Contested Nation Building
The Challenge of Countering Insurgency in Afghanistan in 2007
by Colonel John Frewen, Small Wars Journal

Contested Nation Building (Full Article PDF)

In a military sense, 2007 was the coalition’s year in Afghanistan. The coalition defeated the Taliban tactically at every turn, forcing them to resort to indiscriminate attacks with explosives and suicide bombers — tactics which risk alienating the local population. The Taliban’s much-vaunted ‘Spring offensive’ failed to materialise and they suffered substantial losses, including the death of key leaders such as Mullah Dadullah by coalition actions. They lost freedom of action in former sanctuaries such as the Upper Garesh and Chora valleys, and had Musa Qala — a town the Taliban vowed they would never surrender — seized from them as the 2007 fighting season drew to a close. While international media reports have played up the headline-grabbing “coalition’s deadliest year”, only one side of the ledger has been considered. The increase in coalition fatalities from 191 in 2006 to 232 in 2007 also points to a heightened engagement with the enemy that has produced good results. Throughout last year the Taliban saw support from sanctuaries in Pakistan erode, and a better-trained and more capable Afghan Army played a leading role in the assault on Musa Qala. By military standards 2007 was an awful year for the Taliban. Yet their resolve and influence persists, and more must be done through non-military means to achieve peace for Afghanistan.

Colonel John Frewen is a career infantryman who has served in 1 RAR, 2 RAR and the School of Infantry. In 2003, as CO 2 RAR, he led the initial regional military intervention force to re-establish law and order in the Solomon Islands. Other operational service includes Rwanda and, in 2007, Afghanistan. In 2006 he was the Military Assistant to the Chief of Army. He has been posted with the armies of New Zealand and the United States and holds a Masters of Defence Studies from UNSW. Colonel Frewen is currently the Director Military Strategic Commitments in the Australian Defence Headquarters.

This article was originally published in the Australian Army Journal and is posted here with permission of the author.

Contested Nation Building (Full Article PDF)

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Department of Defense Releases the National Defense Strategy

The DoD released the 2008 National Defense Strategy today. The strategy outlines the national approach to the defense of this nation and its interests.

The NDS is issued periodically and the last one was published in March 2005. It outlines how the Department supports the President’s National Security Strategy and informs the National Military Strategy and other subordinate strategy documents. The strategy builds on lessons learned and insights from previous operations and strategic reviews such as the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review.

Balance at Heart of New Defense Strategy, Gates Says
By Jim Garamone
American Forces Press Service

(Bolded emphasis and links by SWJ)

WASHINGTON, July 31, 2008 – Balance is the key word of the new National Defense Strategy, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said during a news conference today.

Gates and Navy Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told reporters that the U.S. military must be prepared to perform the full range of missions.

The Department must be ready to wage a full-out war and handle irregular warfare and humanitarian missions, Gates said.

“Now, the reality is that conventional and strategic force modernization programs are strongly supported in the services and in the Congress,” Gates said.

The main fiscal 2009 defense budget is a concrete example of that support. It contains $104 billion in procurement and about $80 billion in research and development funding, heavily slanted toward conventional modernization programs. Funding for the irregular wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and other areas in the world has come from supplemental budgets.

“The principal challenge, therefore, is how to ensure that the capabilities gained and counterinsurgency lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the lessons we learned from other places where we have engaged in irregular warfare over the last two decades, are institutionalized within the defense establishment,” Gates said.

The secretary said he does not want the military to forget the lessons that troops have learned at such a painful price. “Looking to the future, we need to find a long-term place in the base budget for [these lessons],” he said.

Conventional modernization plans certainly are important, Gates said, noting they keep the military capable of defending the homeland, deterring conflict, and -- when deterrence fails -- winning the nation’s wars. But the most obvious threat the United States faces in the coming years, he said, comes from non-state actors using asymmetric tactics.

“I firmly believe that in the years ahead, our military is much more likely to engage in asymmetric conflict than conventional conflict against a rising state power,” he said. “We must be ready for both kinds of conflict and fund the capabilities to do both.”

