How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa'ida by Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki of Rand.
All terrorist groups eventually end. But how do they end? The evidence since 1968 indicates that most groups have ended because (1) they joined the political process (43 percent) or (2) local police and intelligence agencies arrested or killed key members (40 percent). Military force has rarely been the primary reason for the end of terrorist groups, and few groups within this time frame have achieved victory. This has significant implications for dealing with al Qa'ida and suggests fundamentally rethinking post-9/11 US counterterrorism strategy: Policymakers need to understand where to prioritize their efforts with limited resources and attention. The authors report that religious terrorist groups take longer to eliminate than other groups and rarely achieve their objectives. The largest groups achieve their goals more often and last longer than the smallest ones do. Finally, groups from upper-income countries are more likely to be left-wing or nationalist and less likely to have religion as their motivation. The authors conclude that policing and intelligence, rather than military force, should form the backbone of US efforts against al Qa'ida. And US policymakers should end the use of the phrase “war on terrorism” since there is no battlefield solution to defeating al Qa'ida.
Comments (2)
The analysis strikes me as having a bit of a chicken and egg problem: which comes first?
I do believe that most terrorist groups ended "because (1) they joined the political process," but only after realizing they could not win militarily. It is a mistake to think the FMLN (one of their case studies) only wanted to join the political process, rather than take over the goverment. The FMLN only accepted negotitations, which were very unpopular with their U.S. supporters, when it became clear that they would not be able to seize control.
Also, while other groups ended because "(2) local police and intelligence agencies arrested or killed key members," police and intelligence agencies are only able to operate in conditions of security provided by military action, which is what occurred in Al Anbar (another of the authors' case studies).
COIN/CT is full-spectrum and inter-agency and it is no surprise that less than one decade into the conflict we are beginning to shift to the non-military side of things. But it is a-historical to say that military force has no place, however much that will make the Air Force, Navy, and certain parts of the Army very happy.
Posted by lrb![[TypeKey Profile Page]](http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/nav-commenters.gif)
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July 30, 2008 12:41 PM
I am still reading this document. However, a few trite thoughts: How many other groups (other than AQ and maybe Aum Shinrikyo) demonstrated the ability and the resolve to kill 3000+ people in one event?
How many more of those kind of events were we to endure if we had maintained the pre 9/11 law enforcement/intelligence agency paradigm in pursuit of counter terrorism?
How many terror groups went away because both the benefactor for most - the USSR - and their popular support disappeared at the same time? Another look at Che in bolivia would have been helpful.
It might also be interesting to discuss if the US would have inflicted the law enforcement environment that the Japanese et al put in place to combat these groups. My guess is that we would not do that to ourselves.
I am not sure this paper isn't just an effort (for some that didn't want to see a change, even after 9/11) to repudiate "Rumsfeld's war on terror." (If we had not gone to Iraq would we be seeing Rumsfeld as the pariah he is considered today?)
Posted by LPierson![[TypeKey Profile Page]](http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/nav-commenters.gif)
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July 31, 2008 9:44 AM