A review of:

The Devil We Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower

by Robert Baer.  Published by Crown, 2008.

 

Reviewed by:

Thomas (Tom) P. Odom

LTC US Army (ret)

Author, Journey Into Darkness: Genocide In Rwanda

A good friend of mine lent me this book to read with the caution, “This will piss you off.”  I was not sure exactly what he meant by that remark but I took the book.  I liked Bob Baer’s first book and have recommended it to others.  After reading this one, Baer’s latest, I would recommend it but with some very strong cautions.  I will address those later.  For now, let me highlight its strengths.

The Good

On Iran as a Nation

Despite the title and its inherent hyperbole, Baer offers some clear insights into the entity we know as Iran.  He correctly takes the reader beyond the recent and ongoing to demonize Iran as a country of religious fanatics led by outspoken, out there, President Ahmandinejad.  Baer instead lays out his argument that the Iran we know today is not the Iran we knew in 1979.  Rather he argues that Iran in 2008 has long abandoned the mob fanaticism of 1979.  Instead Iran has returned to the deeper, longer nationalistic tendencies toward empire that drove the Persians centuries ago and more recently the Pahlavi Dynasty under the Shah. Baer’s thesis--and I will admit to agreeing with him on this—is that most of what Iran does these days driven by long standing grievances toward West colored very brightly by the psychosis of Shia Islam’s cult like persecution complex.  So that while Iran sees those wrongs as a case of long standing injustices that must be set right, the mechanisms and the ultimate motives for correcting said wrongs are very much the stuff of realpolitik.  Baer makes the point that Iran despite Ahmandinejad’s rhetoric is not on a holy war tear to destroy Israel.  Rather Iran seeks to use the injustices it sees in the West’s support for Israel as a club to force concessions furthering Iran’s own desires for regional supremacy.  I would offer a parallel in the recent actions of Putin’s Russia.  Many have used the phrase “return to a Cold War” as if Putin is trying to resurrect the Soviet Union.  I believe Putin’s actions and desires are more like the Czars than the Commissars.  Baer is in my view suggesting that Khamenei and Rafsanjani have more in common with Xerxes or Reza Shah than they do with Khomeini.

On the Sunni versus Shia Split

Baer makes a very valuable contribution with his analysis of Shia Islam’s political structures as compared to the wide paths of interpretation open to Sunni Islam.  Shia Islam is inherently more political because Shia Islam does have a rigidly controlled clergy whose traditions drive it to challenge secular power.  Sunni Islam does not have that hierarchy and its traditions have been generally more secular. But in the context of today’s radical Islam, the Shia longstanding political traditions also serve as a limiting factor.  Not everyone in Shia Islam can claim clerical status.  Calls for religious-based actions are therefore limited in their scope and ultimately more reasonable in their application.

In contrast, the Al Qaeda “thinkers” are at once unhindered by such traditions and limited by their vision of reinstating a caliphate that never really was and certainly could not survive the modern world. Baer’s point in offering these thoughts are two fold: first that the Shia are by the nature of their religion self-limiting when it comes to religious fervor and two that the Iranians use that fervor to further nationalistic aims. His key example in that is the metamorphosis of Lebanon’s Hezbollah from a terror-driven organization to a political, social, and governmental force capable of challenging Israel in a fight to hold ground.  In contrast, radical Sunni Muslim organizations have consistently failed on efforts to shift from the terror front to the political front—at least until Hamas benefited from Hezbollah and Iranian tutelage.

A Pan-Islamic Nationalism

Baer rightly points out that the longstanding dominance of Sunni Islam is clearly in decline if not openly under attack.  Secular pan-Arabism as a social and political force drew its strengths from Sunni Islam’s rejection of a clergy and religion-based political system.  Arab socialism and near communism took those anti-religious tendencies even further while maintaining a façade of pan-Arab ideology. Neither secular pan-Arabism nor socialist/communist pan-Arabism has advanced Arab causes in the past 50 years.  Baer again rightly points to Israel as a symbol of that impotency and frustration.  The upsurge in radical Sunni Islam has done nothing to bolster that image of consistent failure.

In contrast, Iran and its contacts and supporters have made progress.  Baer offers the critical insight that Iran is not about to collapse in social upheaval as many in the West would like to see.  Rather Iran is quite capable of managing its internal pressures through its own complex system of cultural safety valves even as it seeks to expand its influence across the region.  As you should expect, Baer uses Lebanon as a key case study in examining that effort.  He then uses the Lebanese success story to explain Iranian motives elsewhere in the Middle East.  At its central core, Baer’s thesis postulates that the inherent political disciple of Shia Islam is perfectly capable of creating a pan-Islamic nationalism, at once accepting of Iranian hegemony and accommodating both Shia and Sunni partners. He offers Hamas as an example of that cross-secular and cross-national cooperation. Baer’s point that neither Nasrallah nor Khamenei is akin to wide-eyed, radical mullahs we typically associate with the Iranian Revolution is essential to understanding this movement is more about building power than it is about destroying all things Western.  

The Not So Good

The Sky is Not Falling

I liked Baer’s book because of its subtle but substantive points.  I did not like his penchant for doom and despair.  I almost felt like I was watching 300, and I kept waiting for someone to throw a spear at Xerxes.  No one did.  The Spartans in this version surrendered.  To make his points, Baer seems driven to the overstatement.  For example is Iran’s desire for regional influence the same as a desire for empire?  Maybe it is then again maybe it’s not.  I see it more as a desire for regional influence than a need for conquest.  I suspect that Baer sees it the same way but if you read this book without a strong grounding in the area, you probably will get a bit angry.  My friend reacted to Baer’s statement that we have lost Iraq and handed Iran a strategic victory.  I would say that Baer is probably correct in offering that as an Iranian view.  Personally I believe any such Iranian “victory” to be doomed to ultimate defeat. 

Shared Interests Do Not a Proxy Make

I offer similar concerns over Baer’s portrayal of Hezbollah.  Certainly Hezbollah is an Iranian client and its actions serve Tehran’s interest in portraying itself as a champion against the West in general and Israel in particular.  I offer the same cautions when it comes to seeing Hamas as an Iranian proxy.  Time is the greatest test to any such relationship and long standing alliances in the Middle East are non-existent.  Hezbollah likes Iranian support because it is easier to send Iranian advisors home than it was to kick the Syrians out.  Iraqi acceptance of Iranian interests and support with US and Coalition Forces on the ground is a wedding of convenience not love.   Put another way, common borders do not good friends make when forming such alliances in the Middle East.  Long distance relationships are much safer and easier to manage.

The Really Useful

Baer’s real contribution in this book comes in the epilogue.  You have to read the book to get to the epilogue if you are going to understand the author’s intent.  It is all content and context based.  A warning however is in order; neocons will not like the book and they will most likely hate Baer’s conclusions.  I found them thought provoking and in that regard quite useful for fresh discussions regarding Iran and Iranian intentions toward the region and the West.  The book did not piss me off but it did make me think. 

Thomas (Tom) Odom
LTC (ret) U.S. Army