... but were afraid to ask. Council discussion here. Wired article here...

Continue reading "Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Losing the Information War..." »

One of the pleasures of maintaining the Small Wars Journal, and the Urban Operations Journal previously, is receiving papers and studies from members of our community of interest for posting to the site. Typically, this material is first-rate and rivals studies and analytical work that I have seen ‘contracted out’ for by government agencies and organizations at significant cost to the US tax-payer.

What follows are several examples (many more can be found in the SWJ Reference Library) recently received by the SWJ to include papers written by students at the Marine Corps University, Naval Post Graduate School and Kings College in London. The last paper was submitted by a retired Marine Corps lieutenant colonel now working irregular warfare issues for the US Department of Defense...

Continue reading "Small (Wars) Pleasures" »

This SWJ update is an overview of my trip to Iraq, where I had last visited in February of 2007. The April visit - about my 13th time since 2003 - was my typical month-long trip, focused on the company-level. I accompanied twelve Iraqi and American units in Anbar (Habbineah, Haditha, Ramadi, Saqwaniyah, the Zidon, etc.) and Baghdad (Rusafa, Sadr City, Azamiyiah, Khalidiah, Gaziliah).

While I spoke with senior officers -- General Petraeus, LtGen Odierno and MajGen Gaskin run an open organization that goes out of its way to let a journalist accompany any unit -- they were happy to have me go out and take a look for myself. Appended is a list of those who so generously shared their views.

Below are some observations, with my conclusions under point #18. In a nutshell, for the US to achieve the goal of relative stability in Iraq, by the end of 2007 three battlefield conditions must be met. First, Iraq's predominantly Shiite army must demonstrate a strategy and a momentum against a resumption of Shiite ethnic cleansing in and around Baghdad. Second, in Anbar the Iraqi army and the predominantly Sunni police must sustain the momentum for eradicating al Qaeda in Iraq. Third, in the rest of the Sunni Triangle, the Iraqi Army must prevent al Qaeda from developing sanctuaries...

Continue reading "Iraq Trip Report: 2 – 29 April 2007" »

Friends,

I've recently joined Small Wars Journal and I want to express my thanks for the terrific debate on my recent 'generalship' piece.

I thought I would share some common questions/comments about the piece, as well as my responses...

Continue reading "Reflections on 'Generalship'" »

FM 3-24, the new Army/Marine Corps Field Manual, was released on December 15th. It was downloaded more than 1.5 million times in the first month after its posting to the Fort Leavenworth and Marine Corps websites and was widely reviewed, including by several Jihadi websites; copies have been found in Taliban training camps in Pakistan.

It is now for the first time available in hard copy from the University of Chicago Press....

Continue reading "FM 3-24 available in hard copy" »

Consider for a moment the differences in informational-warfare responsbilities of junior leaders in the Marine Corps -- corporals -- and the propagandists in insurgent and terror cells -- cameramen.

Infantry squad leaders -- often, corporals -- know (or should) that the behavior of their Marines sends signals to those always watching them in an insurgency: the people and the insurgents. When the Marines are comfortable with their weapons; seemingly unafraid to interact with the locals; understanding of native customs and mores; and treat the populace with dignity and respect, then the sum of all of these attitudes conveys a certain perception to both the people and terrorists who watch them: it hastens cooperation from the populace and hard-targets them from insurgent attacks. This is the basic informational component of a strategic corporal in Iraq.

Continue reading "The Strategic Corporal vs. The Strategic Cameraman" »

On Wednesday, April 11, 2007 U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon asked New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg if some of the city's police could be deployed with the U.N. for peacekeeping missions. This question succinctly points to the need to develop and deploy new transnational police capabilities to address global threats such as insurgency, terrorism, and the disorder that results from failed states.

Continue reading "The Missing Mission: Expeditionary Police for Peacekeeping and Transnational Stability" »

Several excerpts from and links to recent blog posts on Bing's latest SWJ Iraq trip report...

Continue reading "Comments on Bing West's Iraq Trip Report" »

A few commentators have panned the new counterinsurgency manual for insufficient emphasis on religion. There is a grain of truth in this criticism but, as a practitioner, the evidence I see does not really support it. Rather, field data suggest, some critics may misunderstand both current conflicts and the purpose of doctrine. Worse, they may be swallowing propaganda from munafiquun who pose as defenders of the faith while simultaneously perverting it. (Did I sound like a politician there? Never mind. I will show factual evidence for this assertion, so the resemblance is fleeting…I hope)...

