The Army’s new operations manual, FM 3-0, will be released in February – the manual has a combination of "evolutionary" and "revolutionary" concepts.  Much of the doctrine may be evolutionary, while its impact on the force and the application of the doctrine will be revolutionary. 

Some aspects are evolutionary (strategic context, operational environment, full spectrum operations, command and control, etc.).

Other aspects are revolutionary (stability operations co-equal with offense and defense, emphasis on information engagement, requirements for leaders to be competent with both lethal and non-lethal (soft power) applications of combat power).

There are some elements of the doctrine that are evolutionary – but this is not just a natural evolution of the previous FM 3-0, but rather a maturing of some of the concepts (such as information superiority and changes in the operational environment) that existed in the 2001 document.  But – it is important to note that the 2001 edition of FM 3-0 was developed and published prior to 9/11; as a result of 9/11 and OEF and OIF there are some revolutionary changes that go beyond evolutionary change or simply a maturing of concepts.

To reflect on the size and scope of changes in the doctrine, I look back to the Army of pre-9/11:

1. The organizational structure was based on the division as the key warfighting element
2. Stability operations were considered – but were treated as a symptom of “mission creep.”
3. Talk about the “peace dividend” due to a “strategic pause” was driving our acquisition process to potentially “skip a generation” of equipment
4. There was still a strong tendency towards risk aversion due to Southern Watch, Bosnia, Beirut, and even to some extent Viet Nam. 

Today, our reality is:

1. The organization structure is based on the BCT as the key warfighting element
2. Stability operations are considered a core mission of the military; full spectrum operations means stability operations are just as important (and sometimes more important) than offensive and defensive operations
3. We are in a state of “persistent conflict” in a long term global war
4. There is an emphasis on initiative and accepting risk to achieve decisive results.

The 2001 edition didn’t address these realities; ground truth has forced these “revolutionary” changes.  The 2008 edition of FM 3-0 will not only incorporate these changes, but also provide a blue print for the future.  This impact will be revolutionary; FM 3-0 in the next year will provide the blueprint for a new training strategy, changes in organizational structure to respond to full spectrum operations, and change leader development and professional military education to focus on adaptive and innovative leadership.

This blueprint for the future will look beyond the current fight in Iraq and Afghanistan; the implication of full spectrum operations still includes the requirement to remain fully capable to fight major combat operations in the future; the implication of “information engagement” requires a change in the cultural mindset; and the “whole of government” approach – inherent in all of our operations – requires not only a change in the military but also in the interagency process.  These changes, I believe, will be revolutionary – and FM 3-0 provides the blue print to move out.

Frontier 6 is Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV, Commanding General of the Combined Arms Center at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, the command that oversees the Command and General Staff College and 17 other schools, centers, and training programs located throughout the United States. The Combined Arms Center is also responsible for: development of the Army's doctrinal manuals, training of the Army's commissioned and noncommissioned officers, oversight of major collective training exercises, integration of battle command systems and concepts, and supervision of the Army's Center for the collection and dissemination of lessons learned.

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Daily Roundup Feb 15, 2008 - The Belmont Club