas E. Ricks predicts that the war in Iraq is likely to last at least another five to 10 years. His new book, The Gamble, focuses on General David Petraeus' role in the conflict and reveals disagreements between top commanders in the US military.
In an address, on 29 January, to the Brookings Institution, Senator Joe Lieberman (ID-CT) outlined a comprehensive civil-military campaign with five major elements to defeat the insurgency in Afghanistan.
Below are excerpts and the full text of the speech as prepared for delivery:
"There is no question, we all need to be realists when it comes to Afghanistan, both about our objectives and about the limits of our power. But we should not and cannot take any false comfort from declaring 'modest expectations' for Afghanistan."
"We all agree, our foremost interest in Afghanistan is preventing that country from becoming a terrorist safe haven. But the only realistic way to prevent that from happening is through the emergence of a stable and legitimate political order in Afghanistan, backed by capable indigenous security forces—and neither of those realities is going to materialize without a significant and sustained American commitment. This will be difficult, but it is absolutely necessary."
"...As General David Petraeus put it two years ago about another battlefield: 'hard is not hopeless.' In my remarks today, I want to speak, first, about why—despite the missteps and difficulties in Afghanistan—I am still confident we can turn the tide there; second, about how we can do so; and third, about why I believe we must do so."
"...the decision to send additional troops to Afghanistan this year is both right and important. As the Bush administration learned the hard way in Iraq, counterinsurgency is manpower-intensive. Our military coalition is undermanned and overstretched in Afghanistan today."
"However, as we also learned in Iraq, successful counterinsurgency requires more than a heavy military footprint. In fact, our allied coalition has already doubled the number of troops in Afghanistan over the last two years. But at the same time, security has worsened."
"That is why we must match the coming surge in troop strength in Afghanistan with at least five other surges that are equally important."
"First, we need a surge in the strategic coherence of our war effort. The problem in Afghanistan today is not only that we have devoted too few resources, but that the resources we have devoted are being applied incoherently."
"In contrast to Iraq, where General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker came together two years ago to develop a nationwide civil-military campaign plan to defeat the insurgency, there is still no such integrated nationwide counterinsurgency plan for Afghanistan. This is an unacceptable failure. It is also the predictable consequence of a fragmented military command structure under NATO, an even more incoherent civilian effort, and no unified leadership between the two. This is no way to run a counterinsurgency."
"Second, we must insist that any military surge in Afghanistan is matched by a surge in civilian capacity."
"Third, as the United States steps up its commitments in Afghanistan, it is equally critical that we help the Afghans surge with us."
"Fourth, as many have observed, we cannot deal with Afghanistan in a vacuum. That is why we also need a surge in our regional strategy."
"Fifth and perhaps most importantly, success in Afghanistan requires a sustained, realistic political and public commitment to this mission here at home."
"...there are already voices on both the left and the right murmuring the word 'quagmire.'"
"They say Afghanistan is the graveyard of empires, that we should abandon any hope of nation-building there, and that President Obama should rethink his pledge to deploy additional forces."
"Why, then, is this wrong? Why should we send tens of thousands of our loved ones to a remote country on the far side of the world?"
"The most direct answer is that Afghanistan is the frontline of the global ideological and military war we are waging with Islamist extremism. Afghanistan is where the attacks of 9/11 were plotted, where al Qaeda made its sanctuary under the Taliban, and where they will do so again if given the chance."
Continue on for the full transcript...
Continue reading "Campaign Plan for Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan" »
Continue on for today's Small Wars Journal news and opinion roundup...
The Impact of FCS Technologies on Small Unit Performance
by Colonel Victor M. Rosello, Small Wars Journal
The Impact of FCS Technologies (Full PDF Article)
What capabilities will small units require to fight and win our nation’s wars in the next 10-20 years? What capabilities should they expect that don’t exist today? Recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan indicates that improvements can be made in four major areas to enhance the combat effectiveness of small units. These are lethality, survivability, situational awareness, and battle command. Each one plays a significant part in maintaining the US Army at the cutting edge of modernization and technological innovation. The program responsible for this innovation is the Future Combat Systems (FCS). Its goal is to take a holistic approach in designing and producing a family of modern systems that will enhance the nations’ precious land power assets and resources. In short, to make Army small units better to more effectively and efficiently accomplish their mission.
45th Munich Security Conference
General David H. Petraeus
Remarks for Panel Discussion - 8 February 2009
Well, good morning to you all. And thanks to Chairman Ischinger and his team. It’s an honor to be with you – and it’s great to be on the stage with my new diplomatic partner, AMB Richard Holbrook. You know, it’s every Commander’s dream to have an ambassadorial wingman who is described by journalists with nicknames like “The Bulldozer.” PAUSE. In all seriousness, I want to publicly salute this gifted, selfless diplomat for taking on his new position, an appointment that conveys how significant the focus in the United States is on Afghanistan and Pakistan and on the South and Central Asia region more broadly.
This morning’s topic is Afghanistan, which Secretary of Defense Gates recently described to the US Congress as posing “our greatest military challenge right now.” As he noted, our fundamental objective in Afghanistan is to ensure that transnational terrorists are not able to reestablish the sanctuaries they enjoyed prior to 9/11. It was to eliminate such sanctuaries that we took action in Afghanistan in 2001. And preventing their reestablishment remains an imperative today – noting, to be sure, that achievement of that objective inevitably requires accomplishment of other interrelated tasks as well. And, [as has been explained,] President Obama has directed a strategy review that will sharpen the clarity of those tasks.
Afghanistan has been a very tough endeavor. Certainly, there have been important achievements there over the past seven years – agreement on a constitution, elections, and establishment of a government; increased access to education, health care, media, and telecommunications; construction of a significant number of infrastructure projects; development of the Afghan National Army; and others.
But in recent years the resurgence of the Taliban and Al Qaeda has led to an increase in violence, especially in the southern and eastern parts of the country. Numerous other challenges have emerged as well, among them: difficulties in the development of governmental institutions that achieve legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan people; corruption; expansion – until last year – of poppy production and the illegal narcotics industry; and difficulties in the establishment of the Afghan police.
In fact, there has been nothing easy about Afghanistan. And, as Senator Lieberman observed in a recent speech to the Brookings Institution, “Reversing Afghanistan’s slide into insecurity will not come quickly, easily, or cheaply.” Similarly, Secretary Gates told Congress, “This will undoubtedly be a long and difficult fight.” I agree. In fact, I think it is important to be clear eyed about the challenges that lie ahead, while also remembering the importance of our objectives in Afghanistan and the importance of the opportunity that exists if we all intensify our efforts and work together to achieve those objectives.
Many observers have noted that there are no purely military solutions in Afghanistan. That is correct. Nonetheless, military action, while not sufficient by itself, is absolutely necessary, for security provides the essential foundation for the achievement of progress in all the other so-called lines of operation – recognizing, of course, that progress in other areas made possible by security improvements typically contributes to further progress in the security arena – creating an upward spiral in which improvements in one area reinforce progress in another.
Arresting and then reversing the downward spiral in security in Afghanistan thus will require not just additional military forces, but also more civilian contributions, greater unity of effort between civilian and military elements and with our Afghan partners, and a comprehensive approach, as well as sustained commitment and a strategy that addresses the situations in neighboring countries.
This morning, I’d like to describe in very general terms the resource requirements that are under discussion in Washington and various other national capitals. Then I’ll describe briefly a few of the ideas that helped us in Iraq and that, properly adapted for Afghanistan, can help guide GEN McKiernan and ISAF...
Continue reading "The Future of the Alliance and the Mission in Afghanistan" »
Via Foreign Policy Passport.
Nathaniel Fick and John Nagl, authors of The Counterinsurgency Field Manual: Afghanistan Edition, appeared on WNYC's Brian Lehrer Show and The Gamble author and Best Defense blogger Tom Ricks on The Daily Show below:
Continue on for today's Small Wars Journal news and opinion roundup...
Nagl to run Fort CNAS - Laura Rozen at Foreign Policy's The Cable
... For now, Nagl is acting president, a CNAS officer told The Cable, saying the think tank plans to roll out more detailed plans soon, including the addition of a "big strategic thinker" to guide its policy initiatives. "We will continue to be the leading national security think tank in the U.S.," he said...
