The title and idea behind this thread is shamelessly stolen from Sean Meade at the Thomas P. M. Barnett Web Log. Hat Tip to you Sean.

Here is a roundup (excerpts and links) of posts and comments on recent SWJ Blog articles from around the blogosphere:

Not a Dead End by Max Boot at Commentary Magazine's Contentions Blog

I’ve been traveling a lot so have only now gotten around to reading “Dead End: Counterinsurgency Warfare as Military Malpractice,” Edward Luttwak’s article in the February issue of Harper’s. As usual with Luttwak, the article is thought-provoking and stylishly written. It’s also almost entirely wrong.

The blog of the Small Wars Journal has already posted two trenchant critiques of the article, by two of the leading counterinsurgency experts in the world: Dave Kilcullen, a former lieutenant colonel in the Australian army now working as an adviser to General David Petraeus in Baghdad, and Frank Hoffman, a retired Marine lieutenant colonel and a fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia.

Ruthlessness of the kind Luttwak advocates may, in fact, backfire by provoking more resistance than it suppresses. That was certainly the lesson learned by the Red Army in Afghanistan, where, notwithstanding any number of “massacres,” it was defeated by determined indigenous forces. (This is another war that Luttwak does not mention.)

Nor does Luttwak mention the many counterinsurgencies that have been waged successfully along the lines advocated by the new field manual. The list is a long one, including the British prosecution of the first Boer war and the U.S. success in the Philippine uprising, among others.

Small War Deep Think by Jules Crittenden at the Forward Movement Blog

Small Wars Journal loaded with good stuff:

Australian LTC David Kilcullen, senior counterinsurgency advisor to Petraeus, on the controversial “gated communities” of Baghdad.

Juxtapositon of a couple of curiously related topics: “DoD Models Insufficient for (Gaming) Unrestricted Warfare,” the latter being not Clausewitzian absolute war but anything goes war; and excerpts and related links on Yingling’s “Failure in Generalship.”

Meanwhile, a series of must-reads on counterinsurgency: Luttwak in Harpers on US failings, and Kilcullen in Baghdad on Luttwak’s failings.

New Articles of Interest by Phillip Carter at the Intel Dump Blog

My colleague Lt. John Sullivan has an important article in Small Wars Journal this week discussing the need for an expeditionary law-enforcement capability -- what State Dept insiders call "CIVPOL." For those of you who don't know of John, he's led one of the most innovative anti-terrorism organizations in the country for more than 10 years, the Los Angeles County Terrorism Early Warning Group. He's also a leading theorist in the field where crime and warfare converge.

SWJ to SysAdmin From Below by Tom Barnett at the Thomas P.M. Barnett Web Log

POST: The Missing Mission: Expeditionary Police for Peacekeeping and Transnational Stability

Nice working-it-out logic from Small Wars Journal that basically gets the reader to the SysAdmin concept from "below," or the policing angle, rather than from "above" (the postwar/disaster peacekeeping role).

Just Enough, but Too Late by Tom Barnett at the Thomas P. M. Barnett Web Log

POST: Religion and Insurgency

Good piece that I agree with in terms of the hyperbole we're often subjected to regarding "religious insurgencies."

I agree with Kilcullen: there's nothing special about this time around. The same-old, same-old can be addressed with solid counter-insurgency techniques, updated for the technology. In that sense, I find that little changes in war, more so in the requirements for peace and stabilty.

Where I part with Kilcullen is the notion that squelching the insurgency makes Iraq stable enough that we should still view defeating Al Qaeda there as job #1.

West's Iraq SitRep by Noah Shachtman at Wired's Danger Room Blog

DANGER ROOM pal Bing West just got back from a month in Iraq -- his 13th trip there. After talking to dozens and dozens of officers at every level of command, and going on all kinds of missions, he condenses his what he found into one, 18-point situation report for Small Wars Journal. At times hopeful, at times damning, West's rundown makes for fascinating reading. (Although the lack of discussion about the troubled Diyala province is a pretty glaring omission.) Anyway, here's a snip. Do be sure to read the whole thing.

Religion < Insurgency by Jules Crittenden at the Forward Movement Blog

Australian counterinsurgent Kilcullen at Small Wars Journal on a counterintuitive tack deconstructs the notion of religious insurgencies, particularly of the undefeatable variety, and provides a quick Anbar update while he’s at it.

USMCR infantry officer Josh Manchester weighs in at SWJ with “The Strategic Corporal vs. the Strategic Camera.” Another Saturday morning must-read.

War as Theater by MountainRunner at the MountainRunner Blog

Josh Manchester's post on the Small Wars Journal blog, The Strategic Corporal vs. The Strategic Cameraman, is a must read if you don't think we conduct critical and essential public diplomacy with our military every moment of every day. The soldiers and Marines in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa and elsewhere are the "last three feet" of interaction, forming the bridge between the United States Government and its policies and the locals.

