The Hinge of Fate in Iraq - Tony Blankley, Washington Times / Real Clear Politics

I wonder whether, perhaps, in Gen. Petraeus President Bush has finally found his Gen. Montgomery. And whether Petraeus's new strategy and success at beating al Qaeda in Iraq and growing success against the Mahdi Army -- may be his El Alamein. Wars are curious things. Certainly, as President Bush and many of his supporters have cruelly learned, victories cannot reliably be predicted. But as Sen. Harry Reid, the congressional Democrats (and a growing number of Republicans) may soon learn -- neither can one reliably predict defeat.

Intelligence Needs Human Touch - Dan Thomasson, Washington Times

The day of the spy-in-the-sky approach to intelligence gathering may be coming to an end, plagued by cost overruns and systems so complex they take too long to perfect and probably, most importantly, are increasingly less useful in the age of terrorism.

The Real Long War – Christopher Chantrill, American Thinker

The great challenge for us, conservatives and libertarians, people inspired by the spirit of democratic capitalism, is the challenge of the "oikophobes." It means that the war on terror is not finally a war with Islamic terrorism, but an episode in the long war within the west that began in 1789. It is the war between the heirs of Burke and the heirs of Rousseau and Robespierre, between ordered liberty and the "oikophobic" alliance between rational experts, progressive activists, designer revolutionaries and out-and-out thugs.

Terrorist Threats in the Horn of Africa – Christopher Griffin and Oriana Scherr, FrontPage Magazine

As the Long War against the global jihad movement continues, there is a debate over the nature of the conflict: is it principally an ideological struggle, pitting jihadist dogma against Western liberalism; an organizational fight against the al Qaeda terrorism network; a regional struggle centered on the Middle East (or the Islamic world broadly); or a war with a limited number of charismatic personalities like Osama bin Laden, Abu Musab al Zarqawi, and Fazul Abdullah Mohammed?² It is all four, to some extent, but it is difficult to evaluate their comparative strengths and weaknesses against the capabilities of the United States and its security partners. This analytic muddle, which conflates counterinsurgency, terrorism, religious fundamentalism, and the risk of failing states, stands to benefit from an important tool known as net assessment.

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Continue reading "1 August SWJ Op-Ed Roundup" »

Paul Brinkley, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, and Philip Reeker, US Embassy, Baghdad, join BG Kevin Bergner, Multi-National Force-Iraq spokesman, in an expansion of the normal weekly Iraq update. Bergner starts off with a security update then turns over to Reeker and Brinkley who discuss reconstruction, economic and political efforts underway to assist the government of Iraq.

SWJ PRT Briefing Notes and PRT Background Links follow...

Continue reading "Iraq Weekly Briefing: Reconstruction, Economic and Political Update" »

Irrelevant Exuberance – Phillip Carter, Slate

In 1975, Army Col. Harry Summers went to Hanoi as chief of the U.S. delegation's negotiation team for the four-party military talks that followed the collapse of the South Vietnamese government. While there, he spent some time chatting with his North Vietnamese counterpart, Col. Tu, an old soldier who had fought against the United States and lived to tell his tale. With a tinge of bitterness about the war's outcome, Summers told Tu, "You know, you never defeated us on the battlefield." Tu replied, in a phrase that perfectly captured the American misunderstanding of the Vietnam War, "That may be so, but it is also irrelevant." Today, in Iraq, we face a similar conundrum.

The War We Need To Win – Barack Obama, Real Clear Politics

According to the National Intelligence Estimate, the threat to our homeland from al Qaeda is "persistent and evolving." Iraq is a training ground for terror, torn apart by civil war. Afghanistan is more violent than it has been since 2001. Al Qaeda has a sanctuary in Pakistan. Israel is besieged by emboldened enemies, talking openly of its destruction. Iran is now presenting the broadest strategic challenge to the United States in the Middle East in a generation. Groups affiliated with or inspired by al Qaeda operate worldwide. Six years after 9/11, we are again in the midst of a "summer of threat," with bin Ladin and many more terrorists determined to strike in the United States.

Do We Have Permission to Win in Iraq? – David Warren, Real Clear Politics

So far as I can make out -- I am not writing from Iraq, but I do make a splendid effort to follow the plot there -- the Americans are finally doing what they should have been doing all along. They are taking the battle to the Islamist enemy, or rather, enemies, both Shia and Sunni. They are enlisting the help of tribal lords and other local allies against these enemies, de-emphasizing the grand "Marshall Plan" giveaways, and re-emphasizing small, visible, unbureaucratic improvements on that local scale. They have become less timid about inspections and searches, and thus have taken bigger risks of offending people, in the knowledge that providing better security is the only thing that will get them loved. They not only have more men now in theatre, but are using more proportionally up front and fewer in the rear. They are patrolling frontiers more pro-actively, and turning no blind eyes to suspicious incursions. By using different techniques in different districts, they are also breaking the enemy's ability to camouflage.

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Captain Jeremy Gwinn, US Army

In today’s military, the requirement to conduct tasks far outside traditional specialties is an accepted reality. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have taught leaders across the services the need for flexibility and creativity both in action and organization. The recently published FM 3-24 (MCWP 3-33.5) Counterinsurgency (COIN) manual provides an excellent framework for leaders to understand the demands of the COIN environment and draw from recent lessons. With regard to organizing for COIN, the manual makes several valuable recommendations such as establishing a company level intelligence section and identifying a political and cultural advisor. My purpose here is to go one step further, providing additional, specific recommendations for company level leaders organizing for counterinsurgency operations. Some of the ideas presented involve actual changes to task organization, while others involve developing skills internally that, by doctrine, only exist in specialized attachments. These steps are by no means prescriptive, but intended as a starting point for discussion among officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) at the company level...

Continue reading "Organizing for Counterinsurgency at the Company and Platoon Level" »

Leaving Now Not the Way Out of Iraq – H. R. McMaster, London Times

One of the key strategists behind America’s last-ditch 'surge' in Iraq, Colonel HR McMaster explains his thinking to Marie Colvin, our award-winning correspondent, who has spent decades covering the Middle East and has witnessed the bloody reality of life in Baghdad. McMaster insists that ‘sustained stability’ is possible – eventually. But was the surge the right policy too late?

Adapt or Die - Greg Grant, Government Executive

The Army remains too laden with tradition, too conservative, too hierarchical and rule-bound to cope effectively with its new enemy. Counterinsurgency is small-unit warfare, so leadership and command must devolve to lower levels. The most important field commanders are sergeants, lieutenants and captains - their decisions have strategic implications. But the Army remains focused on making brigades stronger and empowering generals. The Army must change. Its focus must shift to platoons and empowering junior officers - captains like Ike Sallee, for instance.

The Joint Campaign Plan - Richard Lowry, Weekly Standard

The Joint Campaign Plan was developed and has been approved by the U.S. Embassy in Iraq and Multinational Force-Iraq as a top-level strategic planning document for both the Embassy and Multinational Force-Iraq missions. The Joint Campaign Plan certainly does not contain all the answers for the U.S. strategy in Iraq, but it is a living document and will be modified and amended as the situation there continues to develop. Still, the original strategy is a comprehensive plan that has both near-term and long-term goals in four critical areas--political, security, economic and diplomatic.

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AFPS - Jim Garamone: Speaking to Pentagon reporters via teleconference from Ramadi, the capital of Iraq’s Anbar province, Army Col. John Charlton, commander of 1st Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, said counterinsurgencies are fought and won “neighborhood by neighborhood, with the focus on protecting the population and improving conditions in the community.”...

Continue reading "OIF Update Brief - 3 August 07" »

Lower Expectations – Jonah Goldberg, National Review

It’s a small paradox of the war in Iraq. As support for the war inches up (according to a New York Times poll that so shocked the editors they demanded it be retaken), as the surge proves ever more encouraging and as Gen. David Petraeus’s confidence grows, enthusiasm for the democracy project in Iraq wanes.

Good News Bad for Some - Clifford May, Washington Times

It's tough being a member of Congress. Even if you're in the majority, as is Rep. Nancy Boyda, Kansas Democrat, you never know when your ears may be assaulted by outrageous and offensive ideas. Like what? At a recent hearing of the Armed Services Committee, retired Gen. Jack Keane said "progress is being made" by U.S. military forces in Iraq; "We are on the offensive and we have the momentum." The first-term congresswoman was so distressed by these remarks that she walked out.

Why our Alliance with America is Important – London Daily Telegraph editorial

It is worth reminding ourselves why the Anglo-American alliance matters. Many Europeans, and some Britons, believe that we are approximating our policy unconditionally to America's: that we have decided, in a dangerous world, to stick to the mightiest power, right or wrong. But this misunderstands the nature of our compact. It is true that America has an unrivalled military capability, with air- and sea-lift, advanced communications satellites and nuclear capacity. It is true, too, that our Armed Forces enjoy a degree of technical and even nuclear collaboration with the Americans that is unique between two sovereign states. And there is no dishonour in admitting that it is better to be with the world's leading power than against it.

All these considerations, however, are secondary and contingent. The Atlantic alliance rests, as we argued on Monday, on shared assumptions, prejudices and interests. Faced with the same problem, Britain and America - and, indeed, the other free English-speaking nations - tend to react the same way. Our shared heritage gives us a common belief in freedom and free trade, a common indignation at injustice, a common scepticism toward Utopian schemes.

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The Small Wars Journal / Small Wars Council participated in a Blogger's Roundtable on Friday with Philip Reeker, US Embassy, Baghdad. The subject was Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq.

Participants included Andrew Lubin of On Point, Grim of Blackfive, Dave Dilegge of Small Wars Journal / Small Wars Council, Austin Bay, Richard Fernandez of The Belmont Club, David Axe of Aviation Week Charlie Quidnunc of Wizbang and Jason Sigger of Armchair Generalist

As soon as DoD posts the transcript of this roundtable we will place a link here.

SWJ BLUF (On Edit - this is my take-away from the roundtable - opinion on the matter)

The PRTs are a critical component of the population-centric “new strategy” for Iraq to include one of its tactical elements – “the surge”. Criticisms of those executing the grassroots (local level) nature of the PRT program are not only unwarranted, they are detrimental to the success of ongoing operations.

A reality check boils down to reconciliation on a national level is not moving forward – those “in-country” are painfully aware of the “Washington Clock” and are exploiting the only viable option available - working at the local level to provide at least a solid base in terms of rule of law, infrastructure, economic development, governance, and public diplomacy. National-level reconciliation might very well be enabled by these grassroots efforts.

Hindsight 20 / 20 as it is, maybe a bottom-up approach should have been a lynchpin of OIF from the very beginning...

Continue reading "Blogger's Roundtable: PRTs in Iraq" »

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Finally, Some Honesty about the Iraq Mess – Joseph Galloway, Kansas City Star

The Bush administration and the Pentagon were rocked this week by an unfamiliar outburst of public truth-telling by the admiral President Bush has nominated to be the next chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The simple, stark answers on the future of the surge and the prospects of “winning” the war in Iraq that Adm. Mike Mullen gave to the Senate Armed Services Committee came hard on the heels of another embarrassing episode of truthfulness by FBI Director Robert Mueller in the matter of Attorney General Alberto Gonzales.

Defeatism Defeated? - Thomas Sowell, Washington Times

If victory in Iraq was oversold at the outset, there are now signs defeat is likewise being oversold today. One of the earliest signs of this was that Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid has said he could not wait for Lt. Gen. David Petraeus' September report on conditions in Iraq but tried to get an immediate congressional mandate to pull the troops out. Having waited for years, why could he not wait until September for the report by the general who is on the ground in Iraq every day? Why was it necessary for politicians in Washington to declare the troop surge a failure from 8,000 miles away?

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The purpose of this posting is to alert the Small Wars Journal community about an excellent new book by Dr. Jeff Record of the Air War College faculty. Professor Record is no dilettante in this arena; he served in Vietnam as a province advisor before embarking on an academic career, which has been distinguished by a steady stream of short but potent books. His Dark Victory about the 2003 invasion into Iraq is a powerful indictment of the Bush Doctrine and the Administration’s conduct of the Global War on Terrorism. It is must reading, as is his The Wrong War: Why We Lost in Vietnam which the readership would find fascinating in light of Operation Iraqi Freedom due to the similar delusions in our decision making and weak partners in both wars...

