Security Should Be the Deciding Issue - Frederick Kagan, Wall Street Journal opinion

As the scale of the economic crisis becomes clear and comparisons to the Great Depression of the 1930s are tossed around, there is a very real danger that America could succumb to the feeling that we no longer have the luxury of worrying about distant lands, now that we are confronted with a "real" problem that actually affects the lives of all Americans. As we consider whether various bailout plans help Main Street as well as Wall Street, the subtext is that both are much more important to Americans than Haifa Street.

One problem with this emotion is that it ignores the sequel to the Great Depression -- the rise of militaristic Japan marked by the 1931 invasion of Manchuria, and Hitler's rise to power in Germany in 1933, both of which resulted in part from economic dislocations spreading outward from the U.S. The inward-focus of the U.S. and the leading Western powers (Great Britain and France) throughout the 1930s allowed these problems to metastasize, ultimately leading to World War II.

Is it possible that American inattention to the world in the coming years could lead to a similarly devastating result? You betcha.

More at The Wall Street Journal.

H/T Mike Few.

Continue reading "Security Should Be the Deciding Issue" »

Gen. David Petraeus Sworn in as Head of US Central Command - Julian Barnes, Los Angeles Times

Gen. David H. Petraeus took charge of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq today, promising to tackle both immediate and long-term security challenges as he was sworn in as head of US Central Command.

Until last month, Petraeus was the top US commander in Iraq. Now, as the top regional commander, Petraeus will continue to oversee that war, but at Centcom, his most urgent task will be helping to craft a new strategy for the war in Afghanistan.

The conflict in Afghanistan has grown more violent this year. In its closing days the Bush administration, led by the National Security Council, has initiated a broad review of the current strategy in Afghanistan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also have a broad planning effort underway, designed in part to present options to the next administration. But in addition to those efforts, Petraeus is working on his own campaign plan for Afghanistan.

More at The Los Angeles Times.

Petraeus Steps Into New Role as Head of Central Command - Thom Shanker, New York Times

Under a sparkling South Florida sun, thousands of miles from the deserts of the Middle East, Gen. David H. Petraeus took charge of the Central Command on Friday with responsibility for military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and across the region.

General Petraeus becomes responsible not only for overseeing military operations in Iraq, where he still views recent gains as extremely fragile, and in Afghanistan, where violence has increased markedly, but also for a strategic crescent that includes Pakistan, Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and the former Soviet republics of Central Asia.

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates stressed that while it would be a primary task for General Petraeus to “keep us on the right path in Iraq,” an immediate challenge was “bringing coherence to our own strategy” in Afghanistan.

More at The New York Times.

Continue reading "Petraeus Steps Into New Role as Head of Central Command" »

Fear and Loathing in Waziristan
Al Qaeda Propaganda
by Major Matthew Orris, Small Wars Journal

Fear and Loathing in Waziristan (Full PDF Article)

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the myth that Al Qaeda is a far more superior practitioner of the war of ideas because it has proven that it knows far less about the “American street” than supposedly the U.S. does about the “Arab street.” This is highlighted by Al Qaeda’s use of an American convert to be their voice to the U.S. The question that is open to interpretation is of what use is such a person at all to Al Qaeda given that it is doubtful that he is able to gather any significant following amongst Muslims in the Arab world and is considered nothing more than a “bloated buffoon” in the United States?

Al Qaeda’s use of Adam Gadahn is little more than an opportunistic publicity stunt designed to garner as much media exposure as possible because the spokesman is an American. So who is this Adam Gadahn? He is not a mystery. He is not an enigma. Rather Adam Yahiye Gadahn is really Adam Pearlman born in Oregon and raised in Orange County, California. Phil Pearlman (Adam’s father) was a 1960’s radical who suffered an identity crisis (much like Adam) that resulted in the change of the Pearlman surname to "Gadahn".

To understand the message one must understand the messenger and his motivations. The scientific community has yet to create a standard profile of a “typical” terrorist because there is doubt that a single arch-type exists. However, when terrorism is viewed with other serial predatory crimes (murder, rape, sexual assault) the common thread shared by the perpetrators is exhaustive dreaming and planning of executing such an event and those engrossed in such mental exercises are prone in their late teens/early twenties to escalate from fantasy to reality. Adam Gadahn’s own history paints a life of failure, wanting to be important while surrounding himself with violent images and messages. Gadahn’s own writings described having a “yawning emptiness” and seeking ways “to fill that void” by turning away from Death Metal to studying Islam at the Islamic Society of Orange County where he fell in with a group of young fundamentalists.

Fear and Loathing in Waziristan (Full PDF Article)

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From Matt Armstrong at MountainRunner:

Mark your calendar for January 13, 2009. That is the confirmed date for “The Smith-Mundt Act of 1948: Past, Present, and Future”, a symposium to discuss the legislation on which America’s arsenal of persuasion is anchored.

The one-day event will be hosted in Washington, D.C., with the location and co-sponsor all but confirmed. The format is four 90 minute panels and will emphasize Q&A, discourse, and debate and not presentations or monologues. The four panels will focus on past, present, future, what to do, respectively.

Panelists will be drawn from practitioners (State and Defense Departments), academics, Congress, and the media. The event is free and open to the public but registration will be required.

This is a first of its kind in-depth discussion into the legislation that continues to set the parameters of our global engagement. Enacted at the beginning of the First War of Ideas, it is long past time to discuss it ten or more years into the Second War of Ideas, a struggle that goes beyond terrorism and insurgency and into economic and financial power.

Underscoring the importance of the event are the two confirmed keynotes - Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy Jim Glassman will give the morning keynote, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Support to Public Diplomacy Mike Doran will give the lunchtime keynote. A report will be published based on the discourse at the event.

More details to come, including registration information, so check MoutainRunner for updates or contact Matt to be put on an email distribution for updates.

Continue reading "The Smith-Mundt Act of 1948: Past, Present, and Future" »

Long Live U.S. Imperialism - Christian Caryl, Newsweek

A few weeks ago, as the U.S. financial crisis was causing ripples of anxiety throughout world markets, I was on the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington as it sailed into the Japanese port it will be calling home for the next few years. As the immense ship pirouetted around its axis in the middle of Yokosuka Harbor before backing up to its berth, it occurred to me that there are few manifestations of American power more awe-inspiring than an aircraft carrier. I've seen many other examples of America's military reach—from Kosovo to Central Asia, Guam to Iraq—but the George Washington takes the cake. It has 5,200 members on board, and its galleys serve 18,000 meals a day. It is home to an entire Navy air wing of 60 to 70 planes altogether. It's as tall as a 24-story building. And thanks to its nuclear reactors, it can stay out at sea, well, pretty much forever.

Conventional wisdom has it that the George Washington is soon to become an empty symbol. According to everyone from Hamas to Maureen Dowd of The New York Times, the American Empire is over. The era of U.S. hegemony is done for, finito. The reason is simple enough: the financial and economic crisis is already tipping the United States into recession. The huge amounts of money now being spent on reviving the banking system will crimp America's leading role in the world. Whoever the next president is, he'll find it hard to push-through dramatic tax increases; and without additional revenue, the already huge U.S. budget deficit can only get bigger. Aircraft carriers like the George Washington cost $4.5 billion a pop, and keeping them afloat isn't much cheaper. In 2007, the Department of Defense budget was about $440 billion—and that didn't include additional funding for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which add more to the bill. Surely the sheer lack of cash will end up restraining Washington's ambitions to remake the world.

There's just one problem with this thesis: The United States was short on cash long before this latest crisis hit, but that didn't stop it from continuing to build up the world's most formidable military...

More at Newsweek.

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Taliban Two-Step: Can’t Sit Down Yet - Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, Newsweek

Everyone's talking about talking to the Taliban. But before we jaw-jaw, there will be more war-war.

Don't even ask Mullah Sabir about peace talks. There's nothing to talk about, says the tall, burly Afghan, one of the Taliban's highest-ranking commanders. "This is not a political campaign for policy change or power sharing or cabinet ministries," he tells Newsweek at a textiles shop on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. "We are waging jihad to bring Islamic law back to Afghanistan." The refusal to negotiate comes straight from the Taliban's supreme leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar, says Sabir, who did not want his full name used: "The tone of his rejection has been so strong from the first that no one would dare to raise the subject with him." The trouble is, Sabir hasn't seen Mullah Omar in years, and he doesn't know of anyone who has. Internet posts released in Mullah Omar's name on Muslim holy days are the only hint that the one-eyed Commander of the Faithful is still alive. All the same, Sabir says he and thousands of other Taliban won't stop fighting until they're back in power.

Everyone seems eager to talk peace in Afghanistan - except the only people who can turn the wish into a fact. The Taliban's brutal insurgent ally Gulbuddin Hekmatyar has endorsed the idea of negotiations; so has the US defense secretary, Robert Gates. Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah personally hosted an exploratory discussion in Mecca between Afghan and Pakistani officials and former Taliban members during Ramadan, and last week Afghan and Pakistani tribal elders and politicians held a two-day meeting in Islamabad. But Mullah Omar's fighters aren't about to quit while they're on a roll. The number of Coalition deaths in Afghanistan since May has exceeded US deaths in Iraq for the first time since the invasion of Iraq. The Afghan insurgency, which seemed as good as dead in 2004, has come back strong.

More at Newsweek.

Continue reading "Taliban Two-Step: Can’t Sit Down Yet" »

The Background

How We Lost the War We Won - Nir Rosen, Rolling Stone
An American Journalist - Bing West, Small Wars Journal
A Personal Problem With Nir Rosen's... - Dave Dilegge, Small Wars Journal

Around the 'Net

Treason Is Patriotism…Again - Chap, Chapomatic
The Bias, Balance, and Independence... - Galrahn, Information Dissemination
The Joker's Wild - Richard Fernandez, Belmont Club
Nir Rosen And The Temple (Mosque) Of Doom - Bill and Bob's Excellent Adventure
A Small War in Afghanistan - Greg Scoblete, Real Clear World
"Journalist" Gives Taliban Aid - Blackfive, Blackfive
Rosen Used His Passport to Help the Taliban - Armed Liberal, Winds of Change
The Story Thus Far - Greyhawk, Mudville Gazette
Does Embedding with the Taliban Make You a Traitor? - Noah Shachtman, Wired
Two Men, Two Insurance Policies? - HistoryGuy99, HG's World
Aiding The Enemy? - Andrew Sullivan, The Daily Dish
The Failure of Leadership - Tom Grant, Arms and Influence
If Only We Could All Be As Tough... - Andrew Exum, Abu Muqawama
American Psycho - Spencer Ackerman, Attackerman
Embedded With The Taliban - Jules Crittenden, Forward Movement
Creative Dissent - Andrew Exum, Abu Muqawama
Our World - Richard Fernandez, The Belmont Club
Nir Rosen and the Taliban - Herschel Smith, The Captain's Journal
Why Nir Rosen Isn't To Be Trusted - Terry Glavin, Chronicles & Dissent
PSYOPS Against Your Own Nation - CDR Salamander
Recommended Reading - Mark Safranski, Zenpundit
Nir Rosen: the Neo-Taliban’s Nancy DeWolf-Smith? - Joshua Foust, Registan
It’s Official: Nir Rosen, Who Embeds... - Spencer Ackerman, Washington Independent
"I am Only a Journalist"... - Steve Clemons, The Washington Note

Continue reading "Rosen Affair Roundup" »

To Further Afghan Reconciliation
Fight Harder
by Joseph Collins, Small Wars Journal Op-Ed

To Further Afghan Reconciliation: Fight Harder (Full PDF Article)

It’s official. Everyone from the Pentagon to Saudi Arabia thinks that reconciliation between the Taliban and the Karzai government is a good idea and a step toward settling the conflict in Afghanistan. A few deluded analysts even see dealing with the Taliban as the Afghan equivalent of the Sunni Awakening in Iraq. One wonders whether war weariness, success with reconciliation in Iraq, and a lack of familiarity with the Afghan context may not be pushing us toward a tactical error or worse, an endless round of talking with an illegitimate adversary that believes it has the upper hand.

Reconciliation in Afghanistan is fraught with complications. For one, there is no Taliban per se. In the south we have Mullah Omar’s “old” Taliban, but in the East, the toughest fighters come from the Haqqani network and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezbi Islami, both of which work closely with Al Qaeda. Complicating the issue even more, there is now a multi-branch Pakistani Taliban, some of whom operate in both countries. Ironically, the Afghan Taliban and its friends seem to be well tolerated by Pakistani authorities who are now in conflict with their own Taliban.

To Further Afghan Reconciliation: Fight Harder (Full PDF Article)

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Boots on the Ground or Weapons in the Sky? - August Cole and Yochi Dreazen, Wall Street Journal

For years, the military has been roiled by a heated internal debate over what kind of wars it should prepare to fight.

One faction, led by a host of senior officers, favors buying state-of-the-art weapons systems that would be useful in a traditional conflict with a nation like Russia or China. The other side, which includes Defense Secretary Robert Gates, believes the military should prepare for grinding insurgencies that closely resemble the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The dispute has long been largely academic, since the soaring defense budgets in the years since the September 2001 terror attacks left plenty of money for each side's main priorities.

That is beginning to change, a casualty of the widening global financial crisis. With the economy slowing and the tab for the government's bailout of the private sector spiraling higher, Democratic lawmakers are signaling that Pentagon officials will soon have to choose which programs to keep and which to cut. In the long and unresolved debate about the military's future, a clearer vision of how best to defend America will emerge -- but not without one side ceding hard-fought ground.

More at The Wall Street Journal.

Continue reading "Boots on the Ground or Weapons in the Sky?" »

'Clear And Hold' Showing Results 40 Years Later - Tom Bowman, National Public Radio, Morning Edition

It was 40 years ago, on Oct. 31, 1968, when a turning point came in the Vietnam War. President Lyndon B. Johnson went on national television.

"I have now ordered that all air, naval and artillery bombardment of North Vietnam cease as of 8 a.m. Washington time, Friday morning," Johnson said. "And I have reached [this decision] in the belief that this action can lead to progress toward a peaceful settlement of the Vietnamese war."

The bombing halt came not long after a new American commander took over in Vietnam and came up with a military strategy that echoes to this day...

Abrams saw the fight differently — in a counterinsurgency. The important thing isn't enemy body counts. It's protecting the population, training local Vietnamese forces, providing money and programs for a better life. "It's the government presence with its people all over the country, reasonable security and so on," he explained to his staff at a meeting in 1969.

For Abrams, the right strategy was not "search and destroy." He saw it as "clear and hold," words that echoed four decades later as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, President George Bush and Defense Secretary Robert Gates grappled and searched for a new strategy, for another insurgency, this time in Iraq...

More at Morning Edition.

• Tom Bowman and John Nagl will be discussing Vietnam, Iraq, and defense challenges for the next administration on NPR's Talk of the Nation between 3:15 and 4 PM EST tomorrow (4 November).

Continue reading "'Clear And Hold' Showing Results 40 Years Later" »

Talk When It’s Time - Max Boot, Commentary's Contentions

Few outside the Beltway defense community have ever heard of Joe Collins, a retired army colonel who now teaches at the National War College after a stint, from 2001 to 2004, as a deputy assistant secretary of defense in the Rumsfeld Pentagon. But, over the years, I have found him to be a consistent source of clear-eyed thinking about some of our most pressing security challenges. His latest essay on the Small Wars Journal website only confirms that reputation. In it, he pours some cold water on the overheated hopes expressed by so many in recent weeks that negotiations with the Taliban can somehow magically turnaround a failing war effort.

He points out that such talks would have scant prospect of success when the Taliban and related extremists are on the offensive and making gains. “If the Afghan government sits down with the Taliban now, it does so from a position of increasing weakness, and diminished strength,” he writes. “To increase the prospects for Kabul’s success in negotiation, we will have to reverse that condition. How should we proceed?”

Much more at Contentions.

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Lessons of The Surge - Michael O'Hanlon, Washington Times opinion

Many Americans and Iraqis think of the recent surge in Iraq as simply the temporary addition of more US troops to the war effort in 2007 and the first half of 2008. This is incorrect. It is also dangerous.