In the past, irregular warfare has not had the support inside or outside the Pentagon that it requires, the secretary said.

“There is no doubt in my mind that the modernization programs will continue to have strong institutional and congressional support,” he said. “I just want to make sure that the capabilities we need for the conflicts we're in and most likely to face in the foreseeable future also are sustained long term.”

Nothing follows.

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Gates Sees Terrorism Remaining Enemy No. 1 - Josh White, Washington Post

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates says that even winning the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan will not end the "Long War" against violent extremism and that the fight against al-Qaeda and other terrorists should be the nation's top military priority over coming decades, according to a new National Defense Strategy he approved last month.

The strategy document, which has not been released, calls for the military to master "irregular" warfare rather than focusing on conventional conflicts against other nations, though Gates also recommends partnering with China and Russia in order to blunt their rise as potential adversaries. The strategy is a culmination of Gates's work since he took over the Pentagon in late 2006 and spells out his view that the nation must harness both military assets and "soft power" to defeat a complex, transnational foe...

... "The use of force plays a role, yet military efforts to capture or kill terrorists are likely to be subordinate to measures to promote local participation in government and economic programs to spur development, as well as efforts to understand and address the grievances that often lie at the heart of insurgencies," the document said. "For these reasons, arguably the most important military component of the struggle against violent extremists is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we help prepare our partners to defend and govern themselves."...

It's Time to Stop Selling Ambassadorships - Barbara Bodine, Politico

After World War I, the US professionalized its diplomatic and consular corps. Yet, without parallel in the industrialized world, the United States continues to raffle off to well-heeled political donors ambassadorships to many of our most strategically important allies, as well as to some of the cushiest spots on earth. The US ended the sale of military commissions over 100 years ago; it is inconceivable today that we would sell off military commands. We should not sell off diplomatic commands - the last vestige of the 19th-century spoils system.

The American Academy of Diplomacy, which counts among its members all living ex-secretaries of state, recently called upon Sens. Barack Obama and John McCain to pledge to end this practice and accord the nation’s diplomacy and diplomats the same recognition we accord our senior military officers, who dedicate their careers to national service...

... How do you explain to a student or any aspirant to the Foreign Service that, while the US government expects that level of commitment, no matter how well and how long you serve, it is likely that a political donor with little relevant experience will end up with the top job of your profession?

It is time to end the last great vestige of the 19th-century spoils system. The American people, our foreign policy, our national security, and our current and future career Foreign Service officers deserve better.

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A review of:

A Thousand Hills: Rwanda's Rebirth and the Man Who Dreamed It

By Stephen Kinzer, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons. Inc, 2008.

Reviewed by:

Thomas (Tom) P. Odom

LTC US Army (ret)

Author, Journey Into Darkness: Genocide In Rwanda

President Paul Kagame is a man who inspires a wide range of emotions in those who meet him. Some like me admire him.  Others despise him. A former US Ambassador to Burundi described him as "Svengali or perhaps Mephistopheles--some magician or sorcerer."[1]  Certainly many in French diplomatic circles see him as the devil clothed in Anglophone robes.  In the Africanist analytical world, he is either Rwanda's greatest hope or its mortal danger. Certainly his enemies have reason to fear him even as his friends love him. Both enemy and friend know that the wise respect him. 

I first met then Vice President and Defense Minister Major General Paul Kagame in the fall of 1994 when he was struggling to put the shattered country of Rwanda back together.&

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How to Contain Radical Islam

The best global strategy for the US may be the one that won the Cold War.

By Commander Philip Kapusta and Captain Donovan Campbell

This article originally appeared in the 27 July edition of the Boston Globe and is posted here with permission of the authors and Globe.

The events of Sept. 11, 2001, brutally announced the presence of an enemy seemingly distinct from any our country had faced before. Unlike previous adversaries, such as Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, or the Spanish monarchy, this new enemy was difficult to define, let alone understand. It was not motivated by causes that an avowedly secular government could easily comprehend, and it took an amorphous yet terrifying form with little historical precedent.