Thanks to Colonel Bob Jones for his post on Small Wars Council on the topic of Mindset, which triggered some of my recollections oon the sort of allied subject of unintended consequences and their lingering effects. The Brigade structures he referenced were being adjusted for the Army National Guard and were being formed for the Active Army assistors at the time cited in the Post as a result of the activation of three Army National Guard Brigades for Operation Desert Shield / Desert Storm in 1990-91. The activation of those three Brigades had been resisted by senior Army leadership but was forced by political pressure. In an effort to delay the potential dispatch of the Brigades to the operational theater, the Army elected to rotate all three Brigades through the National Training Center. In the event, the ‘war’ ended prior to their deployment.
One result of that failure to be deployed as a result of deferring to process as a forestalling tactic was an unintended consequence of little desired Congressional involvement. As I recall, the Defense Appropriation Acts of 1992 and 1993 dedicated 5,000 experienced Active Component soldiers. All captains had to be branch qualified and all NCOs, mostly SSG and above and had to have recent troop experience.
At the time those structures came into being, I was working in a large headquarters and happened to be in the Commanding General’s Office when he telephonically questioned a Senate staff member of his acquaintance as to why Congress had passed a rather convoluted law that led to the establishment of the Advisory ‘Brigades.’ The response was to the effect that Congress wished to ensure that in future wars The Army National Guard Brigades were deployed. The General’s response to the Staff person was “Well, you haven’t done that. There’s no assurance as I read this law that will happen and what you have done is create a bureaucratic nightmare that will waste Active Component Spaces and is likely to be a detriment to the Reserve Components…” or words to that effect.
By John J. Kruzel
American Forces Press Service
WASHINGTON, Feb. 13, 2009 – The U.S. military boasts dominant nuclear and conventional capabilities, but must improve its capacity to fight irregular wars, NATO's supreme allied commander for transformation said yesterday.
Marine Corps Gen. James N. Mattis, who also serves as the commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command, said the United States has lost some of its nuclear and conventional war edge in recent years, but remains superior on these fronts.
“We are not superior in irregular warfare,” he said in a speech at the Foreign Policy Research Institute here. “And that’s what we’ve got to be.”
Mattis discussed the need for the U.S. military to transform to a “hybrid” force that expands its nonconventional means without sacrificing classic warfighting competence.
Broadly defined, irregular warfare refers to conflict with an enemy that does not organize itself as a traditional military. As in the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, this type of fighting entails stealthy attacks such as roadside bombings and ambushes, instead of direct military-to-military engagement.
In calculating how to establish greater balance among the two types of warfare, the general said, he noticed a common thread among past armies that morphed to meet a new set of challenges...
Continue reading "General Mattis: U.S. Must Prepare for ‘Hybrid’ Warfare" »
SWJ's 6th weekly contribution to Foreign Policy - This Week at War by Robert Haddick - is now posted. Topics include - General Petraeus’s shopping list for Afghanistan - You really have only one choice (Afghanistan strategy) - Does technology make a difference in small wars?
... the main events may not even have happened yet. By Tom Ricks at the Washington Post.
... I don't think the Iraq war is over, and I worry that there is more to come than any of us suspect.
A smaller but long-term U.S. military presence in Iraq is probably the best we can hope for. The thought of having small numbers of U.S. troops dying for years to come in the country's deserts and palm groves isn't appealing, but it appears to be better than either being ejected or pulling out -- and letting the genocidal chips fall where they may.
Almost every American official I interviewed in Iraq over the past three years agreed. "This is not a campaign that can be won in one or two years," said Col. Peter Mansoor, who was Gen. David H. Petraeus's executive officer during much of the latter's tour in Iraq. "The United States has got to be willing to underwrite this effort for many, many years to come. I can't put it in any brighter colors than that." ...
More at The Washington Post.
Continue reading "The war in Iraq isn't over... (updated)" »
Building Our Best Weapon. By Mike Mullen.
We have learned, after seven years of war, that trust is the coin of the realm -- that building it takes time, losing it takes mere seconds, and maintaining it may be our most important and most difficult objective.
That's why images of prisoner maltreatment at Abu Ghraib still serve as recruiting tools for al-Qaeda. And it's why each civilian casualty for which we are even remotely responsible sets back our efforts to gain the confidence of the Afghan people months, if not years.
Going the Distance. The war in Afghanistan isn't doomed. We just need to rethink the insurgency. By Seth G. Jones.
Afghanistan has a reputation as a graveyard of empires, based as much on lore as on reality. This reputation has contributed to a growing pessimism that U.S. and NATO forces will fare no better there than did the Soviet and British armies, or even their predecessors reaching back to Alexander the Great. The gloom was only stoked by last week's brazen suicide attacks in Kabul on the eve of a visit by Richard Holbrooke, President Obama's special envoy to Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Not Even the Afghans Know How to Fix It. By Edward P. Joseph.
At the Jihad Museum in Herat, the ancient Afghan city not far from the Iranian border, the main attraction was just about ready: a 360-degree diorama showing mujaheddin being slaughtered by, and then slaughtering, the Soviet invaders of the 1980s.
I recently visited the exhibit during a seven-week mission to evaluate a U.S. program assisting local governments in Afghanistan. On our way out of the museum, we bumped into a prominent mujahed fighter and his entourage. When an American in our group told him that the United States would never forget the Afghan fighters' struggle against the Soviets, he smiled and nodded proudly. "And we also can never forget your fight against the Taliban now," the American added. With that, the mujahed's smile vanished -- and so did he, with all his people, after an awkward goodbye.
The war in Iraq isn't over. The main events may not even have happened yet. By Tom Ricks.
... I don't think the Iraq war is over, and I worry that there is more to come than any of us suspect.
A smaller but long-term U.S. military presence in Iraq is probably the best we can hope for. The thought of having small numbers of U.S. troops dying for years to come in the country's deserts and palm groves isn't appealing, but it appears to be better than either being ejected or pulling out -- and letting the genocidal chips fall where they may.
Almost every American official I interviewed in Iraq over the past three years agreed. "This is not a campaign that can be won in one or two years," said Col. Peter Mansoor, who was Gen. David H. Petraeus's executive officer during much of the latter's tour in Iraq. "The United States has got to be willing to underwrite this effort for many, many years to come. I can't put it in any brighter colors than that." ...
Continue on for today's Small Wars Journal news and opinion roundup...
The Gamble: Winners and Losers - Andrew Exum at Abu Muqawama.
The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008 - Thomas Ricks
Thomas E. Ricks uses hundreds of hours of exclusive interviews with top officers in Iraq and extraordinary on-the-ground reportage to document the inside story of the Iraq War since late 2005 as only he can, examining the events that took place as the military was forced to reckon with itself, the surge was launched, and a very different war began.
Winners - General Odierno, the West Point social science and history departments, President Bush, AEI and Jack Keane, the U.S. Army, and the foreigners (Skye, Kilcullen and Othman).
Losers - The general officer corps and Colonel Gian Gentile.
Curious Omissions - Brigade commanders, the National Security Council and the new media.
Much more at Abu Muqawama.
Continue reading "Ex Picks the Winners and Losers of The Gamble" »
The Coming Swarm - John Arquilla, New York Times opinion
With three Afghan government ministries in Kabul hit by simultaneous suicide attacks this week, by a total of just eight terrorists, it seems that a new “Mumbai model” of swarming, smaller-scale terrorist violence is emerging.
The basic concept is that hitting several targets at once, even with just a few fighters at each site, can cause fits for elite counterterrorist forces that are often manpower-heavy, far away and organized to deal with only one crisis at a time. This approach certainly worked in Mumbai, India, last November, where five two-man teams of Lashkar-e-Taiba operatives held the city hostage for two days, killing 179 people. The Indian security forces, many of which had to be flown in from New Delhi, simply had little ability to strike back at more than one site at a time.
While it’s true that the assaults in Kabul seem to be echoes of Mumbai, the fact is that Al Qaeda and its affiliates have been using these sorts of swarm tactics for several years. Jemaah Islamiyah - the group responsible for the Bali nightclub attack that killed 202 people in 2002 - mounted simultaneous attacks on 16 Christian churches in Indonesia on Christmas Eve in 2000, befuddling security forces...
More at The New York Times.
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Mrs. Clinton Goes to Asia - Dan Blumenthal, National Review opinion
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s decision to make Asia the destination of her first official trip sends a positive signal to the region. It indicates the Obama administration’s realization that Asia will become the center of gravity of international politics in the decades ahead. Assuming Asian countries resume their strong economic growth after the current recession, within decades they will account for more of the world’s economy than do Europe and the United States combined. In addition, Asia simmers with political and security competition...
More at National Review.