Partly because they misunderstand the true nature of the surge, many American and Iraqi political leaders now seem to want American forces out of Iraq as fast as possible. Iraqi leaders also now seem unwilling to accept a reasonable Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) to govern the actions of US troops in their country after the current UN Security Council mandate expires at the end of the year.

In fact, the basic logic of the surge continues - and must continue - even now that the increase in US combat formations in Iraq has come to an end. At its core, the surge has been about cooperatively protecting the Iraqi civilian population. This is the central point policymakers in Baghdad, Washington and other capitals around the world need to appreciate.

More at The Washington Times.

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Defense Officials Plan for Smooth Transition to New Administration - Jim Garamone, American Forces Press Service

The Defense Department has made extensive plans for a smooth transition from the present administration to that of the president-elect, Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman said here today.

Pentagon officials are ready to begin briefing a new president-elect’s transition team as soon as he’s chosen, Whitman said.

The transition between administrations comes when the United States is at war, the first time this has happened since 1969, when the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson transitioned to that of President Richard M. Nixon in the midst of the Vietnam War.

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates has launched early preparations to minimize disruptions as the administrations change, Whitman said. Gates has created a transition task force that will operate under five guiding principles:

-- Maintaining continuity of operations;

-- Assuring efficient and effective transition of outgoing leadership;

-- Assuring the efficient and effective in-processing of the incoming leaders;

-- Facilitating the transfer of information to the new administration; and

-- Sustaining focus on existing programs and processes while allowing the incoming administration to focus on its governing processes.

“One of the important components of this is ensuring that we’ve identified and highlighted some of the key department events, actions [and] milestones that a new administration will face in its first 90 days,” Whitman said.

More at American Forces Press Service.

Petraeus: Commitment to War Effort Will Stand Firm, Regardless of Who Wins Presidency - Scott Heidler, FOX News

As Americans went to the polls Tuesday to chose the next president, Gen. David Petraeus, the US commander in charge of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, said that whatever the outcome, the US will continue its commitment to battling Al Qaeda.

"Both candidates have been clear about the priority they place [on the war on terror]. So there is truly bipartisan support for [what] I think can be described as a sustained and substantial commitment to Pakistan and Afghanistan," Petraeus told FOX News.

More at FOX News.

David Petraeus Makes Pakistan a Priority - Bruce Loudon, The Australian

The US's preoccupation with Pakistan was strongly underlined last night as General David Petraeus, newly responsible for Washington's wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, made Islamabad his first port of call, and Democratic presidential hopeful Barack Obama signalled a change of policy if he wins tomorrow's election.

The security deterioration in the nuclear-armed nation was dramatically demonstrated shortly after General Petraeus's arrival, when jihadi militants staged a rocket attack on the airport in the city of Peshawar, capital of the al-Qa'ida and Taliban stronghold of North-West Frontier Province, which he was scheduled to visit yesterday.

More at The Australian.

New US President Should Keep Troops in Philippines - Associated Press

The next US president should keep American counterterrorism troops in the southern Philippines, where they have helped prevent the emergence of a key base for al-Qaida-linked militants, a military official said Tuesday.

The Philippine government expects no major changes in its close ties with Washington, whoever wins the US elections. But some Filipino analysts have speculated that a victory by Democrat Barack Obama could lead to a reduction or even a withdrawal of US troops from the southern Mindanao region, where the Philippine military has been battling a decades-long Islamist insurgency.

Maj. Gen. Benjamin Dolorfino, who heads the 8,000-strong Philippine Marines at the front line of counterterrorism efforts in Mindanao, said militants linked to the Abu Sayyaf, which is blacklisted as a terrorist group by Washington, still pose a threat despite US-backed offensives that have crippled the militants and destroyed their strongholds.

More at The Associated Press.

US Troops on Front Lines of War Track Election - Denis Gray, Associated Press

US soldiers on the front lines tuned in Tuesday to CNN and the Internet to track the presidential election that will decide the future of their mission. But for many, the day was spent like so many others on patrols, repairing equipment and other mundane tasks of war. Troops in the war zones of Iraq and Afghanistan mailed in absentee ballots long ago—if they voted. So by the time election day arrived back home, there was nothing for them to do but await the results.

"We can't stop doing what we have to do. We got to keep running," said Maj. Gary Dangerfield of Chicago, spokesman for the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment based in the northern city of Mosul.

Before heading out on missions, some soldiers here at Camp Marez watched a giant television screen airing CNN's election reporting. Others followed the voting on the Web if they were on bases with Internet service.

More at The Associated Press.

Continue reading "DoD Plans for Smooth Transition, AF, PK, PI, More..." »

Obama Wins Historic Election - Mike O'Sullivan, Voice of America

Barack Obama has been elected 44th president of the United States, becoming the first African American elected to the office.

In Grant Park in Chicago, hundreds of thousands of supporters reacted with screams of joy as American television networks projected Barack Obama as the next U.S. president.

In Phoenix, Arizona, losing Republican candidate Senator John McCain conceded the race, telling his somber supporters they had reached the end of a long journey.

"The American people have spoken and they have spoken clearly," said McCain. "A little while ago, I had the honor of calling Senator Barack Obama to congratulate him on being elected the next president of the country that we both love."

A short time later, Senator Obama mounted the stage in Chicago with his wife and two daughters, then spoke to his supporters in a televised address that was seen around the world.

"It's been a long time coming, but tonight, because of what we did on this day, in this election at this defining moment, change has come to America," he said.

The election is historic. When Mr. Obama takes office in January, he will become first the African American president in the nation's 232-year history. His election ends eight years of Republican control of the White House under President George W. Bush.

Continue reading "Obama Wins Historic Election" »

Mr. President-Elect,

Congratulations on your hard-won victory in this historic election. As they say, now the really hard part begins.

We published the following as an open letter to the next Commander-in-Chief on 13 June and believe it remains sage advice.

The Honorable Robert M. Gates must continue on as the Secretary of Defense in your administration.

Our Nation and Armed Services require his leadership and a continuation of the policies he has set in motion.

Thank you for your consideration and again, congratulations,

Small Wars Journal

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A New US Polciy for Syria: Fostering Political Change in a Divided State by Seth Kaplan. Orgininally published by the Middle East Policy Council, this article is posted here with permission of the author and the publisher.

Seth Kaplan is a business consultant to companies in developing countries as well as a foreign-policy analyst. His book Fixing Fragile States: A New Paradigm for Development (2008), critiques Western policies in places such as Pakistan, Somalia, Congo (Kinshasa) and West Africa, and lays out a new approach to overcoming the problems they face (More at the Fixing Fragile States official web page).

From A New US Policy for Syria:

The American foreign-policy establishment seems deeply divided over how to deal with Syria. No one in Washington doubts that Damascus plays a pivotal role in the Middle East, helping to shape events in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine while influencing calculations in Jerusalem, the capital of its principal foe, and Tehran, the capital of its principal ally. But there is considerable disagreement within Washington on how to approach Damascus.

Should Syria be isolated until its economy and its leadership crack under the strain, as the Bush administration has long favored? Should it, to use fashionable parlance, be forced into a “hard landing” - bullied into abandoning its disruptive behavior on the regional stage and softening its internal political complexion? Or should the United States help Syria achieve a soft landing, as many commentators outside the White House now propose? Should engagement with President Bashar al-Asad’s authoritarian regime be the order of the day, with carrots as well as sticks employed to persuade Syria of the benefits of a more cooperative relationship with its neighbors and the West and of more democracy at home?

This debate seems set to run indefinitely…

Much more at A New US Polciy for Syria: Fostering Political Change in a Divided State.

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Congratulations are in order for Major Niel Smith (many of you know him as Cavguy on the Council), US Army, for submitting the winning entry in this month's Armed Forces Journal essay contest. His entry, Lost Lessons of Counterinsurgency, is indeed one fine read.

The book that most changed my career path was The Army and Vietnam by Andrew Krepinevich. Krepinevich’s book fundamentally altered the approach I took as a company commander during my second Iraq tour in 2006.

When I returned to Germany in 2004, fresh from my first 15-month tour in Iraq, I was convinced there had to be a better way to fight this kind of conflict. A year of operations in Baghdad and three months fighting the first Sadr rebellion made it clear to me that our strategies and methods were inadequate to meet the demands of the environment. As a new company commander, I had an obligation to become as educated as possible on counterinsurgency. Unfortunately, I didn’t know where to begin. As an armor officer, my professional military education to this point included great detail on how to fight at the National Training Center or in the Fulda gap but contained absolutely nothing on counterinsurgency...

Much more at Armed Forces Journal.

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Saving Afghanistan: Why the Iraq Strategy isn’t the Answer - Dan Green, Armed Forces Journal

Last fall, I returned from a six-month deployment to Iraq with the Navy, in which I worked as a tribal and leadership engagement officer in the Fallujah area. By the end of my deployment, Fallujah had changed from an area rife with al-Qaida’s presence and upward of 750 security incidents a month to one where al-Qaida was on the run and security incidents were down to about 80 a month. I saw what was needed to convincingly defeat an insurgency as we worked with local tribes and Iraqi security forces to clear and hold each of Fallujah’s 10 neighborhoods and numerous surrounding villages.

As security became the norm in the city, the educated middle-class re-asserted its leadership, and the men with guns who had so long dominated politics in the post-Saddam era transitioned to a civilian-controlled police force. By the end of my tour, engineers, architects, teachers and doctors were dominating the city council’s meetings, asking for more power and authority from US forces to administer their affairs as we began initial planning to draw down our forces.

As much as it heartened me to witness the positive changes taking place in Fallujah, it also saddened me because it demonstrated just how inadequate our efforts are in Afghanistan and how far away we are from victory. It also prompted me to reflect upon my time in Afghanistan, where I worked as a political officer with the State Department for a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in 2005 and 2006 and on the strategies that are now being talked about to stabilize Afghanistan...

Much more at Armed Forces Journal.

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The World Looking Over Their Shoulders: Australian Strategic Corporals on Operations in Somalia and East Timor - Australian Army Land Warfare Studies Centre online book by Bob Breen and Greg McCauley.

This book describes the work of strategic corporals and their teams in two violent and devastated cities in the developing world: Baidoa in Somalia in 1993, and Dili in East Timor in 1999. Both cities had been destroyed by conflict and their citizens traumatised and displaced. In each case, the United Nations endorsed the deployment of international troops to take control. In Baidoa, Australian troops operated under American command to strict defensive ROE, seeking to protect the distribution of humanitarian aid. In Dili, under Australian command and empowered by a UN mandate, Australian troops had the freedom to take whatever measures were required to stabilise the situation, including the use of lethal force...

... In both situations—in Baidoa in 1993 and in Dili and along the East Timor–West Timor border in 1999–2000—junior leaders and small teams had to make decisions carefully with higher level consequences in mind. The ROE were essential decision-making tools, but also effectively increased the pressure on the soldiers to make the right decision when they anticipated danger or were faced with an immediate threat. There are numerous anecdotes illustrating the challenges they faced, many of which remain untold. Those that were recounted have been included in this book, remarkable stories that bespeak the danger and isolation in which many of the most critical decisions were made by young soldiers. The narrative adds context to these decisions and necessarily reflects on their aftermath, consequences and, most critically, the lessons they contain.

The World Looking Over Their Shoulders: Australian Strategic Corporals on Operations in Somalia and East Timor

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Learning From Experience: Afghanistan stabilized after 9/11. Let's get back to what was working. By Clare Lockhart at Slate.

Clare Lockhart is the director of the Institute for State Effectiveness and co-author, with Ashraf Ghani, of Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World. She spent some three years on the ground in Afghanistan and continues to work to revitalize U.S. strategy in that country. This Slate article is an excellent example of learning from the past about the part of counterinsurgency most of us understand least well: the economic and governance lines of operation.

Both candidates for the U.S. presidency pledged to make Afghanistan a top priority. The war there now tops the news on a daily basis with tales of the devastating hardships of the Afghan people and the deaths of Afghans and NATO soldiers. The untold story is that Afghanistan was well on its way to stability in 2004. It is essential that President Obama understands why the nation slipped into chaos. The challenge now is to win the peace...

Learning From Experience at Slate.

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America’s Financial Crisis
Lessons from Reconstructing Iraq
by Captain Timothy Hsia, Small Wars Journal Op-Ed

Lessons from Reconstructing Iraq (Full PDF Article)

News coverage of the 700 billion dollar bailout of Wall Street by the government have briefly mentioned that the government’s bill for rebuilding Wall Street will turn out to be monetarily equivalent to the costs associated with the Iraq War. To alleviate credit concerns, the Treasury Department has established a troubled asset relief program (TARP). Ideally, TARP and the financial bailout will prevent a broadening of the credit crisis from imperiling America’s long term growth while also fueling the global economy. Henry M. Paulson Jr., the Treasury Secretary, will be hard pressed to find any historical financial incident of today’s magnitude when examining our nation’s history which can serve as a historical waypoint. Nonetheless, he should perhaps reflect upon the immediate past as America’s endeavors to reconstruct Iraq proffer vital lessons which can greatly assist today’s financial mandarins as they seek to unwind the country’s financial Gordian knot. The lessons learned from the government’s ongoing reconstruction of Iraq apply in many cases to the current credit restoration, and it would be foolhardy for government officials to ignore these parallels.

Lessons from Reconstructing Iraq (Full PDF Article)

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Character and the Special Forces Soldier
by Brigadier General Bennet Sacolick, Small Wars Journal Op-Ed

Character and the Special Forces Soldier (Full PDF Article)

On a recent Friday I had the opportunity to address some of the finest Soldiers in the United States Army. These young men were graduating from the Special Forces Qualification Course – not an easy feat. Having spent 27 years in the special operations arena, I understood their excitement and how proud they felt during the ceremony; I had sat in a similar chair myself. However, it was important to me that their families understand exactly what their loved ones signed on for. And, in further thinking, it’s also important to me that the citizens of this country know the dedication and professionalism that is embodied in the men of Special Forces. It is to that end, that I share my graduation remarks with you.

Intuitively, I think we all know how hard our graduates work for the privilege of wearing a Green Beret. But did you know that some of these young men have been in training for more than two, maybe three years? This doesn’t count the months they spent just physically preparing themselves before the course began or the countless hours spent with rucksacks on their back in total solitude, usually very early in the morning or very late at night but almost always on their own time because they had other obligations that filled their day. Appreciate the fact that 75 percent of the Soldiers, mostly airborne Soldiers and many with combat experience who began the course, are no longer here today. This is the Army’s most physically demanding course. Scholastically, each Soldier must master more than 1,000 critical tasks, specific to his assigned specialty and hundreds of advanced war-fighting tasks, plus demonstrate a proficiency in a foreign language before they graduate. There is simply not a more demanding school in the entire U.S. Army.

Character and the Special Forces Soldier (Full PDF Article)

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Via e-mail from Noah Shachtman at Danger Room and on the DR Blog.

A social scientist in the Army's controversial Human Terrain program was en route to Brooke Army Medical Center in Texas after being set on fire in and apparent Taliban attack in Afghanistan. It's the third time in five months that a Human Terrain Team member has been killed or seriously wounded.

Paula Lloyd was interviewing locals in the southern village of Maywand on Tuesday as part of her duties in a Human Terrain Team, which embeds civilian cultural experts into U.S. combat units. She approached a man carrying a fuel jug and they began talking about the price of gas. Suddenly, the man doused Lloyd in a flammable liquid and set her on fire. She suffered second- and third-degree burns over 60 percent of her body, a Human Terrain source told Danger Room.

The injuries could have been worse. Lloyd's teammate immediately threw her into a nearby water source to douse the flames, then Lloyd was sped to a nearby medical facility. Fortunately, the first doctor to treat her was a U.S. Army burn specialist. After being stabilized, Lloyd was evacuated to the military's Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany and is now en route to Brooke Army Medical Center in San Antonio. Lloyd is in "stable, but guarded condition," the source said.

The Taliban took credit for the attack on their website. The Taliban has a long history of setting women on fire as a way of punishing them for perceived immodesty.

More at Danger Room and Reuters. Our best wishes to Paula and prayers for a speedy and full recovery and our heartfelt thanks for her service to our Nation and humankind.

