Occupation Plan for Iraq Faulted in Army History - Michael Gordon, New York Times

... The story of the American occupation of Iraq has been the subject of numerous books, studies and memoirs. But now the Army has waded into the highly charged debate with its own nearly 700-page account: “On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign.”

The unclassified study, the second volume in a continuing history of the Iraq conflict, is as noteworthy for who prepared it as for what it says. In essence, the study is an attempt by the Army to tell the story of one of the most contentious periods in its history to military experts - and to itself.

It adds to a growing body of literature about the problems the United States encountered in Iraq, not all of which has been embraced by Army leaders.

Lt. Col. Paul Yingling of the Army ignited a debate when he wrote a magazine article that criticized American generals for failing to prepare a coherent plan to stabilize postwar Iraq.

In 2005, the RAND Corporation submitted a report to the Army, called “Rebuilding Iraq,” that identified problems with virtually every government agency that played a role in planning the postwar phase. After a long delay, the report is scheduled to be made public on Monday.

But the “On Point” report carries the imprimatur of the Army’s Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth. The study is based on 200 interviews conducted by military historians and includes long quotations from active or recently retired officers...

Army's History of After Hussein Faults Pentagon - Josh White, Washington Post

A new Army history of the service's performance in Iraq immediately after the fall of Saddam Hussein faults military and civilian leaders for their planning for the war's aftermath, and it suggests that the Pentagon's current way of using troops is breaking the Army National Guard and Army Reserve.

The study, "On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign," is an unclassified and unhindered look at US Army operations in Iraq from May 2003 to January 2005. That critical era of the war has drawn widespread criticism because of a failure to anticipate the rise of an Iraqi insurgency and because policymakers provided too few US troops and no strategy to maintain order after Iraq's decades-old regime was overthrown.

Donald P. Wright and Col. Timothy R. Reese, who authored the report along with the Army's Contemporary Operations Study Team, conclude that US commanders and civilian leaders were too focused on only the military victory and lacked a realistic vision of what Iraq would look like following that triumph...

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Update 2

News

US Army's Own Report Faults Poor Planning, Lack of Vision - Voice of America

Public Military History Criticizes Pentagon - FOX News

US History Blames Commander and Lack of Plan - The Australian

Blogs

Reflections on "On Point II" - CAC Blog

Generalship and Iraq - HG's World

Preliminary Thoughts - The Captain's Journal

Update 3

After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq by Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker, Keith Crane, Richard R. Brennan, Jr., Heather S. Gregg, Thomas Sullivan, and Andrew Rathmell, Rand Report 30 June 2008.

This monograph begins by examining prewar planning efforts for postwar Iraq, in order to establish what U.S. policymakers expected the postwar situation to look like and what their plans were for reconstruction. The monograph then examines the role of U.S. military forces after major combat officially ended on May 1, 2003; the analysis covers this period through the end of June 2004. Finally, the monograph examines civilian efforts at reconstruction after major combat ended, focusing on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and its efforts to rebuild structures of governance, security forces, economic policy, and essential services prior to June 28, 2004, the day that the CPA dissolved and transferred authority to the Interim Iraqi Government. The authors conclude that the U.S. government was unprepared for the challenges of postwar Iraq for three reasons: a failure to challenge fundamental assumptions about postwar Iraq; ineffective interagency coordination; and the failure to assign responsibility and resources for providing security in the immediate aftermath of major combat operations.

Update 4

On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign - US Army Information Brief

On Point Bloggers Roundtable - Department of Defense

Army's Official Iraq War Report Cites Poor Planning - National Public Radio

Prewar Planning and Occupation of Iraq - The Captain's Journal

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General David H Petraeus: The General's Knowledge - Charles Sennott, The Sunday Times

General David H Petraeus, the commander of US forces in Iraq, looked exhausted. A competitive miler who loves to challenge young field commanders to five-mile running races and push-up contests (which he usually wins), he appears fit as ever. But there are dark circles under his eyes. Leading this war has begun to exact a visible toll.

“You are on the edge of having just enough sleep to sort of make it through every day,” he says, conceding that he has reconfigured his schedule to a less gruelling pace than when he first led the “surge” of 30,000-plus American troops into Iraq just over a year ago. “There is a point of no reservoir.”