Postcard from Mumbai
Modern Urban Siege
by John P. Sullivan and Adam Elkus, Small Wars Journal
Postcard from Mumbai (Full PDF Article)
According to many television news reports, the Mumbai terrorist attacks were a “siege.” But there were no catapults, cannons, or breaching ladders. Instead, a dozen men with guns paralyzed one of the world’s largest cities, killing 173 with barely concealed glee. Sadly, Mumbai heralds a new chapter in the bloody story of war in cities—the siege of the city from within. The polis is fast becoming a war zone where criminals, terrorists, and heavily armed paramilitary forces battle—and all can be targeted. All the while, gardens of steel spring up, constricting popular movement and giving way to an evolving architecture of fear. The “feral city” and the military colony battle each other for dominance in the urban siege.
Defending against the urban siege requires bridging the gap between police and military, building a layered defense, and fighting to preserve the right to the city. Despite the terrifying nature of the threat, the ultimate advantage lies with the vibrant modern city and the police, soldiers, and civilians tasked to defend it. The key to success lies in the construction of resilient physical and moral infrastructure.
This is in reference to Ex Picks the Winners and Losers of The Gamble.
It is not the critic who counts, nor the man who points how the strong man stumbled or where the doer of deeds could have done them better. The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena; whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood; who strives valiantly...who knows the great enthusiasms, the great devotions, and spends himself in a worthy cause; who, at best, knows the triumph of high achievement; and who, at the worst, if he fails, at least fails while daring greatly, so that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who know neither victory nor defeat.
--Theodore Roosevelt, 1910
I spent a good part of last night corresponding with COL Gian Gentile – an Army officer I greatly respect and consider a dear friend. While we often find ourselves on the opposite poles of the COIN – conventional warfare debate – I relayed to him that this debate is a worthy debate – critical to the future of our armed forces. He deserves the highest credit for pushing this debate into the public domain.
Gian did this, all the while opening himself up to both warranted and unwarranted criticism. He stood in the arena while others either cheered or jeered from the sidelines. I cannot express how impressed I am with those who actually take a stand – those who stand tall in that arena.
Gian, as I said in at least two e-mails – you done good and have everything to be proud of. I salute you sir – as a brother in arms and as a loyal friend.
Semper Fi,
Dave
From the Center for a New American Security:
CNAS is thrilled to announce that Michele Flournoy, our President and Co-Founder, was confirmed by the Senate and sworn-in last week as the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. While we will miss Michele’s leadership, drive, and deep knowledge of national security issues, we know she will do great things for the country and the Department of Defense.
Michele’s appointment underscores the transition that CNAS itself is undergoing, and so we wish to take this opportunity to make several announcements about our organization and its ongoing mission of developing strong, pragmatic and principled national security policies.
Staff Changes
Dr. John Nagl, acclaimed author, West Point graduate, Rhodes scholar, retired Army officer, and Bronze Star recipient, will replace Michele as President of CNAS. John is widely respected for co-writing the U.S. Army’s counterinsurgency field manual, for his book Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife, and for his willingness to guide and mentor members of the younger generation of national security leaders.
Nate Tibbits, our former Chief Operating Officer, has accepted a position in Presidential Personnel dealing with national security personnel. We are pleased to announce Nathaniel Fick as our new Chief Operating Officer. Nate Fick, author of the New York Times bestseller One Bullet Away, is a former Marine officer who served in Afghanistan and Iraq before attending the Kennedy School of Government and the Harvard Business School.
In addition to John and Nate, we’ve also added a distinguished senior fellow to our ranks: Thomas Ricks, Pulitzer Prize winning journalist, and author of The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq 2006-2008, published this week.
Board Moves
We are pleased to announce that with the completion of former Secretary of Defense William Perry’s tenure as Chairman of the Board of Directors, the Honorable Richard J. Danzig has taken the helm as Chairman of the Board. We thank Secretary Perry for his leadership and guidance as Chairman, and look forward to continuing to work closely with him as a member of the Board. Richard Danzig, one of this nation's premier defense and national security practitioners and most committed public servants, will help build on the strong foundation Secretary Perry established.
We are pleased to announce that the Honorable R. Nicholas Burns, former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, has joined the Board of Directors of CNAS. We could not be more excited to have such a fine public servant as part of the CNAS family.
Continue on for today's Small Wars Journal news and opinion roundup...
Continue on for today's Small Wars Journal news and opinion roundup...
Via e-mail and subtitled A U.S. Army Member of an Iraq Provincial Reconstruction Team Offers Practical Advice to Foreign Service Colleagues.
To the crew at Small Wars Journal:
I'm a pretty religious reader of your site but have not been a commenter or contributor to date. This morning, an Army officer friend sent me this short article, which he had received from a mutual friend in the State Department. I thought it might create some interesting discussion on your site.
The piece, which was published in the February issue of the Foreign Service Journal (Improving the PRT-Military Professional Relationship by Captain Sean Walsh), offers suggestions from an Army Captain on how foreign service officers can work more effectively as part of PRTs. In a nutshell, his recommendations are 1) recognize that the military is in charge; 2) shape your priorities accordingly; 3) learn our lingo; and 4) don't bum rides from us. It struck us all as an extraordinarily narrow and counterproductive mindset, especially coming from a young officer. At any rate, perhaps you can use.
Hat tip to Mark for sending this along.
Continue reading "Improving the PRT-Military Relationship" »
Laura Rozen at Foreign Policy's The Cable cites unnamed sources concerning the following DoD appointments:
Ashton Carter is expected to be named soon as Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics.
Janine Davidson as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy / Planning.
Theresa Whelan staying on as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Africa.
Phillip Carter as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Issues.
Craig Mullaney as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Central Asia.
Janine’s Speaker’s Notes….
Combined Arms Center Senior Leader Conference
Fort Leavenworth, KS, 3 February 2009
Earlier this month, I was invited to address the senior leaders of the U.S. Army’s Training and Education community at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. This event, hosted by LTG William Caldwell, brought together the commandants of the Army’s training and education centers to discuss issues of importance to their community. LTG Caldwell asked me, along with Beth Cole of the U.S. Institute of Peace, UK LtCol. Mike Redmond, of the U.S. Army’s Stability Operations Office, and retired French LTG Raffenne to discuss how to operationalize the “Comprehensive Approach,” which is the guiding theme of the Army’s new Field Manual, FM 3-07 Stability Operations. Although I did not have formally prepared remarks, the following is an attempt to transcribe my messy handwritten speaker notes from my little brown book into something more concrete to share with the SWJ readership...
Continue reading "Operationalizing the Comprehensive Approach: The Military as “Enabler…”" »
Interagency Reform
by Major Christopher Smith, Small Wars Journal
Interagency Reform (Full PDF Article)
After many years of in-depth studies and comprehensive proposals on how to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the interagency, the time has come to pass legislation that would direct significant interagency reform in an effort to effectively organize the U.S. government for national security. The model for such reform is found in the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols (G-N) Act which led to significant improvements in an organization that had suffered from poor coordination, communication, and execution of joint operations undertaken in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Similar legislation is necessary to reform various government agencies as was the case with G-N and the military services. It is widely accepted that without that legislation, the military, especially the Navy and Marine Corps, would not have carried out the reforms. Likewise, many experts believe that reforms to the interagency can be carried out only by firm legislation.
Continue on for today's Small Wars Journal news and opinion roundup...
Follow this link for an interview posted by Reuters today with Dave Kilcullen. One key take-away:
I see the Taliban as a loose confederation of shifting tactical alliances of convenience, and there's a lot of opportunity for negotiation and for splitting that Taliban alliance. But we've got to do that from a position of strength so that we are not negotiating for stay of execution (for Western forces), but we're negotiating for genuine national reconciliation.
More at Reuters.
T.E. Lawrence
A Leadership Vignette for the Successful Counter-Insurgent
by Captain Crispin Burke, Small Wars Journal
A Leadership Vignette for the Successful Counter-Insurgent (Full PDF Article)
In the last few years, the Army has established the leadership ideal of the “pentathlete”. Pentathletes are leaders who are not only competent in their core warrior skills, but who are also scholars; men and women who are creative, innovative, strategically-minded, culturally competent, and skilled in all aspects of peace, war, politics, and civil administration. In short, the Army needs the type of leader who excels in what we would like to term “Fourth Generation Warfare”. Thomas Edward Lawrence, (1888-1935), known the world over as “Lawrence of Arabia” lived up to all of these leadership attributes. Indeed, his life story is of incredible significance now, especially in light of the US Army’s mission in culturally alien environments conducting counterinsurgency. Against the backdrop of the Middle Eastern Theatre of the First World War, we will examine the personality of this most eccentric character and discover that he possessed many of the characteristics required of the successful counter-insurgent of the 21st Century. We will also examine the subtle nuances of his persona which irked the British Army of the early 20th Century as much as they would annoy the American Army nearly a century later.