SWJ will provide updates as more information becomes available.

HTS Members Killed in the Line of Duty:

Michael Bhatia, a social scientist team member assigned to the Afghanistan Human Terrain Team (HTT) AF1, in support of Task Force Currahee based at FOB Salerno, Khowst Province, was killed on 7 May 2008 when the Humvee he was riding in was struck by an IED. Michael was traveling in a convoy of four vehicles, which were en route to a remote sector of Khowst province. For many years, this part of Khowst had been plagued by a violent inter-tribal conflict concerning land rights. Michael had identified this tribal dispute as a research priority, and was excited to finally be able to visit this area. This trip was the brigade’s initial mission into the area, and it was their intention to initiate a negotiation process between the tribes.

Nicole Suveges, a social scientist team member assigned to the Iraq Human Terrain Team (HTT) IZ3, in support of 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division based at FOB Prosperity, Baghdad, Iraq, was killed on 24 June 2008 when a bomb exploded at the District Council building in southern Sadr City where she was attending a meeting of the District Advisory Council, which was scheduled to elect a new chairman. Nicole had almost completed a PhD in political science at Johns Hopkins University. Her dissertation was titled "Markets & Mullahs: Global Networks, Transnational Ideas and the Deep Play of Political Culture." Formerly, she served in Sarajevo as an Army Reservist in support of SFOR/NATO. For the past two years, Nicole had worked in Iraq, initially as a project lead for polling and later as a subject matter expert for Multinational Corps Iraq (MNCI).

Update:

Pray for Paula Lloyd - Christopher Albon, War and Health
Our Thoughts are with Paula Lloyd and Her Family - Drew Conway, ZIA

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Afghan Government Reaches Out to Tribes - Jim Michaels, USA Today

Afghanistan's government has stepped up efforts to win the cooperation of tribal leaders to try to build security at the village level and fend off the Taliban. The strategy has the backing of coalition forces and is similar to a successful effort in Iraq, where powerful tribal leaders turned on al-Qaeda.

"We're coming back to recognize tribal leadership, to empower and acknowledge them as leaders within their communities," said US Army Brig. Gen. Michael Tucker, deputy commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan.

In Iraq, the tribal movement started in Anbar province, west of Baghdad, and eventually spread throughout the country. It helped isolate al-Qaeda from the local population.

"We need to leverage the tribal system in Afghanistan as was done in Iraq," said US Gen. David McKiernan, the top NATO commander in Afghanistan...

... "The Taliban are anti-tribal," ... "They are trying to destroy the tribal structures. … This gives the Pakistani and Afghani governments a crowbar" to drive a wedge between the Taliban and the general population.

More at USA Today.

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Major Jakob Bruhl is an active duty Army officer currently attending the Air Command and Staff College. He's interested in how the Army can make better use of some of the newer web technologies - such as blogs - to communicate with the people we're sworn to protect.

Have some ideas or opinions on this issue? If yes, then head on over to Soldiers in the Blogosphere and share them with Major Bruhl.

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New Administration to Realign Priorities in Iraq, Afghanistan - Yochi Dreazen, Wall Street Journal

The election of Barack Obama will trigger a significant realignment of US national-security priorities, with Afghanistan and Pakistan gaining in prominence as resources are redirected from Iraq.

US policy in the two regions has been shaped by the Bush administration's decision to commit the bulk of the nation's military and financial resources to Iraq, where the ouster of Saddam Hussein set off a prolonged civil war, rather than to Afghanistan. The focus on Iraq left the Afghanistan mission chronically short of troops and money.

The incoming Obama administration sees the challenges differently. Aides said Mr. Obama is likely to deploy tens of thousands of additional US troops to Afghanistan, where security conditions have worsened markedly in recent months and attacks by the Taliban and others have risen. They said Mr. Obama also would devote more attention to neighboring Pakistan, whose support is seen as crucial to defeating the Taliban and al Qaeda and stabilizing Afghanistan.

With security conditions in Iraq continuing to improve, the Pentagon announced Wednesday that a combat brigade of about 4,000 troops from the 101st Airborne Division would leave Iraq six weeks sooner than planned. Several more brigades are expected to leave by next summer.

Those moves free up more troops for use in Afghanistan.

More at The Wall Street Journal.

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How Much Counterinsurgency Training? - Spencer Ackerman, Washington Independent

The instructor called up the slide on an gigantic screen, so that the nearly 200 students in the lecture hall could see. The lesson was about the effect of leadership on the durability of insurgencies. One example was Al Qaeda. The slide asked: “If UBL” - meaning Osama bin Laden - “dies, is the insurgency dead?” The next example was the American Revolution. “If George Washington dies, is the revolution dead?”

The instructor, Mark Ulrich, explained that his efforts were geared toward getting the class to think about insurgencies in objective and clinical terms. “Again: clinical!” Ulrich practically yelled just before putting the slides on the projector. “Think clinical. Don’t think ‘terrorism-bad.’ That whole thing, ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter,’ that’s not clinical. That’s emotional.”

If this were any other academic setting - a New England liberal arts college, for example - and a tweedy professor tacitly compared bin Laden to George Washington, no matter how loosely, he would find himself targeted by Fox News for the sin of moral equivalence. But Ulrich is largely inoculated against such charges. He’s an Army lieutenant colonel and Iraq veteran assigned to the joint Army-Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center.

This center, now nearly two-years old, was developed to embed the lessons of counterinsurgency warfare into the architecture of a military that, at senior levels, still appears resistant to such methods of fighting. Many senior staff fear these tactics would mean bogging the country down in bloody conflicts and eroding traditional military skills.

Yet Ulrich and the Counterinsurgency Center are dedicated to ensuring that the military doesn’t repeat the mistakes of the post-Vietnam era, when the military purged counterinsurgency from its institutional memory on the mistaken assumption that such a move would prevent U.S. involvement in such conflicts. Instead, this move guaranteed that the military would have to reinvent the wheel in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Approximately 160 officers and enlisted men from around the US military, along with visiting soldiers from Canada and Australia, attended the 2008 Counterinsurgency Leaders’ Workshop this week, at Ft. Leavenworth, to hear Ulrich, the main lecturer, better explain the mission and the enemy many of them have already fought. The conference offered a window into the ways in which the military is changing to absorb counterinsurgency - and, in some ways, how it is resisting that change.

Much more at The Washington Independent.

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Strategic Principles of Counterinsurgency
by Colonel Robert C. Jones, Small Wars Journal Op-Ed

Strategic Principles of Counterinsurgency (Full PDF Article)

Currently there are many voices speaking at once, all competing for attention as to their unique perspective as to what is causing the current unrest in the world. Far too much focus is placed on the tactic of “terrorism,” and many are far too quick to simply label those who apply that tactic as “terrorists.” While certainly this characterization is true, it is not particularly helpful. Instead, I believe it is best to look at the purpose for a man’s actions rather than his actions themselves in order to best judge, and thereby label him. Most that we are so quick to label as terrorists are actually insurgents. Bin Laden, however, is no insurgent. Mr. Bin Laden is in fact a terrorist. He is using his Al Qaeda network to wage a regional unconventional warfare campaign to leverage many nationalist insurgent movements that lay within Muslim populaces in states where those populaces are experiencing poor governance, from the Philippines in the East, to England in the West.

Some who speak on this topic have expertise born of years of engagement at the tactical level, and their perspective reflects that experience. Others who speak have little to no direct experience, but have read and studied the problem in great detail based upon the experience of others. The principles I offer below are my own, and are born of (and limited by) my own experience and studies. They are intended to be neither too tactical, nor too theoretical. They are intended instead to provide what I like to call “pure strategy.” These are not insights that are deemed strategic based upon the level of command to which they apply; but are instead intended to be strategic in that they offer fundamental truths on the nature of insurgency that can be applied at every level of command. Hopefully these can guide squad leaders and presidents alike, and help them all to be a little more successful in their endeavors.

Strategic Principles of Counterinsurgency (Full PDF Article)

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Obama’s Pentagon-in-Waiting - Spencer Ackerman, Washington Independent

The rumor started to spread last week. if Sen. Barack Obama won the presidential election, Michele Flournoy would resign from the Center for a New American Security Thursday following the election. Friday at the latest.

It’s not difficult to understand why the talk circulated. Flournoy boasts an enviable resume. A veteran of the Clinton Pentagon, she worked on counter-proliferation issues before playing a large role in shaping the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, an overview of defense strategy and its implementation.

After leaving government service, Flournoy took a high-profile job at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a prominent Washington policy organization, before co-founding the Center for a New American Security, an increasingly influential defense think tank, in 2007.

It’s not just Flournoy. CNAS, as it’s known, is widely considered a likely feeder for the Obama Pentagon, though the organization disputes this — preferring to bill itself as nonpartisan. What CNAS does not dispute is that, over the course of the past two years — overnight, in Washington terms — it has emerged as an energetic center for studying contemporary defense issues, including Iraq, counterinsurgency and the national-security effects of climate change.

More at The Washington Independent.

Center for a New American Security

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Since 1922, Military Review has provided a forum for the open exchange of ideas on military affairs. Subsequently, publications have proliferated throughout the Army education system that specialize either in tactical issues associated with particular Branches or on strategic issues at the Senior Service School level. Bridging these two levels of intellectual inquiry, Military Review focuses on research and analysis of the concepts, doctrine and principles of warfighting between the tactical and operational levels of war.

Military Review is a refereed journal that provides a forum for original thought and debate on the art and science of land warfare and other issues of current interest to the US Army and the Department of Defense. Military Review also supports the education, training, doctrine development and integration missions of the Combined Arms Center (CAC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Military Review is printed bimonthly in English, Spanish and Portuguese and is distributed to readers in more than 100 countries. It is also printed in Arabic on a quarterly basis. Widely quoted and reprinted throughout the world, it is a readily available reference at most military and civilian university libraries and research agencies.

Here is the November - December 2008 lineup:

Enable from Overwatch: MNF-Iraq by General Raymond T. Odierno, U.S. Army

The MNF-Iraq commander’s operating guidance emphasizes "how we think," "how we operate," and "who we are."

The Strategy of Protracted People’s War: Uganda by Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of the Republic of Uganda

President Museveni presents thoughts and observations on the future of Africa and the moral factor in revolutionary warfare.

Rethinking IO: Complex Operations in the Information Age by Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege, U.S. Army Retired

The Army lacks dexterity with war’s moral domain. Today’s highly complex conflicts demand recovering a holistic approach.

Irregular Warfare Information Operations: Understanding the Role of People, Capabilities, and Effects by Lieutenant Colonel Norman E. Emery, U.S. Army

Current operating environments require balancing IO efforts against the enemy with those efforts intended to influence populations.

Georgia: The War Russia Lost by Stephen J. Blank, Ph.D.

The Strategic Studies Institute’s expert on the Soviet bloc and the post-Soviet world examines the ramifications of Russia’s recent posturing.

China’s Electronic Long-Range Reconnaissance by Lieutenant Colonel Timothy L. Thomas, U.S. Army Retired

China’s ongoing use of “patriotic hackers” may represent electronic reconnaissance for putting cyber-war theory into practice.

On Metaphors We are Led By by Colonel Christopher R. Paparone, Ph.D., U.S. Army Retired

Caring for mild traumatic brain injury is challenging for the military and the Department of Veterans Affairs. Sports medicine’s “best practices” can revolutionize treatment of such injuries for Soldiers.

Sociocultural Expertise and the Military: Beyond the Controversy by Pauline Kusiak, Ph.D.

While using academics for military ethnographic analysis may be controversial, it can foster better security.

Revisiting Modern Warfare: Counterinsurgency in the Mada’in Qadaby by Lieutenant Colonel David G. Fivecoat, U.S. Army, and Captain Aaron T. Schwengler, U.S. Army

French Colonel Roger Trinquier’s 1964 book Modern Warfare has relevant lessons for 21st-century counterinsurgency.

How Jesse James, the Telegraph, and the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 Can Help the Army Win the War on Terrorism by Peter E. Kunkel, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller)

History teaches that a cashless battlefield can translate into less violence and a quicker restoration of stability.

Planning Full Spectrum Operations: Implications of FM 3-0 on Planning Doctrine by Major Glenn A. Henke, U.S. Army

Phasing military operations has proven to be a defunct heuristic for effectively meshing logical lines of operations in COIN.

Relooking Unit Cohesion: A Sensemaking Approach by Major Geoff van Epps, U.S. Army

With the days of Army COHORT units more than two decades past, cohesion has become an afterthought.

Reconstruction: A Damaging Fantasy? by Amitai Etzioni, George Washington University

If we cannot put our own house in order, is it realistic to think we can do it for another country, especially when that country’s culture is significantly different?

Book Reviews

Contemporary readings for the professional.

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Report Details Attack on GIs in Afghanistan - Kent Harris and Joseph Giordono, Stars and Stripes

The Army’s official report on the July battle in Afghanistan that killed nine paratroops and wounded 27 others is filled with details of heroism, desperation and a calculated risk gone wrong.

It begins with the decision to close down an "extremely vulnerable" combat outpost nearby and relocate to Wanat, a move discussed by the brigade for more than a year.

Ten months of coordination with Afghan officials about the land allowed militants to plan an attack "that only required refinement once the land was occupied."

On July 9, in the early morning darkness, the US troops and 24 Afghan paratroops established the vehicle patrol base.

Each day, locals warned the US troops of an impending attack.

"There was intelligence an attack would occur," the report found, "but this was to be expected for the Waygal District."

Troops expected a "probing attack" of around 20 militants. Instead, at around 4:20 a.m., the force of 200 enemy launched a complex, well-organized attack that first targeted the troops’ heavy weapons.

More at Stars and Stripes.

CJTF-101 Report Dated 13 August 2008 - Part 1
CJTF-101 Report Dated 13 August 2008 - Part 2

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Mexico’s Criminal Insurgency - John P. Sullivan and Adam Elkus, Defense and the National Interest

Grenades are thrown at popular gatherings. Mutilated corpses flood the morgues. Heavily armed gunmen blast police to shreds with high-powered automatic weapons. Just another day in Iraq or Afghanistan? No-all of the events described occur regularly in Mexico. Our southern neighbor is imploding under the weight of a criminal insurgency just as dangerous any crew of bomb-tossing jihadists–an insurgency that may soon envelop our borders.

Mexico has always struggled with crime and corruption, but its present troubles can be traced to the mid-90s downfall of the Colombian cartels. Those mega-cartels, epitomized by the excess of Pablo Escobar, directly threatened the Colombian state and lost. As nature abhors a vacuum, the gap was filled by Mexican drug cartels bolstered by gargantuan drug profits. These cartels burrowed into the superstructure of the Mexican state, corrupting the poorly paid civil servants and police officers that make up the Mexican bureaucracy. Those who refused to take a bribe earned a bullet to the brain for their scruples. The cartel evolution in political and financial affairs was matched by a rise in military power, as the narco-gangs built up a capable cadre of enforcers poached from the Mexican military’s Special Forces. These men, known as the Zetas, enabled the cartels to gain a tactical advantage against the poorly equipped Mexican local and state police.

Worst of all, the sheer size of the black economy–$40 billion as estimated by Stratfor’s George Friedman–strangles legitimate enterprise and concentrates power in the hands of a few narco-warlords. These criminal enterprises amass power and legitimacy as the Mexican state loses the trust of its citizens. As a result, Mexico’s periphery has become a lawless wasteland controlled largely by the drug cartels, but the disorder is rapidly spreading into the interior. In a cruel parody of the “ink-blot” strategy employed by counterinsurgents in Iraq, ungoverned spaces controlled by insurgents multiply as the territorial fabric of the Mexican state continues to dissolve.

More at Defense and the National Interest.

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General Lejeune's Birthday Message

MARINE CORPS ORDERS
No. 47 (Series 1921)
HEADQUARTERS U.S. MARINE CORPS
Washington, November 1, 1921

759. The following will be read to the command on the 10th of November, 1921, and hereafter on the 10th of November of every year. Should the order not be received by the 10th of November, 1921, it will be read upon receipt.