It’s a cool, grey day outside his office inside the former Republican Palace of Saddam Hussein, in the heavily fortified green zone in Baghdad. On a delicate tea table sits a folder bulging with field reports and “weekly attack trends”, as well as a series of charts tracking the body count in Iraq. The office is in a corner of the palace he shares with Ryan Crocker, the US ambassador to Iraq. Crocker arrived in Baghdad with Petraeus in February 2007. Both came intending to undo a series of mistakes by the generals and diplomats who preceded them and brought the war to the edge of defeat. Petraeus brought a new playbook: a 240-page counterinsurgency manual he wrote during 2005-6 and whose precepts he was determined to test...

General David H Petraeus: The General's Knowledge

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Today's Financial Times contains a detailed and thought provoking article by Andrew Woods on efforts by Major General Douglas Stone and Task Force 134 in conducting "counterinsurgency inside the wire". Here are several excerpts, be sure to read the entire article...

... An imperial city like this – guarded by an occupying army whose legitimacy has been in the balance since the prison abuse scandal at Abu Ghraib in 2004 – is an unlikely place to test the claim that a more humane military is a more effective one. But, then, Stone is an unlikely commander. A Marine reservist who made a fortune in Silicon Valley before taking a doctorate in public administration, he is now fanatical about winning what he calls “the battlefield of the mind”.

Since arriving in Iraq, he has instituted significant changes to coalition detention centres, including new review boards which explain to detainees why they are being held and what they can do about it; a pledge-and-guarantor programme whereby soon-to-be-released detainees swear in front of a judge that they will not return to the fight; increased family visits to the prisons; education programmes, including maths, Arabic and English classes; vocational training programmes; and religious discussion classes, where privately hired sheikhs discuss the Koran with detainees...

... Stone himself brags that he has “a high tolerance, a very high tolerance” for killing. “Don’t get me wrong,” he says. “You have to have violence. The moderate mosques had extremist imams. Those extremist imams are now with Allah.”

Stone’s great innovation, however, is that the US and its allies must limit indiscriminate killings – and detainee mistreatment – as a matter of public diplomacy rather than principle. This theory is a military doctrine that offers rare common ground for human rights advocates and hard-nosed generals, and it is one Stone has been working on for a while...

... Euphoric as it sounds, this is the way Task Force 134 was originally envisioned. Several policy planners say, off the record, that detention was always thought of as the cornerstone of a new civil society in Iraq. Because they suspected that the rule of law was corrupted under Saddam, American planners decided they would have to rebuild the country’s legal system from the ground up. Detention was seen as a good incubator for “rule of law programmes” – a training ground for Iraqi judges and lawyers, and thereby a means of manufacturing civil society.

None of that materialised. By the time the Abu Ghraib scandal broke in April 2004, detention was a shambles and cycles of rioting and repression were the norm. While Abu Ghraib provoked better oversight – at least of soldiers’ cameras – detention’s basic contours remained static, but the number of detainees was rising fast...

Much more, read and learn.

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With a hat tip to Daniel Troy of the Consortium for Complex Operations - United Press International recently ran a three part series titled Emerging Threats: USAF Counterinsurgency authored by Shaun Watterman. From the introduction in Part 1:

The veteran military officials picked by Defense Secretary Robert Gates to take over the Air Force face a tough job redefining the service's role in what many see as the key kind of combat the U.S. military will face in the immediate future: counterinsurgency.

The problem, say many who have studied the topic, is that the things the U.S. Air Force has made its priority capabilities -- establishing air supremacy over the enemy and perfecting the timely and pinpoint delivery of high explosives -- tend to be less useful in irregular or asymmetric conflicts like those in which the U.S. military is currently engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In particular, critics have singled out an over-reliance on air strikes in Afghanistan as a significant barrier to the success of a "hearts and minds" strategy on the ground, given the inevitability of "collateral damage" -- the accidental killing of civilians.

"From an Air Force perspective, we were told to plan for a different kind of war," Lt. Col. Michael Pietrucha told United Press International, commenting on the general direction of post-Cold War strategic thinking, which emphasized the potential for conventional conflicts with strategic competitors or regional powers like China or Iran.

Pietrucha, a specialist in irregular combat who until recently worked at the Air Force Warfare Center, stressed he did not speak for the service.

He added it was appropriate the Air Force had different priorities, because of its strategic roles in assuring "force projection" -- the ability of the U.S. military to strike anywhere in the world -- and in operating the nation's nuclear strike capabilities.

"We have a set of global responsibilities that require us to keep a slightly different focus," he said, adding that while counterinsurgency might be the most common kind of conflict the military would face in the immediate future, "The most common conflicts are not necessarily the most dangerous."