A Leadership Vignette for the Successful Counter-Insurgent (Full PDF Article)
Continue reading "A Leadership Vignette for the Successful Counter-Insurgent" »
Beyond Irregular Warfare
A Strategic Concept for Countering Irregular Adversaries and Engagement in Complex Security Environments
by Colonel Joseph E. Osborne, Small Wars Journal Op-Ed
Beyond Irregular Warfare (Full PDF Article)
Irregular Warfare – As quickly as I say it, a preconceived notion entered the mind of every person in this room. I can say, based on some 18 months of giving presentations on this topic that none of you are fully correct and none of you are fully mistaken.
So I’d like to open with a brief update on where the evolution of our thinking has taken us in the past 18 months or so since we’ve established an irregular warfare Directorate at USSOCOM. It is also an undisguised attempt to get us all past the DoD term "Irregular Warfare" and get into the substance of this poorly named, but wholly valid concept.
The term itself often prompts visceral reactions. From the non-DoD side of the Inter-Agency (IA) the hue and cry is along the lines of "we don't do warfare". And I would argue that we need look no further than Iraq and Afghanistan let alone the absence of historical precedent to appreciate that comment. From the Defense side it usually centers on the word "irregular"; prompting a knee-jerk response that generally goes along the lines of "that's what SOF does". A correct assertion, but only if half right is considered correct.
The Battle for Peace: A Frontline Vision of America's Power and Purpose - Anthony Zinni and Tony Koltz
The intellectual complement to Zinni and Clancy's bestselling Battle Ready (2004), a narrative memoir salted with specific policy recommendations, this volume provides the former US Central Command chief's analysis of America's current global position. Zinni begins by asserting that America's status as "the most powerful nation in the history of the planet" has created a de facto empire. The US has no choice: if it fails to take the lead, nothing significant happens. At the same time, Americans must recognize that, in a global age, there can be no zero-sum games.
The Unforgiving Minute: A Soldier's Education - Craig Mullaney
The Unforgiving Minute is the ultimate's soldier's book - universal in its raw emotion and its understanding of the larger issues of life and death. Mullaney, a master storyteller, plunges the depths of self-doubt, endurance, and courage. The result: a riveting, suspenseful human story, beautifully told. This is a book written under fire - a lyrical, spellbinding tale of war, love, and courage. The Unforgiving Minute is the Three Cups of Tea of soldiering.
Great Powers: America and the World after Bush - Thomas P.M. Barnett
In civilian and military circles alike, The Pentagon’s New Map became one of the most talked about books of 2004. “A combination of Tom Friedman on globalization and Carl von Clausewitz on war, [it is] the red-hot book among the nation’s admirals and generals,” wrote David Ignatius in The Washington Post. Barnett’s second book, Blueprint for Action, demonstrated how to put the first book’s principles to work. Now, in Great Powers, Barnett delivers his most sweeping - and important - book of all.
The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One - David Kilcullen
A remarkably fresh perspective on the War on Terror. Kilcullen takes us "on the ground" to uncover the face of modern warfare, illuminating both the big global war (the "War on Terrorism") and its relation to the associated "small wars" across the globe: Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Chechnya, Pakistan and North Africa.
The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008 - Thomas Ricks
Thomas E. Ricks uses hundreds of hours of exclusive interviews with top officers in Iraq and extraordinary on-the-ground reportage to document the inside story of the Iraq War since late 2005 as only he can, examining the events that took place as the military was forced to reckon with itself, the surge was launched, and a very different war began.
Why Vietnam Matters: An Eyewitness Account of Lessons Not Learned - Rufus Phillips
Phillips details how the legendary Edward G. Lansdale helped the South Vietnamese gain and consolidate their independence between 1954 and 1956, and how this later changed to a reliance on American conventional warfare with its highly destructive firepower. He reasons that our failure to understand the Communists, our South Vietnamese allies, or even ourselves took us down the wrong road. In summing up US errors in Vietnam, Phillips draws parallels with the American experience in Iraq and Afghanistan and suggests changes in the US approach. Known for his intellectual integrity and firsthand, long-term knowledge of what went on in Vietnam, the author offers lessons for today in this trenchant account.
Baghdad at Sunrise: A Brigade Commander's War in Iraq - Peter Mansoor
This is a unique contribution to the burgeoning literature on the Iraq war, analyzing the day-to-day performance of a US brigade in Baghdad during 2004-2005. Mansoor uses a broad spectrum of sources to address the military, political and cultural aspects of an operation undertaken with almost no relevant preparation, which tested officers and men to their limits and generated mistakes and misjudgments on a daily basis. The critique is balanced, perceptive and merciless - and Mansoor was the brigade commander. Military history is replete with command memoirs. Most are more or less self-exculpatory. Even the honest ones rarely achieve this level of analysis. The effect is like watching a surgeon perform an operation on himself. Mansoor has been simultaneously a soldier and a scholar, able to synergize directly his military and academic experiences.
The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq - Bing West
From a universally respected combat journalist, a gripping history based on five years of front-line reporting about how the war was turned around - and the choice now facing America. We interpret reality through the clouded prism of our own experience, so it is unsurprising that Bing West sees Iraq through the lens of Vietnam. He served as a Marine officer there, and he thinks politicians and the media caused the American public to turn against a war that could have been won. Now a correspondent for the Atlantic, West has made 15 reporting trips to Iraq over the last six years and is almost as personally invested in the current conflict as he was in Vietnam; this book, his third on Iraq, is his attempt to ensure that the "endgame" in Iraq turns out better than in his last war.
Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq - Linda Robinson
After a series of disastrous missteps in its conduct of the war, the White House in 2006 appointed General David Petraeus as the Commanding General of the coalition forces. Tell Me How This Ends is an inside account of his attempt to turn around a failing war. Linda Robinson conducted extensive interviews with Petraeus and his subordinate commanders and spent weeks with key US and Iraqi divisions. The result is the only book that ties together military operations in Iraq and the internecine political drama that is at the heart of the civil war. Replete with dramatic battles, behind-doors confrontations, and astute analysis, the book tells the full story of the Iraq War’s endgame, and lays out the options that will be facing the next president.
The War Within: A Secret White House History 2006-2008 - Bob Woodward
Woodward interviewed key players, obtained dozens of never-before-published documents, and had nearly three hours of exclusive interviews with President Bush. The result is a stunning, firsthand history of the years from mid-2006, when the White House realizes the Iraq strategy is not working, through the decision to surge another 30,000 US troops in 2007, and into mid-2008, when the war becomes a fault line in the presidential election. As violence in Iraq reaches unnerving levels in 2006, a second front in the war rages at the highest levels of the Bush administration. In his fourth book on President George W. Bush, Bob Woodward takes readers deep inside the tensions, secret debates, unofficial backchannels, distrust and determination within the White House, the Pentagon, the State Department, the intelligence agencies and the US military headquarters in Iraq. With unparalleled intimacy and detail, this gripping account of a president at war describes a period of distress and uncertainty within the US government from 2006 through mid-2008. The White House launches a secret strategy review that excludes the military. General George Casey, the commander in Iraq, believes that President Bush does not understand the war and eventually concludes he has lost the president's confidence. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also conduct a secret strategy review that goes nowhere. On the verge of revolt, they worry that the military will be blamed for a failure in Iraq.
We Are Soldiers Still: A Journey Back to the Battlefields of Vietnam - Harold Moore and Joe Galloway
In their stunning follow-up to the classic bestseller We Were Soldiers Once... and Young, Lt. Gen. Hal Moore and Joe Galloway return to Vietnam and reflect on how the war changed them, their men, their enemies, and both countries - often with surprising results. It would be a monumental task for Moore and Galloway to top their classic 1992 memoir. But they come close in this sterling sequel, which tells the backstory of two of the Vietnam War's bloodiest battles (in which Moore participated as a lieutenant colonel), their first book and a 1993 ABC-TV documentary that brought them back to the battlefield. Moore's strong first-person voice reviews the basics of the November 1965 battles, part of the 34-day Battle of the Ia Drang Valley. Among other things, Moore and Galloway (who covered the battle for UPI) offer portraits of two former enemy commanders, generals Nguyen Huu An and Chu Huy Man, whom the authors met - and bonded with - nearly three decades after the battle. This book proves again that Moore is an exceptionally thoughtful, compassionate and courageous leader (he was one of a handful of army officers who studied the history of the Vietnam wars before he arrived) and a strong voice for reconciliation and for honoring the men with whom he served.
