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Professors on the Battlefield – Evan Goldstein, Wall Street Journal
Marcus Griffin is not a soldier. But now that he cuts his hair "high and tight" like a drill sergeant's, he understands why he is being mistaken for one. Mr. Griffin is actually a professor of anthropology at Christopher Newport University in Newport News, Va. His austere grooming habits stem from his enrollment in a new Pentagon initiative, the Human Terrain System. It embeds social scientists with brigades in Afghanistan and Iraq, where they serve as cultural advisers to brigade commanders. Mr. Griffin, a bespectacled 39-year-old who speaks in a methodical monotone, believes that by shedding some light on the local culture-- thereby diminishing the risk that U.S. forces unwittingly offend Iraqi sensibilities--he can improve Iraqi and American lives. On the phone from Fort Benning, two weeks shy of boarding a plane bound for Baghdad, he describes his mission as "using knowledge in the service of human freedom." The Human Terrain System is part of a larger trend: Nearly six years into the war on terror, there is reason to believe that the Vietnam-era legacy of mistrust--even hostility--between academe and the military may be eroding.
Revenge of the Tribes – Rich Lowry, National Review
Since the 1990s, we have witnessed the revenge of the tribes. For hundreds of years, the result — with some spectacular exceptions — of a clash between modern and primitive armies was a bloodbath and disorienting humiliation for the primitive forces. When Inca emperor (and sun god) Atahualpa ventured out into battle in 1532 with a force of 80,000 against an invading Spanish contingent of 168, he was immediately captured and eventually executed. Now, tribes, clans, and primitives of all sorts represent one of the most intractable problems in the war on terror. Throughout the past century, the rules and goals of the West have changed. We are thankfully no longer as comfortable slaughtering people, and we no longer want to directly govern third-world areas. Our goal, on humanitarian and — since Sept. 11 — on security grounds is to create decent indigenous governing authorities where otherwise chaos would reign. And this is the problem — tribes and clans can’t beat back a conquering Western army but they can, quite naturally, frustrate attempts to govern them.
A Plan for Iraq - Ayad Allawi, Washington Post
Next month, Gen. David Petraeus, commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, and Ambassador Ryan Crocker will report to Congress on the situation in my country. I expect that the testimony of these two good men will be qualified and nuanced, as politics requires. I also expect that their assessment will not capture the totality of the tragedy -- that more than four years after its liberation from Saddam Hussein, Iraq is a failing state, not providing the most basic security and services to its people and contributing to an expanding crisis in the Middle East. Let me be clear. Responsibility for the current mess in Iraq rests primarily with the Iraqi government, not with the United States. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has failed to take advantage of the Iraqi people's desire for peaceful and productive lives and of the enormous commitment and sacrifices made by the United States and other nations. The expected "crisis summit" in Baghdad is further evidence of the near-complete collapse of the Iraqi government. The best outcome of the summit is perhaps a renewed effort or commitment for the participants to work together, which may buy a few more weeks or months of cosmetic political activity. But there will be no lasting political reconciliation under Maliki's sectarian regime.
The Burdens of General Petraeus – Victor Davis Hanson, National Review
Several governments have defeated Islamic insurgencies, but usually only after about ten years, and adopting policies of summary executions and carpet bombing or shelling. The Algerians in the 1990s finally stopped the so-called Islamic Salvation Army. The Russians decimated Chechnyan separatists. Syria’s Hafez al-Assad brutally exterminated several groups loosely affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, most infamously by the thousands at the town of Hama. But so far, no recent military has succeeded in defeating a radical Muslim terrorist insurgency, while subject to a constitutional government and an absolutely free media. In this regard, the United States — given its position as the world’s only superpower and recognized as the most sensitive of all countries to easy criticism — is especially at a military disadvantage. In Iraq, then, the question arises — can a liberal Western government defeat a barbarous Islamist terrorist insurgency while under constant audit — and remaining true to its own democratic principles? Gen. Petraeus must cope with the reality that should a half-dozen, or perhaps even one, of his some 160,000 soldiers, in the heat of combat, shoot a wounded terrorist, the damage done could rival losing an entire battle — a fact well known to a religiously zealous enemy that feels no such humanitarian constraints. Radical Islamists may be the enemy, but American forces in the field must downplay, not accentuate religious differences, if they are to keep on their side Muslim forces loyal to an elected government.
Surge Progress Deniers Beware – Clifford May, Washington Times
"The only thing this surge will accomplish is a surge of more death and destruction." That was the prediction of blogger and antiwar activist Arianna Huffington back in December of last year — one month before the Senate unanimously confirmed Gen. David Petraeus as commander in Iraq. "I believe... that this war is lost, and this surge is not accomplishing anything." That was the judgment of Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid in April — two months before the reinforcements Gen. Petraeus needed to fully implement his new "surge" strategy had arrived in Iraq. In mid-June, just as troop strength was reaching the level needed to carry out the revised mission, Mr. Reid added: "As many had foreseen, the escalation has failed to produce the intended results." But now those intended results are being seen — as even some critics of the war, to their credit, are acknowledging. "More American troops have brought more peace to more parts of Iraq. I think that's a fact," Sen. Dick Durbin, Illinois Democrat, told reporters.