(1) On November 10, 1775, a Corps of Marines was created by a resolution of Continental Congress. Since that date many thousand men have borne the name "Marine". In memory of them it is fitting that we who are Marines should commemorate the birthday of our corps by calling to mind the glories of its long and illustrious history.

(2) The record of our corps is one which will bear comparison with that of the most famous military organizations in the world's history. During 90 of the 146 years of its existence the Marine Corps has been in action against the Nation's foes. From the Battle of Trenton to the Argonne, Marines have won foremost honors in war, and in the long eras of tranquility at home, generation after generation of Marines have grown gray in war in both hemispheres and in every corner of the seven seas, that our country and its citizens might enjoy peace and security.

(3) In every battle and skirmish since the birth of our corps, Marines have acquitted themselves with the greatest distinction, winning new honors on each occasion until the term "Marine" has come to signify all that is highest in military efficiency and soldierly virtue.

(4) This high name of distinction and soldierly repute we who are Marines today have received from those who preceded us in the corps. With it we have also received from them the eternal spirit which has animated our corps from generation to generation and has been the distinguishing mark of the Marines in every age. So long as that spirit continues to flourish Marines will be found equal to every emergency in the future as they have been in the past, and the men of our Nation will regard us as worthy successors to the long line of illustrious men who have served as "Soldiers of the Sea" since the founding of the Corps.

JOHN A. LEJEUNE,
Major General Commandant
75705--21

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H/T Scott Nestler for pointing out this New York Times piece by William Safire.

... Infantry footwear has been slogging though mud for centuries, but boots on the ground is a relatively new expression. Earliest citation that Matthew Seelinger, chief historian of the Army Historical Foundation, can find is in an April 11, 1980, article in The Christian Science Monitor. During the Iranian hostage crisis, plans for a rescue operation were made in the Carter administration, and there were worries that the Soviet Union would intervene. “Many American strategists now argue that even light, token US land forces - ‘getting US combat boots on the ground’ ” - as the four-star general Volney Warner put it - “would signal to an enemy that the US... can only be dislodged at the risk of war.” The vivid figure of speech soon triumphed over the formal “infantry in the field.”

More at The New York Times.

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US Plans Expansion of Afghan Airfield To House Special Army Aviation Unit by Walter Pincus, Washington Post

The Bush administration's plans to increase the US military role in Afghanistan include a $100 million expansion next year of the Kandahar airfield, to accommodate aircraft working for Task Force ODIN, the once-secret Army fighting units that have been successful in Iraq.

The US Army Corps of Engineers, according to a notice issued Thursday, has set Wednesday as the "tentative" date for putting out the contract to design and build a secure area for the aircraft. It will have facilities, hangars, ramps and taxiways "for up to twenty-six (26) generic Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft with shelters at Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan."

Task Force ODIN -- the acronym derives from "observe, detect, identify and neutralize" -- is named for the chief Norse god of art, culture, war and the dead. The Army put the ODIN concept together last year to tackle the problem of roadside explosions, which had become the main method of attacking military and truck convoys. In September, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates told Congress that he wanted to replicate the ODIN units in Afghanistan as soon as possible.

More at The Washington Post.

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Girl, 13, is Iraq's Latest Suicide Bomber - Philippe Naughton, The Times

A 13-year-old girl became Iraq's latest suicide bomber today, killing four people at a security checkpoint in the town of Baquba.

On a day of renewed violence, at least 31 people were killed in a double bombing at a Baghdad market, the deadliest attack to rock the Iraqi capital in months. The attackers first detonated a car bomb in the Sunni district of Adhamiyah, hitting a minibus carrying girls to school. As a crowd gathered to help the girls, a suicide bomber ran in and blew himself up.

The Interior Ministry said that 31 people were killed and 71 wounded in the deadliest to hit Baghdad since June 17 when 51 people were killed in a car bombing in the Al-Hurriya district.

In the Baquba attack, the girl blew herself up at a checkpoint manned by members of the Sunni Muslim 'Awakening' councils, which have led the fight against al-Qaeda in Iraq. Four men, including a leading Sunni militiaman, were killed and 15 civilians wounded.

More at The Times.

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The Genetic Roots of the War on Terrorism
Clash of Icon Worship
by Colonel William M. Darley, Small Wars Journal

The Genetic Roots of the War on Terrorism (Full PDF Article)

In its January/February 2006 edition, Foreign Affairs published a rather odd article (for a journal that otherwise specializes in political analysis and commentary) that appeared to get much less attention than it really deserved. In the article, titled “A Natural History of Peace,” Stanford Professor Robert M. Sapolsky compares and contrasts human aggressive tendencies with well-documented propensities for violence among several species of primates, and develops a case suggesting that human aggression of the kind that produces warfare mainly stems from the genetic impulses rooted in humans as primates (not a new suggestion of itself). But more significantly, he offers proof extracted from a now robust body of field work that even strong genetic tendencies for violence in certain species of primates can be mitigated by exposure to the equivalent of “cultural” forces. He singles out from the body of such observations the case history of one group of baboons (a particularly aggressive and violent species of primate) that he calls the Forest Troop, the intensely aggressive behavior of which was ameliorated after exposure to the more peaceful and tolerant “mores” of another baboon troop of an identical species with which the Forest Troop had come in contact. He concludes by asserting that “some primate species can make peace despite violent traits that seem built into their natures.” He goes on to muse, “The challenge now is to figure out under what conditions that can happen, and whether humans can manage the trick themselves.”

Sapolsky’s argument frames the issues associated with the current global conflict in which the United States is now engaged in a potentially very useful light: as a biological problem best understood and dealt with using means specifically tailored to deal with human genetic tendencies in order to promote cooperation and tolerance instead of competitive violence. This stands in contrast to the current approach which appears to assume that the conflict mainly results from a combination of cultural and economic factors that can be dealt with by a strategy that combines selected violence, targeted monetary investments mixed, and cross cultural messages through so called strategic communications. However, understanding the problem as having its roots in primordial genetic urges would focus the search for solutions in a somewhat different way. The first step would be exploring in detail root biological causes for aggressive behaviors in the human species as a member of the family of primates, and then formulating specific measures (not just confined to persuasion or economic investment) needed to channel such biologically behaviors in ways that are conducive to peaceful social co-existence.

The Genetic Roots of the War on Terrorism (Full PDF Article)

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New Potentials for Provincial Reconstruction Teams
by Commander Michael Hallett, Small Wars Journal

New Potentials for Provincial Reconstruction Teams (Full PDF Article)

The promulgation of the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) as the overarching reconstruction and development policy guidance in conjunction with the development of Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GOIRA) capabilities over the past 6 years, (as seen in the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) and the 2007 creation of the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG)) has significantly influenced the Afghan environmental dynamics and has thus created new opportunities for PRTs to engage in governance support activities.

Responding to this situation, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Strategic Vision issued at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008 said the following on PRTs: “Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) play a significant role in enabling security, governance and development. We pledge to provide all the PRTs need, enhance their unity of effort, strengthen their civilian component and further align their development strategies with Afghan Government priorities until such a time as Afghan Government institutions are strong enough to render PRTs unnecessary.” Enabling this ultimate transition requires that PRTs shift from helping the people of Afghanistan directly through activities like project, funding, medical assistance and disaster relief materials provision to supporting the government of Afghanistan in executing these activities. Or, as some have put it, Afghan government capabilities have advanced to the point that it is “time to take off the training wheels”.

New Potentials for Provincial Reconstruction Teams (Full PDF Article)

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Secret Order Lets US Raid Al Qaeda in Many Countries - Eric Schmitt and Mark Mazzetti, New York Times

The United States military since 2004 has used broad, secret authority to carry out nearly a dozen previously undisclosed attacks against Al Qaeda and other militants in Syria, Pakistan and elsewhere, according to senior American officials.

These military raids, typically carried out by Special Operations forces, were authorized by a classified order that Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld signed in the spring of 2004 with the approval of President Bush, the officials said. The secret order gave the military new authority to attack the Qaeda terrorist network anywhere in the world, and a more sweeping mandate to conduct operations in countries not at war with the United States.

In 2006, for example, a Navy Seal team raided a suspected militants’ compound in the Bajaur region of Pakistan, according to a former top official of the Central Intelligence Agency. Officials watched the entire mission - captured by the video camera of a remotely piloted Predator aircraft - in real time in the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center at the agency’s headquarters in Virginia 7,000 miles away.

More at the New York Times, The Times, and Daily Telegraph.

The Old Gray Blabbermouth - Max Boot, Commentary's Contentions

The New York Times continues its series of articles exposing top-secret US operations in the War on Terror. Today’s installment, as Abe mentioned, describes US Special Operations incursions into Syria, Pakistan, Somalia, and other countries under the terms of an executive order signedby President Bush.

Portions of these revelations have already been leaked in the past, making this piece less harmful than previous Times classics such as this 2005 article in which the Paper of Record exposed secret wiretapping of terrorists. Or this article from the Washington Post which exposed the CIA’s overseas prisons in which top terrorists were held. But it’s bad enough.

I can’t help thinking that such operational details never would have been revealed in a war–say World War II–that the editors of these newspapers believed was worth fighting.

More at Contentions.

Pentagon Counterterror Teams Go Deep - Jeff Stein, Congressional Quarterly

It's interesting to speculate on why the expanded operations of Pentagon counterterror teams surfaced in the New York Times today. But one of them has to be that the noses of CIA and State Department officials remain severely out of joint from an initiative launched right after the 9/11 attacks by President Bush and then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.

According to the Times, a 2004 order identified "15 to 20 countries, including Syria, Pakistan, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and several other Persian Gulf states, where Qaeda militants were believed to be operating or to have sought sanctuary, a senior administration official said."

Soon enough, American ambassadors, who are supposed to be the top US official in a foreign country, grew increasingly annoyed by Pentagon "cowboys" zipping in and out, congressional committees heard.

But if only because the State Department, and the CIA, couldn't keep DoD out of their sandboxes, they have been supporting the operations, the Times said.

More at Congressional Quarterly.

"Secret Order" to Target al Qaeda Not So Secret - Bill Roggio, The Weekly Standard's The Blog

The New York Times tells us today that the Bush administration granted approval for the US military "to use new authority to attack the Qaeda terrorist network anywhere in the world, and a more sweeping mandate to conduct operations in countries not at war with the United States." The US military used this "broad, secret authority to carry out nearly a dozen previously undisclosed attacks against Al Qaeda and other militants in Syria, Pakistan and elsewhere," the Times reports.

But anyone who has been remotely following operations against al Qaeda and its allied terror groups has long been able to deduce the US government has granted approval for the military and CIA to attack high value targets outside of the hot zones of Iraq and Afghanistan. This was one of the worst-kept "secrets" because the high-profile nature of the operations can't remain hidden.

With very little time and effort, I tracked down seven of these so-called secret attacks. One of the most brazen attacks occurred in the country of Madagascar in January 2007. That's right, Madagascar. US special operations forces from the hunter killer teams of Task Force 88 (back then it was called Task Force 145, the name has likely changed yet again) killed Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, one of Osama bin Laden's brothers-in-law who has deep roots in al Qaeda as a financier and facilitator.

More at The Blog.

Did Secret Orders Keep US Commandos in Somalia? - David Axe, Wired's Danger Room

Fifteen years ago, a botched Special Forces raid targeting warlords in Mogadishu resulted in the deaths of 18 US servicemen and hundreds of others. The battle, recounted in the book and film Black Hawk Down, cut short an ambitious peacekeeping plan for war-torn Somalia.

Since then, US special operators have returned to the lawless East African country, thanks to secret orders approved in 2004 by then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and President George W. Bush, and reported yesterday in the New York Times. So now, the question becomes: How often have those commandos been in Somalia, and how long have they stayed?

More at Danger Room.

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The Role of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Counterinsurgency Operations
Khost Province, Afghanistan
by Ensign Robert J. Bebber, Ph.D., Small Wars Journal

The Role of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in COIN - (Full PDF Article)

The counterinsurgency (or COIN) in Khost province was supposed to represent the “crown jewel” in American COIN doctrine and tactics. Afghan President Hamid Karzai called Khost a “provincial model of success,” and former CENTCOM commander ADM William J. Fallon described it as “a wonderful example” for the entire country. (Armed Forces Press Service 2007) Anne Marlow (2008) wrote a glowing review of recent efforts in the province in 2008 for The Weekly Standard, suggesting that the forward positioning of small platoons at “Force Protection Facilities” or FPFs, which are located in the district centers of the province, along with the substantial increase in the number and scope of projects such as road, schools, wells and diversion dams through the provincial reconstruction team, had cracked the code for American counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan. Within a couple months, as the security situation continued to deteriorate, she was backtracking on her assessment of why American counterinsurgency strategy was “successful” in Khost province by suggesting that that it had more to do with the “role of commanders’ personalities may be larger than we want to acknowledge.” The previous commanders were “brilliant and personable,” leading one to conclude that the individuals who replaced them were less so.

If only it were that easy, then we could merely charm our way to victory. But any knowledgeable assessment of the counterinsurgency effort in Khost would not conclude that the war was going well. Hype and publicity cannot hide the fact that the situation was growing dire, both in Khost and throughout the country.

The Role of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in COIN - (Full PDF Article)

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Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Collection Management in the Brigade Combat Team during COIN
Three Assumptions and Ten "A-Ha!" Moments on the Path to Battlefield Awareness
by Lieutenant Colonel Scott A. Downey and Captain Zehra T. Guvendiren, Small Wars Journal

ISR Collection Management in the BCT during COIN (Full PDF Article)

We found traditional CM and subsequent analytical methods inapplicable to our fight, but realized that we had to develop systems which met CM needs within counterinsurgency (COIN) to maintain our relevance to our lower and higher echelons…. Our most unconventional initiative was to have our PIR span the full spectrum of BCT Operations, essential when fighting in a COIN environment.

• That CM was somehow an irrelevant, if not exactly a dinosaur of Cold War intelligence art.
• That enemy focused priority intelligence requirements (PIR) would drive our knowledge management (KM) system.
• That after five years of war we would find a KM system in place that met the commander’s needs in counter-insurgency (COIN).

ISR Collection Management in the BCT during COIN (Full PDF Article)

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Remembrance Day – also known as Poppy Day, Armistice Day (the event it commemorates) or Veterans Day – is a day to commemorate the sacrifices of members of the armed forces and of civilians in times of war, specifically since the First World War. It is observed on 11 November to recall the end of World War I on that date in 1918. The day was specifically dedicated by King George V, on 7 November 1919, to the observance of members of the armed forces who were killed during war; this was possibly done upon the suggestion of Edward George Honey to Wellesley Tudor Pole, who established two ceremonial periods of remembrance based on events in 1917.

Common British, Canadian, South African, and ANZAC traditions include two minutes of silence at the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month (11:00 am, 11 November), as that marks the time (in the United Kingdom) when armistice became effective.

In Australia Remembrance Day is always observed on 11 November, although the day is not a public holiday. Services are held at 11am at war memorials in suburbs and towns across the country, at which "Last Post" is sounded by a bugler and a one-minute silence is observed.

Continue reading "Remembrance Day 2008" »

A Proclamation by the President of the United States of America

On Veterans Day, we pay tribute to the service and sacrifice of the men and women who in defense of our freedom have bravely worn the uniform of the United States.

From the fields and forests of war-torn Europe to the jungles of Southeast Asia, from the deserts of Iraq to the mountains of Afghanistan, brave patriots have protected our Nation's ideals, rescued millions from tyranny, and helped spread freedom around the globe. America's veterans answered the call when asked to protect our Nation from some of the most brutal and ruthless tyrants, terrorists, and militaries the world has ever known. They stood tall in the face of grave danger and enabled our Nation to become the greatest force for freedom in human history. Members of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Coast Guard have answered a high calling to serve and have helped secure America at every turn.

Our country is forever indebted to our veterans for their quiet courage and exemplary service. We also remember and honor those who laid down their lives in freedom's defense. These brave men and women made the ultimate sacrifice for our benefit. On Veterans Day, we remember these heroes for their valor, their loyalty, and their dedication. Their selfless sacrifices continue to inspire us today as we work to advance peace and extend freedom around the world.