In a Time of War: The Proud and Perilous Journey of West Point' Class of 2002 - Bill Murphy
The West Point cadets Murphy follows through their baptism by fire are an admirable sample of young American men and women: intelligent, ambitious and intensely patriotic. Most come from career military families and hold conservative opinions. Murphy describes their four years at West Point with respect even when discussing their love lives and marriages. All yearn for battle, and most get their wish. The book's best passages describe the confusion of moving to Iraq or Afghanistan and fighting insurgents, for which they lack both training and equipment. All feel something is not right but concentrate on the job at hand; some inevitably die or are grievously wounded.
Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy - Steven Metz
Today the US military is more nimble, mobile, and focused on rapid responses against smaller powers than ever before. One could argue that the Gulf War and the postwar standoff with Saddam Hussein hastened needed military transformation and strategic reassessments in the post–Cold War era. But the preoccupation with Iraq also mired the United States in the Middle East and led to a bloody occupation. What will American strategy look like after US troops leave Iraq? Metz concludes that the United States has a long-standing, continuing problem “developing sound assumptions when the opponent operates within a different psychological and cultural framework.” He sees a pattern of misjudgments about Saddam and Iraq based on Western cultural and historical bias and a pervasive faith in the superiority of America’s worldview and institutions. This myopia contributed to America being caught off guard by Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, then underestimating his longevity, and finally miscalculating the likelihood of a stable and democratic Iraq after he was toppled. With lessons for all readers concerned about America’s role in the world, Dr. Metz’s important new work will especially appeal to scholars and students of strategy and international security studies, as well as to military professionals and DOD civilians. With a foreword by Colin S. Gray.
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SWJ's 7th weekly contribution to Foreign Policy - This Week at War by Robert Haddick - is now posted. Topics include - Afghan troop request? Approved. Afghan strategy? “Not pre-determined.” - Preparing for hybrid warfare - Will the U.S. receive a nasty “postcard from Mumbai”?
State Dept. Cites 'Large Firefights' in Travel Alert on Mexico - William Booth, Washington Post
The latest travel advisory for Mexico from the US State Department will certainly not please the tourist board. Rather than a glossy brochure advertising the country's many delights, the travel alert issued Friday reads like the plot of a crime thriller.
"Recent Mexican army and police confrontations with drug cartels have resembled small-unit combat, with cartels employing automatic weapons and grenades," the advisory reads. "Large firefights have taken place in many towns and cities across Mexico but most recently in northern Mexico, including Tijuana, Chihuahua City and Ciudad Juarez. During some of these incidents, US citizens have been trapped and temporarily prevented from leaving the area."
More at The Washington Post.
The Perilous State of Mexico - David Luhnow and José de Cordoba, Wall Street Journal
Detective Ramon Jasso was heading to work in this bustling city (Monterrey) a few days ago when an SUV pulled alongside and slowed ominously. Within seconds, gunmen fired 97 bullets at the 37-year-old policeman, killing him instantly.
Mr. Jasso had been warned. The day before, someone called his cellphone and said he would be killed if he didn't immediately release a young man who had been arrested for organizing a violent protest in support of the city's drug gangs. The demonstrators were demanding that the Mexican army withdraw from the drug war. The protests have since spread from Monterrey -- once a model of order and industry - to five other cities.
Much as Pakistan is fighting for survival against Islamic radicals, Mexico is waging a do-or-die battle with the world's most powerful drug cartels. Last year, some 6,000 people died in drug-related violence here, more than twice the number killed the previous year. The dead included several dozen who were beheaded, a chilling echo of the scare tactics used by Islamic radicals. Mexican drug gangs even have an unofficial religion: They worship La Santa Muerte, a Mexican version of the Grim Reaper.
More at The Wall Street Journal and:
Mexico Travel Alert - US Department of State
Juarez Police Chief Quits After Killings of Officers, Threats - Los Angeles Times
Mexican Cop Killed as Chief Pressured to Quit - Associated Press
Mexican President: Gov't Does Not Control Areas on US Border - Threats Watch
Undercover Cop in Middle American City - Global Guerrillas
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Thanks to Mike Burgoyne for his recent email. He and co-author Albert Marckwardt previously provided SWJ readers a short story relevant to small unit leaders. Now you can get all that and more in their book, The Defense of Jisr al-Doreaa
Of particular note on the book's website are their practical exercises -- OPDs in their parlance, but TDGs to many of us -- complete with instructor guides, etc.
The Unforgiving Minute: A Soldier's Education
By Craig M. Mullaney
If you can fill the unforgiving minute
With sixty Seconds' worth of distance, run,
Yours is the Earth and everything in it,
And--which is more--you'll be a Man, my son!
--Rudyard Kipling, "If"
My only regret in reading The Unforgiving Minute is that I had not read it earlier – when I received an advance copy in the mail several weeks ago. Now finished, I will offer up my very short summation, echo the praise lavished on this fine piece of work since its release and give it a hearty thumbs up as essential reading for those in (or veterans of) our business – and maybe more importantly - for those who need to know what that business is all about.
The Unforgiving Minute traces Craig Mullaney’s life as a student at West Point, Ranger School and Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar; as a Soldier in Afghanistan; as a teacher at the US Naval Academy, and as a veteran.
His writing style displays a fine balance that allows The Unforgiving Minute to be informative, educational, moving, and entertaining for both the seasoned warrior and uninitiated civilian alike. General David Petraeus was spot on in describing Mullaney’s book as a wonderful, beautifully written story of the education and development of a young soldier-scholar, the coming of age of an infantry officer, and the exercise of a small unit leader's responsibilities in a tough, complex, and frustrating situation in Afghanistan. It captures particularly eloquently and movingly the relationships among those who walk point for our nation as part of that most elite of fraternities, the brotherhood of the close fight.
Within those words – two – soldier-scholar – probably describe my major take-away from The Unforgiving Minute and reinforces all I’ve experienced the last 30 years associated with the US military – we can ill afford leaders equipped solely with the implements of warfare – they must be intellectually equipped as well. Craig Mullaney is indeed a soldier-scholar and –citizen as well and his story is the story of a whole generation of young leaders.
I'll leave you with Steve Coll's description of The Unforgiving Minute - ... one of the most compelling memoirs yet to emerge from America’s 9/11 era. Craig Mullaney has given us an unusually honest, funny, accessible, and vivid account of a soldier’s coming of age. This is more than a soldier’s story; it is a work of literature.
The Unforgiving Minute - Craig Mullaney's web site
Interview with Andrew Exum - Abu Muqawama
Interview on Afghanistan - Charlie Rose Show
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The U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide has now been officially posted to the U.S. Department of State offical web page. Organizations involved in the drafting of this document included Department of State, Department of Defense, U.S. Agency for International Development, Department of Justice, Department of The Treasury, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Agriculture, Department of Transportation and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
The drafting of this Guide was led by the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Department of State with special thanks to Dr. David Kilcullen, Special Advisor for Counterinsurgency to the Secretary of State, Lieutenant Colonel Matt Porter, U.K. Royal Marines, and Colonel (Ret.) Carlos Burgos, U.S. Army.
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Bravo! to the dedicated team of bureaucrats and thought leaders who toiled for 2 years to produce the new US Government Counterinsurgency Guide.
This guide, written in a collaborative "whole of government" process and endorsed at the highest levels of our diplomacy, development, and defense leadership, reflects the latest doctrine (FM 3-24 and also FM 3-07). It is not, however, a tactical or operational "how-to" guide. Rather it is intended to be a "COIN 101" for policy-makers contemplating US intervention abroad.