Green Zone Blinders – Jonathan Finer, Washington Post
Late last month the Brookings Institution's Kenneth Pollack and Michael O'Hanlon, just back from a quick trip to Baghdad, proclaimed in the New York Times that "we are finally getting somewhere in Iraq." In June, Sen. Joseph Lieberman, fresh from his latest whirlwind tour of the war zone, described in the Wall Street Journal a "dramatic reversal" in the security situation in restive Anbar province. As Washington anticipates a September report assessing the troop surge, there is good reason to be skeptical of such snapshot accounts. A dizzying number of dignitaries have passed through Baghdad for high-level briefings. The Hill newspaper reported this month that 76 U.S. senators have traveled to Iraq during the war, 38 in the past 12 months. Most never left the Green Zone or other well-protected enclaves. Few, if any, changed the views they held before arriving. Reporters based in Baghdad rarely pay much attention to these visits, often skipping the news conferences that conclude most visiting delegations' itineraries. Since leaving Iraq last year, I've been surprised by the impact these choreographed tours have had on domestic discourse about the war. First come opinion pieces full of bold pronouncements of "what I saw" at the front. Next, the recent returnees appear on late-night cable programs or the Sunday talk . Those with opposing views respond, and soon the echo chamber is drowning out whatever's really happening.
The Yezidis' Horror - National Post editorial
The Iraqi interior ministry announced Friday that the death toll from Aug. 14's co-ordinated truck-bombing attack in northern Iraq had reached an astonishing 400. Sources outside the government insist that the dead could number as many as 500. This makes the assault the worst since the U.S. invasion of Iraq and, indeed, the worst single act of terrorism anywhere since 9/11. What makes it even more horrifying to contemplate is that it was perpetrated upon a peaceful, helpless and almost totally self-contained faith group, the Yezidi Kurds. Adherents of a poorly understood pre-Islamic religion, they number no more than about a half million worldwide. There can be few if any examples since antiquity of a people that has absorbed a similar proportional loss from any cause in a single day. Whether carried out by al-Qaeda (as the U.S. Army has concluded) or by other Sunni extremists, the attack was obviously meant to weaken the occupier's confidence in the success of the troop surge, the pacification of outlying areas of Iraq and the prospects for interreligious peace in the country.
Take Some Cues from the Cold War, Mr. President – Philip Gordon, Washington Post
When first proposed, containment was widely condemned as capitulation, and some critics went so far as to advocate preventive war. Fortunately, however, wise leaders such as President Dwight D. Eisenhower understood, as he put it in 1953, that "the colossal job of occupying the territories of the defeated enemy would be far beyond the resources of the United States at the end of such a war." For decades, critics from John Foster Dulles in the 1950s to Richard Perle and Paul D. Wolfowitz in the 1970s called for a more assertive and militarized approach to the Cold War. But none of these critics ever offered serious alternatives to Kennan's essentially defensive -- and ultimately successful -- strategy. Living with the Soviet threat was no fun for anyone, but doing so avoided World War III until communism collapsed. Today, containment means defending against terrorist attacks; capturing terrorists with police, intelligence and judicial means; and using military force only when it is likely to reduce the number of enemies we face. And it means demonstrating confidence that in the long run the terrorists are, as Bush says, "doomed to fail" -- as long as we don't inadvertently help them.
Harder Line with Iran Reduces Options - Georgie Anne Geyer, Chicago Tribune
Lest you cling to the impression that the Bush administration is looking for ways out of Iraq instead of digging ourselves deeper in, take a look at recent headlines. "U.S. Is Weighing Terrorist Labels for Iran Guards, A More Assertive Turn," trumpets The New York Times. "Iranian Unit To Be Labeled Terrorist; U.S. Moving Against Revolutionary Guard," headlines The Washington Post. Unquestionably the big story of the day was that the administration had deliberately taken one more step toward making Iran into even more of an enemy by applying the "terrorist" designation to what is effectively a national army. Until now, the word "terrorist" has been largely restricted to small groups, to ever-evolving cells and to individuals who use violent force of horrible means against often innocent people. To sow "terror" is precisely not to have the ranks of a regular army behind you.
Toward a Realistic Peace - Rudolph Giuliani, Foreign Affairs
The defining challenges of the twentieth century ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall. Full recognition of the first great challenge of the twenty-first century came with the attacks of September 11, 2001, even though Islamist terrorists had begun their assault on world order decades before. Confronted with an act of war on American soil, our old assumptions about conflict between nation-states fell away. Civilization itself, and the international system, had come under attack by a ruthless and radical Islamist enemy. America and its allies have made progress since that terrible day. We have responded forcefully to the Terrorists' War on Us, abandoning a decadelong -- and counterproductive -- strategy of defensive reaction in favor of a vigorous offense. And we have set in motion changes to the international system that promise a safer and better world for generations to come. But this war will be long, and we are still in its early stages. Much like at the beginning of the Cold War, we are at the dawn of a new era in global affairs, when old ideas have to be rethought and new ideas have to be devised to meet new challenges. The next U.S. president will face three key foreign policy challenges. First and foremost will be to set a course for victory in the terrorists' war on global order. The second will be to strengthen the international system that the terrorists seek to destroy. The third will be to extend the benefits of the international system in an ever-widening arc of security and stability across the globe. The most effective means for achieving these goals are building a stronger defense, developing a determined diplomacy, and expanding our economic and cultural influence. Using all three, the next president can build the foundations of a lasting, realistic peace.