Continue reading "The Proverbial Contest" »

The Next Intervention - Ivo Daalder and Robert Kagan, Washington Post

Throughout its history, America has frequently used force on behalf of principles and tangible interests, and that is not likely to change. Despite the difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan, America remains the world's dominant military power, spends half a trillion dollars a year on defense and faces no peer strong enough to deter it if it chooses to act. Between 1989 and 2001, Americans intervened with significant military force on eight occasions -- once every 18 months. This interventionism has been bipartisan -- four interventions were launched by Republican administrations, four by Democratic administrations. Since Sept. 11, 2001, the situations in which an American president may have to use force have only grown, whether it is to respond to terrorist threats, to curb weapons proliferation, to prevent genocide or other human rights violations, or to respond to more traditional forms of aggression.

Perceptions of Iraq War Are Starting to Shift - Michael Barone, Real Clear Politics

It's not often that an opinion article shakes up Washington and changes the way a major issue is viewed. But that happened last week, when The New York Times printed an opinion article by Brookings Institution analysts Michael O'Hanlon and Ken Pollack on the progress of the surge strategy in Iraq. Yes, progress. O'Hanlon and Pollack supported the invasion of Iraq in 2003 -- Pollack even wrote a book urging the overthrow of Saddam Hussein -- but they have sharply criticized military operations there in the ensuing years.

Antiwar Profiteering? - Ernest Istook, Washington Times

Some of the politicians who propose withdrawing our troops from Iraq have an ulterior motive. They want to stop spending money on the military so they can start spending it on social programs. If they succeed, an army of social workers may prove the only force in the world capable of beating America's military. Funding that "army" is a revival of the "peace dividend" doctrine that brought us a hollowed-out military during the Clinton administration.

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Continue reading "6 August SWJ Op-Ed Roundup" »

RADM Mark Fox, MNF-Iraq, BG Gen Robert Allardice, Commander, Coalition Air Force Transition Team, and Iraqi Air Force Commander LTG Kamal Barzanjy speak with reporters 5 August 2007.

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Continue reading "Iraq Roundtable 5 August" »

Richard Fernandez of The Belmont Club has a 'must read' post up concerning the recently released (30 July) Brookings Institution Iraq Index.

The Brookings Institution Iraq Index for July 30, 2007 contains an update of the indicators measured since 2003. The overall summary, based on an examination of the trends is "On balance, Iraq at the end of July is showing significant signs of battlefield momentum in favor of U.S./coalition military forces, but there is nonetheless little good to report on the political front and only modest progress on the economic side of things." However the report itself is much more informative than its summary. The statistics collected by the Brookings Institution describe the shape of combat and politics in Iraq and give us a greater insight into why the the political front is struggling and what the connection is between combat operations and the political arena...

Richard also comments on an earlier Belmont Club post (Half a Loaf) about the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq...

Continue reading "Iraq Index; More on PRTs" »

I'm writing to make everyone aware of an outstanding article on airpower's many crucial enabling contributions to Irregular Warfare. I think this will interest everyone given our previous exchanges on airpower and the COIN manual.

General Peck's article is a balanced, even restrained, articulation of what airpower can and has brought to today's ongoing irregular campaigns, and I highly recommend it. Gen Peck is the Commander of the Air Force Doctrine Center and Vice Commander of Air University. He brings impressive operational and academic credentials to bear on the subject, including his 300 combat hours in the F-15.

Continue on to find out more about Airpower’s Crucial Role in Irregular Warfare...

Continue reading "Airpower’s Crucial Role in Irregular Warfare" »

In the Middle of a Civil War - Gian Gentile, Washington Post

In late February 2006, al-Qaeda destroyed the Askariya Shiite shrine in Samarra. During the previous two months that my cavalry squadron had been operating in Iraq, my main focus was the technical training of the Iraqi national police and combined operations with them against Sunni insurgents in west Baghdad. Before Samarra, it did not seem important which areas of Baghdad were Shiite or Sunni or that the police battalions I operated alongside were almost completely Shiite. Before Samarra, I assumed that Iraqi citizens saw the national police as the security arm of the elected, and thus legitimate, government and that the officers had the people's support against insurgents.

Those Missing Guns in Iraq – New York Times editorial

American taxpayers are rightly prepared to pay for all the equipment our soldiers need to defend themselves in Iraq. What is harder to accept is that because of the Pentagon’s scandalous mismanagement, they may have been paying to arm Iraqi insurgents who are shooting at American soldiers. The Government Accountability Office reports that more than 100,000 AK-47 assault rifles and another 80,000 pistols that Washington thought it was providing to Iraqi security forces in 2004 and 2005 are now unaccounted for. More than 100,000 pieces of body armor and a similar number of helmets have also gone missing.

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In his June 2007 State Department E-Journal article, New Paradigms For 21st Century Conflicts, Dr. Dave Kilcullen of General David Petraeus' senior staff in Baghdad called for, among other things, a "New Lexicon" for better defining and more effectively defeating enemies which subscribe to the faith-based mantra of "Death to America, the Great Satan".

In other public statements and in several Small Wars Journal postings, Kilcullen entered very slowly, very prudently into the virtually verboten realm of attacking al Qaeda-style Terrorism in Islamic religious context, rather than in Western secular terms only -- referring to the AQ terrorists as "munafiquun" (hypocrites to authentic, Qur'anic Islam) and pointing out that "they call themselves mujahideen" but are doing barbaric things which are anything but holy.

To which this word warrior says: Spot on! Two small steps for a good man, two giant steps for truth-in-language and truth-in-Islam in the War on al Qaeda-style Terrorism -- a.k.a., Irhabi Murderdom and the AQ Apostasy, as this essay recommends as its most appropriate new names.

But even these two measured Kilcullen attacks on the terrorists' religious legitimacy were in conflict with the State Department's basic rule in such matters. As stated on page 25 of the US National Strategy For Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication, the official advisory is, in part, as follows: Use caution when dealing with faith issues. Government officials should be extremely cautious and, if possible, avoid using religious language, because it can mean different things and can be easily misunderstood...

Continue reading "General James Mattis - Attacking the al Qaeda "Narrative"" »

Surprise! Things May be Turning Around on Iraq War – Jay Ambrose, Washington Examiner

Maybe, of course, America will lose the war in Iraq, followed by genocidal mayhem, the rise of a Saddam-like, jihad-endorsing dictator, further, perilous instability in the Middle East and an increased risk of emboldened terrorists one day blowing up a city or two or three over here, in the United States. Or maybe not. Over the past week and more, testimony from official and unofficial sources - including the analyses of two Brookings Institution Democrats - has indicated that, believe it or not, the military surge is working, sectarian violence is lessening and that an out-maneuvered, outnumbered al Qaeda enemy is inch-by-inch being defeated.

Why Terrorists Aren’t Soldiers – Wesley Clark and Kal Raustiala, New York Times

The line between soldier and civilian has long been central to the law of war. Today that line is being blurred in the struggle against transnational terrorists. Since 9/11 the Bush administration has sought to categorize members of Al Qaeda and other jihadists as “unlawful combatants” rather than treat them as criminals. The federal courts are increasingly wary of this approach, and rightly so. In a stinging rebuke, this summer a federal appeals court in Richmond, Va., struck down the government’s indefinite detention of a civilian, Ali al-Marri, by the military. The case illustrates once again the pitfalls of our current approach.

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A New Realism – Bill Richardson, Harvard International Review

US foreign policymakers face novel challenges in the 21st century. Jihadists and environmental crises have replaced armies and missiles as the greatest threats, and globalization has eroded the significance of national borders. Many problems that were once national are now global, and dangers that once came only from states now come also from societies—not from hostile governments, but from hostile individuals or from impersonal social trends, such as the consumption of fossil fuels. Despite this sea change of new challenges, there have been only ripples of new thinking about how to address them. While the problems have become largely global and societal, the solutions have not changed accordingly. The United States must craft a new foreign policy adapted to a world of complex global challenges which require thoughtful and global solutions.

Challenging the Joint Chiefs – Washington Times editorial

A significant military readiness deficit, the weight of ongoing Iraqi operations, preparation for eventual withdrawal of troops from Iraq, the Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan and an emboldened Iran are just a few of the serious problems the next chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will face. This doesn't even bring us to a nuclear North Korea, recent Russian hostility to the West or continuing turmoil in the Gaza Strip. President Bush has turned to Adm. Michael Mullen and Marine Corps Gen. James E. Cartwright as chairman and vice chairman. Their nominations are one of a rare few recent executive decisions applauded by both Democrats and Republicans. With good reason, since both men have earned confidence beyond their immediate circles. We expect their tenure to be difficult.

Generals Don’t Need a Watchdog – Jack Jacobs, New York Times

By now, most Americans know the story of Cpl. Pat Tillman. He bravely chose military service rather than the National Football League, and he was killed in Afghanistan in 2004 by fire from his comrades. Sadly, Corporal Tillman’s death comes with another unhappy legacy: a ludicrous change in the Army regulation that deals with reporting casualties. With this change, the Army now requires a formal, independent investigation into the death of every American in a hostile area. If this provision had been in place when we began our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, there would have been about 3,700 investigations by now. The American losses in Vietnam would have required more than 58,000 inquiries. And if the regulation had existed in World War II, we would have conducted 400,000 investigations, requiring perhaps as many investigating officers as we now have troops in Iraq.

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By William S. McCallister

Concerning my SWJ Blog post - The MEF Engagement Model and Al Qaeda – Brian H. comments:

I think the analysis is somewhat overblown and abstract. There are other forces at play, now, in particular the existence of a central government which is selected formally by democratic means. The current compromise with sectarian or tribal blocs is unstable and will gradually or quickly erode under the pressure to actually perform. This provides a kind of power base for the Sattars of the world which is distinct from the traditional system; specifically, the ability to bridge the needs and wishes of a populace and the power levers and structures of a formal central government (and/or provincial government, as elections for those proceed.)

So the dynamics of tribal dominance and power-playing will probably fall into a degree of eclipse as it becomes clear they cannot access resources and make enduring agreements with wider communities inside Iraq. It will be telling if Sattar makes a move to become an "independent" player in the democratic mode. This would signal that evolution is proceeding apace.

As my reply is rather long for the comments section at the original site I’ll post it here...

Continue reading "A Means to Structure Analysis" »

Links to two recent DoD / MNF-I Blogger’s Roundtables that the SWJ was unable to participate in:

8 August - U.S. Soldiers Partner With Iraqi Troops in Mahmudiyah with U. S. Army Lt. Col. Robert Morschauser.

AFPS (Donna Miles) - U.S. soldiers leading operations in and around Mahmudiyah, Iraq, have “cracked the code when it comes to working with the Iraqi army,” their task force commander said today.

Army Lt. Col. Morschauser, battalion commander for the 10th Mountain Division’s 2nd Brigade, 2nd Battalion, 15th Artillery, said his unit is doing more than simply training Iraqi soldiers. It’s partnering with them at all levels – and yielding results.

“Our unit is heavily focused on the extremely important task of supporting and advising and providing advanced training to our Iraqi army partners so that they can operate autonomously in the near future,” he said from Mahmudiyah during a conference call with online journalists and “bloggers.”

That focus isn’t limited to military transition teams within the task force, he said. “Our brigade has placed our entire battalion toward this mission, rather than a traditional 11-man MTT.”

This arrangement brings a full task force of manpower to the training mission, enabling the soldiers to serve as partners rather than just advisors to the 6th Iraqi Army Division’s 4th Brigade, Morschauser said… More – Roundtable Audio – Transcript – Bio

8 August - Coalition Successes Mount Against al Qaeda in Iraq with U.S. Army Brig. Gen. Kevin J. Bergner.

AFPS (John Kruzel) - Coalition and Iraqi security forces captured or killed 18 senior al Qaeda members in July, a Multinational Force Iraq spokesman said today.