As reflected in the debate over the Army's new doctrine on Stability Operations (FM 3-07), some cringe at the mere articulation of COIN principles in an official government publication; suspecting it might lead us to attempt more such intervention. But as I pointed out in my blog post on FM 3-07, doctrine is not grand strategy or policy. "For those who worry that this new doctrine will make it more likely that we will try to invade and occupy more countries, consider that it might just have the opposite effect…Having a better understanding of the complexity and cost of these missions can only enhance the policy and strategy-making processes." Indeed, this is the core theme – and purpose- of this new publication:
"Such understanding provides the foundation for policy formulation when the risks and costs of intervention are weighted against US interests in determining whether to become involved and what form that involvement should take. This decision should not be taken lightly: historically COIN campaigns have almost always been more costly, more protracted and more difficult than first anticipated." (COIN Guide, p. 3)
The guide provides policy makers a framework for understanding the complexity and risks associated with COIN and, importantly, under what circumstances an attempted COIN intervention might actually be "folly." As with the latest publication of the Army's FM for stability operations, FM 3-07, this Handbook should generate debate about the wisdom of- and trade-offs associated with US involvement in these interventions. It should be read, understood, and debated by political leaders and anyone else interested in the what, why, and how of US intervention abroad.
Information Operations on the Counterinsurgency Battlefield
by Azriel Peskowitz, Small Wars Journal
Information Operations on the Counterinsurgency Battlefield (Full PDF Article)
Terrorism has always been an information-based conflict. A terrorist wins or loses by how much he can imprint a perception of lethality (hence the terror in terrorism) upon a population, in order to influence the government. Like anyone else Terrorists can shape their narrative through propaganda, but for few aside from terrorists is that shaping so critical to survival. In the modern era, terror groups have gone beyond the mimeographed missive of relying on the media’s easy attraction to bloodshed and spectacle. They have embraced the modern communications technologies that spread their message exponentially more effectively than anything seen previously. Some have created their own media conglomerates to professionally produce original media. This paper is concerned specifically with how terrorist groups use media as a combat multiplier. Propaganda helps terrorists shape their own narratives, a task that is critical to their survival. That task is no longer confined to convincing someone of the righteousness of a cause or the evil of one’s enemies. Instead, it has played a role in altering political support for battles as they occur.
To illustrate this, we shall focus on battles against terrorists and insurgencies whose outcomes have been determined in the insurgents’ favor due to Information Operations. Using three case studies of military battles against Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas, the Mujahadeen Shura, and Hizb’allah, this paper will show not just that IO can determine outcomes and even grant victory to terrorists, but explore by what methods it does so and the lessons that can be learned from this.
Information Operations on the Counterinsurgency Battlefield (Full PDF Article)
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Wanted in Pakistan: Competent Counterinsurgency - George Packer, The New Yorker
... The US government has just released its new counterinsurgency guide for the civilian agencies, written under the direction of David Kilcullen. During the Bush years, a sort of counterinsurgency insurgency sprang up both in and out of the government and military - a group of thoughtful dissidents who, from very early on, tried to change American strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan. Kilcullen was one of the key figures, and now other members of the group are being appointed to or talked about for important posts in the Obama Administration, including Janine Davidson as deputy assistant secretary of defense for plans, Colin Kahl for the Middle East, and Phil Carter for detainee issues...
I know them all, think highly of them, would be very happy if they join the new administration, and wish them well. They’ve all absorbed the hard lessons of the past seven years of war, often up close. I don’t know if there’s still time to apply these lessons in Afghanistan, and I don’t know if Pakistan even wants to learn them. But the new group in Washington might want to send a copy of both counterinsurgency manuals to the government in Islamabad, and another copy to the team of American advisers there.
More at The New Yorker.
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Ike Skelton Chair of COIN
US Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth Kansas
Limited Tenure NTE: 3 Years; Renewable -- Full Time
Duties: The scope of duties of the Ike Skelton Distinguished Chair of Counterinsurgency involves interaction with national and international governmental and private agencies. Serves as an advocate for counterinsurgency education within the U.S. Army. Collaborates with the Commandant (Lieutenant General), Deputy Commandant (Brigadier General), CGSC school directors, staff and faculty, course and lesson authors, curriculum developers, and CAC agencies in the development and delivery of instruction addressing counterinsurgency subject matter. Serves as a professor, sits on thesis committees, and advises and assists student monograph development. Advises and provides recommendations on the role of CGSC and CAC in changing the culture of the force through the use of experimentation, counterinsurgency articles, and the creation and sharing of knowledge and experiences.
About the Position: CGSC is a multifaceted educational institution, annually teaching over 4,000 students in its resident and non-resident populations. Its diverse population includes representation from over 70 countries and all of the armed services of the United States military. Regionally accredited by the Higher Learning Commission and a member of the North Central Association of Colleges and Schools, CGSC grants the Master of Military Art and Science degree to approximately 200 students annually.
The incumbent serves as the focal point for the diffusion of knowledge within CGSC and its three schools (Command and General Staff School, School of Advanced Military Studies, and School of Command Preparation) concerning all aspects of counterinsurgency.
More information at the US Army Civilian Personnel Online - Job Announcement # SWEX09142011
The Winter 2008-2009 issue of the US Army War College’s Parameters is posted.
Parameters, a refereed journal of ideas and issues, provides a forum for the expression of mature thought on the art and science of land warfare, joint and combined matters, national and international security affairs, military strategy, military leadership and management, military history, ethics, and other topics of significant and current interest to the US Army and Department of Defense.
Here is the line-up:
In This Issue - Parameters Editors
Preserving Infrastructure: A 21st Century Challenge by Michael Chertoff
The 21st Century Security Environment and the Future of War by Colin S. Gray
Crafting Strategy in an Age of Transition by Shawn Brimley
COIN in the Real World by David R. Haines
Georgia’s Cyber Left Hook by Stephen W. Korns and Joshua E. Kastenberg
Reconsidering Afghanistan: Time for an ‘Azimuth Check’ by Richard deVillafranca
United States-Iranian Relations: The Terrorism Challenge by Gawdat Bahgat
Binding the Nation: National Service in America by Carol Armistead Grigsby
In war, the General Purpose Forces (GPF) and the Special Operations Forces (SOF) are needed in a sensible mix and they must work together. They do not now do that as well as they should. Previous Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR) have not properly addressed that long standing problem; this one should do so by firmly allotting roles and missions to the GPF and SOF. Currently, long standing biases are in the way of proper task migration and allocation. The issue is the all important fight for funds, flags and spaces. That does the nation, the services and those who serve no favors.
That perspective is based on serving long ago on both sides of the GPF / SOF fence and on current conversations with relatives having recent multiple deployments on both sides of that fence today. My belief and their belief is that there is a problem, that it is significant and that it will take a major effort to fix. Some may differ; discussion would be welcome...
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... in the current edition of U.S. News & World Report.
Surge In Afghanistan Can Work, With Right Resources, Enough Time by John Nagl
There is an increasingly intense desire to transfer lessons learned from what appears to be a successful counterinsurgency effort in Iraq to America's long-neglected war in Afghanistan. The shift in attention is both laudable and overdue. While Iraq is increasingly secure and stable, Afghanistan is more dangerous than ever. We can certainly do better in Afghanistan than we have over the past seven years of war—but it will require a careful appraisal of what we're trying to accomplish and an appreciation for the resources required to get there. A strategic review must reflect an understanding of how to apply all the components of American power—not just the military—to achieve our ends. We need an Afghan surge—an increase of troops (including Afghan forces) to enable the application of a population- and oil-spot-security strategy. While additional U.S. troops are necessary, they are not sufficient to achieve success in Afghanistan...
More at U.S. News & World Report.
Afghanistan Surge Is Not Worth the Cost in Blood and Treasure by Andrew Bacevich
More than seven years after 9/11, the global war on terrorism—in Pentagon parlance, the Long War—is entering a new phase. Attention is now shifting back to Afghanistan, with President Obama seemingly intent on redeeming an ill-advised campaign pledge to increase the U.S. troop commitment to that theater of operations. Yet as the conflict continues, the correlation between American actions and America's interests is becoming increasingly difficult to discern. The fundamental incoherence of U.S. strategy becomes ever more apparent. Worst of all, there is no end in sight...
More at U.S. News & World Report.
Afghanistan and Iraq - What If? - Dexter Filkens, New York Times
In their quiet moments, aid workers call it “the tragedy:” the billions of dollars that never arrived here. The troops that landed somewhere else. The bright minds that turned to that other, greater subject. And, in all those events, the sad sinking of the promise that greeted the American-led victory over the Taliban in November 2001, more than seven years ago.
The “tragedy” these aid workers are referring to, of course, is the war in Iraq. Not that the Iraq war itself was tragic but that it was calamitous in its results for the other war that suddenly fell to the lower tier. More than any other factor, it is the American invasion of Iraq that looms over Afghanistan and all of its dashed hopes...
More at The New York Times.