Continue reading "Religion and Insurgency" »

In reply to Dave Kilcullen's post on religion and insurgency:

The problem is that the insurgency in Iraq and elsewhere is fueled, if not based on an Islamic jihad. The element most intransigent and so far impervious to counter methods is the suicide bomber who believes that he goes to heaven for killing men, women and children in the name and the cause of an extreme religiosity.

Continue reading "A Quick Note on Religion and Insurgency" »

SWJ friend Jim Guirard of the TrueSpeak Institute e-mailed us his latest Words Have Meaning related commentary.

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Dear SWJ Blog,

David Kilcullen of General David Petraeus' staff in Baghdad makes a fine start but has much farther to go in attacking the pseudo-religious scam of al Qaeda-style Terrorism (AQST) in Islamic religious terms.

To date, the State Department, the White House and the Defense Department -- and even the otherwise excellent new COIN Manual itself -- have studiously avoided this approach in favor of Western secular words only. This is because of an understandable but, I think, inordinate fear of making mistakes (as indeed we would from time to time) if we were to begin combating AQST in religious terms and frames of reference.

Continue reading "More on Religion and Insurgency" »

The title and idea behind this thread is shamelessly stolen from Sean Meade at the Thomas P. M. Barnett Web Log. Hat Tip to you Sean.

Here is a roundup (excerpts and links) of posts and comments on recent SWJ Blog articles from around the blogosphere...

Continue reading "SWJ Blog Around the Web" »

We received this overview of a soon to be published book from the author, Ms. Karina Marczuk. Marczuk is the Deputy Director of the Office of the Secretary of the State, Deputy Chief of the Crisis Management Team of the State within the National Security Bureau – Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland. This SWJ blog post is an excerpt from a much longer and detailed article published in the January – March edition of Romanian Military Thinking. We encourage our readers to visit their link for a detailed discussion of Marczuk’s book and an European view of the security role of police forces...

Continue reading "Mediterranean Constabulary Forces: Theory, Practice, Solution?" »

Air Force Major General Charles Dunlap, a respected but frequently provocative author, has critiqued the Army/Marine counterinsurgency manual in a commentary titled “We have a COIN shortage” in the May Naval Institute Proceedings. I would have normally dismissed General Dunlap’s observations as a rare but poor example of discourse, as I have a lot of respect for him personally. But this commentary reflected more than just an inadequate grasp of irregular warfare. Having recently returned from a counterinsurgency symposium at Maxwell Air Force Base, it is clear that a broader misunderstanding exists about the nature of irregular conflict and FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 that needs to be cleared up...

Continue reading "“Non Cents”" »

With some interest I have been tracking these exchanges over what Paul Yingling, Jack Cushman and Doug McGregor have had to say about our military operations since 9/11. It takes a great deal of courage to say things that are sure to be unpopular whether you are beyond the reach of those who might be offended or not, and therefore we ought to listen for that reason alone. And Paul Yingling is most at risk, therefore his message interests me the most.

There is another reason to listen. I know Jack Cushman and Doug McGregor personally, and they are in the top few percentiles points of their respective generations in intellect and passion for the profession of arms. I suspect Paul Yingling is too. Intellect and passion for our business should be cultivated.

There is a third reason to listen closely, and that is to encourage others to share their views. I think these discussions are healthy, actually they are a sign of hope for the institution. It was exactly these kinds of discussions that led to the Post Vietnam Army Reforms of the 1980's. And during the mid to late 70's general officers had to face tough questions from Leavenworth and War College students. Most bore our criticisms with good grace. I suspect those of the present day will do so as well.

Continue reading "Of "Intellectual and Moral" Failures" »

Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization, Hoboken, NJ: Wiley & Sons, 2007, 208 pgs, $24.95.

John Robb’s long anticipated book is finally out, and I have to say that I think it’s an important contribution to anyone trying to make sense of today’s evolving security challenges. It’s a rather brilliant synthesis of Fourth Generation Warfare, net war, swarming and global insurgency. For those of you who not routinely read the Global Guerillas blog, Robb is a former counter-terrorism officer with the U.S. Air Force, and is now based out of Boston as a consultant. His blog has been highly regarded by forward thinking analysts as evidenced in the warm foreword written by the prescient James Fallows of The Atlantic Monthly. For those who are familiar with Robb’s main themes Brave New War offers a book length treatment of the problem and a number of recommendations for dealing with today’s religiously inspired, globally networked urban terrorists...