Of the 18, six were terrorist unit commanders known as “senior emirs,” and seven were either foreign fighters or weapons distributors. Troops detained or killed three cell leaders and two members who manned an al Qaeda media operation, Army Brig. Gen. Kevin Bergner told online journalists and “bloggers” during a conference call.

“There has been some tactical momentum achieved in July and into the first week now of August,” he said. “And we have continued to see the results of some of those successful operations.”

The most noteworthy terrorist nabbed recently is al Qaeda’s No. 1 Iraqi operative, Khaled al Mashhadani, whom coalition forces captured July 4, the general said. Mashhadani rose through the al Qaeda ranks by directing media and communications operations, and he helped create an online virtual organization called the Islamic State of Iraq, Bergner said in a previous briefing… More – Roundtable Audio – Transcript - Briefing Slide - Bio

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Continue reading "8 August Blogger's Roundtables" »

Excerpts from recent posts by Max Boot (War Made New and The Savage Wars of Peace) at Commentary Magazine’s blog Contentions...

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‘Get it Done’ – Peggy Noonan, Wall Street Journal

In the lives of interesting people, there are bound to be interesting events. This is about one in the life of Gen. David Petraeus, commander of U.S. troops in Iraq. Gen. Petraeus of course will be all over television in September, reporting to Congress on the war, and America will be getting used to him. He is not in an easy position. The left and most Democrats are invested in the idea of Iraq as disaster. The right and most Republicans placed their bets on the president and the decision to invade. Normal Americans just want Iraq handled. They want America to succeed: for the war to end in a way and time that prove if possible that the Iraq endeavor helped the world, or us, or didn't make things worse for the world, or us. My hunch: The American people have concluded the war was a mistake, but know from their own lives that mistakes can be salvaged, and sometimes turned to good.

Remembering Partition – Fred Kaplan, Slate

Next week marks the 60th anniversary of the partition of India. Two new books on the subject—Yasmin Khan's The Great Partition and Alex von Tunzelmann's Indian Summer—are reviewed in recent issues of the Economist and The New Yorker, respectively. And though neither review mentions today's Iraq, (except, at most, in passing), the parallels are ominous and inescapable. Anyone who believes that U.S. troops can simply and suddenly leave Iraq without risk of unleashing great horror—or who regards religious or ethnic partition as a solution instead of a desperate ploy—should look back at the summer of 1947, when the British Empire packed up and India fulfilled its "tryst with destiny" (as Jawaharlal Nehru described its awakening to independence), only to plunge into a monstrous spree of ethnic cleansing (12 million people uprooted, as many as 1 million murdered) that continues to take its toll today.

Progress in Iraq – Phil Gingrey, Washington Times

I am currently in the Middle East on a fact-finding mission for the House Armed Services Committee, in advance of Gen. David Petraeus's September report on our progress in Iraq. I have traveled to Iraq on three previous occasions — I was here, in fact, just five days after U.S. forces captured Saddam Hussein in December of 2003 — but I have never been in the combat zone at such a critical and momentous time. Just two days ago, I had the opportunity to meet with Gen. Petraeus at his home. Although I cannot reveal the specific military details he shared during our meeting, due to the ongoing risk to our troops, I can share that his September progress report may be far more positive than what the far left expect.

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Fight Less, Win More - Nathaniel Fick, Washington Post

Welcome to the paradoxical world of counterinsurgency warfare -- the kind of war you win by not shooting. The objective in fighting insurgents isn't to kill every enemy fighter -- you simply can't -- but to persuade the population to abandon the insurgents' cause. The laws of these campaigns seem topsy-turvy by conventional military standards: Money is more decisive than bullets; protecting our own forces undermines the U.S. mission; heavy firepower is counterproductive; and winning battles guarantees nothing. The first tenet is that the best weapons don't shoot. Counterinsurgents must excel at finding creative, nonmilitary solutions to military problems.

Surging Politics – Victor Davis Hanson, Washington Times

Critics of the U.S. troop "surge" in Iraq called for by President Bush in January, early on cited American losses and then announced the plan's failure. Supporters have seen progress from new tactics (which, many argue, should have been adopted far earlier). Such wide disagreement over a military campaign in progress is not that unusual. Sixty years after World War II, historians, even with the benefits of hindsight, still argue over the cost-benefit ratios and strategic results of diverse battles from Operation Market Garden to Okinawa. The U.S. military reports that the surge in Iraq has helped reduce violence and defeat terrorists. But its officers also warn of manpower shortages, as well as commitments in Europe, Japan, the Balkans, Korea and elsewhere in the Middle East. We can't maintain the surge at present manpower levels in Iraq indefinitely. So how do we know whether the surge is working — especially whether its apparent present tactical success will translate into long-term strategic advantage?

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The US Air Force recently (1 August) signed off on its latest doctrinal publication - AFDD 2-3 Irregular Warfare.

Foreword

Our nation is at war. Warriors must plan and orchestrate irregular warfare as joint, multinational, and multi-agency campaigns, beginning with the first efforts of strategy development and concluding with the achievement of the desired endstate. As Airmen, we have a unique warfighting perspective shaped by a century-long quest to gain and maintain the high ground. We must be able to articulate Air Force capabilities and contributions to the irregular warfare fight, with its unique attributes and requirements. Employed properly, airpower (to include air, space, and cyberspace capabilities) produces asymmetric advantages that can be effectively leveraged by joint force commanders in virtually every aspect of irregular warfare. Irregular warfare is sufficiently different from traditional conflict to warrant a separate keystone doctrine document. While the fighting experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan should weigh heavily in the development of our doctrine, we intend this doctrine document to be broad, enduring, and forward-looking, rather than focusing on any particular operation, current or past.

Purpose

Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-3, Irregular Warfare, establishes operational-level doctrinal guidance for irregular warfare (IW). IW is not a lesser included form of traditional warfare. Rather, IW encompasses a spectrum of warfare where the nature and characteristics are significantly different from traditional war. IW presents unique challenges to military forces requiring innovative strategies for employing Air Force capabilities. Effectively combating and conducting IW is critical to protecting the US and its vital interests.

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An American Hajj - Charles A. Krohn, Washington Post

Muslims are obliged to make at least one trip to the holy city of Mecca during their lifetime. This pilgrimage is known as the hajj. It is mandatory for men, voluntary but encouraged for women. A basic dress code ensures that there's no visible difference between rich and poor, weak and powerful. This simple requirement unites the faithful. I started thinking about the hajj in the spring, when my wife and I visited nine American military cemeteries in Europe. With the exception of the Normandy American Cemetery, which attracts thousands, others are virtually devoid of visitors, especially American visitors. I wondered: What if every American who is able to do so made an effort to visit at least one American military cemetery overseas during his or her lifetime?

Wars within Wars – Richard Engel, Los Angeles Times

Despite what you may have heard, there is no "war" in Iraq. Rather, there are many wars raging through the Shiite, Kurdish and Sunni territories. These wars are complicated and deep-seated, with roots that, in some cases, go back centuries. But this is not what Americans are often led to believe. The perception portrayed by the White House and the Iraqi government in Baghdad -- and all too often reflected, I'm sorry to say, in the news media -- is that the violence in Iraq is the result of a straightforward struggle between two opposing teams: the Freedom Lovers and the Freedom Haters.

‘Doing the Right Thing’ – Oliver North, Washington Times

For three years, politicians and pundits challenged the president's policy of spreading democracy around the world. Can't be done — particularly in the Middle East, they tell us. Won't help to make us safer, they claim. It has become a mantra of the Left. To support their assertion that democracy has reached inevitable limits, they cite problems in Afghanistan with a resurgent Taliban and, of course, "the U.S. failure" in Iraq. Both issues were raised repeatedly with President Bush at his press conference on the economy last week. Despite evidence of progress on the ground in Iraq, the masters of the media — and the majority in Congress appear unwilling to desist in their attacks — and intend to continue their barrage of defeatism. The mainstream media all but ignored press releases from Iraqi and coalition commands on successes against both Iranian-backed terror cells in Baghdad's Sadr City and al Qaeda's network in northern Iraq, Salahadin, Diyala and Al Anbar provinces. Instead of covering these stories with in-depth reporting from the front, the potentates of the press launched a "shock and awe" campaign of their own. The target? The Iraqi parliament — for taking a month-long recess in the midst of a war.

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Colonel Anderson discusses recent Iraq related war games and how the situation on the ground may play out if the US withdraws military forces.

Nothing follows.

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Not the Way to Intervene – Paul Saunders, Washington Post

Ivo Daalder and Robert Kagan are frustrated that the United States has not been able to count on the U.N. Security Council to provide legitimacy for American military action, and they want the world's democracies to decide when intervention is appropriate [" The Next Intervention," op-ed, Aug. 6]. But the cure they propose is much worse than the disease -- and it could undermine not only vital U.S. interests but also American efforts to promote freedom. First, Daalder and Kagan fail to offer a persuasive answer to what they correctly call the "critical question" in winning international legitimacy for military action: who decides. Their answer -- "the world's democracies" -- is shallow. How will the world's democracies decide to endorse American use of force? Not democratically -- that would create a new General Assembly, a U.N. body even less willing to do American bidding than the Security Council.

Salute and Disobey? - Richard Myers and Richard Kohn, Mackubin Thomas Owens, Lawrence Korb and Michael Desch, Foreign Affairs / Real Clear Politics

Michael Desch's "Bush and the Generals" (May/June 2007) contains significant errors of fact and interpretation. One of us, Richard Myers, has direct knowledge and personal experience with the subject; the other, Richard Kohn, has been studying and observing American civil-military relations for 45 years. Bush administration officials did not, as Desch charges, "overrule" the military "on the number of troops to be sent" to Iraq or "the timing of ... deployment." Both were the result of over a year of questioning and discussion back and forth, and the final plan contained contingencies for different numbers of forces depending on the course of the campaign. To be sure, the combatant commander often found the probing and questioning of plans by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and the Joint Chiefs of Staff distasteful. But in the end, all involved supported the final plan regardless of the disagreements along the way.

Wrong Way Out of Iraq – New York Times editorial

As Americans argue about how to bring the troops home from Iraq, British forces are already partway out the door. Four years ago, there were some 30,000 British ground troops in southern Iraq. By the end of this summer, there will be 5,000. None will be based in urban areas. Those who remain will instead be quartered at an airbase outside Basra. Rather than trying to calm Iraq’s civil war, their main mission will be training Iraqis to take over security responsibilities, while doing limited counterinsurgency operations. That closely follows the script some Americans now advocate for American forces in Iraq: reduce the numbers — and urban exposure — but still maintain a significant presence for the next several years. It’s a tempting formula, reaping domestic political credit for withdrawal without acknowledging that the mission has failed. If anyone outside the White House truly believes this can work — that the United States can simply stay in Iraq in reduced numbers, while ignoring the civil war and expecting Iraqi forces to impose order— the British experience demonstrates otherwise.

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By Charles J. Dunlap

One of the most controversial issues today is the role of kinetic military force, and especially airpower, in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. While no one advocates the use of force except when truly necessary, the history of COIN efforts reveal that it is essential to success. For example, Professor Daniel Moran points out in his book, Wars of National Liberation, that in Malaya, the COIN operation most admired by many contemporary COIN aficionados, “7,000 guerillas were killed” out of total number “which probably never exceeded 10,000.”

Nevertheless, accepted wisdom these days is that reflected in FM 3-24, that is, “killing insurgents…cannot itself defeat an insurgency.” This is complemented by a related listing of “paradoxes” which include such aphorisms as “sometimes, the more force is used, the less effective it is.” (Of course, “sometimes” is a qualifier that renders it almost meaningless because virtually anything can happen “sometimes” – to include sometimes the more force is used, the more effective it is.)

The overall flavor of FM 3-24 is, however, most unambiguously reflected in its attitude toward airpower...