Our leaders responded to this new threat with dramatic changes. In the largest government reorganization of the past 50 years, the Department of Homeland Security lumbered into existence. A new director of national intelligence was named to oversee America's vast intelligence apparatus, and the defense of the homeland was made the military's top priority. Most dramatically, the United States announced - and then implemented - an aggressive new policy of preemptive war.

Yet, with the seventh anniversary of 9/11 approaching, it seems clear that policy makers have not responded particularly well. Islamic extremists are gaining strength, while America finds itself increasingly isolated in the world. The coalition of the willing, never overly robust, is now on life support. In the Middle East, the Islamist parties Hezbollah and Hamas have enough popular support to prosper in free and fair elections, and Al Qaeda is adding franchise chapters in North Africa, the Levant, the Arabian Peninsula, and elsewhere. Our most prominent post- 9/11 action remains the Iraq war, which has arguably failed to improve America's national security even as it has strengthened the position of our sworn enemies in the government of Iran...

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How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa'ida by Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki of Rand.

All terrorist groups eventually end. But how do they end? The evidence since 1968 indicates that most groups have ended because (1) they joined the political process (43 percent) or (2) local police and intelligence agencies arrested or killed key members (40 percent). Military force has rarely been the primary reason for the end of terrorist groups, and few groups within this time frame have achieved victory. This has significant implications for dealing with al Qa'ida and suggests fundamentally rethinking post-9/11 US counterterrorism strategy: Policymakers need to understand where to prioritize their efforts with limited resources and attention. The authors report that religious terrorist groups take longer to eliminate than other groups and rarely achieve their objectives. The largest groups achieve their goals more often and last longer than the smallest ones do. Finally, groups from upper-income countries are more likely to be left-wing or nationalist and less likely to have religion as their motivation. The authors conclude that policing and intelligence, rather than military force, should form the backbone of US efforts against al Qa'ida. And US policymakers should end the use of the phrase “war on terrorism” since there is no battlefield solution to defeating al Qa'ida.

How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa'ida

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A couple of pictures from our SWC Northern Virginia "Non-Virtual" get together tonight at the Globe and Laurel restaurant near Marine Corps Base Quantico. While solutions to world problems were not quite nailed down, the conversation on irregular warfare, counterinsurgency, etc. was stimulating as was the great company (Marine, Army, DOD/OSD, JFCOM, JAWP) and of course the food and drink. We'll be holding more of these - wherever Council members hang their hat / cover. Stay tuned - and better yet - sign on and join the Small Wars Council for the virtual half of 'the dialogue'. More images can be found in the members only portion of the board.

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Spencer Ackerman, in yesterday’s Washington Independent, claims I told him the Iraq war was “f*cking stupid”. He did not seek to clear that quote with me, and I would not have approved it if he had. If he HAD sought a formal comment, I would have told him what I have said publicly before: in my view, the decision to invade Iraq in 2003 was an extremely serious strategic error. But the task of the moment is not to cry over spilt milk, rather to help clean it up: a task in which the surge, the comprehensive counterinsurgency approach, and our troops on the ground are admirably succeeding.

Anyone who knows me has been well aware of my position on Iraq for years. When I went to Iraq in 2007 (and on both previous occasions) it was to end the war, by suppressing the violence and defeating the insurgency. (Note: I said END the war, not abandon it half-way through, leaving the Iraqis to be slaughtered. When we invaded Iraq, we took on a moral and legal responsibility for its people’s wellbeing. Regardless of anyone’s position on the decision to invade, those obligations still stand and cannot be wished away merely because they have proven inconvenient).