With respect for and in recognition of the contributions our service members have made to the cause of peace and freedom around the world, the Congress has provided (5 U.S.C. 6103(a)) that November 11 of each year shall be set aside as a legal public holiday to honor America's veterans.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GEORGE W. BUSH, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim November 11, 2008, as Veterans Day and urge all Americans to observe November 9 through November 15, 2008, as National Veterans Awareness Week. I encourage all Americans to recognize the bravery and sacrifice of our veterans through ceremonies and prayers. I call upon Federal, State, and local officials to display the flag of the United States and to support and participate in patriotic activities in their communities. I invite civic and fraternal organizations, places of worship, schools, businesses, unions, and the media to support this national observance with commemorative expressions and programs.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this thirty-first day of October, in the year of our Lord two thousand eight, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and thirty-third.

GEORGE W. BUSH

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Editor’s note: we’re pleased to publish this Veterans Day reflection by Colonel David Sutherland. To his thoughtful words, we would merely add here’s also to the many Iraqi patriots shaping their country, and the countless others making do as best they can amidst the bravery of their countrymen and ours.

One year ago today, November 11, 2007, our Brigade Combat Team began its redeployment from Diyala province, Iraq, back to Fort Hood, Texas. As we remember our veterans, I think about those brave men and women who participated in the surge operations that led to improvements seen in Iraq today.

The Greywolf Brigade began its deployment to Iraq in October 2006. Our formation consisted of approximately 5,000 of our nation’s finest men and women from all branches of our Armed Services, Department of Defense civilians, Department of State, and other interagency and Coalition partners. For 14 months, they poured their hearts and souls into the mission – a mission that required we bind-up the wounds of the innocent and reestablish rule of law, while at the same time combating a depraved enemy, devoid of human decency.

No one, to include myself, was able to fathom the reality we were about to face as we deployed to Diyala province – a complex area of Sunni, Shia and Kurd, that quickly became the primary battleground of the fight faced in Iraq. Reality, however, struck quickly at my base’s aid station during the first week of our deployment.

Continue reading "Veterans Day Op-Ed: A Year Ago in Diyala with the Greywolf Bde" »

Getting the Basics Right
A Discussion on Tactical Actions for Strategic Impact in Afghanistan
by Lieutenant Colonel Trent Scott and Colonel John Agoglia, Small Wars Journal

Getting the Basics Right (Full PDF Article)

This paper has been prepared by the Counterinsurgency Training Center – Afghanistan. The purpose of the paper is generate discussion and analysis on whether we are not only doing things right here in Afghanistan, but indeed whether we are doing the right things. This analysis and requisite change is essential if we are to employ additional incoming ISAF units in the most effective manner. Comments/objections/counter-arguments can be sent to trent.scott@us.army.mil or john.agoglia@us.army.mil.

Events in Afghanistan are not going according to plan. There is a growing perception among local Afghans and within the international community that the insurgency in Afghanistan is growing stronger and more influential by the day. A spate of recent Western media reporting decrying the killing of innocent Afghans and Pakistanis as a result of the alleged over-judicious use of ISAF/OEF-controlled air power, the very public death of nine US soldiers in eastern Afghanistan followed almost immediately by the killing of just under a dozen French soldiers in central Afghanistan, and the widespread public belief that the central Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) under Hamid Karzai is institutionally corrupt, have contributed to the groundswell of local and international voices calling for a radical change to the way things are currently done in Afghanistan. Change is required, it must begin at the tactical level, and it needs to be led by ISAF. This is our war just as much as it is the Afghan’s war.

Although there is much to do at the strategic level in Afghanistan, such as developing a comprehensive border strategy, eliminating corruption, developing an effective and functioning government, defining the role of the Afghan National Police (ANP) – the list goes on – it is at the tactical level, at Regional Commands (RC), Task Forces (TF), Battlegroups, Companies and Coalition mentoring teams that the most immediate and tangible change for good can be made. Tactical actions resonate throughout the local communities ISAF troops are supposed to protect and influence audiences across the world. And, because insurgency is a violent political competition, tactical actions can have significant political impact. Conducting comprehensive, best practice operations designed to defeat the insurgency from the grass roots up is imperative if ISAF is to halt the consolidation of the insurgent’s influence in rural Afghanistan, establish the legitimate rule of law, and contribute to the development of a stable Afghanistan. Cumulative success at the tactical level will provide time and space – literally and figuratively – for the key stakeholders at the strategic level to make the necessary institutional changes required to ensure long term stability.

Getting the Basics Right (Full PDF Article)

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You know how we feel here at SWJ - looks like the President-Elect might feel the same way. Moreover, and while not written in stone, Mr. Gates may just well add one more year on that countdown watch he keeps in his pocket. From Yochi Dreazen at the Wall Street Journal:

President-elect Barack Obama is leaning toward asking Defense Secretary Robert Gates to remain in his position for at least a year, according to two Obama advisers. A senior Pentagon official said Mr. Gates would likely accept the offer if it is made.

No final decision has been made, and Obama aides said other people are also under serious consideration for the defense post, one of the most highly coveted in any new cabinet. Several prominent Democrats, including former Clinton Navy Secretary Richard Danzig and former Clinton Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre, are also being considered.

The decision on retaining Mr. Gates will be the clearest indication to date of the incoming administration's thinking about Iraq and Afghanistan...

More at The Wall Street Journal. Now, what's this purple thing you are talking about Spencer? Also see Spencer's Another Year’s Worth Of Gates?

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Colonel David Gurney (USMC Ret.), Editor of Joint Force Quarterly and Director of National Defense University Press, has been closely following the debate between John Nagl and Gian Gentile and our guest commentators here on Small Wars Journal. For SWJ newcomers or the uninitiated - this debate has centered on the kinds of threats the U.S. will face in the period ahead and how U.S. ground forces should prepare for those threats.

Colonel Gurney has kindly – and we greatly appreciate this – granted SWJ permission to post a Nagl-Gentile “point-counterpoint” that will appear in the January 2009 issue of JFQ.

Without further ado here it is:

POINT: Let’s Win the Wars We’re In by John Nagl

A stunning if predictable development in the military community over the past 2 years has been the backlash against the promulgation of counterinsurgency learning in the midst of the ongoing campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. These wars have spurred long-overdue changes in the way the U.S. military prepares for and prioritizes irregular warfare. These changes are hard-won: they have been achieved only after years of wartime trials and tribulations that have cost the United States dearly in money, materiel, and the lives of its courageous Service-members.

Yet despite the relatively tentative nature of such changes, there are already those who predict grim strategic outcomes for America if its military, particularly the Army, continues the process of adaptation. Gian Gentile, the vocal Army critic of counterinsurgency adaptation, has written that a “hyper-emphasis on counterinsurgency puts the American Army in a perilous condition. Its ability to fight wars consisting of head-on battles using tanks and mechanized infantry is in danger of atrophy.” He is not alone in his views. Three brigade commanders in the Iraq War wrote a white paper warning about the degradation of seldom used field artillery, declaring that the Army is “mortgaging [its] ability to fight the next war” by neglecting the requirements for combined arms operations. The Army Secretary, Pete Geren, and Chief of Staff, General George Casey, both assert that the Army is “out of balance” in part because of “a focus on training for counterinsurgency operations to the exclusion of other capabilities.” Prominent civilian thinkers in the academic community have presented similar arguments. With such dire warnings, one might forget that there’s a war on right now...

Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl, USA (Ret.), is a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security.

COUNTERPOINT: Let’s Build an Army to Win All Wars by Gian Gentile

The U.S. Army officer corps has not seriously debated the content of the many doctrinal field manuals (FM) published over the past 2 years (for example, FM 3–24, Counterinsurgency, FM 3–0, Operations, and FM 3–07, Stability Operations and Support Operations). Though these manuals have been successfully pushed through the bureaucratic lines of the Army’s senior leadership, few other officers raised questions about the wisdom of employing American military power to build nations where none exist or where an American military presence is not wanted. Instead, the Army has been steamrolled by a process that proposes its use as an instrument of nationbuilding in the most unstable parts of the world. Nationbuilding, rather than fighting, has become the core function of the U.S. Army.

The Army under the Petraeus Doctrine “is entering into an era in which armed conflict will be protracted, ambiguous, and continuous - with the application of force becoming a lesser part of the soldier’s repertoire.” The implication of this doctrine is that the Army should be transformed into a light infantry-based constabulary force designed to police the world’s endless numbers of unstable areas. The concept rests on the assumption that the much- touted “surge” in Iraq was a successful feat of arms, an assertion that despite the claims of punditry supporters in the press has yet to be proven. The war in Iraq is not yet over...

Colonel Gian P. Gentile, USA, is Director of the Military History Program at the United States Military Academy.

Discuss at Small Wars Council

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Nagl and Gentile are Both Right
So What Do We Do Now?
by Robert Haddick, Small Wars Journal Op-Ed

Nagl and Gentile are Both Right (Full PDF Article)

Small Wars Journal readers are no doubt familiar with the debate between John Nagl and Gian Gentile about the kinds of threats the U.S. will face in the period ahead and how U.S. ground forces should prepare for those threats. (See Shawn Brimley’s excellent summary of the argument for a refresher.)

I have concluded that both men are right; their arguments are not mutually exclusive. But if both men are right, how should the U.S. organize, train, and employ its ground forces?

The purpose of this paper is to explain how to succeed against irregular adversaries, while restoring a more credible deterrence against conventional high-intensity threats.

Main Points

1. The Long War, characterized by persistent tribal and ethnic conflicts, is a reality. Some of these conflicts will threaten U.S. interests. John Nagl is correct when he argues that the U.S. needs military forces that are specially adapted for success in persistent irregular warfare.

2. But Gian Gentile is also right – the U.S. has an interest in maintaining its military resource commitment low and its strategic flexibility high. The U.S. should not drain away its limited endurance, prestige, and resources on open-ended medium-intensity engagements in the Islamic world or anywhere else.

3. The answer is to create Nagl’s Combat Advisor Corps and use it to for Phase 0 and 1 operations – prevention, shaping, and deterrence. The more attention the U.S. gives to Phase 0-1 operations, the fewer Phase 2-4 operations America’s general purpose forces will have to fight.

4. Making a greater commitment to Phase 0-1 operations will allow the U.S. to seize the initiative in the irregular warfare domain, control US operational tempo, and regulate U.S. military resource usage.

5. Advisor Corps Phase 0-1 operations are an economy-of-force mission. When successful, they will allow the rest of the U.S. military, including the large majority of U.S. ground combat power, to prepare for major combat contingencies, thus enhancing strategic deterrence.

6. A professional and well-trained Advisor Corps will also have the mission of establishing relationships with sub-national ethnic and tribal groupings. These relationships will provide U.S. decision-makers with greater flexibility when dealing with future irregular conflicts.

Nagl and Gentile are Both Right (Full PDF Article)

Discuss at Small Wars Council

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Colonel David Gurney (USMC Ret.), Editor of Joint Force Quarterly and Director of National Defense University Press, when not closely following the debate between John Nagl and Gian Gentile, seeks out the best and brightest for their views on the potential threats we may face in the not so distant future – and of course any such search leads to Frank Hoffman.

Colonel Gurney has, again, kindly – and we, again, greatly appreciate this – granted SWJ permission to post Frank's Hybrid Warfare and Challenges that will appear in the January 2009 issue of JFQ.

The U.S. military faces an era of enormous complexity. This complexity has been extended by globalization, the proliferation of advanced technology, violent transnational extremists, and resurgent powers. America’s vaunted military might stand atop all others but is tested in many ways. Trying to understand the possible perturbations the future poses to our interests is a daunting challenge. But, as usual, a familiarity with history is our best aid to interpretation. In particular, that great and timeless illuminator of conflict, chance, and human nature Thucydides—is as relevant and revealing as ever.

In his classic history, Thucydides detailed the savage 27-year conflict between Sparta and Athens. Sparta was the overwhelming land power of its day, and its hoplites were drilled to perfection. The Athenians, led by Pericles, were the supreme maritime power, supported by a walled capital, a fleet of powerful triremes, and tributary allies. The Spartan leader, Archidamius, warned his kinsmen about Athens’ relative power, but the Spartans and their supporters would not heed their king. In 431 BCE, the Spartans marched through Attica and ravaged the Athenian country estates and surrounding farms. They encamped and awaited the Athenian heralds and army for what they hoped would be a decisive battle and a short war.

The scarlet-clad Spartans learned the first lesson of military history—the enemy gets a vote. The Athenians elected to remain behind their walls and fight a protracted campaign that played to their strengths and worked against their enemies. Thucydides’ ponderous tome on the carnage of the Peloponnesian War is an extended history of the operational adaptation of each side as they strove to gain a sustainable advantage over their enemy. These key lessons are, as he intended, a valuable “possession for all time.”

In the midst of an ongoing inter-Service roles and missions review, and an upcoming defense review, these lessons need to be underlined. As we begin to debate the scale and shape of the Armed Forces, an acute appreciation of history’s hard-earned lessons will remain useful. Tomorrow’s enemies will still get a vote, and they will remain as cunning and elusive as today’s foes. They may be more lethal and more implacable. We should plan accordingly.

One should normally eschew simplistic metanarratives, especially in dynamic and nonlinear times. However, the evolving character of conflict that we currently face is best characterized by convergence. This includes the convergence of the physical and psychological, the kinetic and nonkinetic, and combatants and noncombatants. So, too, we see the convergence of military force and the interagency community, of states and nonstate actors, and of the capabilities they are armed with. Of greatest relevance are the converging modes of war. What once might have been distinct operational types or categorizations among terrorism and conventional, criminal, and irregular warfare have less utility today.

Lieutenant Colonel Frank G. Hoffman, USMCR (Ret.), is a retired Marine infantryman who serves as a research fellow in the Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command.. He is also a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Phila, PA.

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How to Win in Afghanistan - Michael O'Hanlon, Wall Street Journal opinion

The war in Afghanistan is not going well, and the critical problem is the same one that dogged our efforts in Iraq for years: grossly inadequate troop levels. Western troop totals there have just inched over 60,000, while Afghan security forces total some 140,000. Let's put this into perspective: We are trying to do with 200,000 personnel what it took 700,000 soldiers and police (plus 100,000 "volunteers") to accomplish in Iraq. But Afghanistan is even larger than Iraq, and more populous.

President-elect Barack Obama has wisely promised an increase in US forces for Afghanistan. But his proposed minisurge of perhaps 15,000 more troops, on top of the 30,000 Americans and 30,000 NATO personnel now there, will not suffice as a strategy. More is needed.

To be sure, it is not all about numbers. As Gen. David Petraeus has already underscored, Afghanistan is not Iraq, and what worked in one place may not succeed in another. Among other things, the Pakistan sanctuary enjoyed by Taliban fighters, as well as partisans supporting Jalaluddin Haqqani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and other warlords, complicates the Afghan situation enormously. That said, basic principles of counterinsurgency and stabilization do have a general applicability across missions. The size of security forces always matters.

More at The Wall Street Journal.

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Kilcullen on Afghanistan: It's Still Winnable, But Only Just - George Packer, The New Yorker's Interesting Times

I wrote about David Kilcullen two years ago, in a piece called Knowing the Enemy. Few experts understand counterinsurgency and counterterrorism better than this former Australian army officer and anthropology Ph.D, who has advised the American, British, and Australian governments, was one of General Petraeus’s strategic whizzes at the start of the surge, in early 2007, and writes so well that you’d never imagine he’s spent his whole career in government, the military, and academia. Kilcullen is now a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, which has provided Obama with foreign-policy advisers and advice.

This week, Kilcullen agreed to do an e-mail Q. & A. on Afghanistan and Pakistan, where he’s spent a lot of time, and where the most pressing foreign crisis awaits the new Administration. Though Kilcullen is still an adviser to the State Department, he emphasized that his views are his own. And they are characteristically blunt...

Read the Q&A at The New Yorker.

Also - Dave will be a guest of CNN this Sunday (1 PM ET) on Fareed Zakaria's show GPS - the subject - counterinsurgency in Afghanistan.