Continue reading "Collateral Damage and Counterinsurgency Doctrine" »

Welcome to Ramadi – Mario Loyola, National Review

I was not told about our trip to Ramadi — provincial capital of Iraq’s Anbar province — until the night before. This was in order to preserve “operational security”: We were to meet U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker and presidential envoy Meghan O’Sullivan, for a tour of what only a few months ago was the most feared insurgent stronghold in all of Iraq. No matter; no amount of warning could have prepared me for what I was about to witness. Back home, the media has apparently gotten bored of pessimism about Iraq; optimism is now coming into vogue. The basic story (e.g., “A War We Might Just Win”) is by now familiar. At its center is the “Anbar Awakening,” in which Sunni tribes that were once bitterly opposed to the Coalition have turned in our favor and against al Qaeda. That much I knew in advance. What I could not have imagined was the extent and tightness of the cooperation between the Americans and the local Anbaris — at every level. After four years of constant fighting, peace is unmistakably coming to Anbar province.

Fighting the "Real" Fight – Christopher Hitchens, Slate

Over the past few months, I have been debating Roman Catholics who differ from their Eastern Orthodox brethren on the nature of the Trinity, Protestants who are willing to quarrel bitterly with one another about election and predestination, with Jews who cannot concur about a covenant with God, and with Muslims who harbor bitter disagreements over the discrepant interpretations of the Quran. Arcane as these disputes may seem, and much as I relish seeing the faithful fight among themselves, the believers are models of lucidity when compared to the hair-splitting secularists who cannot accept that al-Qaida in Mesopotamia is a branch of al-Qaida itself. Objections to this self-evident fact take one of two forms. It is argued, first, that there was no such organization before the coalition intervention in Iraq. It is argued, second, that the character of the gang itself is somewhat autonomous from, and even independent of, the original group proclaimed by Osama Bin Laden. These objections sometimes, but not always, amount to the suggestion that the "real" fight against al-Qaida is, or should be, not in Iraq but in Afghanistan. (I say "not always," because many of those who argue the difference are openly hostile to the presence of NATO forces in Afghanistan as well as to the presence of coalition soldiers in Iraq.)

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How Not to Get Out of Iraq - Max Boot, Commentary

The current build-up of American forces in Iraq—universally known as the “surge”—was unveiled by President Bush on January 10. The earliest units shipped out in the middle of February, and the full complement of roughly 160,000 troops arrived only in June. Yet, by then, a vociferous chorus of voices back home—consisting mainly of Democrats but also of a growing number of middle-of-the-road Republicans—was already pronouncing the entire operation a failure and demanding a “change of course,” a “new strategy,” a “Plan B. Such a new strategy would of course involve not more troops on the ground but fewer, in response to the overwhelming impetus of public opinion to start bringing soldiers home. Nevertheless, while increasingly eager for an end to American involvement in the Iraq war, most legislators have continued to endorse what Senator Richard Lugar, in a much-heralded June speech, declared to be “four primary objectives” in Iraq. These are: “preventing Iraq or any piece of its territory from being used as a safe haven or training ground for terrorists or as a repository or assembly point for weapons of mass destruction”; “preventing the disorder and sectarian violence in Iraq from upsetting wider regional stability”; “preventing Iranian domination of the region”; and “limiting the loss of U.S. credibility. That is a very tall order. And so, all summer long, and even as reports surfaced attesting to initial successes of the surge, the search has been on for a plan that could accomplish these goals with a smaller commitment of resources. Does such a plan exist? It is worth surveying the major proposals to see if any of them offers a credible way forward.

On the Brink – Michael Ledeen, National Review

President Bush is annoyed that Afghan President Karzai and Iraqi President Maliki are both speaking about Iran in words reserved for an ally, rather than the main engine driving the terror wars in their countries. But if you look at the world through their eyes, it is easy enough to understand. They fear that the Americans will soon leave, and the Iranians will still be there. They know that Iran is a mortal threat, and they are now making a down payment on the insurance costs that are sure to come if the Democrats in Washington have their way. For extras, Maliki has certainly noticed that the United States is paying off the Middle Eastern Sunnis, hoping that the Saudis, Jordanians, and Gulf States will manage to contain Iran in the future. This cannot be good news in Baghdad, where the Shiites are struggling to put together a government capable of managing the country’s myriad crises. There are many reasons for the respect of Iraqis for our fighters, starting with the fact that the military is currently the best institution in America, and our military men and women are several notches above the politicians, intellectuals and journalists in moral fiber and bravery. You can see that in the way the military deals with the Iranian intrusion in Iraq and Afghanistan. The politicians, diplomats, and spooks downplay the Iranian role, reshaping the facts to fit their desire for a “negotiated solution” they know in their heart of hearts will never be accomplished. But our military officers, whose troops are being blown up by Iranian explosives or Iranian-trained suicide bombers or gunned down by Iranian-trained snipers, are laying out the facts for anyone who cares to know what’s going on.

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Recently released report from the New York Police Department’s Intelligence Division - Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat by Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt.

Preface

If the post-September 11th world has taught us anything, it is that the tools for conducting serious terrorist attacks are becoming easier to acquire. Therefore intention becomes an increasingly important factor in the formation of terrorist cells. This study is an attempt to look at how that intention forms, hardens and leads to an attack or attempted attack using real world case studies.

While the threat from overseas remains, many of the terrorist attacks or thwarted plots against cities in Europe, Canada, Australia and the United States have been conceptualized and planned by local residents/citizens who sought to attack their country of residence. The majority of these individuals began as “unremarkable” -they had “unremarkable” jobs, had lived “unremarkable” lives and had little, if any criminal history. The recently thwarted plot by homegrown jihadists, in May 2007, against Fort Dix in New Jersey, only underscores the seriousness of this emerging threat.

Understanding this trend and the radicalization process in the West that drives “unremarkable” people to become terrorists is vital for developing effective counter-strategies. This realization has special importance for the NYPD and the City of New York. As one of the country’s iconic symbols and the target of numerous terrorist plots since the 1990’s, New York City continues to be the one of the top targets of terrorists worldwide. Consequently, the NYPD places a priority on understanding what drives and defines the radicalization process.

The aim of this report is to assist policymakers and law enforcement officials, both in Washington and throughout the country, by providing a thorough understanding of the kind of threat we face domestically. It also seeks to contribute to the debate among intelligence and law enforcement agencies on how best to counter this emerging threat by better understanding what constitutes the radicalization process...

Continue reading "NYPD Intelligence Division: The Homegrown Threat" »

21st Century Barbarism – Washington Post editorial

On reason the debate over Iraq can seem so perplexing at times is that the nature of the violence can be so horrendous as to be nearly unfathomable. The inexcusable killing of civilians by insurgents and militias is so common as to go almost unremarked upon. But four simultaneous truck-bomb explosions in one small community in northwestern Iraq on Tuesday night, all directed against defenseless civilians, provided a savage and jarring reminder. The suicide bombers targeted members of the ancient religious sect known as the Yazidis. Women were killed at market; children were buried as clay and mud houses collapsed. At least 250 people were killed and hundreds more wounded, according to Iraqi officials, which would make the attack the deadliest of the war. Gen. David H. Petraeus, U.S. military commander in Iraq, blamed al-Qaeda in Iraq for the "horrific and indiscriminate attacks." Another U.S. general called the bombings "an act of ethnic cleansing, if you will, almost genocide." Extremist Sunni elements have been targeting the Yazidis at least since the spring, when a cellphone video was widely circulated on the Internet showing -- also unfathomable to most Americans -- a 17-year-old Yazidi girl being stoned to death because she had fallen in love with a Sunni man.

The Toll of Intolerance in Iraq – Boston Globe editorial

The truck bombings Tuesday that killed more than 250 members of the religious sect known as Yazidi in northern Iraq appear to reflect local, parochial enmities. Still, this atrocity casts light on a more diffuse phenomenon in Iraq that US policy makers have failed to comprehend and that cosmopolitan Iraqis have long ignored or denied -- a ruthless intolerance of the other. Beyond the obvious struggles for power and resources, old sectarian and ethnic animosities -- some from as far back as the 7th century -- are being revived. Long-dormant vendettas between Shi'ites and Sunni Arabs, between Kurds and Turkmen, or between Islamists and secular Iraqis have been let loose. Acknowledging this reality need not mean giving up all hope that Iraqis may eventually find ways to live in peace. Still, for American policy makers, the lesson is that an invading power cannot destroy the administrative and security structures of a fragile society and expect to harvest a pluralist democracy. The lesson for the disparate Iraqi communities is that if they don't find a way to live together, they will go on killing each other.

Serial Killers of Americans – Washington Times editorial

The Bush administration's decision to designated Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the elite military arm of the radical Islamist regime in Tehran, as a "specially designated global terrorist" (SDGT) organization strikes a huge blow against one of the world's most deadly jihadist groups. The IRGC, through its longstanding relationship with Hezbollah, has the blood of hundreds of Americans on its hands — among them the 241 American servicemen who were killed in the Oct. 23, 1983, bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon. In essence, SDGT designation will treat the Revolutionary Guards, who are heavily involved in obtaining nuclear weapons technology and supporting terrorist organizations, much the same as the Cali and Medellin drug cartels, making it possible to move relatively quickly to seize the organization's business assets — which are substantial. Federal officials said that the IRGC would become the first military branch of a national government to be included on the terrorism list — which generally consists of non-state actors.

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As a lead-in – to this much longer than usual SWJ Blog entry – I thought I’d post some recent news as well as recent and not-so-recent background / reference material on the establishment of our newest Combatant Command – U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and issues that will impact on AFRICOM’s mission.

Regardless of where you might stand on the value of establishing this new command, it is happening and we need to get it right. Getting it right includes ensuring that AFRICOM receives the necessary resources (people and funding) and is enabled to pursue operations utilizing all instruments of national power – read interagency…

Please post to comments below (or on this thread at Small Wars Council) any additional relevant material (articles, studies, presentations…) for addition to the SWJ Reference Library – Thanks!

Introduction

On 6 February President Bush directed the creation of U.S. Africa Command. The decision was the culmination of a 10-year thought process within the Department of Defense (DOD) acknowledging the emerging strategic importance of Africa, and recognizing that peace and stability on the continent impacts not only Africans, but the interests of the U.S. and international community as well. Yet, the department’s regional command structure did not account for Africa in a comprehensive way, with three different U.S. military headquarters maintaining relationships with African countries. The creation of U.S. Africa Command will enable DOD to better focus its resources to support and enhance existing U.S. initiatives that help African nations, the African Union, and the regional economic communities succeed. It also provides African nations and regional organizations an integrated DOD coordination point to help address security and related needs.

On 10 July Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates announced that President Bush had nominated Gen. William E. Ward for re-appointment to the rank of general with assignment as commander, U.S. Africa Command

The command will initially report to U.S. European Command, with initial operational capability scheduled to begin in October 2007. The command is scheduled to be fully operational by October 2008. The AFRICOM Transition Team is currently based in Stuttgart, Germany.

Much more...

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On the Move - Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, National Review

The new National Intelligence Estimate caught the media’s attention in mid-July by discussing an aspect of the war on terror that some analysts have warned about for over a year: al Qaeda’s regenerated capabilities. This finding should not have taken observers by surprise, but sometimes our understanding of terrorist strategies and capabilities can be myopic. If we are to avoid future surprises, it is worthwhile at this point to take stock of how we came to the present situation, and to understand what al Qaeda has planned for the future. Before 9/11, Taliban-ruled Afghanistan served as a safe haven for the terrorist group, a base of operations where it could train operatives and plan attacks. After the October 2001 U.S. invasion deprived al Qaeda of this safe haven, the group’s central leadership largely relocated to Pakistan. At the time, most analysts believed that al Qaeda’s leadership was on the run, incapable of effectively leading the organization. Further, most analysts thought the central leadership’s weakness would cause the group to become increasingly decentralized, and less dangerous.

U.N. Returns to Iraq – Austin Bay, Washington Times

Four years after an explosives-packed suicide cement truck blew up and destroyed the United Nations headquarters building in Baghdad, the U.N. Security Council voted unanimously to expand its operation in Iraq. The Aug. 19, 2003, terror bombing wounded over a hundred people and murdered 22. The dead included the distinguished Brazilian diplomat Sergio Vieira de Mello, who was serving as the United Nations' "special representative" in post-Saddam Iraq. Then-U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan had prevailed on de Mello to take the job. De Mello viewed himself as a diplomat with a lot of experience in "the field" — which he once described in an essay as a place where he had "seen the best and worst of what we have to offer each other." Everyone who has worked in the world's various hells understands that confronting them requires charity, mercy, discipline, courage and sacrifice. That was de Mello's point and why he went to Iraq.

