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Changing the Organizational Culture (Updated)

The technology of the Twenty-first Century – the “new media” – has made it possible for virtually anyone to have immediate access to an audience of millions around the world and to be somewhat anonymous. This technology has enabled and empowered the rise of a new enemy. This enemy is not constrained by the borders of a nation or the International Laws of War. The new media allows them to decentralize their command and control and disperse their elements around the globe. They stay loosely connected by an ideology, send cryptic messages across websites and via e-mail and recruit new members using the same new media technologies.

Responding to this challenge requires changes in our approach to warfare. The one thing we can change now does not require resources – just a change in attitudes and the organizational culture in our Army. Recent experiences in Iraq illustrate how important it is to address cultural change and also how very difficult it is to change culture: After MNF-I broke through the bureaucratic red-tape and was able to start posting on YouTube, MNF-I videos from Iraq were among the top ten videos viewed on YouTube for weeks after their posting. These videos included gun tape videos showing the awesome power the US military can bring to bear. Using YouTube – part of the new media – proved to be an extremely effective tool in countering an adaptive enemy. Here are some areas that our Army will need to address if we are going to change our culture with respect to this critical area:

First, we need to Encourage Soldiers to “tell/share their story”. Across America, there is a widely held perception that media coverage of the War in Iraq is overwhelmingly negative. We need to be careful to NOT blame the news media for this. The public has a voracious appetite for the sensational, the graphic and the shocking. We all have a difficult time taking our eyes off the train wreck in progress - it is human nature. Walter Cronkite once said “If it's extraordinary, and it affects us deeply, it's news." Knowing this, we, as a military, owe it to the public to actively seek out and engage the media with our stories in order to provide them with a fuller perspective of the situation. When Soldiers do this, the media is very open and receptive. The public may have an appetite for the sensational, but when it comes to their men and women in uniform, they also have a very strong desire to hear their personal stories. They want to know what it is like, what the Soldiers are experiencing, and how the Soldiers feel about their mission. That is why we must encourage our Soldiers to interact with the media, to get onto blogs and to send their YouTube videos to their friends and family. When our Soldiers tell/share their stories, it has an overwhelmingly positive effect.

Just playing lip service to encouraging Soldiers is not enough. Leaders need to not only encourage but also Empower subordinates. A critical component of empowering is underwriting honest mistakes and failure. Soldiers are encouraged to take the initiative and calculated risk in the operational battlefield because we understand the importance of maintaining the offensive. However, once we move into the informational domain, we have a tendency to be zero defect and risk averse. Leaders have to understand and accept that not all media interactions are going to go well. Leaders need to assume risk in the information domain and allow subordinates the leeway to make mistakes. Unfortunately, the culture is such that the first time a subordinate makes a mistake in dealing with the media and gets punished for it, it will be the last time ANYONE in that organization takes a risk and engages with the media.

Hand in hand with encouragement and empowerment is Education. If Soldiers are better educated to deal with new media and its effects, they will feel more empowered and be encouraged to act. We need to educate Soldiers on how to deal with the media and how their actions can have strategic implications. They need to know what the second and third order effects of their actions are. I believe that most people want to do a good job. There are very few Soldiers out there who would intentionally harm the mission or intentionally do something to reflect poorly on their unit or the Army. When many of these incidents occur, and we have all seen them, it is because they just don’t know that it is going to have that kind of effect and cause that kind of damage.

Finally, we need to Equip Soldiers to engage the new media. If we educate them and encourage them, we need to trust them enough to give them the tools to properly tell/share their stories. The experience of trying to gain YouTube access in Iraq and even back in the United States is a prime example. A suggestion for consideration might be equipping unit leaders with camcorders to document operations but also daily life. The enemy video tapes operations and then distorts and twists the information and images to misinform the world. What if we had documented video footage of the same operations which refuted what our enemies say? By the way, that is not enough, we have to get our images out FIRST! The first images broadcast become reality to viewers. If we wait until we see the enemy’s images, we are being reactive and we have already squandered the opportunity.

Frontier 6 is Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV, Commanding General of the Combined Arms Center at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, the command that oversees the Command and General Staff College and 17 other schools, centers, and training programs located throughout the United States. The Combined Arms Center is also responsible for: development of the Army's doctrinal manuals, training of the Army's commissioned and noncommissioned officers, oversight of major collective training exercises, integration of battle command systems and concepts, and supervision of the Army's Center for the collection and dissemination of lessons learned.

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Update: SWJ Editors Links

Let Soldiers Blog, Post YouTube Videos, General Says - Greg Grant, Government Executive

Top General: Let Soldiers Blog - Noah Shachtman, Danger Room

Score One for Soldier Blogs - Mike Gilbert, News Tribune

More War Blogging - Spencer Ackerman, Washington Independent

Required Reading 01/31/2008 - Michael Goldfarb, Weekly Standard

Discuss - Small Wars Council

Comments (12)

marct [TypeKey Profile Page]:

An excellent commentary on what is needed. Thank you for this post. Given the power and spread of the new media, I am really glad to see that this battlefield is being taken seriously.

