The latest in our ‘posts of note’ series.

Posted by Maximus on the Small Wars Council and Marine Corps Gazette discussion boards, I thought this Q&A with a Marine Corps lieutenant would be of interest to SWJ Blog readers.

Council member Maximus is an active duty Marine Corps captain (infantry). He served in Iraq as a rifle platoon commander, rifle company executive officer, and as a combined anti-armor team platoon commander.

Continue reading "COIN: The Ability and Willingness to Adapt" »

U.S. Army Captain John Shermer e-mailed us his thoughts on Operation Tigris Waves as seen through the lens of Dr. David Kilcullen’s Twenty-Eight Articles : Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency. CPT Shermer is a Military Intelligence Officer who served two tours in Iraq. Both tours were with 1-66 Armor Battalion as their intelligence officer. He is currently in command of a tactical intelligence company at Fort Hood, Texas.

Continue reading "Operation Tigris Waves: Victory and Defeat" »

Sunni Tribes Battle al Qaeda Terrorists in the Insurgency's Stronghold

Last fall, President Bush, citing the violence in Baghdad, said that the U.S. strategy in Iraq was "slowly failing." At that time, though, more Americans were dying in Anbar Province, stronghold of the Sunni insurgency. About the size of Utah, Anbar has the savagery, lawlessness and violence of America's Wild West in the 1870s. The two most lethal cities in Iraq are Fallujah and Ramadi, and the 25-mile swath of farmlands between them is Indian Country.

Imagine the surprise of the veteran Iraqi battalion last November when a young sheik, leader of a local tribe outside Ramadi, offered to point out the insurgents hiding in his hometown. "We have decided that by helping you," he said, "we are helping God."

Continue reading "Iraq's Real 'Civil War'" »

SWJ friend Jim Guirard of the TrueSpeak Institute e-mailed us his latest Words Have Meaning related commentary.

Peter Beinert's "The War of the Words" essay in the Washington Post (Op-ed, April 1) is seriously lacking on several counts. He demonstrates the same blind spots and faulty analysis as the Pelosi-Murtha House Democrats do when they issue a cut-and-run document which, along with other nonsense, condemns use of the "Global War on Terrorism" label...

Continue reading ""War on Terrorism" is the Correct Label" »

To the Iraqi People:

Monday, April 9, 2007 will mark the 4th anniversary of the liberation of Iraq from Saddam Hussein's regime. For many in Iraq and around the world, it will be a time for reflection on the early days after liberation in 2003 and on what has transpired since then...

Continue reading "General David Petraeus' Letter to the Iraqi People" »

Several odds and ends from the Small Wars Journal and Council…

Bing West is off to Iraq again to research his next OIF / Telic book – Do or Die. The third in his Iraq ‘trilogy’ (The March Up and No True Glory are one and two), Do or Die will focus on recent developments concerning our counterinsurgency efforts and prospects for the future. Here is a link to a recent National Review commentary by Bing also titled Do or Die. We are anticipating several blog reports from Bing while in-country.

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Bill Nagle (my SWJ / SWC partner in crime) and I spent a pleasant afternoon several weeks ago in the Washington D.C. radio studio of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation. We were there to be interviewed by Stan Correy of Background Briefing on a range of Small Wars related subjects to include on-line ‘communities of interest’, lessons learned – or not learned, Dave Kilcullen, counterinsurgency… Our segment is part of a show scheduled to be broadcast on 15 April - Iraq: New Team, New Strategy, New Tensions...

Continue reading "SWJ / SWC Odds and Ends" »

I spent a few hours recently, reading Edward N. Luttwak’s article in Harper’s Magazine, “Dead End: Counter-Insurgency as Military Malpractice”, and carefully thinking over his argument. It was a pleasant holiday from the reality of war here in Baghdad, and a reassuring reminder that there are still havens of calm (like CSIS, where Dr Luttwak is a Senior Fellow) where one can consider issues thoroughly and arrive at firm conclusions. From my viewpoint, here in Iraq, things somehow never seem quite so black-and-white...

Continue reading "Edward Luttwak’s “Counterinsurgency Malpractice”" »

Within this context, what follows are observations from collective experience: the distilled essence of what those who went before learned. They are expressed as commandments, for clarity, but are really more like folklore. Apply them judiciously and skeptically.

David Kilcullen intended his Twenty-Eight Articles, Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency as a guide for the company commander facing a COIN operation. Since the article first circulated, hundreds of officers have served as company commanders and in other positions in Iraq and Afghanistan. In this article some of those officers comment on how Kilcullen's thinking applied to their mission in theater. Other former or retired Soldiers measure Kilcullen's points against their own experiences in other countries, conflicts, and years. All -- including David Kilcullen -- are members of the community of interest at the Small Wars Journal and Council.