Like every other counterinsurgency professional, I warned against the war in 2002-3 on the grounds that it was likely to be extremely difficult, demand far more resources than our leaders seemed willing to commit, inflame world Muslim opinion making our counterterrorism tasks harder, and entail a significant opportunity cost in Afghanistan and elsewhere. This was hardly an original or brilliant insight. Nor was it particularly newsworthy: it was a view shared with the rest of my community, and you would be hard-pressed to find any professional counterinsurgent who thought the 2003/4 strategy was sensible.

The question of whether we were right to invade Iraq is a fascinating debate for historians and politicians, and a valid issue for the American people to consider in an election year. As it happens, I think it was a mistake. But that is not my key concern. The issue for practitioners in the field is not to second-guess a decision from six years ago, but to get on with the job at hand which, I believe, is what both Americans and Iraqis expect of us. In that respect, the new strategy and tactics implemented in 2007, and which relied for their effectiveness on the extra troop numbers of the Surge, ARE succeeding and need to be supported. In 2006, a normal night in Baghdad involved 120 to 150 dead Iraqi civilians, and each month we lost dozens of Americans killed or maimed. This year, a bad night involves one or two dead civilians, U.S. losses are dramatically down, and security is restored. Therefore, even on the most conservative estimate, in the eighteen months of the surge to date we have saved 12 to 16 thousand Iraqis and hundreds of American lives. And we are now in a position to pursue a political strategy that will ultimately see Iraq stable, our forces withdrawn, and this whole sorry adventure tidied up to the maximum extent possible so that we can get on with the fight in other theaters – most pressingly, Afghanistan.

On the ground, in both Iraq and Afghanistan over several years, I have fought and worked beside brave and dedicated military and civilian colleagues who are making an enormous difference in an incredibly tough environment. I salute their dedication – Americans, Iraqis and Afghans alike – and I hold all of them in the highest possible regard. These quiet professionals deserve our unstinting support. Besides having the courage to close with and finish the enemy, (an enemy capable of literally unbelievable depravity and cruelty towards its own people) they have proven capable of great compassion and kindness toward the people they protect. The new tactics and tools they are now applying – protecting the people 24/7, building alliances of trust with local communities, putting political reconciliation and engagement first, connecting the people to the government, co-opting anyone willing to be reconciled and simultaneously eliminating the irreconcilables with precision and discrimination – these techniques are the best way out of a situation we should never have gotten ourselves into.

These are not the policy positions of any party – I am not politically partisan, just a professional expressing my professional opinion. I was against the war on professional grounds but (also on professional grounds) I support the surge as the best means to end it favorably and humanely. I thought the initial plan was flawed, but my duty is to help fix it, not wash my hands of it. I thought the decision to invade was a mistake, but I put my life on the line to save the Iraqi people from the terrorists who tore their society apart after we failed in our obligation to stabilize it. And if you find those positions hard to understand, you probably haven’t been to Iraq.

-----

SWJ Editors' Notes:

Spencer Ackerman asks that we post a link to his reply - Sources Holler Back: Kilcullen Edition.

In the course of a piece I'm proud of about David Kilcullen's forthcoming strategy-level counterinsurgency handbook, I included a profanity-laden quote from him about the wisdom of the Iraq war. This was a mistake on my part and I take full responsibility for the fact that it overshadowed what I consider Kilcullen's valuable, serious, and hard-learned counterinsurgency insights.

In the course of our conversation about his handbook, Dave made these and other points about the war, which are included lower down in the piece. I included the profanity because I thought it underscored the depth of his commitment to try to dig American strategy out of the morass of Iraq, which I and many others view as uncomplicatedly admirable. What I should have realized is that the profanity overwhelms the broader points presented in the handbook and about Dave's personality and professional vision. For that, I apologize, not only to Dave, but to my readers, who I hope will pay attention to those broader points despite my error in judgment...

Grim at Blackfive.

... We can all be completely certain that his contribution to the efforts to stabilize Iraq and protect the Iraqi population have been tremendous. Dr. Kilcullen is a model of the honorable disgreement that best characterizes a free society. Good for him. Good for us, to have him as a companion.

And more by Erin Simpson (aka Charlie) at Abu Muqawama.