Personally, I would argue that some form of new media training should be included right at the start of a soldier's career. Many people come in knowing a lot about the new media: it's uses, abuses and culture. I believe that this is as much a "critical skill" as the ability to shoot a rifle accurately was 100 years ago (and still is today).

Today's battlefield is increasingly amongst those traditionally termed "non-combatants": they vote, provide "aid and comfort" and change global perceptions by their musings on blogs, discussion boards and forums. Telling our soldiers that they are not allowed to "fight" in this field is analogically equivalent to tying one hand behind their backs.

Much of enemy operations in Iraq were focused on a PR strategy. Most attacks were militarily insignificant. The majority of attacks were against non combatants at "strategic" ice cream pallors, and standing in line for job or attending worship services.

Where we have really done a poor job is in focusing attention on the war crimes aspects of these enemy operations. The enemy war crime of not wearing an identifiable uniform is never mentioned in stories where our troops accidentally kill non combatants.

Much of the media adopted the enemy story line on their attacks focusing on our failure to stop them rather than the war crimes of the enemy in attacking non combatants. But, it was exactly this conduct that turned Iraqis against the enemy and caused them to rally to our side.

Hopefully, getting the troops involved will change the discussion to what is really significant about the enemy actions and our response.

The YouTube clips have been great. I would also like to see some of the UAV footage on significant events if it can be done without compromising operational security. These clips can add context that explains what units faced during particular operations.

Timeliness should also be a concern. Too often it took several news cycles to respond to enemy charges, by which time more charges had been made and people may have forgotten about the original one by the time it was shown to be misleading or wrong. When you have an enemy that claims half the war is taking place in the media, we can't afford to let him have several news cycles head start on the truth.

Thinker [TypeKey Profile Page]:

Agreed, this diagnosis and prespription is on target. Soldiers in these wars need to attend to control of three spaces - the physical battle space, the cultural space, and the information space. It may take additional tools to control the information space beyond media training and access to online posting. Each group of soldiers may need a dedicated public relations soldier who defines in the scope of each mission the required information outcomes. For example, a unit may have a battle mission to take and control a piece of territory, or suppress an enemy. The cultural goal would be to integrate that success with native populations, pre-emptively as military partners and as follow up with leaders within that society so our troops' gains are their gains. The information goal would be to pre-spin the story before engagement, co-orient those telling the story, and be ready to distribute and cement that story across multiple audiences. A well controlled information space allows our military to control each stage of the war story - using our terminology, our labels, our language, our philosophy, our check points, and our success measures.

Right now we're finding out how challenging it is to fight an information war in an open access world. But is not impossible to win this facet of the battle if we attend to it as closely we do combat victory.

I understand why Regulars need to be careful to NOT blame the news media for their overwhelmingly negative of coverage of the War in Iraq, but somebody has to bring them to account.

Tom Odom [TypeKey Profile Page]:

Great message for all in the Long War. We have been pushing the idea that the media is much like terrain; it is part of the battlefield and you have to adapt to it. No one I know likes humping a ruck through mountains. But most of us don't waste our time disliking the mountains. Instead we change loads or find another way to go. The same line of reasoning applies to the media. We need to quit wasting time complaining about what will not change and adapt ourselves to better use what is very much part of the battlefield. That adaptation can work to your advantage; not adapting will definitely work against you.

Ironhorse [TypeKey Profile Page]:

Concur 1000%. Thanks, Frontier 6.

I did get the feeling that this is speaking more towards the media "at home" than in country. Very interesting to me that a pamphlet is prone to be seen as a PSYOP or Strategic Communication product requiring pre-approval by God, while a JDAM can get cleared hot by the altar boy. As we continue to institutionalize "trust" and the many Es mentioned here, I hope it will extend to our non-lethal fires in country.

Matt Williams [TypeKey Profile Page]:

As a civilian, I see the following sentence as the most important element in the whole article.

"Unfortunately, the culture is such that the first time a subordinate makes a mistake in dealing with the media and gets punished for it, it will be the last time ANYONE in that organization takes a risk and engages with the media."

first time
subordinate
mistake
punished
risk
ANYONE
last time

It is disturbing - and on several levels.

Ken White [TypeKey Profile Page]:

It may be disturbing but it is -- or should be -- totally understandable. People don't like to be chastised and in any field of endeavor, if a co-worker gets slammed for something, others tend to avoid the cause of that slam.

There are three problems here. The one I cite above is the first, the second is that mistakes are too easily made with the media because they frequently do not understand what they're being told and worse, Editors removed from the scene frequently modify the words of reporters.

The third is that the media, generally, are ignorant of all things military but most of the journalists have an instinct for the weak links and will ask leading questions of those they deem most likely to provide an answer that will gain some traction and get exposure. I do not fault the media for this, nor am I faulting Private Jones or Lieutenant Smith. That's just the way things are. The media don't want and can't use good news, they look for problems and are deeply suspicious of everyone (except themselves). "Gotcha" is why they live...