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Professors on the Battlefield – Evan Goldstein, Wall Street Journal

Marcus Griffin is not a soldier. But now that he cuts his hair "high and tight" like a drill sergeant's, he understands why he is being mistaken for one. Mr. Griffin is actually a professor of anthropology at Christopher Newport University in Newport News, Va. His austere grooming habits stem from his enrollment in a new Pentagon initiative, the Human Terrain System. It embeds social scientists with brigades in Afghanistan and Iraq, where they serve as cultural advisers to brigade commanders. Mr. Griffin, a bespectacled 39-year-old who speaks in a methodical monotone, believes that by shedding some light on the local culture-- thereby diminishing the risk that U.S. forces unwittingly offend Iraqi sensibilities--he can improve Iraqi and American lives. On the phone from Fort Benning, two weeks shy of boarding a plane bound for Baghdad, he describes his mission as "using knowledge in the service of human freedom." The Human Terrain System is part of a larger trend: Nearly six years into the war on terror, there is reason to believe that the Vietnam-era legacy of mistrust--even hostility--between academe and the military may be eroding.

Revenge of the Tribes – Rich Lowry, National Review

Since the 1990s, we have witnessed the revenge of the tribes. For hundreds of years, the result — with some spectacular exceptions — of a clash between modern and primitive armies was a bloodbath and disorienting humiliation for the primitive forces. When Inca emperor (and sun god) Atahualpa ventured out into battle in 1532 with a force of 80,000 against an invading Spanish contingent of 168, he was immediately captured and eventually executed. Now, tribes, clans, and primitives of all sorts represent one of the most intractable problems in the war on terror. Throughout the past century, the rules and goals of the West have changed. We are thankfully no longer as comfortable slaughtering people, and we no longer want to directly govern third-world areas. Our goal, on humanitarian and — since Sept. 11 — on security grounds is to create decent indigenous governing authorities where otherwise chaos would reign. And this is the problem — tribes and clans can’t beat back a conquering Western army but they can, quite naturally, frustrate attempts to govern them.

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Today’s edition of The Australian offers up a profile on counterinsurgency expert, and Small Wars Journal contributor, Dr. David Kilcullen – Strategist Behind War Gains by Rebecca Weisser.

… when the invasion of Iraq was being planned, Kilcullen was one of a handful of senior military advisers in the coalition of the willing to voice a dissenting view. "I was one of a bunch of people ... who said 'Iraq is going to be a lot harder than you people seem to think, based on 20 years of experience doing it and studying it. It's going to take a lot more than you seem to be willing to commit."

It was a view that then US defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld rejected out of hand, saying Kilcullen didn't know what he was talking about.

But now, after more than four years of entrenched conflict with no end in sight, Kilcullen's doctrine of counterinsurgency prevails in Washington and on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq, where it provided the foundation for the surge strategy the Bush administration says is beginning to succeed…

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Seeing is Believing – Thomas Friedman, New York Times (subscription required)

Is the surge in Iraq working? That is the question that Gen. David Petraeus and U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker will answer for us next month. I, alas, am not interested in their opinions. It is not because I don’t hold both men in very high regard. I do. But I’m still not interested in their opinions. I’m only interested in yours. Yes, you — the person reading this column. You know more than you think. You see, I have a simple view about both Arab-Israeli peace-making and Iraqi surge-making, and it goes like this: Any Arab-Israeli peace overture that requires a Middle East expert to explain to you is not worth considering. It’s going nowhere. Either a peace overture is so obvious and grabs you in the gut — Anwar Sadat’s trip to Israel — or it’s going nowhere. That is why the Saudi-Arab League peace overture is going nowhere. No emotional content. It was basically faxed to the Israeli people, and people don’t give up land for peace in a deal that comes over the fax. Ditto with Iraqi surges. If it takes a Middle East expert to explain to you why it is working, it’s not working. To be sure, it is good news if the number of Iraqis found dead in Baghdad each night is diminishing. Indeed, it is good news if casualties are down everywhere that U.S. troops have made their presence felt. But all that tells me is something that was obvious from the start of the war, which Donald Rumsfeld ignored: where you put in large numbers of U.S. troops you get security, and where you don’t you get insecurity.

The Iraq Surge: What Next? - Greg Reeson, American Chronicle

As the U.S. Congress and Iraqi parliament enjoy their summer recesses, reports from military officials and independent analysts in Iraq indicate that President Bush’s so-called “surge” strategy for Baghdad and al-Anbar Province is beginning to have its desired effect. A serious reading of events since the final surge troops arrived in Iraq in June reveals that U.S. forces are making steady, if incremental, progress. The new emphasis on counterinsurgency operations and securing the Iraqi population has resulted in a nearly 50 percent decrease in major attacks (the spectacular bombings generally attributed to foreign terrorist elements), Sunni tribes turning against al-Qaeda in Iraq elements, some progress toward reducing sectarian violence, something resembling normalcy in several Baghdad neighborhoods, and improved morale among U.S. military troops who now feel they have a solid strategy and a commander they can trust. Yes, there are still mass casualty bombings and unacceptable levels of violence, but the trend is clearly toward an improved security situation in Iraq. Of course, this should come as no surprise to anyone who has been more than a casual observer of the performance of U.S. troops in the field. American military forces are the most capable and professional in the world and, given the right resources, can bring order and stability to just about any environment into which they are placed. But the improving situation in Iraq cannot be maintained indefinitely. The successes we are seeing are at the tactical level and are being paid for with the blood and sweat of American military men and women. What is required now is progress at the national level among the elected Iraqi leadership.

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Al Qaeda’s Travel Agent – Joseph Lieberman, Wall Street Journal

The United States is at last making significant progress against al Qaeda in Iraq--but the road to victory now requires cutting off al Qaeda's road to Iraq through Damascus. Thanks to Gen. David Petraeus's new counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq, and the strength and skill of the American soldiers fighting there, al Qaeda in Iraq is now being routed from its former strongholds in Anbar and Diyala provinces. Many of Iraq's Sunni Arabs, meanwhile, are uniting with us against al Qaeda, alienated by the barbarism and brutality of their erstwhile allies. As Gen. Petraeus recently said of al Qaeda in Iraq: "We have them off plan." But defeating al Qaeda in Iraq requires not only that we continue pressing the offensive against its leadership and infrastructure inside the country. We must also aggressively target its links to "global" al Qaeda and close off the routes its foreign fighters are using to get into Iraq. Recently declassified American intelligence reveals just how much al Qaeda in Iraq is dependent for its survival on the support it receives from the broader, global al Qaeda network, and how most of that support flows into Iraq through one country--Syria. Al Qaeda in Iraq is sustained by a transnational network of facilitators and human smugglers, who replenish its supply of suicide bombers--approximately 60 to 80 Islamist extremists, recruited every month from across the Middle East, North Africa and Europe, and sent to meet their al Qaeda handlers in Syria, from where they are taken to Iraq to blow themselves up to kill countless others.

The Surge in Action - Jeff Emanuel, Weekly Standard

Though ease is an extremely relative attribute in this case, hunting and killing the enemy in the Salman Pak region of Iraq (southeast of Baghdad) is, in fact, the easy part of the U.S. mission there. 'Terrain denial' artillery missions are staged in known al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) areas on a nightly basis, attack aviation assets are constantly scouring the area and firing on militant outposts, and, with the launching of the division-sized Operation Marne Huskey on August 15, major air-and-land offensives are being conducted in virtually every known insurgent stronghold and outpost in the region. But fighting is what these soldiers have been trained for, and what they have been preparing--both mentally and physically--to do their entire careers. Very few soldiers have been trained to carry out nation-building or ambassadorial missions, and in the case of an area like Salman Pak, which has seen a negligible troop presence since the initial invasion, trust and rapport cannot be improved or built on, but rather must be created and constructed entirely from scratch. This is an infinitely more difficult (and time-consuming) process, but one which is absolutely essential to the coalition effort in Iraq. The key to making it happen is demonstrating, on a daily basis, that the coalition has the best interest of the Iraqi people--from security, to services, to medical care-at heart.

The Good War, Still to be Won – New York Times editorial

We will never know just how much better the fight in Afghanistan might be going if it had been managed more competently over the past six years. But there can be little doubt that American forces — and Afghanistan’s government — would be in far stronger positions than they are today. How different things might be if the Bush administration had not diverted needed troops and dollars into the misguided invasion of Iraq, nor wasted years discouraging needed NATO military assistance, nor pulled its punches rather than pressuring a Pakistani dictator with, at best, mixed feelings toward the Taliban. Those are some of the questions raised in a devastating Times account earlier this month of how Afghanistan’s “good war” went bad. The battle against Al Qaeda and its Taliban allies is still winnable, and it is vital to American security. But victory will require a smarter strategy and a lot more attention and resources.

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Why Study War? – Victor Davis Hanson, City Journal

Try explaining to a college student that Tet was an American military victory. You’ll provoke not a counterargument—let alone an assent—but a blank stare: Who or what was Tet? Doing interviews about the recent hit movie 300, I encountered similar bewilderment from listeners and hosts. Not only did most of them not know who the 300 were or what Thermopylae was; they seemed clueless about the Persian Wars altogether. It’s no surprise that civilian Americans tend to lack a basic understanding of military matters. Even when I was a graduate student, 30-some years ago, military history—understood broadly as the investigation of why one side wins and another loses a war, and encompassing reflections on magisterial or foolish generalship, technological stagnation or breakthrough, and the roles of discipline, bravery, national will, and culture in determining a conflict’s outcome and its consequences—had already become unfashionable on campus. Today, universities are even less receptive to the subject. This state of affairs is profoundly troubling, for democratic citizenship requires knowledge of war—and now, in the age of weapons of mass annihilation, more than ever.

The Enemy Late Acknowledged – National Review editorial

Two reactions are appropriate to the Bush administration’s decision to place Iran’s Revolutionary Guard on the State Department’s list of terrorist organizations. First, one should cheer. Second, one should ask how much longer it will take the president to resolve the contradiction at the heart of his Iran policy. One should cheer because the Revolutionary Guard is among the world’s most effective forces for barbarity and chaos. Separate from Iran’s regular military, it espouses the revolution-exporting ideology of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Ali Khamenei (the latter of whom possesses ultimate control of its actions). It has killed Americans gladly, as at the Khobar Towers. Its current specialty is killing American soldiers in Iraq, through Iraqi proxies, with armor-piercing bombs. These things alone do not make it a terrorist group in the precise sense of that term, but its arming and financing of Hezbollah certainly does. Likewise the massacres of civilians that its aid to Iraqi militants has made possible. To designate the Revolutionary Guard as a terrorist entity, then, is to acknowledge reality. Yet there is something decidedly unrealistic in the idea that the Revolutionary Guard can be separated from the Iranian government as a whole. (The distinctions got even more jesuitical when it emerged that the State Department might not designate the entire Revolutionary Guard a terrorist organization, but simply its Quds Force, composed of special covert units.) There is no getting around the fact that the Revolutionary Guard — including the Quds Force — expresses the will of Iran’s highest rulers. If what it does counts as terrorism, they count as terrorists.

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Director's Statement on the Release of the 9/11 IG Report Executive Summary

Earlier this month, Congress passed a bill implementing some of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. The legislation, lengthy and complex, includes a provision dealing with the report that CIA’s Office of Inspector General prepared on the performance of our agency prior to September 11th. The act gave me 30 days to make available to the public a version of the report’s executive summary, declassified to the maximum extent possible. Today, well within deadline, I am releasing that material...