Other observers agree that, if the Air Force has been slow to meet the counterinsurgency challenge, they have other priorities, too.

"They have always put their emphasis on air supremacy," said a senior congressional staffer, "on the basis that unless you have that, your troops on the ground are at risk."

"The question," he added, "is whether they have overemphasized it."

Part 1

Part 2

Part 3

Analysis: USAF's Counterinsurgency Plan

Discuss at Small Wars Council

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The latest issue of Joint Force Quarterly has been posted. JFQ is published for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, to promote understanding of the integrated employment of land, sea, air, space, and special operations forces. The journal focuses on joint doctrine, integrated operations, coalition warfare, contingency planning, military operations conducted across the spectrum of conflict, and joint force development. Here are the featured articles:

ISR Evolution in the Iraqi Theater by Raymond T. Odierno, Nichoel E. Brooks, and Francesco P. Mastracchio

Employing ISR: SOF Best Practices by Michael T. Flynn, Rich Juergens, and Thomas L. Cantrell

Tribal Engagement in Anbar Province: The Critical Role of Special Operations Forces by Thomas R. Searle

The Imbalance in Iraqi Security Force Transition by Scott S. Jensen

The Influence of Just War Perspectives: Implications for U.S. Central Command by Tyler Rauert

Forty Years of COIN: The Israeli Occupation of the Palestinian Territories by Nathan W. Toronto

Israel’s Survival Instincts and the Dangers of Nuclear Weapons in Iranian Hands by Richard L. Russell

Integration of Coalition Forces into the USCENTCOM Mission by John F. Couture

Battling Misperceptions: Challenges to U.S. Security Cooperation in Central Asia by Roger D. Kangas

Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies: Building Relationships, Enhancing Security by John D. Lawrence

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Improving Information Operations in Iraq and the Global War on Terror
by Farook Ahmed and Oubai Shahbandar, Small Wars Journal

Download interim version of article as PDF

The Surge of US military forces in Iraq has delivered a tremendous level of success in providing security to areas of Iraq that were previously under insurgent control. In order to build on these successes in the future, the United States would greatly benefit from force multipliers that can help promote security and foster political reconciliation as the extra troops provided by the Surge withdraw.

A cheap and effective way to augment the Soldiers on the ground is to defeat radical extremist groups’ ideologies and continue to win over the Iraqi population. The first step in developing this capability will be for the United States to establish a strategic framework that provides a central role for information operations (IO). These operations are analogous to a political campaign; they revolve around putting together and conveying a coherent message that convinces people to be sympathetic to one group and oppose that group’s adversary. In Iraq and in the broader war against violent Jihadism, the United States not only needs the power to act, but also the power to influence how its actions are interpreted.

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Notes Towards a Theory of Information Operations (IO) - Marc Tyrrell, In Harmonium

Yesterday (June 26, 2008), Andrew Exum posted a blog entry over at Small Wars Journal on Information Operations. As part of the post, he laid out a challenge to SWC members.

So far, as of early morning the following day (June 27, 2008), a rather active thread on the question has emerged. Part of the thread was a comment I posted that tried to pull apart the roots of Information Operations (IO) so that an actual, analytically useful, definition could be produced. After working on the post for half an hour, I realized that it would require a lot more thought and detail, hence this post...

Good reads all, Ex's and Marc's posts and the Council discussion.

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Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan - June 2008 Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act
(Section 1230, Public Law 110-181).

This report to Congress is submitted consistent with Section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181). It includes a description of the comprehensive strategy of the United States for security and stability in Afghanistan. This report is the first in a series of reports required every 180 days through fiscal year 2010 and has been prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Director of National Intelligence, the Attorney General, the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, and the Secretary of Agriculture. This assessment complements other reports and information about Afghanistan provided to the Congress; however, it is not intended as a single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its Coalition Partners, or Afghanistan. The information contained in this report is current as of April 10, 2008.

United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces - June 2008 Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1231, Public Law 110-181).

This report to Congress is submitted consistent with Section 1231 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181). It includes the United States plan for sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF). In accordance with subsection (a), it includes a description of the long-term plan for sustaining the ANSF, with the objective of ensuring that the ANSF will be able to conduct operations independently and effectively and maintain long-term security and stability in Afghanistan. The report includes a comprehensive strategy and budget, with defined objectives; mechanisms for tracking funding, equipment, training, and services provided to the ANSF; and any actions necessary to assist the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to achieve a number of specified goals and the results of such actions. This report is the first of the annual reports required through 2010 on the long-term plan for Afghanistan. Consistent with this Act, this report has been prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State. This assessment complements other reports and information about Afghanistan provided to the Congress; however, it is not intended as a single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its international partners, or Afghanistan.