U.S. Senator John McCain (R-AZ) today made the following remarks to the American Enterprise Institute on Winning the War in Afghanistan:
More than three years ago, I spoke at AEI about the war in Iraq. At that time, conditions on the ground were going from bad to worse. Violence had accelerated out of control, al Qaeda had firmly entrenched itself in Anbar province, and Iranian-backed Shia militias had taken control of large swaths of Baghdad and southern Iraq. The Iraqi government and its security forces appeared hopelessly corrupt, sectarian, ineffective, and unable to break the cycle of reciprocal violence fueled by Sunni and Shiite extremists. The Bush administration continued to pursue a failed war strategy—despite mounting evidence of its catastrophic consequences. More and more Americans, members of Congress and opinion leaders wondered whether the war in Iraq could ever be won, or whether it was already lost.
It seemed obvious to me that failure in Iraq would be a calamity, and to prevent it we would have to accept the urgent necessity of a new strategy – a strategy based on the fundamental principles of counterinsurgency, the imperative to secure the civilian population, and a significant increase in the number of American troops. Yet more than a year passed, as the deteriorating situation in Iraq approached the point of no return and a substantial majority of Americans turned firmly against the war, before President Bush at last shifted course, dismissed Secretary Rumsfeld, and adopted such a strategy.
Thanks to the courage and skill of our troops on the ground and the wisdom of leaders such as General David Petraeus, Ambassador Ryan Crocker, and General Ray Odierno, the collapse of the American effort in Iraq was not just arrested but reversed. With the right strategy finally in place – and I should note the intellectual contributions to it by General Jack Keane, Fred and Kim Kagan, Andrew Krepinevich, and Gary Schmitt – and the resources on the ground necessary to implement it, we not only stepped back from the precipice of a strategic disaster of immense and long lasting consequences, but progressed toward obtaining our objectives in Iraq beyond the most hopeful projections for the new strategy’s success.
We now face a similar moment with respect to the war in Afghanistan. The situation in Afghanistan is nowhere near as dire as it was in Iraq just two years ago – to cite one example, civilian fatalities at their peak in Iraq were ten times higher than civilian deaths at their peak in Afghanistan last year. But the same truth that was apparent three years ago in Iraq is apparent today in Afghanistan: when you aren’t winning in this kind of war, you are losing. And, in Afghanistan today, we are not winning. Let us not shy from the truth, but let us not be paralyzed by it either.
Nearly every indicator in Afghanistan is heading in the wrong direction. Civilian fatalities in Afghanistan have increased dramatically as security has deteriorated, particularly in the southern provinces of the country. The number of insurgent attacks was higher every single week in 2008 than during the same week in 2007. Since 2005, violence has increased over 500 percent, and despite the presence of tens of thousands of coalition troops, growing portions of the country suffer under the influence of the Taliban. The percentage of Afghans rating their security positively has declined from 77 percent in 2005 to 40 percent today. Only a third of Afghans say that U.S. or NATO forces have a strong presence in their areas, down from 57 percent just two years ago, and Afghans cite the lack of security and corruption as the foremost reasons their country is moving in the wrong direction...
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Afghanistan and Pakistan on the Brink: Framing U.S. Policy Options - Frederick Barton, Karin von Hippel, Mark Irvine, Thomas Patterson, and Mehlaqa Samdani; Center for Strategic and International Studies
Dramatic changes are needed in order to succeed in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Almost daily, the people of the region experience deteriorating security and a worsening economic situation. At the same time, Afghans and Pakistanis will both be making tough political choices in the coming months, and the United States and major allies are in the midst of multiple policy reviews. The appointment of Ambassador Richard Holbrooke should provide the opportunity to transform the current approach into one that has clear goals and a compelling narrative.
Afghanistan and Pakistan on the Brink is the result of a 200 person conference, held on November 21, 2008 at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and co-organized by the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the National Defense University (NDU). The event included participants from all parts of the U.S. government. (See agenda in Appendix A and participants in Appendix B).
The report is divided into three sections: 1) Policy Challenges; 2) Assumptions; and 3) Recommendations and Policy Options.
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Company Level Tactical Intelligence and Targeting
by Major Wayne Hennessy-Barrett, Small Wars Journal
Company Level Tactical Intelligence and Targeting (Full PDF Article)
Infantry rifle companies on operations today are increasingly likely to find themselves operating independently and in isolation from the traditional brigade and battle group context for which they normally prepare. Depending on the role and terrain, this can present significant challenges in terms of resources, mission command and operational design. No 1 Company 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards found itself in such a position during Operation HERRICK 7 in the role of Kabul Patrols Company operating from Camp Souter (STR). With a very different mission and environment from Task Force Helmand (TFH) the Company had the role of ensuring the security of the UK base and all force elements and dependants in the capital. It was also the operations company for the Multinational Regional Command-Capital (RC-C) in the city, with few other International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) elements able to operate in their mandated Areas of Operation (AOs). Tasks ranged from the expected intelligence-led Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in the city to providing Quick Reaction Force (QRF) and deliberate support to UK and allied specialist agencies and other government departments.
In direct support of these tasks No. 1 Company had an intelligence cell responsible for fusing products from allies and agencies to produce the tactical J2 and situational awareness picture for the city of Kabul and much of the Northern Afghanistan AO on behalf of all UK force elements in the city.
Having prepared rigorously for the Battle Group Centre role in Gereshk we were re-tasked and had three weeks to re-orientate to urban skills and attempt to understand the cultural and contextual differences between Kabul and Helmand. At this point we had no tactical or intelligence picture other than that gleaned from a 2-day theatre reconnaissance. The lessons learned during the deployment drove the development of the tactics, techniques and procedures as well as processes described here. Although shaped by the Kabul patrols role, it is hoped these lessons will be of use to company commanders elsewhere.
Company Level Tactical Intelligence and Targeting (Full PDF Article)
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From today's Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on Strategic Options in Afghanistan and Pakistan - Testimony of Dr. Marin J. Strmecki, Senior Vice President and Director of Programs, Smith Richardson Foundation.
... In light of the opportunity and challenge that Afghanistan presents to the Obama Administration, the Committee’s hearings are very timely. Today, I want to make five major points.
1. During the past three years, the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated, particularly in terms of security. The vast majority of Afghans oppose the Taliban, but local communities cannot defend themselves from insurgent intimidation and attacks. Reversing the negative trends requires rededicated U.S. leadership, greater resources, and an improved strategy and campaign plan. The fact that the Obama Administration is undertaking a wide-ranging strategic review is an encouraging sign.
2. In this review, it would be a mistake to revise our goals downward, giving up the current objective of enabling Afghans to establish an effective and representative government aligned with us in the war against terror. The United States needs an Afghan state capable of policing its territory to prevent the reestablishment of a terrorist safe haven. Helping the Afghan people succeed politically and economically will produce a significant positive demonstration effect in the wider region, thereby contributing to the war of ideas against extremism. Success will end the cycle of proxy warfare that has cost more than a million Afghan lives during the 1980s and 1990s. It will also open a route to global markets for the Central Asia states and create an economic zone that can be the basis for greater prosperity in Central and South Asia.
3. The focus of our policy should be to defeat a real and growing threat arising from a set of violent extremist groups based in western Pakistan and their supporters in Pakistan. The necessary conditions for success include the stabilization of Afghanistan, as well as strengthening elements in Pakistan opposed to extremism and finding ways progressively to narrow the areas in Pakistan in which the extremists can operate until these organizations have in effect been smothered.
4. A key task is to induce elements of the government of Pakistan that have historic ties to the Taliban and other groups to make a strategic choice to cooperate fully in eliminating extremist sanctuaries. This requires the United States to undertake sustained diplomacy that is cognizant of the motivations and interests that might underlie Pakistan’s policies and that is designed to create a regional context conducive to the stabilization of Afghanistan. The Obama Administration’s appointment of Ambassador Richard Holbrooke as a special envoy presents this opportunity.
5. U.S. efforts to “harden” Afghanistan against the insurgent threat operating out of the sanctuaries can succeed. To do so will require changes in our current approach, including development of a more robust political and state-building effort, shifting to a classic counterinsurgency strategy focused primarily on providing security to the population, and integrating Afghan and international civilian and military efforts in a phased campaign to secure contested areas.
Full transcript of Dr. Strmecki's prepared statement. Also see the prepared statements of Lieutenant General David W. Barno, USA (Ret.) and Ambassador James Dobbins.
Continue reading "26 Feb SASC Hearing on Afghanistan and Pakistan" »
Continue on for today's Small Wars Journal news and opinion roundup...