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Agonizing Choices of War - Harlan Ullman, Washington Times

Despite many positive reports about the progress of the military "surge" in Iraq, we, our coalition partners and the Iraqis face agonizing choices about what to do after the long-awaited reports from the ground commander, Gen. David Petraeus, and Ambassador Ryan Crocker are received in three weeks time — choices that at best can only limit and not end the carnage, and, if wrongly implemented, could inflict the entire region with greater violence. The shorthand of "money, boots on the ground and political power" can best explain the reasons for this looming strategic tsunami in Iraq. While any categorization risks oversimplification, the impact and consequences of each are self-evident. This calendar year alone, Congress will appropriate nearly $1 trillion both for running the Defense Department and the costs of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. For the new fiscal year year, which begins Oct. 1, $450 billion goes for the defense budget. Two emergency supplemental spending bills for the war add another $300 billion. And soon the Pentagon will be sending to Congress a bill for the costs of the surge that were never covered by prior spending, and are estimated at $50 billion to $100 billion so far. The approximately $800 billion to $850 billion spent for this year is about 6 percent of GNP, a level that is economically sustainable. However, politically and psychologically, the public and its elected representatives are unlikely to countenance that level of spending and the additional increases that will be needed for these wars for much longer — even as "supporting the troops" has become the new national mantra.

Another Test in Iraq: Our Aid to Refugees – Michael Gerson, Washington Post

The Bush administration correctly asserts that the entire Middle East, from royal palaces to terrorist camps, is watching the eventual outcome in Iraq to determine the state of American resolve. But the region is also taking a more immediate measure of America's commitment to its friends: our response to the Iraqi refugee crisis. And this, too, is a matter of national credibility and honor. About 2 million Iraqis have been displaced within Iraq by sectarian violence and contagious fear; another 2 million have fled the country for Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt and beyond. According to the United Nations, a steady flow of new refugees continues at about 50,000 each month. For the most part, these Iraqis are not concentrated in refugee camps but dispersed in poor urban areas of cities such as Damascus or Amman, making it difficult for humanitarian agencies to identify and reach them. The sudden arrival of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis creates tensions -- swamping education and health services, increasing prices and provoking suspicion. According to Kristele Younes of Refugees International, Lebanon has begun deportations. Some refugees in Jordan are in hiding for fear of raids. The eventual danger is clear: As some Palestinians have demonstrated, refugee populations can marinate in their grievances, succumb to radicalism and trigger broader conflict.

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Lots of odds and ends (and links) to include RCT 6 in Iraq, President Bush and Ambassador Crocker on Prime Minister Maliki, free online FSI language courses, SOF seminar at NDU and much more…

Key take-away from today’s DoD Bloggers Roundtable with RCT 6 CO Col Richard Simcock...

Grim had special praise for RCT 6’s Blog… And Col Simcock had praise for Blackfive’s RCT 6 e-mail campaign. Job well done all around.

Let me just say one thing about the e-mails. The response on that was tremendous. It was -- it literally -- it overwhelmed our systems over here. Within about -- I think it was two weeks, we had like 30,000 e-mails that came to us in support, and I would just like to say, we actually had to stop them because they were overwhelming our system, and we had to put them on a -- you know, refer them to our webpage.

If you can, I would appreciate you doing anything to thank the people for all their support that they gave us. The Marines over here really do appreciate that; that's something sometimes that gets lost.

They -- as I said, they watch the news over here, and a lot of times they seem to think that, you know, the people in the United States are not supporting what we're doing over here. Nothing, you know, based on the amount of replies we got back, could be further from the truth. It was obviously an overwhelming response, and I just thank you, because it came from your guys' follow-up on me asking that… I just want to thank you for the support that you all are giving us.

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... so you can read this:

Challenging the Generals by Fred Kaplan

On Aug. 1, Gen. Richard Cody, the United States Army’s vice chief of staff, flew to the sprawling base at Fort Knox, Ky., to talk with the officers enrolled in the Captains Career Course. These are the Army’s elite junior officers. Of the 127 captains taking the five-week course, 119 had served one or two tours of duty in Iraq or Afghanistan, mainly as lieutenants. Nearly all would soon be going back as company commanders. A captain named Matt Wignall, who recently spent 16 months in Iraq with a Stryker brigade combat team, asked Cody, the Army’s second-highest-ranking general, what he thought of a recent article by Lt. Col. Paul Yingling titled “A Failure in Generalship.” The article, a scathing indictment that circulated far and wide, including in Iraq, accused the Army’s generals of lacking “professional character,” “creative intelligence” and “moral courage.”...

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What September Won’t Settle – George Will, Washington Post

Come September, America might slip closer toward a Weimar moment. It would be milder than the original but significantly disagreeable. After the First World War, politics in Germany's new Weimar Republic were poisoned by the belief that the army had been poised for victory in 1918 and that one more surge could have turned the tide. Many Germans bitterly concluded that the political class, having lost its nerve and will to win, capitulated. The fact that fanciful analysis fed this rancor did not diminish its power. The Weimar Republic was fragile; America's domestic tranquility is not. Still, remember the bitterness stirred by the accusatory question "Who lost China?" and corrosive suspicions that the fruits of victory in Europe had been squandered by Americans of bad character or bad motives at Yalta. So, consider this: When Gen. David Petraeus delivers his report on the war, his Washington audience will include two militant factions. Perhaps nothing he can responsibly say will sway either, so September will reinforce animosities.

A Surge of War Support – Washington Times editorial

With positive military news continuing from Iraq, President Bush yesterday seized the moment. In a speech to the national convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars in Kansas City, Mr. Bush recalled the naysayers of the previous century who questioned Japan's suitability for democracy. He recalled others who regarded the setbacks in the fight against Communist aggression in Korea as evidence that that the war was a blunder. The first dissenters were wrong. The second were myopic. Many who oppose the war now see progress in Iraq after the "surge" of new troops. Sens. Carl Levin and Hillary Clinton have lent their voices to that chorus, and this poses difficult questions for their friends on the left. "We've begun to change tactics in Iraq, and in some areas, particularly in Anbar province, it's working," Mrs. Clinton said. Just about everyone today applauds the foreign-policy goals and ideals that undergirded the commitment to Japan and Korea more than a half-century ago. If the good news of the surge continues from Iraq, the president's critics will no doubt ask why he didn't send enough troops in the first place. It's a fair question. But if the good news continues there won't be a logical basis to continue the clamor for withdrawal.

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Prospects for Iraq’s Stability: Some Security Progress but Political Reconciliation Elusive

Update to NIE, Prospects for Iraq’s Stability: A Challenging Road Ahead

August 2007

Continue on for the NIE's Key Judgements and News / Blogs Links...

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The Iraqi Convergence - Charles Krauthammer, Washington Post

After months of surreality, the Iraq debate has quite abruptly acquired a relationship to reality. Following the Democratic victory last November, panicked Republican senators began rifling the thesaurus to find exactly the right phrase to express exactly the right nuance to establish exactly the right distance from the president's Iraq policy, while Murtha Democrats searched for exactly the right legislative ruse to force a retreat from Iraq without appearing to do so. In the last month, however, as a consensus has emerged about realities in Iraq, a reasoned debate has begun. A number of fair-minded observers, both critics and supporters of the war, agree that the surge has yielded considerable military progress, while at the national political level the Maliki government remains a disaster. The latest report from the battlefield is from Carl Levin, Democratic chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and a strong critic of the Iraq war. He returned saying essentially what we have heard from Michael O'Hanlon and Kenneth Pollack of the Brookings Institution and various liberal congressmen, the latest being Brian Baird (D-Wash.): Al-Qaeda has been seriously set back as Sunni tribal leaders in Anbar, Diyala and other provinces switched from the insurgency to our side.

The Next War in Iraq - Joe Klein, Time Magazine

At the Iowa Straw Poll a few weeks ago, just about every Republican presidential candidate who mentioned the war in Iraq cited an Op-Ed piece in the "liberal" New York Times written by two military analysts from the "liberal" Brookings Institution. They had just returned from a brief tour of Iraq where they saw many of the same things I saw on a similar trip in June. They saw the success our military has had in turning Sunni tribes against extremists from al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) but then extrapolated wildly, saying this was a war we "just might win." Predictably, this had the impact of crack cocaine on neoconservatives, producing a euphoric and slightly violent high. The conservative Weekly Standard scurrilously announced that it had helped dash the "hope" of war opponents that Iraq was lost. The Op-Ed will be cited continually in the discussion of the war that will accompany the September reports of General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker. Which is too bad, because it is fundamentally misleading about the next stage of the war. To be sure, the success in the Sunni areas is real, but it may have greater long-term significance in the region than it does in Iraq. We've learned an important lesson in Anbar province: the Islamic-extremist message is a loser. Most Muslims do not want to live without music, television and, especially, tobacco. They don't want their daughters forcibly married to jihadis or their sons shrouded in explosive vests. That is certainly good news, but it's not enough. Indeed, the campaign against AQI may be among the last useful missions for the U.S. military in Iraq. We could drive out every last Islamic extremist, and the country would still be in the midst of a civil war that is trending toward chaos. And make no mistake: the U.S. colonialist insistence on dictating the shape of Iraq's future—framing a constitution, training an Iraqi army and the threat of a permanent U.S. military presence—has exacerbated the chaos.

Another Vietnam? - Max Boot, Wall Street Journal

Ever since the mid-1970s, critics of American military involvement have warned that any decision to deploy armed forces abroad--in Lebanon and El Salvador in the 1980s, in Kuwait, Somalia, and Kosovo in the 1990s, and more recently in Iraq and Afghanistan--would result in "another Vietnam." Conversely, supporters of those interventions have adamantly resisted any Vietnam comparisons. President George W. Bush boldly abandoned that template with his speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars on Wednesday. In a skillful bit of political jujitsu, he cited Vietnam not as evidence that the Iraq War is unwinnable, but to argue that the costs of giving up the fight would be catastrophic--just as they were in Southeast Asia. This has met with predictable and angry denunciations from antiwar advocates who argue that the consequences of defeat in Vietnam weren't so grave. After all, isn't Vietnam today an emerging economic power that is cultivating friendly ties with the U.S.? True, but that's 30 years after the fact. In the short-term, the costs of defeat were indeed heavy. More than a million people perished in the killing fields of Cambodia, while in Vietnam, those who worked with American forces were consigned, as Mr. Bush noted, to prison camps "where tens of thousands perished." Many more fled as "boat people," he continued, "many of them going to their graves in the South China Sea." That assessment actually understates the terrible repercussions from the American defeat, whose ripples spread around the world. In the late 1970s, America's enemies seized power in countries from Mozambique to Iran to Nicaragua. American hostages were seized aboard the SS Mayaguez (off Cambodia) and in Tehran. The Red Army invaded Afghanistan. It is impossible to prove the connection with the Vietnam War, but there is little doubt that the enfeeblement of a superpower encouraged our enemies to undertake acts of aggression that they might otherwise have shied away from. Indeed, as Mr. Bush noted, jihadists still gain hope from what Ayman al Zawahiri accurately describes as "the aftermath of the collapse of the American power in Vietnam and how they ran and left their agents."

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Originally published in the Media Matters blog Altercations, the author has been kind enough to grant SWJ permission to repost his view on the recent New York Times op-ed The War as We Saw It.

Can They Say That?

Lieutenant Colonel Bob Bateman

I am a 7th Cavalryman. That is to say, within the Army, my personal regimental affiliation is with the 7th Cavalry Regiment. All soldiers are aligned with one regiment, though in this day and age that is largely an ornamental designation. In my case it came about because I commanded within the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry. Because of this, and because of my interest in history, I am effectively the de facto active-duty regimental historian. That is how I know the honorary colonel of my regiment, retired Lt. Gen. Hal Moore. You might know of Moore from the movie We Were Soldiers, itself based on the book We Were Soldiers Once ... And Young. Or you might have read the interview Charlie Pierce did with Mel Gibson (who played Moore in that movie) about his role depicting then-Lt. Col. Moore for Esquire. I assure you, Mel Gibson, even in full Hollywood action hero mode, is a pale shade of the actual man.

It was from Gen. Moore that I picked up my own code of ethics with regard to what I can and cannot (or should not) say in public. Specifically, when writing for the public, or talking to a reporter, I follow his guidance. Moore had a very simple rule for all of his soldiers with regards to the press, and he laid it out for them as they deployed to Vietnam in the summer of '65. It went something like this: "Talk to any reporter you want. Say what you want, but speak the truth. Do not exaggerate, and stay in your lane. Talk about what you know personally, what you have seen, what you have done, and then stand by your words. " These words of wisdom have guided me for the better part of a decade and a half now, and I credit them with keeping me out of trouble...