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The Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Aligning and Integrating Military and Civilian Roles in Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations edited by Jay W. Boggs and Colonel (USA, Ret) Joseph R. Cerami, US Army War College - Strategic Studies Institute.

For decades since the formation of the defense establishment under the 1947 National Security Act, all U.S. cabinet departments, national security agencies, and military services involved in providing for the common defense have struggled to overcome differences in policy and strategy formulation, organizational cultures, and even basic terminology. Post-September 11, 2001, international systems, security environments, U.S. military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the greater Global War on Terrorism have confronted civilian policymakers and senior military officers with a complex, fluid battlefield which demands kinetic and counterinsurgency capabilities. This monograph addresses the security, stability, transition, and reconstruction missions that place the most pressure on interagency communication and coordination. The results from Kabul to Baghdad reveal that the interagency process is in need of reform and that a more robust effort to integrate and align civilian and military elements is a prerequisite for success.

The Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Aligning and Integrating Military and Civilian Roles in Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations

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Wars of Ideas and the War of Ideas by Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria, II, US Army War College - Strategic Studies Institute.

The author discusses several types of wars of ideas in an effort to achieve a better understanding of what wars of ideas are. That knowledge, in turn, can help inform strategy. It is important to note, for instance, that because ideas are interpreted subjectively, it is not likely that opposing parties will “win” each other over by means of an ideational campaign alone. Hence, physical events, whether intended or incidental, typically play determining roles in the ways wars of ideas unfold, and how (or whether) they are end. Thus, while the act of communicating strategically remains a vital part of any war of ideas, we need to manage our expectations as far as what it can accomplish.

Wars of Ideas and the War of Ideas

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Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare (Public Event). Washington, DC. The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) is sponsoring a discussion on counterinsurgency on 22 July 2008, at the National Press Club (the Holeman Lounge), Washington, DC. Dr. John Nagl (Center for a New American Security), Dr. Daniel Marston (Australian National University), and Dr. Carter Malkasian (CNA) recently collaborated on Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare (Osprey, 2008), an edited book that examines 13 of the most important counterinsurgency campaigns of the past 100 years, including the current Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. Dr. David Kilcullen (U.S. State Department), the renowned counterinsurgency expert, will moderate the discussion and provide critical commentary. Lunch will be provided. Books will be available to purchase at a discounted rate. For more information, visit the first link above. RSVP at kattm@cna.org or 703.824.2436.

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Sebastian Sprenger at Inside the Pentagon (subscription required) is reporting that the draft Irregular Warfare (IW) Directive has sparked "intense controversy" within the Department of Defense. Originally scheduled to be released this month, ITP reports the directive is now scheduled for a fall release. The fall release will coincide with the unveiling of the Pentagon’s response to a congressionally mandated review of roles and missions within the Department.

Several items concerning the directive from the ITP article:

1) To replace DOD Directive 3000.5 that placed Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations on par with “traditional” combat operations.

2) Directs “host of efforts” to improve coordination between Defense and other government agencies.

3) Defines IW as comprising Counterinsurgency (COIN), SSTR, Counterterrorism (CT), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), and Unconventional Warfare (UW).

4) Instructs the Services to balance their capabilities to conduct both regular and irregular warfare.

ITP reports that critics contend that including SSTR under IW would cast stabilization operations, in which help from civilian government agencies and non-governmental organizations is crucial in too militaristic a light.

There is much more at Inside the Pentagon.

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Information Operations

By Andrew Exum

I have a few questions for the learned readership of Small Wars Journal. The first is, how many of you have ever looked up the official Department of Defense definition for ‘Information Operations?’

According to JP 3-13, Information Operations, the term is defined as “the integrated employment of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.”

I am confident there exist more confusing definitions in the U.S. military lexicon, but surely there cannot be too many. In effect, the Department of Defense has taken the term ‘information operations’ as understood by cyberwarfare types and mashed it together with the term ‘information operations’ as understood by those of us waging wars of narratives in Iraq and Afghanistan. The resulting confusion has left us with a definition that tries to be everything to everyone while at the same time leaving us with a shoddy definition to communicate what we’re talking about as counter-insurgency theorist-practitioners when we use the term...

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