It is now, as Kiclullen wrote Charlie, "case closed, hatchet buried."

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I had the opportunity (and good fortune) to attend the Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare panel discussion Tuesday, 22 July, at the National Press Club in Washington, DC. The Center for Naval Analysis and Osprey Publishing sponsored this discussion on counterinsurgency featuring Dr. John Nagl (Center for a New American Security), Dr. Daniel Marston (Australian National University), and Dr. Carter Malkasian (CNA). They recently collaborated on Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare (Osprey, 2008), an edited book that examines 13 of the most important counterinsurgency campaigns of the past 100 years, including the current Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. Dr. David Kilcullen (US State Department) moderated the discussion and provided critical commentary.

Speaking to a packed crowd in the main ballroom, the panel held court presenting a wide array of COIN theory, history and practice. I am about half through transcribing my notes from a recording I made of the event - but decided to go ahead and post this entry now as CNA was kind enough to provide an edited transcript.

As a partial introduction - here are my notes of Dr. John Nagl's opening statement on the importance of US Army Field Manual 3-24 / Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 33.3.5 - Counterinsurgency and how it filled a critical gap.

We were not prepared when the insurgency began in Iraq in 2003. We were trained and equipped to defeat a conventional enemy.

The Army’s unpreparedness dates back to its failure to internalize and learn the lessons of Vietnam. This led to a 40 year gap in counterinsurgency doctrine, education and doctrine. In 2003, US Army officers knew more about the American Civil War than they did about counterinsurgency.

The Army focused on winning short campaigns to topple unfriendly governments without considering the more difficult tasks required to rebuild friendly ones. Thus stunningly successful invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and of Iraq in early 2003 were triumphs without victory as stubborn insurgents stymied America's conventional military power.

As a result, we did not have all the equipment needed to protect our soldiers from time-honored insurgent tactics like roadside bombs, we had not trained our soldiers in understanding the key to success in counterinsurgency is protecting the population; nor had we empowered them with all the political, diplomatic, and linguistic skills they needed to accomplish that objective.

While there were many reasons why the Army was unprepared for the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, among the most important was the lack of current counterinsurgency doctrine when the campaigns began.

Doctrine is important to the American Army as it codifies both how the institution thinks about its role in the world and how it accomplishes that role on the battlefield. Doctrine drives decisions on how the Army should organize, what missions it should train to accomplish and what equipment it needs.

But then Lieutenant General David Petraeus became the Commander of the Army’s Combined Arms Center at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas in late 2005. He and his Marine Corps counterpart, then Lieutenant General James Mattis (Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command), decided to remedy that particular part of the problem. They worked together based on their shared understanding of the cognitive counterinsurgency and the urgent need to reform their services to make them more capable of conducting this most difficult type of war. One of the tools they chose to drive change in the Army and the Marine Corps was the new Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency doctrine (FM 3- 24 / MCWP 3-33.5). In a sheer stroke of genius, General Petraeus asked his old West Point classmate Conrad Crane to be the lead ‘pen’ on the project that became 3-24. Con’s role in this project has been underreported and underappreciated.

In Vietnam the Army did not learn one of the principles of counterinsurgency in time – we didn’t get it figured until the American people lost faith in the war effort. This time, the learning process happened much quicker. The driver and the beneficiary of that change was FM 3-24.

The book was designed both to help the Army and Marine Corps prepare for the next counterinsurgency campaign and was also designed to make substantive contributions to our ongoing efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Additional Links:

Senior Scholars Advise Next Steps in COIN- Wall Street Journal Market Watch

More Troops May Not Solve Afghanistan - Andrew Gray, Reuters

Afghanistan Needs Iraq Strategy - United Press International

Adviser: Iraq Approach Likely in Afghanistan - Sean Naylor, Army Times

Majority of Afghan Insurgents Not Taliban - Khalid Hasan, Daily Times

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Rethinking Smith-Mundt
by Matt Armstrong, Small Wars Journal