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More comments came in by email on the Rosen Affair Roundup from two weeks ago, which summarized some of the reactions to the SWJ commentaries An American Journalist by Bing West and A Personal Problem with Nir Rosen’s Dance With the Devil by Dave Dilegge on Nir Rosen’s recent article in Rolling Stone.  This short exchange in particular adds some non-armchair perspective from a rolling stone with no moss on it (ouch, sorry):  Robert Young Pelton of Come Back Alive. 

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I noticed you did a round up of hate articles on Rosen.  There needs to be a little context here. The taliban don't do "embeds", the term was deliberately used by Nir or his editor at Rolling Stone to mirror the U.S. militaries management of media. Secondly the article was printed in Rolling Stone which deliberately chose the timing and the focus of the piece just before the elections. Finally Nir did not do anything with the "taliban" since its a generic term with Big T and Little T and myriads of small groups claiming allegiance. As someone who has been in 36 wars but just did my first "embed" with the DoD in Bagram, I have to laugh at the comparison. Embedding is a legal contract between a journo and a sponsoring organization that covers accreditation, safety, censorship, transportation etc etc. No such think exists or has existed with any of the insurgent, terrorist or rebel groups I have covered and it does not exist with the "taliban.”

Nir Rosen is a good journalist but his hatred of anything USG is sad. Scrape off the hate and you have a brave inquiring mind hustled by left wing agenda media.

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Concerning George Packer's Kilcullen on Afghanistan: It's Still Winnable, But Only Just at The New Yorker's Interesting Times - Richard Fernandez at Belmont Club sums up the dilemma we find ourselves in concerning Afghanistan and The Long War.

The bottom line here is that the War on Terror is far from over. Whether we are, as Churchill once said, not at the beginning of the end, but at least at the end of the beginning ultimately depends on whether there is a consensus in the West that can sustain the long campaign that Kilcullen describes. The limp response from NATO and the desire for quick fixes suggests that while the road to ultimate victory may be known, we may not want to go there. Where we will go on the road of quick fixes is another story.

More at Belmont Club.

And from Max Boot at Commentary's Contentions - Kilcullen on Afghanistan.

He also pours some cold water on the dream of negotiating with an undefeated Taliban - that “is totally not in the cards,” as he puts it. As an alternative he suggests “community engagement” to win over local areas that are “tacitly supporting the Taliban by default (because of lack of an alternative).”

Read, as they say, the whole thing.

More at Contentions.

Also - Dave Kilcullen will be a guest of CNN this Sunday (1 PM ET) on Fareed Zakaria's show GPS - the subject - counterinsurgency in Afghanistan.

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How Should the U.S. Execute a Surge in Afghanistan?
by Lieutenant Colonel Robert A. Downey, Lieutenant Colonel Lee K. Grubbs, Commander Brian J. Malloy and Lieutenant Colonel Craig R. Wonson, Small Wars Journal

How Should the U.S. Execute a Surge in Afghanistan? (Full PDF Article)

In the fall of 2006, the security situation in Iraq had deteriorated to a level worse than at any other period during the previous three years of U.S. occupation. Violence was on the rise and attacks by insurgents continued to increase even after the top Al Qaeda leader in Iraq, Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, was killed by U.S. forces. Calls for a drawdown of U.S. troops gained considerable support in Washington as policymakers questioned whether long-term stability in Iraq was achievable or if continued U.S. presence would merely add to the growing number of casualties. Reinforcing the perception that U.S. forces were not making sufficient gains was the release of a Marine Corps intelligence report stating that the struggle against Sunni insurgents in Al Anbar Province could not be won militarily.

U.S. military commanders concluded that the best way to improve the security situation in Iraq was to adopt a more proactive “clear-hold-build” strategy supported by a significant increase in the number of ground combat units. This increase in forces, often referred to simply as “the surge”, introduced five additional combat brigades into Iraq that provided the means to wrest the initiative from the enemy. It allowed U.S. forces to simultaneously conduct large-scale operations to clear enemy safe havens, train Iraqi security forces, and disrupt insurgent lines of communication without having to leave key urban areas unprotected. In less than a year, the surge helped reduce the number of enemy attacks, increased the support of the Iraqi people, improved the security situation throughout the country, and all but defeated the insurgency.

The security situation in Afghanistan has steadily deteriorated since 2006 largely due to the lack of forces required to execute an effective counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy. As the U.S. struggles to find a viable solution to this problem, calls for an Iraq-type surge of forces to help stabilize security and set conditions for political and economic improvement in Afghanistan have increased. President Bush and Defense Secretary Robert Gates have both acknowledged that additional forces are needed in Afghanistan but have not specifically outlined how many or what type. Although the goal of executing a surge in Afghanistan would be similar in nature to that of Iraq, the challenges presented by a larger, rural-based population with unique tribal dynamics, a harsher geography, and an enemy operating from bases outside the country will require a different focus and force structure.

How Should the U.S. Execute a Surge in Afghanistan? (Full PDF Article)

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For Nation at War, Gates Seeks Smooth Transition - Ann Scott Tyson, Washington Post

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates is approaching the presidential transition unlike any of his predecessors.

He has ordered hundreds of political appointees at the Pentagon canvassed to see whether they wish to stay on in the new administration, has streamlined policy briefings and has set up suites for President-elect Barack Obama's transition team just down the hall from his own E-ring office.

Gates's efforts to ensure a smooth changeover during the first wartime presidential transition in 40 years mark a consensus-oriented style that has won him strong support inside and outside the Pentagon.

More at The Washington Post.

A Military for a Dangerous New World - New York Times editorial

As president, Barack Obama will face the most daunting and complicated national security challenges in more than a generation - and he will inherit a military that is critically ill-equipped for the task.

Troops and equipment are so overtaxed by President Bush’s disastrous Iraq war that the Pentagon does not have enough of either for the fight in Afghanistan, the war on terror’s front line, let alone to confront the next threats.

This is intolerable, especially when the Pentagon’s budget, including spending on the two wars, reached $685 billion in 2008. That is an increase of 85 percent in real dollars since 2000 and nearly equal to all of the rest of the world’s defense budgets combined. It is also the highest level in real dollars since World War II.

To protect the nation, the Obama administration will have to rebuild and significantly reshape the military. We do not minimize the difficulty of this task. Even if money were limitless, planning is extraordinarily difficult in a world with no single enemy and many dangers.

More at The New York Times.

Unsettling Times for Jihadists - David Ignatius, Washington Post opinion

Let's try for a moment to read the mind of an al-Qaeda operative in the remote mountains of Waziristan as he listens to the news on the radio. His worldview has been roiled recently by two events -- one confounding his image of the West and the other confirming it.

The upsetting news for our imaginary jihadist is the election of Barack Obama as president of the United States. This wasn't supposed to happen, in al-Qaeda's playbook. Its aim was to draw the "far enemy" (meaning America) ever deeper onto the battlefields of Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Instead, the jihadists must cope with a president-elect who promises to get out of Iraq and whose advisers are talking about negotiating with the Taliban. And to top it off, the guy's middle name is Hussein.

Before the election, the radical Sheik Yusuf al-Qaradhawi even issued a fatwa supporting John McCain: "Personally, I would prefer for the Republican candidate, McCain, to be elected. This is because I prefer the obvious enemy who does not hypocritically [conceal] his hostility toward you . . . to the enemy who wears a mask [of friendliness]."

More at The Washington Post.

Continue reading "National Security and The Long War" »

Colonel David Gurney (USMC Ret.), Editor of Joint Force Quarterly and Director of National Defense University Press, has again kindly permitted SWJ to post an item that will appear in the January 2009 issue of JFQ.

Colonel Gurney and Dr. Jeffrey D. Smotherman of Joint Force Quarterly interviewed Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army General George Casey at his Pentagon office – get an early read of this interview here at SWJ.

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Obama Dips Into Think Tank For Talent - Yochi Dreazen, Wall Street Journal

The Center for a New American Security, a small think tank here with generally middle-of-the-road policy views, is rapidly emerging as a top farm team for the incoming Obama administration.

When President-elect Barack Obama released a roster of his transition advisers last week, many of the national-security appointments came from the ranks of the center, which was founded by a pair of former Clinton administration officials in February 2007.

The think tank's central role in the transition effort suggests that its positions -- which include rejecting a fixed timeline for a withdrawal from Iraq -- will get a warm reception within the new administration.

Michele Flournoy, who co-founded the center with Kurt Campbell, a former Clinton National Security Council and Pentagon official, now serves as its president. She is one of two top members of Mr. Obama's defense transition team and is likely to be offered a high-ranking position at the Pentagon. Some Obama advisers say she could eventually be tapped as the nation's first female defense secretary...

Much more at The Wall Street Journal.

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Danger Room Debrief: Gang Threat Could Top Al Qaeda, Mr. President-Elect by Noah Shachtman at Wired Magazine's Danger Room

... Today we hear from John P. Sullivan, the co-founder of the Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning Group. He's a lieutenant with the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, focusing on emerging threats. Sullivan co-edited Countering Terrorism and WMD: Creating a Global Counter-Terrorism Network.

While the public and media are occupied with wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the potential conflict with Iran, the downward spiral in Pakistan, and a global economic meltdown, a new, rapidly-evolving danger - narco-cartels and gangs - has been developing in Mexico and Latin America. And it has the potential to trump global terrorism as a threat to the United States...

Much more at Danger Room.

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Here There Bee (More) Pirates… and Might the Obama Administration Take Them Out? By Kenneth Anderson at Opinio Juris

Somali pirates strike again, this time hijacking a Saudi-owned tanker off the coast of Kenya. The running stand off with the hijacked ship carrying arms and a Ukrainian crew continues; Russia announces that it repelled an attack on a different Saudi vessel...

Might piracy be a relatively easy place for the Obama administration to demonstrate its approach to use of force, multilateralism, and international law? No use of force question is ever truly easy - law of unintended consequences always in effect - but clearly this is a rising issue, and one in which the vessels of many nations have been attacked and continue at risk....

Much more at Opinio Juris - Kenneth poses some good questions at this post and is seeking those with operational experience to comment.

Continue reading "Here There Bee (More) Pirates..." »

Talking With the Taliban by Paul McLeary at Aviation Week's Ares

There’s been a lot of talk lately about opening negotiations with the Taliban—or at least trying to pull in the “reconcilables” while continuing to kill the “unreconcilables”—which has created a lot of back and forth in hotbeds for debate about counterinsurgency tactics and procedures, like the Small Wars Journal and Abu Muquwama blogs...

I recently spoke with Nathaniel Fick, a former Marine officer who served in Iraq and Afghanistan and later taught at the counterinsurgency school in Kabul, and who is currently a Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, who thinks that negotiating with the Taliban right now is a bad idea. “If we open negotiations with the Taliban right now, we will be doing so from a position of weakness,” he says. “The trick for the next administration is to take the tactical and operational and strategic steps to get us into a position of strength where negotiation is an option.”

John Nagl, a former army Lieutenant Colonel also at the Center for a New American Security, told me that in the near term, what he sees as most crucial for finding a solution to the Afghan mess is the need for “confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan” that could be very useful in allowing Pakistan to focus more exclusively “on the Taliban insurgency in its midst and the continuing problem of al Qaeda. None of these things by itself is going to turn the tide. A combination of all of them with additional resources has the potential to be enormously helpful.”...

Much more at Ares.

Continue reading "Talking With the Taliban" »

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, released his guidance for 2008-2009 on 17 November.

S. Dawn Casey of Talk Radio News Service on a recent press briefing by Admiral Mullen:

This is the first administration transition during wartime in forty years, and traditionally, a crisis will occur during that period, said Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, during a press briefing at the Pentagon.

Mullen said he believes it’s critical to pursue all the issues in the CJCS Guidance memorandum, which includes defending vital National interests in the broader Middle East; Resetting, Reconstituting, and Revitalizing our Forces; and properly balancing our global strategic risk. In addition to these issues, he said, there is a whole range of other global concerns such as tensions in Eurasia and Africa, and the impact of the economic crisis.

Excerpts from an e-mail by Admiral Mullen to members of the Joint Staff follow.

My top three priorities have remained the same:

1) Defend our Vital National Interests in the Broader Middle East.
2) Reset, Reconstitute and Revitalize our Armed Forces.
3) Properly Balanced Global Strategic Risk.

We must also prepare for the arrival of a new Commander-in-Chief. President-elect Obama is forming a transition team to prepare for his leadership of the Defense Department. As I said to you in my transition guidance, I expect us all to support his team to the very best of our ability - staying responsive to their requests for information, while at the same time executing faithfully the policies of this administration.

Mullen Issues Guidance Listing Priorities for Joint Staff - Jim Garamone, American Forces Press Service

Dealing with the greater Middle East, avoiding the militarization of U.S. foreign policy, resetting the forces and speeding up the Joint Staff are among the priorities the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has set for the coming year.

Navy Adm. Mike Mullen issued his guidance for the coming year yesterday. Some of the guidance has not changed since last year, when Mullen first took office, some has been fine-tuned after the experiences of the past year, and some new items have made the list.

The chairman said he issued the guidance to give the 1,500 members of the Joint Staff the path ahead and to prioritize the strategic objectives for the future...

Continue reading "CJCS Guidance for 2008-2009" »

The Autumn 2008 issue of the US Army War College’s Parameters is posted.

Parameters, a refereed journal of ideas and issues, provides a forum for the expression of mature thought on the art and science of land warfare, joint and combined matters, national and international security affairs, military strategy, military leadership and management, military history, ethics, and other topics of significant and current interest to the US Army and Department of Defense.

Here is the line-up:

In This Issue - Parameters Editors

Tying US Defense Spending to GDP: Bad Logic, Bad Policy by Travis Sharp

As the war in Iraq drags into its sixth year and cumulative spending approved by the Congress for the “global war on terrorism” surpasses $850 billion, both the American public and security experts are becoming increasingly concerned about the present and future direction of US defense spending. One proposal under consideration is to allocate the defense budget each year as a specific percentage of America’s gross domestic product (GDP). Advocates of this approach typically recommend pegging “base” Department of Defense (DOD) spending, which excludes both supplemental appropriations for ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and Department of Energy-administered nuclear weapons activities, at four percent of GDP.

USJFCOM Commander’s Guidance for Effects-based Operations by James N. Mattis

Herein are my thoughts and commander’s guidance regarding effects-based operations (EBO). This article is designed to provide the US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) staff with clear guidance and a new direction on how EBO will be addressed in joint doctrine and used in joint training, concept development, and experimentation. I am convinced that the various interpretations of EBO have caused confusion throughout the joint force and among our multinational partners that we must correct. It is my view that EBO has been misapplied and overextended to the point that it actually hinders rather than helps joint operations.

Effects-based Operations: More Important Than Ever by Tomislav Z. Ruby

Whether effects-based operations (EBO) and the effects-based approach to planning have led to negative warfighting results is a topic well worth our collective time and study. In fact, it is a healthy activity of any defense institution to question and evaluate its doctrine, policy, and procedures. The current debate on EBO brought about by General James N. Mattis’s memorandum to US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) directing the elimination of the term from the command’s vocabulary has not put the issue to rest. Quite to the contrary, the Mattis memo reinvigorated the debate, and this article aims at being part of that debate. Effects-based operations are not dead. No one individual can kill a concept, and this concept has staying power. When the underlying rationale for General Mattis’s decision is analyzed, one can see that EBO as a concept for planning will be around for some time.

The Next Wave of Nuclear Proliferation by Nader Elhefnawy

In recent years record oil prices, long-term concerns about fossil fuel supplies (particularly oil), and worries about the contributions of fossil fuels to the accumulation of greenhouse gases such as carbon and methane have helped revive interest in nuclear energy production. Indeed, it has become commonplace to advocate renewed investment in nuclear energy production in the United States. There has been, however, little consideration as to what a global turn to nuclear energy on an enlarged scale would actually entail, let alone the security implications of such.