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The Work Behind Our Iraq Views – Michael O’Hanlon, Washington Post

How can one gather and assess information about Iraq -- collected on a trip or from any other source? Information from a war zone is difficult to attain and interpretation is open to many views. Unfortunately, much of the blogosphere and other media outlets have emphasized the wrong question, challenging the integrity of anyone who dares to express politically incorrect views about Iraq. Last week, Jonathan Finer criticized on this page [" Green Zone Blinders," Aug. 18] a New York Times essay that Ken Pollack and I wrote, as well as the comments of several senators, for claiming too much insight based on short trips to Iraq. Finer suggested that we did not leave the Green Zone, although we frequently did, on this and other trips, and he ignored how critical Pollack and I have been of administration policy in the past. Worse, Finer and critics such as Rep. Jack Murtha and Salon columnist Glenn Greenwald have suggested that our analyses are based on a few days of military "dog-and-pony shows." Our assessments are based on our observations as well as on years of study. That experience creates networks of colleagues such as military officers whose off-the-record insights can inform ours and who in the past have often told us when they did not think their strategies were working or could work. While hardly making us infallible, this also led each of us to oppose predictions of a "cakewalk" before the invasion and to join Gen. Eric Shinseki in criticizing invasion plans that had too few troops and too little thought given to the post-invasion mission.

Vietnam’s Real Lessons - Andrew J. Bacevich, Los Angeles Times

Finding in the debacle of the Vietnam War a rationale for sustaining the U.S. military presence in Iraq requires considerable imagination. If nothing else, President Bush's speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars earlier this week revealed a hitherto unsuspected capacity for creativity. Yet as an exercise in historical analysis, his remarks proved to be self-serving and selective. For years, the Bush administration has rejected all comparisons between Iraq and Vietnam. Now the president cites Vietnam to bolster his insistence on "seeing the Iraqis through as they build their democracy." To do otherwise, he says, will invite a recurrence of the events that followed the fall of Saigon, when "millions of innocent citizens" were murdered, imprisoned or forced to flee. The president views the abandonment of our Southeast Asian allies as a disgrace, deploring the fate suffered by the "boat people" and the victims of the Khmer Rouge. According to Bush, withdrawing from Iraq constitutes a comparable act of abandonment. Beyond that, the president finds little connection between Vietnam and Iraq. This is unfortunate. For that earlier war offers lessons of immediate relevance to the predicament we face today. As the balance of the president's VFW address makes clear, Bush remains oblivious to the history that actually matters.

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History Proves Vietnam Victors Wrong – Senator James Webb (D-VA), Wall Street Journal (28 April 2000)

… While it is correct to say that the American people wearied of an ineffective national strategy as the war dragged on, they never ceased in their support for South Vietnam's war effort. As late as September 1972, a Harris survey indicated overwhelming support for continued bombing of North Vietnam (55% to 32%) and for mining North Vietnamese harbors (64% to 22%). By a margin of 74% to 11%, those polled agreed that "it is important that South Vietnam not fall into the control of the communists."

The 1973 Paris Peace Accords, which earned both the American and North Vietnamese negotiators the Nobel Peace Prize, are largely ignored by present-day commentators. If we were to treat these accords as a binding international agreement between two still-existing governments, Hanoi would be held accountable for having taken South Vietnam by "other than peaceful means," and for failing to uphold its promise of internationally supervised free elections.

The humiliating end result of the communists' final offensive in early 1975 is usually placed on the shoulders of a supposedly incompetent South Vietnamese military. Little mention is made of the impact our "Watergate Congress" had on both its inception and success. This Congress was elected in November 1974, only months after Nixon's resignation, and it was dominated by a fresh group of antiwar Democrats. One of the first actions of the new Congress was to vote down a supplemental appropriation for the beleaguered South Vietnamese that would have provided $800 million in military aid, including much-needed ammunition, spare parts and medical supplies.

This vote was a horrendous blow, in both emotional and practical terms, to the country that had trusted American judgment for more than a decade of intense conflict. It was also a clear indication that Washington was abandoning the South Vietnamese even as the North Vietnamese continued to enjoy the support of the Soviet Union, China and other Eastern bloc nations. The vote's impact was hardly lost on North Vietnamese military planners, who began the final offensive only five weeks later, as the South Vietnamese were attempting to adjust their military defenses.

Finally, the aftermath of Saigon's fall is rarely dealt with at all. A gruesome holocaust took place in Cambodia, the likes of which had not been seen since World War II. Two million Vietnamese fled their country -- usually by boat -- with untold thousands losing their lives in the process. This was the first such Diaspora in Vietnam's long and frequently tragic history. Inside Vietnam a million of the South's best young leaders were sent to re-education camps; more than 50,000 perished while imprisoned, and others remained captives for as long as 18 years. An apartheid system was put into place that punished those who had been loyal to the U.S., as well as their families, in matters of education, employment and housing. The Soviet Union made Vietnam a client state until its own demise, pumping billions of dollars into the country and keeping extensive naval and air bases at Cam Ranh Bay…

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Post-Iraq Strategy – David Ignatius, Washington Post

The Bush administration, beyond the daily temperature readings about the progress of the U.S. troop surge in Baghdad, is making a subtle but important shift in its strategy for the Middle East -- establishing containment of Iranian power in the region as a top American priority. A simple shorthand for this approach might be "back to the future," for it is strikingly reminiscent of American strategy during the 1980s after the Iranian revolution. The cornerstone is a political-military alliance with the dominant Sunni Arab powers -- especially Saudi Arabia. The hardware will be new arms sales to Israel, Egypt and the Saudis. The software will be a refurbished Israeli-Palestinian peace process. "The message to Iran is, 'We're still powerful, we protect our friends, we're not going away,' " explains a senior State Department official. While the Iraq part of the story still has to play itself out, the new approach isn't premised on success there but the possibility of failure. Iraq will continue to straddle the Sunni-Shiite fault line. Rather than a bulwark against Iranian expansion, as it was under Saddam Hussein, the new Shiite-led Iraq will be a battleground. To the extent that it comes under radical Iranian influence, it, too, will have to be contained. Though the Iranians appear strong in this new alignment, the reality is that they have missed a golden opportunity to consolidate their power. Where they once stood to gain tacit American acquiescence to their regional hegemony, they now confront growing American resistance. It's an Iranian mistake that's likely to have lasting consequences, reminiscent of the Islamic Republic's failure to consolidate its gains in the initial years of the Iran-Iraq war.

What is the Plan in Iraq after the Surge? – Miami Herald editorial

The basic conclusions of last week's long-awaited National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq come as no surprise to anyone who has been following the news and understands the basic dynamics of war. The surge has achieved modest success for the obvious reason that the more troops one side puts on the battlefield, the better the chances of achieving tactical success, at least in the short run. What the NIE could not say, however, is how many more troops it will take to turn the tide and how long those troops would have to stay. Those are critical questions. Crucially, the NIE also found that the incremental progress on the military side won't matter much as long as the Iraqi government fails to make political progress. That fundamental reality is something that has stymied the Bush administration's policy in Iraq and has been clear to anyone who has been paying attention to what the nation's military leaders have been saying all along. On July 31, in a confirmation hearing in the Senate, Adm. Michael G. Mullen, President Bush's nominee to head the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified that unless the Iraqi government takes advantage of the ''breathing space'' that U.S. soldiers are providing, ``no amount of troops in no amount of time will make much difference.'' Last week, in a speech to the VFW, President Bush once again succumbed to the unfortunate temptation to inject U.S. soldiers into the political debate by insisting that they support the mission in Iraq. The clear implication is that anyone who doesn't support his policy does not support the troops. However, what the president himself doesn't say, or do, is to articulate a clear strategy, other than staying the course, for achieving success in Iraq.

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An active duty Army field-grade officer on his 3rd tour in Iraq, Small Wars Council member Patriot, discusses officer retention for company and field grade ranks:

I wanted to share some of my observations on an issue that has become a major topic for Army leaders – officer retention. In the Army we hear a lot about retaining company grade officers and there have been a number of actions taken over the past few years to mitigate the high demand for company grade officers with their requirements...

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Still Invested in Failure – Washington Times editorial

The media's coverage of two recent events — the release of the new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq and Sen. John Warner's call for a symbolic reduction of troops by Christmas — serves to illustrate the perverse symbiosis between defeatist politicians and a news media that is heavily invested in an American failure in Iraq. Read carefully, the updated NIE provides some ammunition for both supporters and opponents of the war, presenting dour predictions about the level of violence in Iraq and the ability of the Iraqi government to achieve national-level political reconciliation, but also pointing out that "measurable" security improvements have been made in Iraq since January and will expand modestly in the next 12 months with continued pressure on the insurgents. Buried in the final two paragraphs of the report is the following: "We assess that changing the mission of Coalition forces from a primarily counterinsurgency and stabilization role to a primarily combat support role for Iraqi forces and counterterrorist operations to prevent [al Qaeda in Iraq] from establishing a safehaven would erode security gains made thus far... A change of mission that interrupts that synchronization would place security improvements at risk." In other words, this last section of the report knocks down a key argument made by war critics: that we would be better off if we move troops out of combat against Iraq-based jihadists and into training Iraqi forces.

Don’t Fail Afghanistan – Los Angeles Times editorial

The United States is now at risk of "losing" Afghanistan, the predictable result of committing insufficient troops and money to that catastrophically failed state after the rout of the Taliban in 2001. U.S. forces are suffering sharply higher casualties as Taliban fighters surge back in, and drug lords are coming to dominate the political and economic landscape. The collapse of the noble nation-building experiment in Afghanistan would destroy U.S. credibility in the eyes of the world, shake global security and condemn millions of people to another generation of warfare and terrorism. And it would be all the more devastating if accompanied by U.S. defeat in Iraq. Yet the effort to build a stable nation atop the wreckage of Afghanistan can still, with great effort, be salvaged. This page has argued that Iraq's civil war is beyond the United States' ability to suppress by military means and that the presence of U.S. troops can only delay the bloody but inevitable political reckoning. Although it is unlikely that a workable political accord will be reached before the power struggle is settled on the battlefield, only the Iraqis themselves can prevent this calamity. All is not lost in Afghanistan, however. Unlike the Iraqis, Afghans are not engaged in nationwide sectarian warfare. They have a weak but legitimate government, a corrupt but functioning parliament and an elected president who commands broad international support.

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Through the NIE Lens - Jim Saxton, Washington Times

The Intelligence Community (IC) publicly released its take on prospects for Iraq's stability in the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Aug. 23. Many commentators have already recognized the NIE as either a glass "half-full" or a "half-empty," depending on one's perspective of the war in Iraq. Regardless, the NIE underscores a few noteworthy key points. The regional perspective of the Iraq war is sometimes lost in the exchange of commentaries and criticisms of the mission. I myself have been concerned with Iran's intent to use Iraq as a land-bridge to Syria, Lebanon and Israel. Iran would benefit greatly from being able to openly use Iraq as a conduit to provide support to Hamas and Hezbollah. Iran would also be able to more effectively aid Syria's objective to destabilize the Lebanese government. A rushed pullout of American forces or premature change in mission could create the conditions for Iran and Syria to exploit a weakened Iraq. The NIE says "The IC assesses that Iraq's neighbors will continue to focus on improving their leverage in Iraq in anticipation of a Coalition drawdown." It comments on Iran as a destabilizing force in Iraq, and on Syria's support of groups in Iraq to increase its own influence there. The Syrian-Iranian strategic partnership that has emerged — which includes Iran bolstering Syria's weapons arsenal and a commitment to share nuclear research with Syria — is already extremely dangerous. Giving them unfettered access through Iraq would clearly exacerbate the threat.