That fact of life however is not tolerated well by a bureaucracy that (like all its brethren) is reluctant to admit mistakes or problems.

Thus, I agree it is disturbing (and would add that it needs to change, though that will be difficult) -- but it should also be understandable and seen for what it is; not an attempt to censor but merely a series of normal human reactions that are in competition with each other.

This is a smart and well-crafted essay. I concur with the sentiments expressed in it (it even uses good pedagogical techniques, the four E’s – encourage, empower, educate and equip). Every one of these should be done, and I am just as troubled at the idea of punishment for screwups here and there as anyone else. This atmosphere will prevent the application of the ideas expressed in the essay. Command structure absolutely must learn to be more sophisticated than that. The clampdown on Milblogs several months ago took the DoD in the opposite direction they need to be headed.

The essay is also smart in that the emphasis seems to be on letting the real story come out. This is different from spin. The boundary conditions for a Soldier or Marine – whatever his rank – telling his story, would seem to be circumscribed by rules for OPSEC. Perhaps there are a few more rules such as things that could be seen as detrimental to morale, but the University of Oklahoma study has found that blogs generally do no such thing.

http://www.ou.edu/deptcomm/dodjcc/groups/06A/capstone.pdf

On the whole, I consider it better for a warrior to have tried to tell his story and the MSM gotten it wrong or ‘spinned’ it than for the warrior to be inhibited from telling his story. The public can usually tell when the MSM is spinning things. Moreover, the timbre of some of the comments here is slightly troubling. For instance, with regards to “the information goal would be to pre-spin the story before engagement, co-orient those telling the story, and be ready to distribute and cement that story across multiple audiences,” I have to respectfully disagree.

Just like the public can tell when a story has been spun by the MSM, they can also tell when it is spun by the military, or military blogs, or official DoD press releases. Spinning the narrative causes a permanent loss of credibility. For example, in my interviews (and other conversations used to form views and create prose) with certain members of the military, I have found that Michael Yon’s views of PAOs is basically correct. Sometimes PAOs are useful and courteous and informative and given latitude. Sometimes, however, they take you on what Michael calls the “PAO happy tour.” “See, look here, everyone is happy … see, look over here, everyone here is happy too! We’re all very happy! Are you happy?” Happy tours are insulting and not very useful. The public always seems to identify with and appreciate raw and gritty reporting and information. They’re not as fragile as we want to make them out to be.

As long as OPSEC is not compromised, it is always best to let the truth come out, good and bad, positive and negative. We gain from both, since the good news and analysis is always a credit to the hard work of our warriors, and the bad can always be used as a learning tool. I understand that there are always exceptions (e.g., the idiotic and false reporting surrounding the Haditha Marines tarnished the careers of good men and should never have been done), but in the main, I think what I’ve said here is basically correct.

Thinker [TypeKey Profile Page]:

Hershel,

You have a good heart, but this is war. Either our soldiers control information spin or expect our enemies to control it. No middle ground.

Now, the story of a lone soldier telling his tale of survival in battle, that's a great play for the home front. But a combined information battle plan encompassing the story for locals, home front and internals can gain further goodwill/pacification and perhaps as importantly deny the enemy opportunity to shape the discourse.

Your thoughts?

Thanks for the exchange. Well, more people than not would deny that I have a "good heart." Those who know me have just voted and the nays have it by a wide margin. Based on what I know about me, they're right.

My point went to whether spin works. My claim is that it doesn't. I don't think the General is proffering that idea either. He can weigh in.

Rob Thornton [TypeKey Profile Page]:

I think a big part of leadership has always been lead by example. In this case having a GO post a blog is in itself something military members can point to. It also gets to engagement - we've known for awhile that blogs were helping leadership get some ground floor assessment on a number of issues, but I think many of them were a bit hesitant to engage openly because they did not want to create an artificial filter by doing so. However by doing so, they can show what is on their mind and get some great feedback from places they might not otherwise have access to - by adding their name - it provides the context around which the content might be framed.

We've proven here on SWJ that we can engage in a reasonably articulate manner, and respect each other in doing so to further some important discussions - even where we agree to disagree, I'd remarked on one of the private forums I was glad to see a couple of others (well known leaders) openly post recently, their comments and thoughts add a great deal to the discourse.

I hope we see more senior leaders engage openly on both this forum and others - be it an interactive one, or a one time post that others can weigh in on. Both permit broader public input and feedback then say a T.V. interview or remarks captured from a speech. There is a sense of conversation in a blog or a threaded discussion - a sense of engagement. The discourse creates additional thoughts that would not come to light otherwise - which is kind of the point I think we need to capture in regards to the media. Without our participation, we become background to a reporter's interpretation - and subject to a third person narrative. I think we stand a much better chance of presenting things correctly if we're either telling our story from the first person - me to you, or inter-acting in a two way (or group) discussion.

So - who else would we like to see on SWJ? Well - anyone with an interest or stake in small wars.

Best, Rob

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This page contains a single entry posted on January 1, 2008 1:50 AM.

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