A Concert-Balance Strategy for a Multipolar World by Michael Lind

The United States is a superpower in search of a strategy. Following the end of the Cold War, no new grand strategy has won the bipartisan support that underpinned America’s strategy of containment from President Truman to President Reagan. Enthusiastic promoters of globalization occasionally argue that international trade will be a panacea for conflict, at least among developed nations. The neoconservative vision of unilateral US global hegemony always lacked adequate military forces and funding to realize its ambitious goals. Now, in the aftermath of the Iraq War, the hegemony strategy also lacks public support. Most critics of the hegemony strategy, however, have failed to propose a credible alternative capable of guiding US national security.

Contractors: The New Element of Military Force Structure by Mark Cancian

Mercenaries,” “merchants of death,” “coalition of the billing,” “a national disgrace” all have been used to describe the use of contractors in war. The extensive use of contractors on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan has engendered strong emotion and calls for change. An ever-expanding literature and much larger volume of opinion pieces have led the discussion, most expressing shock and disappointment that such a situation has occurred. Unfortunately, little of this literature is useful to planners trying to design future forces in a world characterized by extensive commitments and limited manpower. The purpose of this article is to examine what battlefield contractors actually do, consider how we got to the situation we are in today, and provide force planners with some useful insight regarding the future.

Why Contractor Fatalities Matter by Steven L. Schooner

The true US death toll in Iraq and Afghanistan recently reached the 6,000 threshold. But that is not what the media are reporting and as a result, the public remains generally unaware. At the end of July 2008, mainstream media reported that 4,673 service members have died in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. Counting only military fatalities, however, understates the human cost of America’s engagements in these regions by nearly a fourth. On the modern, outsourced battlefield, contractors are sustaining injuries and fatalities in increasing numbers. Specifically, the losses chronicled in The Washington Post’s ongoing “Faces of the Fallen” series fail to recognize the little-known fact that, as of 30 June 2008, more than 1,350 civilian contractor personnel had died in Iraq and Afghanistan in support of US military and political operations. Another 29,000 contractors have been injured; more than 8,300 seriously. Yet contractor fatalities (and injuries) remain generally outside the public’s consciousness.

Global Counterinsurgency: Strategic Clarity for the Long War by Daniel S. Roper

Though policy initiatives since the attacks of 11 September 2001 have positively influenced certain agencies and processes within the US government in their efforts to secure America, some steps have worked at cross purposes and limited the nation’s effectiveness in countering the threats it faces. One entrenched policy that inhibits clear analysis and understanding of the threat is the continued framing of this global struggle as a “War on Terrorism” (WOT). Words have consequences in shaping understanding and framing potential courses of action. The broad use and narrow connotations of the term WOT have cultivated a widespread, erroneous intellectual paradigm for dealing with both terrorism and insurgencies. This false strategy conflates a single tactic into the overall characteristic of a diverse number of enemy organizations, who exercise terrorism as just one tool. Continuing to frame the conflict as a war against terrorism alone serves to mischaracterize the enemy, obscures an understanding of the techniques they employ, distorts the challenges posed, and impedes the development and implementation of a strategy for countering their impact.

Time for a New Strategy by William McDonough

On 10 January 2007, during an address to the nation, President George W. Bush announced the United States’ third strategy to achieve several goals in Iraq. The goals were to improve security conditions; develop Iraqi Security Forces’ capabilities and transfer security responsibilities to the Government of Iraq (GoI); assist GoI efforts to draft, enact, and implement key legislative initiatives; assist full expenditure of budgets; and help the GoI provide essential services to its people. This strategy, known as The New Way Forward or more commonly as the Surge Strategy, established a 12- to 18-month timeframe to achieve these objectives. The strategy reiterated the Administration’s long-term goal of a unified, federal, and democratic Iraq that could govern, defend, and sustain itself, and be an ally in the war on terrorism.

Commentary and Reply

Review Essay

Book Reviews

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Panel Foresees Lesser US Role - Nicholas Kralev, Washington Times

The top US intelligence panel this week is expected to issue a snapshot of the world in 2025, in a report that predicts fading American economic and military dominance and warns of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East.

The predictions come from the National Intelligence Council (NIC), part of Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell's office.

The NIC report, a draft copy of which is titled "Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World," is slated for release as early as Thursday.

The report also predicts "a unified Korea" is likely by then, and that China will be the world's second-largest economy and a major military power.

"The United States will remain the single most powerful country, although less dominant," according to a "working draft" of the document obtained by The Washington Times. "Shrinking economic and military capabilities may force the US into a difficult set of tradeoffs between domestic and foreign-policy priorities."

More at The Washington Times.

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I was struck during my recent visit to Afghanistan by an impressive understanding of counterinsurgency principles in the International Security Assistance Force and at subordinate headquarters (See In Afghanistan, 'New Spirit' To Confront The Taliban at NPR).

At the request of the small group of think-tankers I was travelling with, General David McKiernan's headquarters has agreed to release an unclassified version of the ISAF Campaign plan specifically for posting on Small Wars Journal. Things I find particularly interesting in this plan include the upfront acknowledgement that this is a counterinsurgency (vice peacekeeping) campaign (obvious to us, but hugely important in the NATO context); the addition of "Shaping Operations" to the classic "Clear, Hold, Build" COIN methodology; an acknowledgment that in this still critically under-resourced theater, ISAF cannot be strong everywhere and must therefore prioritize areas to clear and hold (a point Dave Kilcullen made well on Sunday with Fareed Zakaria); and the overt emphasis on buildling Afghan governance capability and capacity as the objective of all of our operations.

Continue reading "ISAF Campaign Plan Summary" »

CNAS Press Release - 19 November 2008 - David Kilcullen Joins CNAS as a Senior Fellow.

The Center for a New American Security (CNAS) is pleased to officially announce that Dr. David Kilcullen has joined CNAS as a senior fellow. Kilcullen was a non-resident senior fellow with CNAS for more than a year and collaborated with CNAS on Iraq and Afghanistan reports, as well as violent extremism and grand strategy Solarium projects in 2007 and 2008.

Kilcullen's position as the Special Advisor for Counterinsurgency to the Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, will conclude in December 2008, at which time he will also become a partner at the Crumpton Group, a Washington, D.C.-based strategic advisory firm...

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20 November

World Grapples with Pirate Problem - Peter Spiegel and Henry Chu, Los Angeles Times

The Saudis chose to negotiate. The Indian navy opened fire. The US Navy said shipping companies should do more to protect their vessels, and the ship owners said governments should guard the high seas.

But everyone wants the barely functioning government of Somalia to control the pirates who sail from its ports to seize the cargo ships and tankers that ply past.

Mightily armed, but slightly baffled, 21st century civilization appears to have no collective answer to piracy, a scourge once considered banished into history.

More at The Los Angeles Times.

Continue on for more on the piracy problem off the Horn of Africa...

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America's Best Leaders: US Junior Officers, Military - Anna Mulrine, US News and World Report

They have been called upon to serve in bloody and complicated wars on two fronts, many for more than half of their short careers. As a result, lieutenants and captains often have more combat experience than the generals who command them. "They are wise beyond their years," Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said about junior officers in an address this year to the Army War College. "We owe them our attention and our time." He urged their superiors to listen to them and called upon junior officers to question their superiors as well.

And they have. Indeed, the experience of junior officers has occasionally created strained relationships with senior leadership. Many have been frustrated by what they view as a lack of accountability at the highest levels of leadership. "It has created some tension," says Nathaniel Fick, author of One Bullet Away: the Making of a Marine Officer and a platoon leader in Iraq in the spring of 2003. "A private who loses a rifle gets into more trouble than a general who loses a war."

Much more at US News and World Report.

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A review of:

The Devil We Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower

by Robert Baer.  Published by Crown, 2008.

Reviewed by:

Thomas (Tom) P. Odom

LTC US Army (ret)

Author, Journey Into Darkness: Genocide In Rwanda

A good friend of mine lent me this book to read with the caution, “This will piss you off.”  I was not sure exactly what he meant by that remark but I took the book.  I liked Bob Baer’s first book and have recommended it to others.  After reading this one, Baer’s latest, I would recommend it but with some very strong cautions.  I will address those later.  For now, let me highlight its strengths...

Continue reading "Book Review - The Devil We Know" »

Brian Bennett begins The General, Time Magazine, by reviewing the former concerns about LTG Odierno's kinetic old school style as the antithesis of COIN (an opinion commonly held here):

When Ray Odierno took over the top military post in Iraq from General David Petraeus in September, there was a lot of hand-wringing among folk at defense think tanks in Washington worried that he was the wrong man for the job. They pointed to Odierno's reputation from his first tour in Iraq, in 2003, as a heavy-handed division commander who had neither a grasp of the subtleties of fighting an insurgency nor the political acumen to sell his ideas back home. Some correspondents who covered Iraq in the months after the fall of Saddam Hussein also came away with that opinion.

But rightly spends the bulk of his article discussing the remarkable outcomes from the in-stride transformation of an agile, adaptable leader.  The Anbar Awakening is not the only amazing 180 of this operation writ large, and we're glad to be on the same team as great leaders of principle, vision, and open minds.

But the doubters didn't take into account the evolution of Odierno's thinking during his second tour in Iraq, in 2006, when he helped develop the military's surge strategy--which contributed hugely to the reduction of violence in much of the country. Petraeus sold Washington on the surge, but it was Odierno who gave him something to sell. "It is clear that by late 2006, he was as important as Petraeus, if not more important, because he was the guy on the ground," says Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institution.

The success of the surge has led to a reassessment of Odierno, 54. Retired General Jack Keane, who consulted closely with Odierno on the surge in late 2006, was so impressed that he later used his powerful connections in the Administration to push for promoting Odierno to Petraeus' job. "He went through a complete metamorphosis," says Keane. "He educated himself and became the pre-eminent operational commander we have in conducting irregular warfare."...

Much more at Time.

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A Framework for Success in Iraq - Michael Gerson, Washington Post opinion

A war that once seemed likely to end in a panic of helicopters fleeing the American Embassy now seems destined to conclude as the result of a parliamentary process. A landmark status-of-forces agreement (SOFA) -- requiring the withdrawal of US combat troops from Iraqi cities by the end of June and from Iraq itself by the end of 2011 -- is headed for a final reading in the Iraqi parliament next week.

The approval of the SOFA would leave a chapter of history decorated with paradoxes. President Bush -- who once called withdrawal timelines "arbitrary" and "unacceptable" -- ends his term accepting them. President-elect Barack Obama will inherit a more peaceful Iraq because of policies he strongly opposed. And the Iraqi government -- so often criticized by Americans as weak and ineffectual -- is now asserting its sovereignty in a decisive manner, for good or ill.

More at The Washington Post.

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Keep Gates - Peggy Noonan, Wall Street Journal opinion

Reappointing Robert Gates as secretary of defense would be magnanimity with a purpose, a show of something better than cleverness, and that is wisdom.

We are at war, in two countries. The stakes don't get much higher....

What does Mr. Gates bring to this? Two years, next month, of success, and a professional lifetime of experience and knowledge. He is a bipartisan figure of respect—truly an object of across-the-board admiration. He is not part of the old crew that got us into war and bungled it but the new crew that stabilized it and created progress. And the point is to keep him not only for continuity, which may be virtue enough in a difficult and dynamic situation, but for his particular gifts and acumen.

More at The Wall Street Journal.

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Obama’s War - Clifford May, National Review opinion

American troops in Afghanistan are fighting what will soon become Barack Obama’s war - not just because he will inherit it, but also because he has claimed it. This is “the right battlefield,” Obama has said. The war in Afghanistan “has to be won.”

How can that mission be accomplished? Extensive interviews with American military commanders, European diplomats, and Afghan officials lead to this conclusion: Although we are not currently defeating the Taliban and other belligerent groups in Afghanistan, we can prevail - if the incoming administration is prepared to fully resource a sophisticated counter-insurgency strategy similar to that implemented by General David Petraeus in Iraq.

A subtle and often misunderstood point: The war in Iraq was not turned around by “surging” more troops into the country to do more of the same. Rather, the key was transitioning to counterinsurgency - COIN - a form of warfare that requires many boots on the ground.

More at National Review.

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Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World (PDF - 33.5 MB) is the fourth unclassified report prepared by the National Intelligence Council (NIC) in recent years that takes a long-term view of the future. It offers a fresh look at how key global trends might develop over the next 15 years to influence world events. The report is not meant to be an exercise in prediction or crystal ball-gazing. Mindful that there are many possible "futures," the report offers a range of possibilities and potential discontinuities, as a way of opening our minds to developments that might otherwise be missed.

Several preliminary assessments are listed below:

1. The whole international system - as constructed following WWII - will be revolutionized. Not only will new players - Brazil, Russia, India and China - have a seat at the international high table, they will bring new stakes and rules of the game.

2. The unprecedented transfer of wealth roughly from West to East now under way will continue for the foreseeable future.

3. Unprecedented economic growth, coupled with 1.5 billion more people, will put pressure on resources - particularly energy, food, and water - raising the specter of scarcities emerging as demand outstrips supply.

4. The potential for conflict will increase owing partly to political turbulence in parts of the greater Middle East.

As with the earlier NIC efforts - such as Mapping The Global Future 2020 - the project's primary goal is to provide US policymakers with a view of how world developments could evolve, identifying opportunities and potentially negative developments that might warrant policy action. The NIC also hopes this paper stimulates a broader discussion of value to educational and policy institutions at home and abroad.

In the News:

Nuclear Arms, Scarce Resources as Seeds of Global Instability - Washington Post
NIC Expects Al Qaeda’s Appeal to Falter - New York Times
NIC: Sun Setting on the American Century - The Times
NIC Says US Influence will 'Substantially' Decline - Daily Telegraph
The Year 2025: Oil, Dollar Out; Russia, Islam In - Associated Press
US Power, Influence will Decline in Future, Report Says - CNN News
US Influence Will Fade By 2025 - CBS News
US Global Dominance 'Set to Wane' - BBC News
Intelligence Study Sees Risks in Rapid Global Power Shift - McClatchy
US Clout Down, Risks Up by 2025 - Reuters
Nuclear War Threat to Grow by 2025 - Agence France-Presse
Europe: a Hobbled Giant - Financial Times
New US Intelligence Report: A Gloomy Future - Military Watch

Continue reading "Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World" »

Lieutenant General William Caldwell (aka Frontier 6), Commanding General of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, is not the only senior military officer who has embraced blogging – just found out from the good folks at Defense Media Activity (DoD Bloggers Roundtable) that Admiral James Stavridis, Commander of U.S. Southern Command, is an active blogger too. Check out his SOUTHCOM Commander’s Blog and his recommendations on the ten books and one movie for understanding Latin America and the Caribbean.

I’m surprised we missed this blog – and we've probably missed some more - let us know of any other senior officer blogs out there on the ‘Net. Thanks.

Continue reading "Down South Blogging" »

Via e-mail and Andrew Exum at Abu Muqawama - some important weekend reading - Strategy for the Long Haul: An Army at the Crossroads by Andrew Krepinevich at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. An excerpt from the Preface follows:

The United States faces three primary existing and emerging strategic challenges that are most likely to preoccupy senior decision-makers in the coming years:

- Defeating both the Sunni Salifi-Takfiri and Shia Khomeinist brands of violent Islamist radicalism;
- Hedging against the rise of a hostile or more openly confrontational China and the potential challenge posed by authoritarian capitalist states; and
- Preparing for a world in which there are more nuclear-armed regional powers.

Addressing these specific challenges should be at the forefront of the incoming administration’s strategic calculations, particularly during the 2009 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which will help shape US defense strategy, planning, and force structure over the next twenty years.

Read the full report here and the presentation slides here.

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Colonel David Gurney (USMC Ret.), Editor of Joint Force Quarterly and Director of National Defense University Press, has again kindly permitted SWJ to post a Point - Counterpoint that will appear in the January 2009 issue of JFQ.

First up; from SWJ, this 14 August 2009 memo by General James Mattis, Commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command.

Attached are my thoughts and Commander’s guidance regarding Effects Based Operations (EBO). The paper is designed to provide the JFCOM staff with clear guidance and a new direction on how EBO will be addressed in joint doctrine and used in joint training, concept development, and experimentation. I am convinced that the various interpretations of EBO have caused confusion throughout the joint force and amongst our multinational partners that we must correct. It is my view that EBO has been misapplied and overextended to the point that it actually hinders rather than helps joint operations.