Download interim version of article as PDF

The question asked repeatedly since 9/11 is how can a guy in cave out propagandize the country that created public relations and the Internet? An obscure group in 1998, Al-Qaeda increased their influence and reach with words, images, and actions. The United States responded with showcases of Americana that, not surprisingly, failed to resonate with the target audiences: our enemies’ base, moderates, “swing voters”, and even our friends and allies. Ignoring the importance of linking policy with the psychology of information to persuade and dissuade, American public diplomacy and strategic communication increasingly became an irrelevant whisper and beauty contest in stark contrast to the adversary’s propaganda of words and deeds. In the war of ideas, the United States is largely unarmed and has accordingly fallen in global influence and stature, increasing vulnerabilities not only in the military domain, but in economic, financial, and diplomatic realms too.

Sixty years ago, the elements of America’s national power – diplomacy, information, military, and economics – were retooled with the National Security Act of 1947 and the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948. The former has received significant attention over the years and is currently the subject of an intense project to recommend updates. In contrast, the latter, a direct response to the global ideological threat posed by Communist propaganda, has been variously ignored, glossed over, or been subject to revisionism. Smith-Mundt was a largely successful bipartisan effort, establishing the foundation for the informational and cultural and educational engagement that became known as “public diplomacy.”

While today is unlike yesterday, it is worthwhile to look back on the purpose of Smith-Mundt and the debates surrounding the dissemination prohibition that has taken on mythical proportions. The modern interpretation of Smith-Mundt has given rise to an imaginary information environment bifurcated by a uniquely American “iron fence” separating the American media environment from the rest of the world. In 1948, the prohibition was a minor hurdle as the requirements for information and cultural and educational exchanges were debated.

However, modern analysis of Smith-Mundt tends to be informed by modern perceptions in disregard of the historical record. The prohibition was not intended to be prophylactic for sensitive American eyes and ears, but to be a non-compete agreement to protect private media. It was also to protect the Government from itself in the form of censoring the State Department, whose loyalties were suspect to many Congressmen.

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In today's Washington Independent Spencer Ackerman provides an update on the US Department of State's Counterinsurgency: A Guide for Policy-Makers (October 2007 version).

... "Counterinsurgency: A Guide for Policy-Makers" takes the lessons learned by the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan and elevates them to the highest levels of national strategy. Counterinsurgency is defined in the text as "the politico-military techniques developed to neutralize... armed rebellion against constituted authority." The handbook is due to be published in November or December. A copy of its most recent draft was obtained by The Washington Independent.

The handbook seeks to provide a framework for considering whether Washington should intervene in foreign countries' counterinsurgency operations, raising difficult questions about whether such nations deserve US support; under what conditions that support should occur, and whether success is possible at acceptable cost. No systematic approach to strategic-level questions in counterinsurgency currently exists for senior US government officials...

The handbook instructs policy-makers about the necessity of using all elements of national power -- not just military force, but also diplomacy, development aid, the rule of law, academic disciplines and other specialties often considered peripheral to warfighting -- to triumph in counterinsurgency. Victory, as well, is defined as support for a foreign nation's ability to successfully govern, rather than a decisive US military effort...

Unlike the 2006 Army/Marine Corps counterinsurgency field manual. written principally by Petraeus and Marine Gen. James Mattis, this new handbook is not intended to be a guide for counterinsurgency practitioners, but rather to give Cabinet-level officials and their staffs a framework for viewing questions of intervention in combatting insurgencies...

More.

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Head on over to Abu Muqawama for boots-on-the-ground LL. Kip has just posted Notes from Anbar - A USMC LT on his way out of Anbar speaks to some of the amazing changes that have taken place there since the Awakening and offers some advice (including reading this blog) for those on their way. Good common sense stuff...

Of note - The Counterinsurgency Cliff Notes: Techniques for the Conventional Rifle Platoon, in Layman’s Terms by Captain Craig Coppock, Small Wars Journal, is cited as a very worthwhile resource.

Nothing follows.

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