Be Realistic on Iraq and Afghanistan - Tom Barnett on Dave Kilcullen's SWJ piece Crunch Time in Afghanistan-Pakistan.
Good, intelligent piece by Kilcullen. I think he is right on the Option A timeline. To be honest, this is why I make the argument in Great Powers that going to Iraq was right. There we've dealt with a state located in the center of al Qaeda's strategic ambitions. In Afghanistan, to do it right (meaning, to include Pakistan's FATA), it will stretch across presidencies. We will expend lotsa blood and treasure and--at the end of any day we choose to leave--it's likely to return right back to what it's always been. Al Qaeda's ambition is not Afghanistan or even Pakistan (the latter being unallowable by India and the US--at least--and probably more). The longer it's trapped there, the more it will lose its strategic ambitions and thus the more we'll spend significant blood and treasure on something that--in the grand scheme of things--will not matter much at all...
More at Tom's place and related issues in Dave's new book The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One as well as Tom's latest - Great Powers: America and the World after Bush.
Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq
Remarks of President Barack Obama – As Prepared for Delivery
Camp Lejeune, North Carolina
Friday, February 27, 2009
Good morning Marines. Good morning Camp Lejeune. Good morning Jacksonville. Thank you for that outstanding welcome. I want to thank Lieutenant General Hejlik for hosting me here today.
I also want to acknowledge all of our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. That includes the Camp Lejeune Marines now serving with – or soon joining – the Second Marine Expeditionary Force in Iraq; those with Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force in Afghanistan; and those among the 8,000 Marines who are preparing to deploy to Afghanistan. We have you in our prayers. We pay tribute to your service. We thank you and your families for all that you do for America. And I want all of you to know that there is no higher honor or greater responsibility than serving as your Commander-in-Chief.
I also want to take this opportunity to acknowledge Ryan Crocker, who recently completed his service as our Ambassador to Iraq. Throughout his career, Ryan always took on the toughest assignments. He is an example of the very best that this nation has to offer, and we owe him a great debt of gratitude. He carried on his work with an extraordinary degree of cooperation with two of our finest Generals – General David Petraeus, and General Ray Odierno – who will be critical in carrying forward the strategy that I will outline today.
Next month will mark the sixth anniversary of the war in Iraq. By any measure, this has already been a long war. For the men and women of America’s armed forces – and for your families – this war has been one of the most extraordinary chapters of service in the history of our nation. You have endured tour after tour after tour of duty. You have known the dangers of combat and the lonely distance of loved ones. You have fought against tyranny and disorder. You have bled for your best friends and for unknown Iraqis. And you have borne an enormous burden for your fellow citizens, while extending a precious opportunity to the people of Iraq. Under tough circumstances, the men and women of the United States military have served with honor, and succeeded beyond any expectation.
Today, I have come to speak to you about how the war in Iraq will end...
SWJ's 8th weekly contribution to Foreign Policy - This Week at War by Robert Haddick - is now posted. Topics include - Mexico's troubles: a crime problem or a war? - The "U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide" -- a cookbook for conquest?
Facing Language Gaps and ‘Flying Trucks,’ US Trains Afghan Pilots - Elisabeth Bumiller, New York Times
Col. James A. Brandon flew Black Hawks when Moscow was considered a mortal foe of the United States and spent years in the Army studying enemy aircraft. So he now finds it a little bizarre to be piloting an old MI-17 Russian helicopter, a legacy of the Soviet invaders here, in the Hindu Kush of Afghanistan.
But in a case of going to war with not just the military you have, but the military your enemy once had, Colonel Brandon is a leader of a bumpy American effort to build an Afghan Air Force from the wreckage up. To do that as quickly and (relatively) cheaply as possible, the United States is training American pilots to fly the helicopters of the former Soviet Union - Colonel Brandon calls them “flying trucks” - so the American pilots can in turn train, or retrain, Afghan pilots who once flew for the Russians, the Taliban or powerful warlords.
More at The New York Times.
Continue on for today's Small Wars Journal news and opinion roundup...
Developing an IO Environmental Assessment in Khost Province
Information Operations at PRT Khost in 2008
by Ensign Robert J. Bebber, PhD, Small Wars Journal
Developing an IO Environmental Assessment in Khost Province (Full PDF Article)
The goal of Information Operations (or “IO”) is to “influence, corrupt, disrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.” But how does one know whether the decision process – either human or automated – has actually been influenced in some way? We can assume or surmise that, based on the actions of the target of the IO campaign, some desired effect was achieved or not achieved (but how much of that was based on our IO campaign and how much on other factors, perhaps unknown even to us?). We can also, if given the opportunity, ask the target after the fact whether campaign activities influenced their decision making.
Commanders conducting counterinsurgency operations should have two primary IO targets: the insurgents and the local population. John Nagl notes that “persuading the masses of people that the government is capable of providing essential services – and defeating the insurgents – is just as important” as enticing the insurgents to surrender and provide information on their comrades.
The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) is not charged with directly targeting insurgents. Instead, its mission is to build the capacity of the host government to provide governance and development to the local population – to show the people that the government can indeed provide “essential services” as Nagl notes.
Information Operations traditionally suffer from a lack of available metrics by which planners can assess their environment and measure the effectiveness of their programs. It may be impossible to show direct causation – or even correlation – between Information Operations and actual effects (i.e., did my PSYOP program actually have its desired effect?) in all cases. This often places IO practitioners at a distinct disadvantage when attempting to gain the confidence of unit commanders, who are tasked with allocating scarce battlefield resources and who are often skeptical of Information Operations as a whole.
This project developed an Information Operations Environmental Assessment tool that can be utilized and replicated at the unit level (battalion or less) for use by planners in order to establish an initial benchmark (where am I?) and measure progress toward achieving the IO program goals and objectives (where do I want to go?) The Provincial Reconstruction Team in Khost province, Afghanistan, needed a tool by which the leadership could benchmark current conditions and evaluate the information environment under which the population lived. It was hoped that such a tool could help provide clues whether our IO (and overall PRT) efforts were having the intended effect.
Developing an IO Environmental Assessment in Khost Province (Full PDF Article)
Continue reading "Developing an IO Environmental Assessment" »
The 2nd Quarter 2009 issue of Joint Force Quarterly is now posted.
Joint Force Quarterly is published by the National Defense University Press for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
JFQ is the Chairman's flagship joint military and security studies journal designed to inform members of the U.S. Armed Forces, allies, and other partners on joint and integrated operations; national security policy and strategy; efforts to combat terrorism; homeland security; and developments in training and joint professional military education to transform America's military and security apparatus to better meet tomorrow's challenges while protecting freedom today.
Here is the lineup:
Forum Executive Summary by David H. Gurney
What Is Economic Power? by Ellen L. Frost
The Rise of the Rest by William H. Overholt
Finance and Power by James G. Lacey and David L. Asher
Conflict Trends in the 21st Century by Michael Moodie
Transnational Movements and Terrorism by Mark E. Stout, Thomas F. Lynch III, and T.X. Hammes
Time to Improve U.S. Defense Structure for the Western Hemisphere by Craig A. Deare
Nuclear Arms and the Future of South Asia by Michael Krepon
NATO’s Uncertain Future: Is Demography Destiny? by Jeffrey Simon
Operational Design for ISAF in Afghanistan: A Primer by Julian D. Alford and Scott A. Cuomo
Commercializing USCENTCOM Aerial Ports by John E. Michel and Jean M. Mahan
Looking Back on Operation Jump Start by David M. Church
Trouble with Doctrine? by David H. Gurney
Effects-based Thinking in Joint Doctrine by Joint Staff J7 Joint Doctrine and Education Division Staff
Commander’s Business: Learning to Practice Operational Design by Richard M. Swain
A Case Against Systemic Operational Design by Milan N. Vego
Victory over Terrorism: Essential Services as Counterinsurgency Strategy by Jeffrey Philip Treistman
A Perfect Storm for Pentagon Reform by Travis Sharp
DOD Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System: A Path Toward Improvement by Albert T. Church and Ted Warner
Bridging the Strategy-Resources Gap: Defense Planning in a Time of Crisis by Ionut C. Popescu
Protecting the Past to Secure the Future: The Strategic Value of Heritage Training by Laurie W. Rush and Matthew F. Bogdanos
Joint Doctrine Update by Joint Chiefs of Staff J7
Continue reading "Latest Joint Force Quarterly Now Posted" »
This page contains all entries posted to SWJ Blog in February 2009. They are listed from oldest to newest.
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