On the "State of the ground Forces Article" by Flournoy and Reed.

In the conclusion of the article they postulate:
"In light of the recent testimony from Army Secretary Peter Geren and Army Chief of Staff Casey, Congress and the American people must ask: How much of a drawdown of troops in Iraq would enable the Army to move to a more sustainable rotation rate? Can the Army realistically recruit and retain a larger force without continuing to lower quality standards? Do we need to slow the expansion to keep quality high? Does the Army's expansion plan target growth on the right types of capabilities — those in the highest demand?"

The Army can only expand as fast as its retention and recruiting allow - however, the proposed expansion provides flexibility in terms of slowing OPTEMPO - more BCTs to rotate means less strain on existing BCTs, less “best of bad choices” with regard to activating RC units, more opportunities across the force to provide PME (your Military Education - CCC, ILE, BNCOC, ANCOC), ACS (Advanced Civil Schooling) opportunities, perhaps the opportunities to allow leaders a chance to work in the Inter-Agency, etc. This last bit is critical because the educational experiences provide leaders new tools & skill sets to draw upon - critical in our full spectrum environment.

Less strain bought at the expense of increasing the size of the force also reduces some of the stress on the individuals and their families. I say some because growing BCTs is going to be hard - standing up units is no easy task - filling them with personnel, getting them their equipment, and training a new unit is hard - however we have done it before - and we're pretty good at it. There will be some stress on the leaders, soldiers, families, installations, etc.

Overall its kind of a Catch-22, but its one where the consequences have probably been considered by Army leadership - no one knows the strains, or has a deeper interest in the health of the Army more then its primary stakeholders.

Is the Army going to get only the best and brightest American society has to offer - probably not - not only can it not offer the level of incentives required to entice them (its a not for profit organization), but the vast majority of them seem uninterested in serving in the Army for even a few years - slowing the growth is not going to change American pop culture – but it will increase the strain on the existing force as the Army and the other services execute to meet policy objectives set forward by political leadership (this is not limited to OIF - its what we exist to do)

Finally - with regard to the "right" capabilities, I'd originally thought specialized capabilities might be justified - primarily as a vehicle to obtain certain mind sets, cultural skills and attributes which could be sent back out into the larger force in order to get us more agile and adaptable. I also thought it might reduce the frictions associated with individual tasking of key leaders and skills in order to field various types of TTs or other teams that will be required for some time to come. While I still consider that an option, there is a downside.

First, it emphasizes an organizational fix in the DOTLMPF (Doctrine, Organizational, Training, Leadership, Material, Personnel, Facilities) scheme. I think our fix has to emphasize Leadership more then anything else because we cannot predict the future with enough certainty to commit to broader specialization then we already have. While our involvement in OEF and OIF offer some insights into the future, so do the many wars and possible wars which others are waging or prepared to wage in pursuit of their own objectives. This may mean that we inevitably will incur some type of learning curve as we adapt to both the environment in which future wars are fought, and in terms to the subjective nature of the war in which we are employed – but it also means we’ll have the depth and flexibility to overcome where a particular war and the wars/contingencies that may occur simultaneously fall out on the full spectrum of war. Again the surest way I beleive we can prevail in this environment is to invest in leaders who can quickly identify the requirements of their environment and the nature of the war as it exists, and then adapt to recognize opportunities and execute options which provide them advantages and put enemies at a disadvantage.

In my opinion we’re not a force that can only consider what DOTLMPF sets “are in demand” based on the current wars, or even the immediate future that we have a reasonable grasp of. We must be enduring and flexible (relevant and ready) to meet the often unpredictable requirements as set forth by policymakers that will create conditions under which ground forces might be employed – as well as the conditions that might occur as ground forces are introduced and our enemies interact – there is no fire and forget policy, and the enemy always gets a vote.

It takes time to build a quality Army/Marine Corps that has leadership through and through to meet the broad and deep types of policies such as those of the United States. A Navy friend of mine is fond of discussing how long it takes to build and replace ships – he often says that it is easier to raise troops. I had to explain to him that while it might be easier to gather up a group of men and women, hand them a rifle and put them in the field – that is not the kind of formations we have or require – to get to the point where units were in 2001/2002 takes time and a compilation of resources that also took time to build – behind every good BN or BCT is a host of military institutions and experiences that can take lifetimes to build. I bring this up because building new BCTs is going to take time – even if we can fill them – bringing them up is not like growing sea monkeys.

Best Regards, Rob