Continue reading "Thoughts from the Field on Kilcullen's 28 Articles (Pt. I)" »

David Kilcullen intended his Twenty-Eight Articles, Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency as a guide for the company commander facing a COIN operation. Since the article first circulated, hundreds of officers have served as company commanders and in other positions in Iraq and Afghanistan. In this article some of those officers comment on how Kilcullen's thinking applied to their mission in theater. Other former or retired Soldiers measure Kilcullen's points against their own experiences in other countries, conflicts, and years. All -- including David Kilcullen -- are members of the community of interest at the Small Wars Journal and Council. This entry is Part II and includes Articles 6 – 12...

Continue reading "Thoughts from the Field on Kilcullen's 28 Articles (Pt. II)" »

David Kilcullen intended his Twenty-Eight Articles, Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency as a guide for the company commander facing a COIN operation. Since the article first circulated, hundreds of officers have served as company commanders and in other positions in Iraq and Afghanistan. In this article some of those officers comment on how Kilcullen's thinking applied to their mission in theater. Other former or retired Soldiers measure Kilcullen's points against their own experiences in other countries, conflicts, and years. All -- including David Kilcullen -- are members of the community of interest at the Small Wars Journal and Council. This entry is Part III and includes Articles 13 – 20...

Continue reading "Thoughts from the Field on Kilcullen's 28 Articles (Pt. III)" »

David Kilcullen intended his Twenty-Eight Articles, Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency as a guide for the company commander facing a COIN operation. Since the article first circulated, hundreds of officers have served as company commanders and in other positions in Iraq and Afghanistan. In this article some of those officers comment on how Kilcullen's thinking applied to their mission in theater. Other former or retired Soldiers measure Kilcullen's points against their own experiences in other countries, conflicts, and years. All -- including David Kilcullen -- are members of the community of interest at the Small Wars Journal and Council. This entry is Part IV and includes Articles 21 – 28...

Continue reading "Thoughts from the Field on Kilcullen's 28 Articles (Pt. IV)" »

I’d like to follow up Dave Kilcullen’s commentary about Dr. Luttwak’s specious article. Dr. Kilcullen is too much of a gentleman to suggest that someone has not taken their medication, yet he was far too gentle with the insidious notion that the writing team was advocating the moral equivalent of medical malpractice. (Full disclosure, I had a minor part in the production of the manual.) The new FM is a welcomed step forward, reflecting our current understanding of an increasingly complex and lethal mode of conflict. Dr. Luttwak may long for the gruesome effectiveness of “the Roman model,” but he has badly misdiagnosed the disease and his overemphasis on kinetic solutions reflects poorly on his grasp of history and a bad use of history out of context. The Romans were smart enough to minimize their footprint and maximized local leadership and control over government, taxes, and religion. The benefits or “carrots” of Roman rule were more obvious than its costs, but clearly the “stick” (more accurately the gladius and pilum) was available when necessary.

Continue reading "Luttwak's Lament" »

On 22 March 2007, Inside the Pentagon published an article by Rati Bishnoi entitled "Army Officials Call DoD Models Insufficient for Modeling Unrestricted Warfare." The tone of the piece laments the lack of M&S tools to reflect what the Chinese have long called "unrestricted warfare," a meaning quite different than what many others might think it is--particularly if you are thinking of the Clausewitzian "absolute war" construct. No, here it means "anything can be made into a weapon" and is an approach favored by those who must rely on strategic (as well as tactical and operational) asymmetrical means to win over a militarily superior adversary. Of course, many have seen "unrestricted warfare" in this sense to be a key method in "small wars" and/or so-called "asymmetrical warfare."...

Continue reading "DoD Models Insufficient for Unrestricted Warfare" »

In this morning’s Washington Post Tom Ricks reports on an Armed Forces Journal article that should be required reading for anyone who cares about our nation’s capability to successfully prosecute the LONG WAR...

Continue reading "A Failure in Generalship" »

Gated communities in counterinsurgency are like tourniquets in surgery. They can stem a life-threatening hemorrhage, but they must be applied sparingly, released as often and as soon as possible, and they have side-effects that have to be taken into account. They are never a first choice. But, given the dire current situation in Baghdad, the “urban tourniquet” is the lesser of several evils, because it breaks the cycle of sectarian violence that has caused so much damage and human suffering in Iraq...

Continue reading "The Urban Tourniquet – “Gated Communities” in Baghdad" »

Gangs and Iraqi insurgents, militias, and other non-state groups share common origins based on tribalism, and therefore, it is expected that they will exhibit similar structures and behaviors. It is our belief that further insight into Iraq’s present situation and future prospects may be derived from a perspective utilizing 3rd generation gang (3 GEN Gangs) studies which present lessons learned from the emergence and spread of gangs within the United States, and other parts of the world, over roughly the last four decades.1 Basically, from a 3 GEN Gangs perspective, three generations of gangs have been found to exist: turf based, drug based, and mercenary based. The first generation gangs, comprising the vast majority, focus on protecting their turf. These gangs, the least developed of the three generational forms, provide both protection and identity to their members and little more. While some drug dealing is evident, it tends with these gangs to be a sideline activity...

Continue reading "Iraq & the Americas: 3 GEN Gangs Lessons and Prospects" »