Iraq’s Last Best Hope? - Ivan Eland, Washington Times

Iraq's future as a viable country may require an entirely new form of government unique in its power-sharing structure, a government that will survive only if the Iraqis adopt a useful political trick devised by Massachusetts Gov. Elbridge Gerry in 1812. Time is running out. The United States probably will start withdrawing troops from Iraq early next year. More than likely, politicians will gravitate toward the Iraq Study Group's recommendation to withdraw about half of the U.S. combat troops and use remaining forces to hunt down al Qaeda operatives, train Iraqi security forces and guard the Iraqi borders. But even a modest withdrawal probably will trigger more violence, putting the remaining U.S. forces at greater risk. A better solution would be to announce plans to withdraw all U.S. forces. Getting it over quickly would limit U.S. casualties and provide the Shi'ite and Kurdish-dominated national government with a sober reality check that will force it to make needed concessions to the Sunni, which might prevent a winner-take-all civil war. The main concession would be an agreement to decentralize the country, creating three semi-autonomous states — a Kurdish state in the north, a Sunni state in the center, and a Shi'ite state in the south, with the government in Baghdad responsible mainly for trade and economic affairs and the conduct of foreign policy.

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MNF-I counterinsurgency adviser and SWJ blogger Dave Kilcullen was featured in a 29 August op-ed piece in The Australian - Our Leaders Must Match Iraqis by Janet Alberechtsen.

Alberechtsen opens with a preview of what President Bush should expect during the upcoming Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in Sydney and cuts to the quick in challenging those who “wish U.S. failure” in Iraq to answer two critical questions:

… Bush arrives in Sydney next week. Mostly, Bush's visit will attract open hostility from feral Bush-haters and quiet ridicule from many others. And the reason is Iraq.

Many have a vested interest in an American failure in Iraq. Not just the emotional anti-Bushies but also the more level-headed people who believe failure in Iraq is needed to puncture American hubris.

Those willing a failure in Iraq to vindicate their derision of Bush ought to answer two questions: Do they have an alternative solution? And what does a precipitate troop withdrawal mean for Iraqis?

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Watch the Sunni Tribes – Thomas Friedman, New York Times (subscription required)

When U.S. Army officers try to explain the challenge of rebuilding Iraq, they often talk about the three different time pieces they’re working with: Washington’s is a stop watch, where every second longer we stay in Iraq is a problem; the Iraqi Shiite-led government’s watch often seems broken, and you have to regularly tap it to get it to work; and the Iraqi Sunni watch always wants to go in reverse — back to Saddam’s day, when Sunnis were in charge. I’ve just bounced between Baquba and Balad and a Sunni and Shiite neighborhood in Baghdad as an embedded reporter with the visiting Adm. William Fallon, head of the Central Command. I don’t know whether the surge is working — too early, too short a visit. But I did see something new here, which, if played right, could help to stabilize Iraq and better synchronize some of those watches. It’s this: the willingness of the Sunni tribes, and key Sunni neighborhood leaders in Baghdad, to work side by side with the American soldiers they’ve been shooting at for four years in order to retake Sunni towns and districts from the Taliban-like, pro-Al Qaeda Iraqi Sunnis who took charge in 2006, when the undermanned United States forces pulled out of many areas and handed over security to unprepared Iraqi Army units. Ironically, a key reason violence appears to be trending lower here is because Al Qaeda’s “surge” in 2006 so frightened Iraq’s more moderate, occasionally whisky-drinking Sunni tribal leaders — the backbone of the Sunni community here — that they became willing to work with the Americans just when the U.S. surge was taking off. Warning! This important shift by the Sunni tribes could come unglued if the Shiite-led Iraqi government doesn’t start providing government services — water, fuel and electricity — to the Sunni areas the tribes have retaken.

Who's the Real Sectarian? - Harold Meyerson, Washington Post

Nobody loves Nouri Kamal al-Maliki. In his own country, the Iraqi prime minister heads a government of, by and for fractious Shiites, against which enraged Sunnis, among others, have taken up arms. In our country, which sustains him in power, both liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans call for his ouster. A National Intelligence Estimate finds his administration utterly incapable of settling the differences that are pulling his nation apart. The bill of particulars against Maliki is long and convincing, but it all boils down to this: The prime minister has done nothing to reconcile Iraq's warring populations and, to the contrary, seems either content or resigned to heading a government that consolidates the Shiite ascendancy in Iraq. His ministries are controlled by sectarian Shiites. Sunnis fear the government's police force, dread going to the government's hospitals and have given up on the government's ever picking up the garbage in their neighborhoods or providing any of the ordinary amenities that government normally provides. Over the past few months, not surprisingly, Sunni and nonsectarian parties have withdrawn from Maliki's cabinet and boycotted the parliament. Rivalries within his own Shiite community have also weakened Maliki, who, unlike such Shiite leaders as Abdul Aziz al-Hakim or Moqtada al-Sadr, lacks sectarian military legions to call his own.

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Some aspects of the war in Iraq are hard to fit into “classical” models of insurgency. One of these is the growing tribal uprising against al Qa’ida, which could transform the war in ways not factored into neat “benchmarks” developed many months ago and thousands of miles away. I spent time out on the ground during May and June working with coalition units, tribal leaders and fighters engaged in the uprising, so I felt a few field observations might be of interest to the Small Wars community. I apologize in advance for the epic length of this post, but it's a complex issue, so I hope people will forgive my long-windedness. Like much else, it’s too early to know how this new development will play out. But surprisingly (surprising to me, anyway), indications so far are relatively positive...

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The Former-Insurgent Counterinsurgency – Michael Gordon, New York Times Magazine (subscription required)

The American strategy to stabilize Iraq is outlined in a several-inches-thick document called the Joint Campaign Plan. The stated goal is to achieve “localized security” (that is, in Baghdad and other critical parts of Iraq) by the summer of 2008 and to establish “sustainable security” nationwide by the summer of 2009. War critics at home have bemoaned the two-year time line, but meeting the objectives in such a short period would be an extraordinary accomplishment. The mission has been made all the more complex by the fact that the United States’ adversaries in Iraq are well aware that the “surge” of American reinforcements has placed a considerable strain on the Army and Marines and will probably run its course by early 2008. Yet the surge has also provided a chance to forge alliances between American forces and Sunnis who were fed up with Al Qaeda militants and uneasy about the Shiite-dominated government. The additional troops have enabled the United States to push into Sunni areas where American forces had not operated for many months and to stay there rather than sweeping through and leaving. Before leaving Baghdad to embed with the troops, I stopped by the fortified Green Zone to talk with Maj. Gen. Paul Newton. A British officer with eight tours of duty in Northern Ireland, Newton recently joined the staff of Gen. David H. Petraeus, the top American commander in Iraq, and headed the Force Strategic Engagement Cell with Donald Blome, a senior aide to the U.S. ambassador, Ryan C. Crocker. It was part of the determined effort to exploit the willingness of local Sunnis to work with the American-led coalition. To my ear, it sometimes sounded as if the command had an assistant secretary of war for peace. Yet this effort was being carried out with hardheaded practicality and was potentially of enormous significance. The basic strategy was to persuade sheiks and former insurgents to submit lists of potential recruits for local security forces.

The Washington Clock Runs Down - Kyle Teamey, Washington Post

Mismanagement by the Bush administration and an unquestioning Republican Congress may have set the stage for the sectarian violence of 2006, but Democratic efforts to pull out troops, cut off support or link support to unattainable benchmarks have been equally damaging to attempts to get militias and insurgents to lay down their arms. In the long run, neither Americans nor Iraqis will benefit from a hasty withdrawal of U.S. troops. Yet, because Iraq has become a political liability for Republicans, and because Democrats increasingly view and treat it as an opportunity, the timing associated with both parties' Iraq policies centers on the 2008 campaign calendar, not on the realities of the war. Gen. Petraeus put it this way in April: "The Washington clock is moving more rapidly than the Baghdad clock." Translation: Party politics matters more than the results of a distant war. Though the pacification of much of western Iraq provides evidence of substantial gains in the past six months, the battle of perceptions is all but lost, and with it, the political clock has run out. Today, Iraqi insurgents need only bide their time. They will continue to carry out acts of violence such as the Aug. 14 truck bombings in unprotected Yazidi villages, to reinforce the belief that they are unstoppable. Armed groups will jockey for position street by street, neighborhood by neighborhood, wherever they are able to exploit the lack of a coalition presence. Unless the Iraqi government is able to assert itself, the civil conflict will worsen as U.S. troops withdraw.

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Authors note: This article was first published in March 2005. The information is as relevant today as it was two years ago. The student of counterinsurgency should read this article within a broader context that includes political mobilization such as is the case with the Sahawa al Anbar Awakening in Iraq.

Anatomy of a Tribal Rebellion

The answers to what motivates and sustains the insurgency in Iraq are not readily found in traditional insurgency literature. Much better answers can be found by reexamining something deemed anachronistic in the information age: the dynamics of traditionally networked tribes and clans. This paper provides such a reexamination, and shows that tribal dynamics are particularly evident among insurgents in Fallujah and other parts of the so–called Sunni triangle...

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Promising Iraq Developments – Washington Times editorial

With evidence mounting that the troop "surge" in Iraq is achieving results, even diehard opponents of the war like Sens. Carl Levin and Dick Durbin have been forced to concede that the change in strategy ordered by President Bush is working militarily. The American public seems to believe that victory can be achieved in Iraq. According to a UPI/Zogby Poll released on Wednesday, 54 percent of Americans said the war is not lost. So, in recent weeks, these politicians have turned their attention to the lack of political progress in Iraq. But on Sunday, five Iraqi political leaders (Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a Shi'ite; President Jalal Talabani, a Kurd; Vice President Tariq Hashemi, a Sunni; Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi, a Shi'ite; and Massoud Barzani, president of the Kurdistan Regional Government) announced they had reached agreement on "de-Ba'athification" — the policy that barred many members of Saddam Hussein's overwhelmingly Sunni Ba'ath Party from holding positions in the post-Saddam government. They also agreed on provincial elections; a law to distribute oil revenue; and a law providing for the release of prisoners held without charge. All of these changes were demanded by the Iraqi Accordance Front, the major Sunni bloc in parliament, which created a political firestorm when it withdrew its six ministers from from the government Aug. 1.

More Realism, Less Spin – New York Times editorial

A new report from Congress’s investigative arm provides a powerful fresh dose of nonpartisan realism about Iraq as President Bush tries to spin people into thinking that significant — or at least sufficient — progress is being made. With a crucial debate on Iraq set for next month, the report should be read by members of Congress who may be wavering in the fight with the White House over withdrawing American troops. The Government Accountability Office, in a draft assessment reported yesterday, determined that Iraq has failed to meet 15 out of 18 benchmarks for political and military progress mandated by Congress. Laws on constitutional reform, oil and permitting former Baathists back into the government have not been enacted. Among other failings, there has been unsatisfactory progress toward deploying three Iraqi brigades in Baghdad and reducing the level of sectarian violence. These conclusions are in line with a recent National Intelligence Estimate that found that violence in Iraq remained high, terrorists could still mount formidable attacks and the country’s leaders “remain unable to govern effectively.”

A Season of Hope in Iraq – Michael Gerson, Washington Post

The season now ending with school bells and the return of Congress was supposed to be the "Iraq Summer." A coalition of antiwar groups promised 10 weeks of phone banks, billboards, petitions and protests targeted at 40 Republican members of Congress who support the war. "It's going to be like laying asphalt in August -- hot," boasted one organizer. During their summer vacation, Americans discovered that Gen. David Petraeus doesn't take one. And his energy and urgency have shifted the Iraq debate in some fundamental ways. A few months ago, it was the received wisdom that Iraq was in the midst of a rapidly escalating civil war. That claim is no longer plausible. While the level of violence is still unacceptably high, the surge has disrupted the cycle of escalation and proved that progress is possible. Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno's briefing this month was an antidote to pessimism. "Total attacks," he said, "are at their lowest levels since August of 2006." Some of the most violent and lawless regions of Iraq, such as Anbar and Diyala, have been stabilized with the cooperation of local Sunni leaders who have turned against al-Qaeda thuggery. Insurgents are being pushed out of population centers and then targeted in further operations. Sectarian murders in Baghdad have gone down by more than 50 percent in a few months, reaching their lowest levels since the Samarra mosque bombing. And new sectarian provocations -- such as the al-Qaeda bombings in Nineveh -- have not resulted in the usual spiral of revenge murders.

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