Bing West and a ‘Bottom-up’ Approach by Westhawk at the Westhawk Blog

Mr. West seems very pessimistic about the upper reaches of the Iraqi government. The politicians and officers at the top are corrupt, incompetent, or disloyal to the whole country. This does not leave much hope at this point that Iraqi society can come together in a unified effort against the country’s violence.

In his point #4, Mr. West mentions that the Americans are already preparing for what will happen after the “surge” strategy ends (in either success or failure). According to Mr. West, this summer the Americans will select advisor team leaders for assignments to Iraqi units, with duty presumably beginning in the autumn.

As we have mentioned in previous posts this week, this September the American political situation will likely force a change in the U.S. military strategy in Iraq.

Ear to the Ground by Wretchard at The Belmont Club Blog

Bottom line: Iraqis on the ground are increasingly doing well but Iraqis at the top are screwing up. One reason why diplomatic solutions sometimes fail is that higher levels of abstraction are achieved at the price of losing information in detail. This problem is solved in data-mining situations by allowing the user to "drill down" and rediscover the detail. But that presumes you have a drill. This loss of information is especially acute in countries where national systems do not have an adequate correspondence with actors on the ground. Whatever the shortcomings of the US involvement in Iraq might be, especially under the strategy where troops are fielded in community-based joint security stations or patrol bases, is that it has resulted in a "bit bang" or information explosion which mutually influences operations on the ground on both the Iraqi and American sides.

Recommended Reading by Mark at the ZenPundit Blog

SWJ Blog has LTC. Dave Kilcullen on "Religion and Insurgency" and Bing West's response "A Quick Note on Religion and Insurgency" ( Note: West is a former Reagan administration Assist. SecDef and correspondent for The Atlantic Monthly, recently returned from Iraq. Dr. Kilcullen is a State Department official, Australian counterinsurgency expert and an adviser to General Petraeus).

Also from SWJ Blog, blogfriend Josh Manchester (formerly of "The Adventures of Chester" and TCS) has his first post up "The Strategic Corporal vs. The Strategic Cameraman".

Optimism and Pessimism at the ShrinkWrapped Blog

The second reason for optimism is that even if the surge fails in its political objective, ie establishing conditions whereby the Iraqi government makes the difficult political decisions necessary to end the sectarian estrangement, thereby ending the support for the insurgency, both Democratic realists and Republican strategists have a nidus of a plan which any future administration can use as an ongoing foundation for the war against Islamic fascism.

Bing West's Iraq Report by Bill Roggio at The Fourth Rail Blog

Bing West's observations on the state of the Iraqi Army and police, both challenges and setbacks, largely mirror my own. He also makes several recommendations for moving forward, but only considers Baghdad and Anbar province as the major centers of gravity in Iraq. Here is where I disagree. While Baghdad and Anbar province are vital to success, securing both the Baghdad "belts" and Diyala are integral to the security effort, and the absence of these two theaters in his report is a glaring omission.

Iraqi Trip Report Congress Should Read by Merv Benson at the PrairiePundit Blog

West provides on the ground experience and details that will not be found in mainstream media stories. I highly recommend reading this in full if you are interested in what is happening in the war and what it is going to take to win. Those who want to lose should avoid reading this because you may be disappointed.

Kilcullen on Religion and Insurgency by Abu Muqawama at the Abu Maqawama Blog.

Regular readers already know that Abu Muqawama pays close attention whenever Kilcullen writes -- and this is no exception. Abu Muqawama generally agrees with Kilcullen, but more importantly to readers, he thinks Kilcullen and his views accurately reflect the views of General Petraeus and what kinds of tactics Petraeus is trying to implement in Iraq. So, uh, read this.

Religion and Insurgency: A Response to Dave Kilcullen by Herschel Smith at The Captain's Journal Blog.

On April 15, 2007, Dave Kilcullen authored a commentary on Edward Luttwak’s commentary entitled Dead End: Counterinsurgency Warfare as Military Malpractice. Kilcullen invokes this discussion in his most recent commentary entitled Religion and Insurgency at the Small Wars Journal; Kilcullen puts forward a series of interesting thoughts on the role (or lack thereof) of religion in the current insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan. Without studying these articles, my commentary will be read in a vacuum. It is recommended that you spend the time necessary to understand Kilcullen’s arguments before tackling my response. In the lengthy article that follows, Smith responds to Kilcullen; first to his views concerning the relationship of Islam and the insurgency in Iraq, second to his views concerning the Peters / Luttwak position, and finally the current state of affairs concerning rules of engagement and the Petraeus letter to the troops concerning the same.

Religion and War by Vimothy at the House of War Blog.

This post over at Small Wars Journal is excellent, and even (whisper it) cautiously optimistic. Kilcullen discusses criticism of the US army’s COIN manual, and the Petraeus/Nagl surge more generally. Some writers have theorised that Iraq’s insurgency is uniquely and insanely religious, and as such traditional COIN is unsuitable, being too “soft”.