Giuliani vs. Edwards - Max Boot, Contentions
The title, with its invocation of “realism,” which is used by so many to bludgeon President Bush’s policies, might raise hackles among some contentions readers. But never fear. Giuliani is most definitely not making a plea for realpolitik of the kind that Brent Scowcroft might endorse. In fact, he says: “A realistic peace is not a peace to be achieved by embracing the ‘realist’ school of foreign-policy thought. That doctrine defines America’s interests too narrowly and avoids attempts to reform the international system according to our values.” Instead of eschewing idealism, Giuliani pledges to pursue it, well, realistically: “Idealism should define our ultimate goals; realism must help us recognize the road we must travel to achieve them.” By contrast, John Edwards’s article in the same issue of Foreign Affairs is filled with pure pablum that will be familiar to anyone who recalls the Kerry campaign. He calls for a “strategy of reengagement” with the world, and even advocates greater military intervention in Darfur, at the same time that he advocates disengagement from Iraq, the central front in the war on terrorism. He even calls the “war on terror” “a bumper sticker, not a plan.” Actually, Edwards favors bumper stickers himself, writing, at one point, “we need substance, not slogans.”The only part of Edwards’s essay that struck a chord with me was his endorsement of an expanded nation-building capacity similar to that outlined by Giuliani. Edwards calls his version the “Marshall Corps” (a good name), and says it “will consist of at least 10,000 civilian experts who could be deployed abroad to serve in reconstruction, stabilization, and humanitarian missions.” At least that’s one area where there seems to be some bipartisan consensus.
Musharraf's Choices – Boston Globe editorial
Pakistan’s president Pervez Musharraf faces daunting obstacles in his quest for another five-year term. Because the Bush administration has backed Musharraf as a pragmatic partner in a dangerous region, the United States has a stake in the choices Musharraf will make and may be tempted to weigh in on his side. But the United States would best serve its own and Pakistan's interests by supporting the rules of the democratic game, not any particular party or candidate. Musharraf has hardly been an ideal ally. As a recent national intelligence estimate warned, Al Qaeda has been able to regroup within Pakistan. And as illustrated by recent protests against Musharraf's failed effort to suspend the chief justice of Pakistan's Supreme Court, Musharraf has alienated precisely those sectors of Pakistani society that ought to be most favorable to the values Washington preaches: rule of law, independent judiciary, and civil liberties.
Russia Resurgent – London Daily Telegraph leader
Now that Russia can not only pay its bills but also invest heavily abroad, and is able to use its energy reserves to blackmail its neighbours, we are paying the price for the coolness of that early welcome. President Vladimir Putin is a proud man, and one who cares little for the good opinion of his peers. But he is also a former Cold Warrior who knows that, if there was one weapon that enabled the Soviet Union to survive as long as it did, that weapon was fear. So now that he can afford to restore the strategic bomber patrols that were abandoned in 1992, he has done so; he taunts the West by engaging in cosy military exercises with the Chinese; his aircraft have restarted the game of forcing American planes to scramble from Guam. The message is that Russia is neither bankrupt nor contrite, and that east-west diplomacy is once more a potentially deadly contest of equals.
Can We Tell Heroes and Villains Apart? – Michael Henderson, London Daily Telegraph
When you read of Captain Dave Hicks of the Royal Anglians, who lost his life this week in Helmand province, it is impossible not to feel humble, and a bit ashamed. Humble, because most of us could not do what was asked of him; ashamed, because these brave men and women must live with the indifference of a Government that will not even equip them properly. Struck by rocket-propelled grenades and gunfire as he led a counter-attack against the Taliban, Capt Hicks refused morphine because he wanted to carry on fighting. The most senior officer to lose his life in the current struggle, he was 26. Heroism, one might call it. But we don't care much for heroism any more. The Ministry of Defence has refused to acknowledge the special nature of the conflict in Helmand by striking a dedicated medal for Servicemen, and the wounded are receiving such inadequate care that the Royal British Legion has felt obliged to remind the Government of its responsibility. Naturally, one wishes them well, but they shouldn't expect much from an administration that seems to be embarrassed by the fact that the Armed Forces exist at all. Who can forget Peter Mandelson's "joke" about "chinless wonders" on Irish television? It was clearly designed to win the favour of the audience (it didn't), and it revealed all you ever needed to know about that horrid little man. He should have been put in the stocks for a month.
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