Continue reading "Global Guerrillas" »

More odds and ends from the blogosphere and mainstream media...

Continue reading "More SWJ Odds and Ends" »

Major Rob Thornton, US Army

I think this weekend it is important to remember the hard things. It is what we owe our fallen, and we owe the nation as it’s the most precious of treasures we spend in our profession. I’d encourage others here to write their remembrances of those who are not coming back, and what we lost in their deaths. I think by remembering them, we can assure ourselves and their memories that they did not pass unnoticed, and that we honor their sacrifice...

Continue reading "Memorializing Our Fallen" »

The SWJ received the following via e-mail from G. Hale Laughlin who is currently serving in Afghanistan.

Neither does Dr. Kilcullen, nor mil doctrine, state that religion is a, 'trivial actor in the struggle', as implied by Herschel Smith in his response to Dr. Kilcullen's Small Wars Journal Blog piece from 12 May 2007, “Religion and Insurgencies”. In fact, Dr. Kilcullen succinctly provides guidance that,

“The bottom line is that no handbook relieves a professional counterinsurgent from the personal obligation to study, internalize and interpret the physical, human, informational and ideological setting in which the conflict takes place. Conflict ethnography is key; to borrow a literary term, there is no substitute for a “close reading” of the environment.”

While I am not prepared with empirical evidence to support this hypothesis, I believe that the positions between the non-religious insurgency and religious insurgency schools of thought lies in the deeper theory of what religion means to the human condition...

Continue reading "More on FM 23-4 and Religion" »

SWJ Editors Note - the following article by Bing West and Owen West was originally posted at Slate.com. It is reprinted here with the author's permission to accelerate the discussion leading to honest assessments, decisions and action. For an example, will an adviser model -- fewer Americans but out beyond the wire -- change casualties significantly? Will it matter? There's also a Small Wars Council thread on the original Slate article.
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Now that Democrats have stripped their troop-withdrawal timetable from the war funding bill, it's clear that American forces will remain in Iraq through 2008. It also seems likely that they will stay much, much longer. The leading presidential candidates in both parties recognize the dangers of a rapid pullout, and achieving stability in Iraq is going to take a decade.

How can U.S. soldiers stay in Iraq and accomplish what needs to be done? Our best hope is the Adviser Model. With the surge still under way, Gen. David Petraeus obviously cannot discuss a Plan B. But given U.S. public opinion, a Plan B for 2008 and beyond is a certainty. Its central feature is likely to be the buildup of a combat-advisory corps as our combat units are drawn down.

Continue reading "The Adviser Model" »

Haninah Levine e-mailed a link to his Center for Defense Information article Behind the Headlines on the Winograd Commission’s Interim Report. All translations from Hebrew are by the author.

Lesson One: Western militaries are in active denial concerning the limitations of precision weapons...

Lesson Two: There are real consequences to overstretching a military...

Lesson Three: Rhetorical praise for the troops must not interfere with honest assessment of their abilities...

Continue reading "Behind the Headlines on the Winograd Commission’s Interim Report" »

Plan B in Iraq
Beyond the Surge: Keeping the Military Relevant in an Asymmetric World

Fernando Martinez Luján

Regardless of “the Surge’s” outcome this summer, growing domestic political pressure will likely soon force American decision-makers to “pull the plug” on the large US troop presence in Iraq. Faced with this difficult situation, senior military and civilian leaders must act now to develop a viable “Plan B” as an alternative to precipitous, forced troop withdrawal. By necessity, this Plan B must incorporate both a smaller, sustainable troop presence and a series of sweeping organizational reforms to address the military’s badly outdated intervention strategies. Yet the stumbling in Iraq is only a symptom of a much larger problem: America’s military and civilian institutions, organized for Cold War conflict have grown increasingly incapable of dealing with today’s world of failing states, insurgencies, humanitarian crises, and non-state actors. Without a major reform of institutions—leveraging interagency elements, developing more nuanced and culturally-attuned forces, and recognizing the importance of the media—the changing dynamics in areas of conflict will make American power increasingly irrelevant...

Continue reading "Plan B in Iraq" »