This brings us to January's JFQ Point - Counterpoint in reaction to General Mattis's memo. First, from Lieutenant General Paul K. Van Riper, USMC, (ret.) - EBO: There Was No Baby in the Bathwater.

We should not be surprised that one of our most combat-seasoned and professionally informed leaders, General James Mattis, USMC, who commands U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), recently issued a memorandum that calls for an end to the effects-based operations (EBO) nonsense that has permeated much of the American defense community for the past 6 years. Nor should we be surprised that other leaders with similar operational experience promptly applauded General Mattis’ actions. They all saw effects based operations as a vacuous concept that has slowly but surely undermined professional military thought and operational planning. One can only hope that the general’s action, coupled with a similar effort by U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command in 2007,will halt the U.S. military’s decade-and-a-half decline in conceptual thinking.

U.S. Air Force Colonels Paul M. Carpenter and William F. Andrews take issue in Effects Based Operations - Combat Proven.

The USJFCOM directive to “turn off” EBO concepts is not well advised. Although the command has vigorously pursued development of EBO concepts, over time efforts have rendered a valuable joint concept unusable by promising unattainable predictability and by linking it to the highly deterministic computer-based modeling of ONA and SoSA. Instead of pursuing a constructive approach by separating useful and proven aspects of EBO and recommending improvements, USJFCOM has prescribed the consumption of a fatal poison. General Mattis declares that “the term effects-based is fundamentally flawed... and goes against the very nature of war.”

We disagree. EBO is combat proven; it was the basis for the success of the Operation Desert Storm air campaign and Operation Allied Force. A very successful wartime concept is sound and remains an effective tool for commanders. It is valuable for commanders to better understand cause and effect - to better relate objectives to the tasks that forces perform in the operational environment. While there are problems associated with how EBO has been implemented by some organizations, they can be easily adjusted. As a military, we must understand the value of EBO, address concerns in its implementation, and establish a way ahead to gain the benefits and avoid the potential pitfalls of the concept.

The current issue of the U.S. Army War College’s Parameters also reprints the General Mattis memo in article format with a counter by Tomislav Z. Ruby entitled Effects-based Operations: More Important Than Ever.

Whether effects-based operations (EBO) and the effects-based approach to planning have led to negative warfighting results is a topic well worth our collective time and study. In fact, it is a healthy activity of any defense institution to question and evaluate its doctrine, policy, and procedures. The current debate on EBO brought about by General James N. Mattis’s memorandum to US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) directing the elimination of the term from the command’s vocabulary has not put the issue to rest. Quite to the contrary, the Mattis memo reinvigorated the debate, and this article aims at being part of that debate. Effects-based operations are not dead. No one individual can kill a concept, and this concept has staying power. When the underlying rationale for General Mattis’s decision is analyzed, one can see that EBO as a concept for planning will be around for some time.

A lively discussion concerning EBO can be found at SWJ's Small Wars Council.

Continue reading "And the EBO beat (debate) goes on..." »

Last month the US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center (COIN Center) solicited feedback concerning a statement made by General David Petraeus (Commander, US Central Command) as quoted by the New York Times:

People often ask, "What did you learn from Iraq that might be transferable to Afghanistan?" he said. "The first lesson, the first caution really, is that every situation like this is truly and absolutely unique, and has its own context and specifics and its own texture," he said.

Counterinsurgents have to understand that in as nuanced a manner as possible, and then with that kind of understanding try to craft a comprehensive approach to the problems.

The COIN Center's OPSO, Major Niel Smith, put out the challenge - We would like to ask for feedback - what lessons from Iraq are applicable to our operations in Afghanistan? - and in the October COIN Center SITREP, the Director - Colonel Daniel Roper - summarized the key points from the responses as follows:

(1) Basic COIN principles of protecting the population, connecting the government with the people and permanently isolating insurgents from the population apply in either conflict but must be adapted for local conditions.

(2) Shift emphasis from top-down (strong central government) to bottom-up (locally provided security) to leverage tribal structure in Afghanistan.

(3) Seek neither to apply directly the Anbar strategy to Afghanistan nor simply surge more forces; more troops (2–4 BCTs) are unlikely to measurably change the effort with the current strategy.

(4) Increase efforts in advisory and PRT initiatives to enhance Afghan capabilities.

(5) Put an Afghan face on all CERP. Use Jirgas to solicit needs from the local populace to bolster local government entities.

And in a note - the COIN Center continues to solicit additional feedback on the CERP issue and invites comments on a blog entry titled "Money as a tool in COIN, mission enhancer or detractor?"

Continue reading "Afghanistan: What Lessons to Apply from Iraq?" »

The Relevance of Operational Flexibility
by Colonel William T. Anderson, Small Wars Journal Book Review

The Relevance of Operational Flexibility (Full PDF Article)

Mark Ethan Grotelueschen. The AEF Way of War: The American Army and Combat in World War I. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

The newspapers today are filled with references to evolving Army doctrine in support of our national security interests. Very recently, the Army unveiled a new doctrinal publication highlighting the requirement for “nation-building” missions as well as conventional combat. This new field manual on Stability Operations comes on the heels of the groundbreaking counterinsurgency manual co-authored with the Marine Corps in 2006. Mired in Iraq, the Army jump-started its doctrine process under the leadership of forward thinkers like General David Petraeus. However, both documents have their critics arguing that the Army is headed in the wrong direction. Claiming the Army is guilty of losing focus of its “core warfighting” skills, these critics stress that the Army must be preparing for major ground combat operations. Spending too much time on non-traditional skills is, in their view, a “dangerous distraction.”

This is not the first time the Army has wrestled with doctrinal controversy. In a well-written book on the First World War, author Mark Ethan Grotelueschen addresses the competing views about the nature of war within the US Army at the dawn of the 20th Century. Although there are many books on American operations in France, they are generally memoires or unit histories, all falling short of true campaign studies that tell us why the Americans fought the way they did. Mr. Grotelueschen provides us with an extensively researched book on how the Army actually prepared for the war and how it adapted its doctrine during the war to take advantage of lessons learned. It is highly recommended.

The Relevance of Operational Flexibility (Full PDF Article)

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New York Times: It is not a stretch to say that Barack Obama faces stiffer, more vexing challenges on more fronts than any president in recent memory. In the coming weeks, the Opinion section will publish a series of Op-Ed articles by experts on the most formidable issues facing the new president. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are the subject of today’s articles.

The Little Battles We Must Win - Linda Robinson
Out of Conflict, a Partnership - Frederick Kagan
A Wartime Presidency, On Two Fronts - Anthony Cordesman
One Surge Does Not Fit All - Donald Rumsfeld
How to Leave Iraq, Intact - Peter Mansoor
Thanks, But You Can Go Now - Ahmad Chalabi
The 'Good War' Isn't Worth Fighting - Rory Stewart

Continue reading "One War, Two Fronts" »

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Counterinsurgency (COIN) Leadership Seminar. On 8 December 2008 the US Marine Corps Center for Irregular Warfare (CIW) will host a Counterinsurgency Leadership Seminar at Little Hall (Base Theater), Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia, featuring Colonel Stephen Davis (USMC), Colonel David Maxwell (USA) and Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling. This seminar is cosponsored by CIW, US Joint Forces Command Irregular Warfare Center (IWC), the US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center (COIN Center) and Small Wars Journal (SWJ).

Seminar Panel Members. Colonel Stephen Davis, USMC. Col Davis is currently the Deputy Commander of Marine Corps Special Operations Command. Previously, Col Davis commanded Regimental Combat Team 2 in Iraq. Colonel David Maxwell, USA. COL Maxwell is currently the G-3 (Operations Officer) of the US Army Special Operations Command. Previously he commanded the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines. Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling, USA. LTC Yingling is the Commander of 1st Battalion, 21st Field Artillery and is currently deployed to Iraq performing detainee operations. He has served two previous tours in Iraq and has also deployed to Bosnia and Operation Desert Storm.

Moderator. Colonel Daniel Kelly, USMC. Col Kelly is the Director of the US Marine Corps Center for Irregular Warfare. He has held a wide variety of command and staff billets and participated in numerous operations to include Operations Restore Hope / Continue Hope (Somalia), Operations Allied Force / Joint Guardian, (Kosovo) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF I and II).

COIN Leadership Seminar - Information Paper and Map

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Known Unknowns: Unconventional "Strategic Shocks" in Defense Strategy Development - Nathan P. Freier, Strategic Studies Institute

The author provides the defense policy team a clear warning against excessive adherence to past defense and national security convention. Including the insights of a number of noted scholars on the subjects of “wild cards” and “strategic surprise,” he argues that future disruptive, unconventional shocks are inevitable. Through strategic impact and potential for disruption and violence, such shocks, in spite of their nonmilitary character, will demand the focused attention of defense leadership, as well as the decisive employment of defense capabilities in response. As a consequence, the author makes a solid case for continued commitment by the Department of Defense to prudent strategic hedging against their potential occurrence.

Much more at The Strategic Studies Institute.

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Unity of Command in Afghanistan: A Forsaken Principle of War - Colonel Ian Hope, Strategic Studies Institute

This Carlisle Paper discusses the traditional importance of unity of command in American doctrine and practice from World War I until now, and how this principle has been forsaken in the evolution of military command for Afghanistan. It examines the unprecedented departure from the principle of unity of command in Afghanistan in 2006, when Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan passed control of the ground fight to the International Security Assistance Force, and operations became split between several unified or “supreme” commanders in charge of US Central Command, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and US Special Operations Command. It argues for a renewal of understanding of the importance of unity of command, and recommends that the United States revert to the application of this principle by amending the Unified Command Plan to invest one “supreme commander” with responsibility for the current Operation Enduring Freedom Joint Operations Area.

Much more at the Strategic Studies Institute.

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10 Questions for Colonel Peter Mansoor, USA (Ret.)

Reposted here in full with permission of the Consortium for Complex Operations with a hat tip to Dan Troy.

COL (Ret.) Pete Mansoor is currently the Raymond E. Mason Jr. Chair in Military History at The Ohio State University. COL Mansoor retired this past summer after more than 26 years in the United States Army. Most recently, he served as Executive Officer to General David Petraeus, then Commander MNF-I. Prior to holding that position, COL Mansoor served on a Council of Colonels that advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a new strategy for Iraq and was the founding director of the US Army/USMC Counterinsurgency Center at Fort Leavenworth, KS, where his team assisted in the final revision process of Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24.

COL Mansoor recently released Baghdad at Sunrise: A Brigade Commander's War in Iraq, a memoir of his time leading the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, in Baghdad from 2003-2004. COL Mansoor recently agreed to be interviewed by the CCO on his new book and the counterinsurgency lessons he learned during his first tour in Iraq.

Continue on for the Q&A...

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Just in from the US Army / US Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center concerning a "virtual COIN brown bag" tomorrow:

Friends of the COIN Center,

The US Army/USMC Counterinsurgency Center is pleased to host Dr. Geoff Demarest at the COIN Center Brownbag from 1200 to 1300 CST (1300 - 1400 EST) on Tuesday, November 25, 2008. Dr. Demarest will present on US Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Latin America. Those interested in attending may either come to the COIN Center at 630 McClellan Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, or view the meeting on-line. Those wishing to attend virtually should head to https://connect.dco.dod.mil/coinbrownbag and participate via Adobe Connect as a guest. Remote attendees will be able to ask questions and view the slides through the software.

Dr. Demarest’s presentation proposes a list of eight common themes, or clichés, of US COIN doctrine and offers part of the reason for their presence. He suggests that the eight are overstated, that they can misdirect, should perhaps be down-toned, and other concepts raised in relative weight. His presentation will offer as evidence current experiences from northern South America.

Geoff Demarest is the author of Property & Peace: Insurgency, Strategy and the Stature of Frauds; Geoproperty: Foreign Affairs, National Security and Property Rights; and the monograph Mapping Colombia: The Correlation Between Land Data and Strategy. He earned his PhD. from the Denver U. Graduate School of International Studies in 1989, submitting a dissertation on professionalism in the Colombian army. He earned a law degree from the Denver School of Law in 1981, and practiced law in Loveland, Colorado. He is a graduate of the Defense Language Institute, the Spanish Language Institute, the JFK Special Warfare Center, the School of the Americas and the US Army War College. While still on active duty in the Army, he served in Central America for five years, and over the past 25 years has traveled to Colombia dozens of times, as well as to other countries in the region. He is currently a Senior Analyst at the Foreign Military Studies Office here at Ft. Leavenworth.

Linked here is a read ahead for the event. Please head to http://coin.army.mil and use the “contact us” link with any questions.

v/r,

Major Niel A. Smith
Operations Officer
USA/USMC Counterinsurgency Center
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
http://coin.army.mil

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Commanding General, Combined Arms Center, Response to Small Wars Journal Blog Post, “Afghanistan, What Lessons to Apply from Iraq”

The discussion unfolding here and on the COIN Center’s blog is an important one, since the situation in Iraq continues to improve while in Afghanistan it deteriorates. As ideas of an Afghan “surge,” similar to the course of action adopted in Iraq, circulate among decision makers, the nuances of the Afghanistan situation remain particularly relevant. GEN Petraeus recently noted in a New York Times interview, “The first lesson, the first caution really, is that every situation like this is truly and absolutely unique, and has its own context and specifics and its own texture.” In light of these remarks, what are the peculiarities and strategic nuances inherent in the Afghanistan situation?

The Army Field Manual, FM 3-07, “Stability Operations,” states, “Understanding is fundamental to planning. Without understanding, commanders cannot establish the situation’s context.” Adopting a “Comprehensive Approach” that includes understanding regional dynamics is central to crafting any kind of successful Afghan strategy. Pakistan, seeking strategic depth, has systematically sought influence within Afghanistan for decades. If the Kashmir conflict was resolved and tensions reduced between India and Pakistan, the latter would no longer need to pursue the strategic depth Afghanistan could provide. Reconciling regional conflicts should be a part of any Afghan strategy.

Afghanistan does not have a tradition of a strong central government. The kind of government NATO helps Afghanistan build is of paramount importance. Perhaps a federal system with much more power vested in regional and even local entities would allow tribal structures the autonomy they have historically enjoyed. As COL Roper noted, the bottom up method of building security was one of the keys to success in Iraq. That being said, building governmental capacity is also important. Afghanistan throughout its governing structures needs the kind of mentoring PRTs can provide. The Vietnam-era CORDS program is an example of the kind of interagency cooperation and unity of effort required to build governmental capacity down to sub-district levels.

GEN Petraeus has also noted that reconciliation must become a key line of effort. The Army’s new Stability Operations doctrine emphasizes the roles that disarmament, demobilization and reintegration play in security sector reform. Again, the diverse capabilities inherent in PRTs could assist training and reforming Afghan security forces, while legal assistance might strengthen the Afghan judiciary. Long term stability will emerge only when Afghan police forces protect Afghan citizens and enforce the rule of law through a functioning Afghan court system.

Finally, developing Afghanistan’s infrastructure must remain a priority. More money is spent each month in Iraq than has been spent on Afghanistan infrastructure since 2001. The judicious use of CERP funds is a start. However, as some commentators noted in the COIN Center blog, training Afghanis in various trades is a necessary part of building Afghan capacity and enhancing employment opportunities. Human resource development is one of the main elements of capacity building, as emphasized in the Stability Operations doctrine.

Frontier 6 is Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV, Commanding General of the Combined Arms Center at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, the command that oversees the Command and General Staff College and 17 other schools, centers, and training programs located throughout the United States. The Combined Arms Center is also responsible for: development of the Army's doctrinal manuals, training of the Army's commissioned and noncommissioned officers, oversight of major collective training exercises, integration of battle command systems and concepts, and supervision of the Army's Center for the collection and dissemination of lessons learned.

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This past Saturday the New York Times ran a series of opinion pieces concerning the road ahead in Iraq and Afghanistan. One piece in particular - One Surge Does Not Fit All – by former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld – is not much in way of a critique of an anticipated “Afghanistan Surge”. Rather, it is his take on the run-up to a new Iraq population-centric counterinsurgency strategy – of which a surge in ground combat forces was a